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ABSTRACT
THE DYNAMICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
by
EDWARD BAER ROBERTS
Submitted to the Department of Economics on May 11, 1962,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophyo
A general theory of research and development ia fonmulated,
which theory encompasses the system ot interactions between the
manifested characteristics of the Rand D product, the firm, the
custam~r, and the organizational processes required by the nature
of the worko These interactions take place continuously during
project li£e cycles, which cycles involve a set of ongoing activi-
ties: perception of the need for a new product; estimation of
effort requirements; cost ;estimatioD; company requests for finan-
cial support, and customer evaluation followed by funding response
to these reques~s; or, company investment in it~ own project ideas;
application of engineering effort and the accomplishment 01 job
progress; evaluation of the progress; and reformulation of new
prol1uc·t value and ef'£ort estimates; with continua1ion of the activity
life cycleo
An Induatrial Dynamics model of this process is developed,
and extensive computer simul~tion experiments on the model elements
are reported and analyzed~ Three basic product-related factors
are found to be important l~luences on the outcomes of research
and development projects: (1) the intrinsic job size; (2) the
intrinsic product value: and (3) the state of the pr~duct technology 0
F~V6 ch~1.·d.(;t~J:"is"tics of tlJ.e firm are examined and tr..ree are deter-
mined as significant in their project effects: (1) the overall
quality of the firm; (2) the ri~'s willingness to undertake risk;
and (3) the integrity of the :rirmo The financial resources and
the previous jOb-:;ize experience of -the firm are found to mve little
effect except/under extreme situationso The important customer
aspects are discover~d to be present iIi some manifestations of cus-
tomer quality and risk-taking prop f3Dsityo The req~irem.ent for
rapid but effective organizational gro~h is seen ~o have major
bearing on project results, while the inefficiencies due to organi-
zational size contribute cnlya scaling effect to the resea:ch and
development processo
iii
Policies for treating many of these critical areas are
suggested: emphasizing particularly the apparent conflicts be-
tween the objectives anu the implementation of the existing
government approach to research and aevelopment contractinfo
The general applicability of the study" is discussed
and suggestions for further research undertakings are providedo
Thesis Supervisor: Franklin Yo Fisher
Title: Associate Professor of Economics
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INTRODUCTION
THE NEED FOR RESEARCH ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The Problems of Research and Developnent
The importance of' research and developnent to our national
economy and to international security is uniYersally acknowledgedo
However, its importance itsel£ does not constitute sufficient reason
for an extensive research stUdy. There must be some demanding need
£or an investigation--a need ~hich should manifest itself in vital
problems plaguing the research and development industry 3.(!d urgently
reqtliring solutionso Such problems are apparent in the major dif:fi-
culties experienced by r~s doing research and development work a~ed
at new products p in the serious failures or f1aws uncovered in our
military research and deveJ.opment efforts (eogojt recently the Sputnik-
Vanguard and Cosmonaut-Astronaut races) J1 and in general in the over-all
confusion and lack of understanding of the process or research and
development management 0
Looking rirst at industry11
although a definitive stu~ on project failure rates
has ye-t to be done, all avaiJ.abl.e evidence points to
a heavy mortality in research projectso ~or example,
the average experience of 20 companies in the chemical
industry shows that o~ one successful product results
from every eight projects that go into research. Simi-
1ar situations seem to be present in a11 industryoooo
Survey results covering more than 100 major companies
show the median failure rate to be about 67%0 (Failure
here is derined as projects instituted and designed for
market ,~.:.~earanee that never reach the marke"t placeC?l
leo Wilson Randle, "Probi.ems o£ Rand D Management'l1, Harvard
Business Review, Vol 0 37, Noo 1 (January-Februar~r 1959) I po 128.
2An even more pessimistic view is pu't :forth by the marketing manager
of one large company's research division. He says, "Out or 500
bright ideas usually only one proves practical enough to reach the
market as a finished product = Thenp only one or two products in 10
are geod enough to last more than two years in the IDflrket.wr 2
In addition to the problems relating to this high failure rate
ot product research and deveJ..opnent e£torts l industria1 managers find
themse1ves faced with an extremely long lead-time before the initial
research attempts can begin to pay o£f.
In the age or technological. advance» 6. product
(or service) can be created, can mature, and have
l-:~ day in the econ.omic sun ~ then can perish through
obso~escence and campetitiono And whi1e accelerating
technology is tending to make the sales li£e o£ a
product or service shorter l' the complexity o:r this
same technology is tending to make the research!
deve~opmentj) or geetationp period 1onger--=<lft~n
up to 5 or 10 years in the case or advanced elec-
tronic" chemica.lJ) or pharmaceutical products• .3
This long lead-t~e9 creating a need £or inte11igent decision-~ng
a decade prior to maz·ket rele9~ae or a new product ~ is likely to be c)~a
of the. £aetors producing the high p~duet development failure rate me:=:-
tiulled aboveo In any e·vent l' the problem.s racing corpora.te management
which must operate in this kind of eIlYironment seem. obviously signi.ficant 0
2r.ouis Ro Larsen:> "New Product Development--13asis for Growth!lll,
Industrial. Science~ Engineering, Vol. 5, No. 6J) (November 1958) ~ p. 36ar
--'WilJ.5..am J 0 Platt ~ n Pre-Testing Company Plazming", Stan1l)ord
Research Institll,te Third Annual. Industrial Economics Conference,
January 1.958.
3The second general problem area relating to research and develop-
ment arises with respect to the military or ~uasi-military (ioeo, AoEoCo
or NoAoSoAo) requirements for research and development Qutputso One
tspect of the problem was very succinctly stated by Lto General Arthur
Go Tnldeau, while he was serving as Chief of Research and Development
of the U0 So Armyo "The curre'nt lead-time", said General Trudea.u y
"from conception of a new weapon until its delivery is 7 to 8 years
I
here in the United Stateso Russia does a comparable job in 5 yearso"~
This comparatively longer lead-time is but one mani~estation of the
problems encountered in the management of military research and develop-
mentG
Another sign of underlying difficulties is the fact that so mar~
of our military developments seem obsolete, out-of-date J and devoid of
purpose even before they leave the test siteo In only a half-facetious
vein one writer has "explained" this situation by the "Principle of
Dynamic Obsol~scenceoo.oofirst formulated a number of years ago in
approximately these terms 0 • If we make a new system big enough and
complicated enough, it will be obsolete before we can get it finishedo'ft 5
The author goes on to cite the cost implications o£ this problem,
maintaining that
the costs associated with dynamic obsolesce'nee in
military work are becoming all too familiar 0 When
we are in competition with an alert and inventive
enemy, and forced to maintain an instant capability,
4Electronic Industries, Vol. 19, Noo 11 (November 1960), po 40
5Dro Richard Co Raymond9 IlAvoiding Obsolescence in System
Planning" (General Electric Technical ~litary Planning OperatioD J May
1959), po 10
4we cannot a.fford to be caught with less than the
highest performance weapon system which we can
deploy. If we find that the life of a system is
drastically foreshortened either through a change
in technology or in operational requirements or
through late deployment,oooothe cost per hour of
operation of the system can become prohibitiveo 6
This obsole~cence factor thus lessens the e~:0ct~venc~s Jf a relatively
fixed national defense budget, or increases the costs without similarly
~proving the effectiveness, and thereby indicates a trouble spot in
our research and development pictureo
Thusfar we have pointed out some obvious major problems in both
the areas of industrial new product development and military research
and developmento These factors would seem to demand thorough direct
investigation if, indeed, these were the problems, instead of merely
the outgrowth of other, more fundamental, needs 0 There seems to be
good reason to believe that underlying all those appa~ent griefs is
a not-so-apparent, but far more important, general lack of understanding
of tlie entire process of managing research and development undertakingso
One indication of this lack of know-hoW' a·o·.-,ut researcll and develo~~ent
is the great effort put into debating and defining the meaning of the
te~so This shows up in the variance in dollar measures of our nationVs
research and development inputso The budgetary statistics on research
and development are so poorly defined that "it can be said on the basis
of published reports 0 0 o that expenditures for military research and
development in fiscal year 1959 are est~ated at 202 billion dollars,
or 204 billion dollars, or 303 billion dollars, or~ if you like J as
6.IlW1.: p. 2
much as 6.2 billion dollars. n? This absence of reliable statistical
data is perhaps sad commentary on whether or not those few people who
talk about our "national research and development program" even know
which program they are discussing.
But far more important than the inaccurate gross figures on the
nation's research and developnent inputs is the major l.ack which exiets
in our understanding or what is the research and deve10pment process
itself. Our newspapers abound with examples or the mystics of research
and developnent: cance11ation of a multi-bill.ion dollar atomic p1ane
project; Congressional demands for more emphasis on men-in~space pro-
grams: an announcement to stockholders or the f'orthcaning release of
two-minute Qo1.or photography; new heights reached by the stock priae
of a nglam.our~ research and development·-based company, currently selling
at eighty times earnings. Many of the phrases linked with research
and deve1.opment---s-tretchout, speedup, astrophysics, geophysics, compu-
tation, automa.tion, bomber gap, missile gap---hav·e became almost house-
h)ld words, yet f'undamentaJ. understanding of what lies behind these
words is almost n.onexistent, even among our so-ca11ed experts. Why
are so many of our weapon systems obso1eted so soon? What distinguishes
the company whose market fortunes grow apparently unbounded on the basis
\or product innovations fram one which bankrupts itself on i11-conceived
and/or ill-conducted research ventures? What are the facts of research
7NatiQDal Science Foundation, nMethodological Aspects of
Statistics on Research and Deve1o!Ulent Costa and Manpower" (Washington:
United States ~Jovernment Printing Ofrioe, 1959), p. 7. .
6aI.\d development li:fe which cause the vast proportion of new product
e££orts to be scrapped be£ore they even reach the testing grounds of
the market-place? These questions carry far more than the ri:rteen
billion dollar price tag that marks our current annual expenditures £or
research and development. For with their an·gwers goes not only the key
to our country's 'economic growth and military security, but also the
cornerstone to fathoming much of the innovative world in which we live.
Sources o~ Misunderstanding of Research and Development
Since the main body or this work will argue that research and
development is most e£f'ect:f..vely viewed from a systems perspective, it
is worthwhi~e here to examine the sources of misunderstanding 0"£ research
and deveJ.opnent that arise from the usual. non-system approach. Seven
general factors are identified below~ to which 1ist no doubt ethers
could be addedo
1. The typical multi-department involvement of research and
development highlights fo~ C!8.ch department its "speciaJ. pro~bJ.emslf
while it obscures the key process common to all. aspects of the involve-
ment. Personnel sees the "special prob1ems" of recruiting, training~
evaluating, and retaining engineering and scientific manpower. Finance
encounters the "special problems" o£ govertment contracting~ research
and development progress measurement, and projeet funds control:
Manufacturing SU£f'ers from the 11 special problems" of the many- change
orders 11sually acc~an;ying a new research and developnent output's
entry into production, or fran the exacting demands placed upon the
manu£acturing department IS shopso l!a.rketing views its 11 special problem.s"
as reJ.ating to the relativel.y £ew sources or contracts, the need for
7major technical-financial job proposals in areas of high uncertainty,
or the too-often boom or bust nature o£ market participation. All of
these nspecial problems" prevent or at least discourage managers ~ram
asking "What business are we in?", etc.
2. The large amount of random-like behavior masks the fundamental
character o£ research and development activities. In any situation
involving human actions and C:~.:?Ci3j~G!1S at least some o£ the behavior
is caused by random factors which introduce what engineers call "noisew
into the observed system. character. The process o£ invention seems
intrinsical1y 1inked with creativity or genius or 1uck and is most often
cited as causing the necessary uncertainty or research and development
work. Yet, the invention process appears to be a good exampl.e of the
case in which basic in£1uences on behavior have much noise (or uncer-
tainty) superimposed over the base. At least ve 1!S1 as i:f we believe
such a statement, even if we do not in fact ~ such things. The
v~ existence or organized research programs co~~ng fantastic
expend!tures o£ company and government funds shows the fundamental con-
£icence or these groups in the inheren'~ predictability of at leas-t :~e
pattern or results expected from these research and deveJ.opme!rt e£fortso
Efforts seeking managerial understanding need to be directed toward
such underJ.ying patterns, rather than focused on the super£icial random
d~-by-d~ eventso
,30 The intangible nature of many- basic phenomena of research and
development is a principal reason £or lack of their exp1icit recognition.
How, for example, does one mea~~e engineering ef£ectiveness, or
8eJt."J)erience, or real accomplishment? One writer suggested that in
general,
the variables that turn out to be of critical impor-
tan~e in mathematical models and the simulation of
complex operations rarelY have been recorded exp1icitly
in practice. This appears to be particularly true
in engineering and research work. In this area,
we are concerned with the manner in which a research
and development project transro~s technical effort
or scientists, engineers, and support personnel into
increments of technological advance. 8
Since neither the inputs n07· the outputs seem. readily measurable, per-
~ps it is not surprising that the transr~r process between input and
out~t is over-simply perceived.
4- The nonlinear aspects or research and dev"elopment make still
more confusion in the manager's DL.i.nd. One clearly nonlinear part of
the research and development process is the effectiveness of the engi-
neering work force as a function of its size. Certainly no reader would
be so naive as to claim that the hundred-man organization is ten times
more effective than the ten-man core group l!hiCh initiated the project.
Yet, this kind of 1.inear extrapolation of a basically nonlinear phenomen-
non is behind much o£ the chaos in project-estimating procedureso 1 nether
example in the same general area is the changed errective!ness or an engi-
neering team as it becomes more familiar and experienced with its task.
This "learning process" in engineering is most likely not a lineaT :func-
tiOD either of time or of work output, but which research and development
manager ev·en attemptfi ~o take this nonlinearity into his thinking?
8Peter Vo Norden, "On the Anatomy or Development Projects";
mE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. EM-7, No. 1 (March
1960)" p. 34.
95. Many secondary problems in research and development afterl get
an undesf.~rved amount of public attention, removing the focus of manage-
ment researchers from critical areas. With respect to one such atten-
tion-getter, the so-called engineer Shortage, a Booz, Allen, and
Hamilton survey reached this concJ:usion: "While it is true that many
laboratories can use additiona1 talent, especiallY or top-flight cali-
ber, and that certain sections of the country have experienced a
tightening in the supply o£ scientists and engineers, none of the [more
than 100] companies in the survey considered the shortage of technical
personnel a critical problem.n9 The shortage more likely exists in the
number or properly utilized engineers and scientists and in the ~umber
of engineering managers who understand and can cope with this di££icuJ.tyo
And yet the public and pro~essional press~ university research studies,
and goverIDDent and trade association paneJ.s spent much time and e£:fort
on the nonexistent "quantity" problem, with almost no intensity of work
devoted to the more vital phases of the manpower problem. Another seCOD-
dary problem which for a time drew the major attention of research and
deveJ.opment-oriented thinking is the surge in engineering salaries which
began a few years ago. EventuallY, usua11.y after much turmoil!J the wage
increase which began in the college recruitment race was extended through-
out the engineering organization, resu1.ting in somewhat higher proJeot
costs. But E:££ects of this nature are probably both insigni.£icant and
inevitable, and the manager's view of the basic research and development
activity f'1.ows should not be obscured by the existence of such tranf~ients
9Randle, ~. cit~, po 130.
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in flows.
6. The organization of research and developnlent itself--the
functional compartmentalization which exists---restricts the manager
from recognizing a~ systematic character of research and developmento
This compartmentaliz~tiontakes place in three wayso First, the research
laboratory is generally separated, often even geographically, from the
other company £unctions o~ marketing, manufacturing, etco Secondly,
within the research organization itself, one usually encounters the
functional separation of engineering from marketing or from personnel,
for ex~ple, or the project-phase separation of the proposal-prepara-
tion group ~rom the advanced developers from the product design team
from the production engineers. Finally, within the major engineering
group are found samples of organization by discipline (such as physics
or chemistry or mathematical analysis), or by product subsystems; (eog.
combustors or compressors, and memory devices or control systems), or
by state-of-the-art (for example, a group labeled "Vacuwn Tubes" with
another called "Solid-State Components ff ), This :fine breakdown of opera-
tions, though perhaps justifiable to those who worry about the economies
to be derived from specialization, division of labor, or from still
further decentralization, nevertheless does erect solid walls in the
paths of managerial vision of the organization as a wholeo Each research
and development manager is thus given a very special pair of sunglasses
for use in viewing the research and development process. ~ot only does
each manager see whatever he observes with a special and individually-
selected color, but also he has blinders placed on both sides to narrow
the breadth of his possible pcrceptiona It is this mode of organizing
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Rand D (and, in fact, of organizing most large cor~orate activities)
which has been one of the foremost restraints on management's efforts
at understanding research and development.
7. Finally, the underlying belief by most people that the elements
of research and development cannot be related by means of some basic
framework has discouraged search in this direction. The apparent pre-
~ption that there is no orderliness to Rand D keeps people from
looking for 1t. If government and industry could be convinced that
~ framework basic to the research and development process does in fact
exist, several alternatives would soon be discoveredo
An Approach to Understanding Research and Developmen~
The primary need in the research and development area thus seems
to be a demand for a set of concepts that will enab].~ research and
development managers in both government and industry to:
10 place into perspective their current Rand D headaches;
20 seek the underlying causal factors beneath the supe~ficial
layer 0"£ everyday e'\tent s ;
30 recognize the importance of at least considering same of
the intangible or difficult-to-measure variables of the research and
development process;
40 £ocus management attention on the pe~nent internal forces
creating Rand D success or failure rather than on such temporary exter-
nal "crises ft as manpower shortages and salary races;
,. uncover a unif)dng structure that ties together the uissected
organizations of people contributing to a single research and development
12
effort; and thereby
6. provide for themselves a thought-and-action framework which
they can effectively utilize in the management of R and Do
The following chapters constitute an approach to gaining the under-
standing of research and development which need has been outlined aboveo
It proceeds on the theory that tlle heart of research and developmen't
activities is the research and development projecto Whether formally
recognized or not, every new product, process, or technique (consumer,
industrial, or milit~) comes into existence by means of a project-
type endeavor. The crux of understanding the research and development
process then must lie in those factors which in£luence the life cycle
of Rand D projects, from the birth of the project activity through to
the emergence of the final product fonm or to the earlier haltil~ )f
this research-development processo
The most obvious projects which come to mind are those aimed at
developing militarJ or 'CJ.1.1asi- ·nilitary products 0 These constitllte the
largest single area of research and development activity (over eight
billion dollars in 1961 according to the figures cited previously), are
most immediately importan't to o~r nationis well-being, and include the
most easily identifiable and best publicized project entities 0 More-
over, the military research an~ development process is in some regarde
more simplified than other Rand D forms, since any given project encom-
passes for all intents and purposes but a single customer, a very specific
end product (at least after the early stages of research have been com-
pleted), and often but a single finm engaged in the development of that
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producio For these reasons the emphasis will be placed primarily on
research and development for military purposes, although the method of
approach, the theory, and the conclusions are no doubt generally appli.-
cable to all research and development, including that directed at the
industrial or consumer marketso
The general procedure that is used here is that developed in a
new approach to the study C.r socia-economic systems called Industrial
Dynamics 0 Industrial Dynamics
treats the time-varying (dynamic) behavior of
industrial organizationsoooo~ndustrialDynamics
is the study of the infonmation-feedback ~harac­
teristics of industrial activity to show how orga-
nization structure, amplification (in policies),
and t~e delays (in decisions and actions) interact
to influence the success of an enterprise. It treats
the interactions between the flows of in£o~ation,
money, orders, materials, personnel, and capital
equipment in a company, an industry, or a national
economyooo.It is a quantitative and experimental
approach for relating organizational st~~ucture and 10
corporate policy to industrial growth and stabilityo
The several stages through which an Industrial Dynamics approach
progresses form in ef~ect the outline of this volume 0 The first phase
j.s the identification of a key industrial or economic problem which
appears to merit dynamic system-oriented investi.gatioDo The earlier
part of this chapter showed the signiricance o£ the problems arising
out of the lack of understanding of the research and development processo
Furthermore, the heart of this proces& was identified as the researcn
~nd development project, whose life cycle embodies the time-varying
lOJay W. Forrester, Industria~ Dynamics (Cambridge: The M.l.T.
Press, and New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ineo, 1961), po 13.
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interacting forces which can be treated by the Industrial Dynamics approach 0
The second stage of an Industrial Dynamics study consists of the
development of a verbal theory of cause-and effect interaction, an iso-
lation of the "information-reedback loops that link decisions to action
to resulting information changes and to new decisions,nll and a verbal
description of the decision policies in effect in the system being studiedo
The chapters of Part I of this work will develo~ such a verbal synthesis
of research and development, utilizing empirical findings; the descrip-
tive literature, and personal experience and hypothesis where suitable
or necessary to accomplish the integrationo
The next phase of Industrial Dynamics study requires the const~~c­
tion of a mathematical model.of the research and development system,
the infonmation generated about the state of these activities, and the
use of such information in the decision policies of research and develop-
ment ma.nagers.
This phase will be treated in the appendices to the chapters of Part Io
Each appendix will develop in flow diagram form a visuai treatment of
the verbal material of the preceding chaptero The diagrams are intended
both as an aid ~o understanding the model that follows, and as a take-
off point for researchers desiring to utilize techniques other than the
model-caildi~~methods adopted in t~;s work: Following the diagrams
will be the development of the mathematical model which is intended
to add much precision, and hence enhanced understanding, to the des-
criptive and theoretical portions of this volumeo This phase in it-
self is a major undertaking in both scope and content, being heavily
llIbido
1'5
concerned with the intangible aspects o~ the real world, including
problems relating to decision-making and human behavioro Although the
model will be developed in a language and manner intended to be readily
comprehensible to the intelligent la~an, the reading of these appendices
is not required for gaining most of the understanding of the remainder
of the work.
The fourth phase of development o~ an Industrial Dynamics investi-
gation is the gene~ation over time of the behavior of the modeled systemo
Digital computer simulation techniques will be used for the study of
the research and devel.opment model, results will be compared with avail-
able knuw-how about Rand D projects, and the model will be revised until
it seems acceptable for more intensive study of the actual systamo The
results o:f this initial exploration pllase, as well as those of the more
detailed simulation experimentation which constitutes stage £ive of a
typical Industrial Dynamics study, will be described in Part IIo The
extensive studies will be aimed at determining which factors of the ma~
included in the representation of the research and development process
seem most important to the potential improvement o£ Rand D behavioro
The identification of such factora ~ediately contributes to the goal
o~ increasing the basis for understanding research and development and
provides clues to beneficial changes in organizational policies and
structure of the actual Rand D management systemG
A sixth phase of research, also described i4 the chapters of Part
II, involves incorporation into the model o~ redesigned system parameters
or policies and experimentation with them to determine their effective-
ness on altering the outcomes of research and development projectso
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Finally, an Industrial Dynamics study of a real organization
ought to attempt change of the real system in the improved manner
indicated by the model experimentation 0 However, this study of research
and development is of a general, rather than specific, nature and a
different final phase of activity seems more appropriate 0 As a result
of the extensive studies of project variables, the basis for general
understanding of research and development will no doubt need redefining
and restressing, and direction will have to be provided to the further
research required before policy implementation can result. This sum-
marization with suggestions for additional studies will be provided in
the last chapter of this volume.
The Industrial Dynamics approach outlined above has been applied
d\~ing the past five years to a wide variety of industrial and economic
problems. I~all these attempts ~~ccess has been achieved at least
with respect to the heightening of understanding of the managerial
problem under investigationo While this study of research and develop-
ment is by far the most complex Industrial Dynamics undertaking until
now, treating as it must the elusive and intangible forces that bear
so strongly on the Rand D management process, th~re is good reason to
believe that similar ~enefits to understanding can b~~ achieved.
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PART I
A GENERAL THEORY OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
"Of all forms of mental activity, the most difficult to induce is the
act of handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing them
in a new system of relations with one another by giving them a different
framework, all of which virtually means putting on a di£ferent kind of
thinking-cap for the moment."
Herbert Butte~field
~ Origins of Modern Science
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PART I
Part I is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter presents
a brief over-ail description of the life cycle of research and develop-
ment projects. The second through the sixth chapters discuss the various
phases o£ activity of the Rand D life cycle, describing in detail the
factors that enter into the complete process o£ research and development
management. The final chapter of Part I examines the detailed descrip-
tion to determine these factors which seem to critically in£luence the
behavior that is produced by the Rand D cycle. The flow diagrams and
mathematical model equations which represent this verbal description
are presented in the appendices o£ Chapters 1 through 7.
CHAPTER I
THE OVER-ALL DESCRIPrION OF A PROJECT LIFE CYCLE
Most attempts to discuss the process o~ research and develop-
ment use a fr~ework which hinders rather than aids understanding. The
typical art1cle breaks Rand D activities into three or more phases of
work, distinct in time and in aharacter. One such approach designates
the three phases as "pr'eliminary", "design", and "hardware", and then
breaks these down i~to twelve steps, going £rom "basic conceptualiza-
tion and plannin6~ to "system testing and debugging".l Another attempt
conceives the phases of system design as falling into two categories,
"pre-proposal" and "post-proposal", in turn su-cdividing these into:
~) initiation, 2) organization, J) preliminary design, 4) principal
design, 5) bread board, 6) prototype construction, 7) test, and 8) pre-
productionn • 2 There is little question but that most Rand D project
li£e cycles can be viewed, at least after the fact, as having been
composed of such segments. The question does exist, however, as to
whether or not one has gained much from such an organizational frame
of reference.
There are two primar-.f raults to the type o-r approach toward descrj_~-
bing or analyzing Rand D that has been indicated above. The first is
3:l?et~r V. Norden, ~!Curve Fitting -ror a Model o-r Applied R
and D Scheduling", !.m! Journal of Research and Development, Vol 0 2,
No.3 (JUly 1958), po 234-
2Harry Ha Goode, Alntracompany Systems Management", IRE
Transactions 2£ Engineering Management, Yolo EM-7, Noo 1 (March 1960)
p. 17.
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that the Qynamic essence of research and development is distortedo
The emphasis is placed upon discrete sets of activities, separated
in time, lacking any base of underlying COl1DIlon elements to bind them 0
The second fault is that the fundamental systems nature of Rand D is
ignored, with progress proceeding unidirectionally from preliminary
to design to hardware and out, or from conceptualization through to
preproduction, or what-have-you. The ever-present feedbacks that
exist in all socie-economic systems are glossed over by such an approach,
and writers convey their understandings through tentative definitions
such as this: "A development project is a finite sequence of purposeful,
temporally ordered activities, operating on a homogeneous set of problem
elements, to meet a specified set of objectives representing an increment
of technological advance. w3 This definition suffers fram its overlooking
of the significance of feedbacks between action, results, information,
and new action, the very' ~rux of change in Rand D projectso It suffers
also by laying emphasis on the finite set of activities rather than on
the continuous ensemble of behavioral and decision-making characteristics
which produce 'these activitieso
The organizational approach to be taken in the following presenta-
tiOD is that the most ef:Cective way of studying any complex system., such
as a research and development project, is to examine those underlying
flows of activities which continuously interact to produce the economic
behavior in the projecto To be sure during the initial period of a
Jpeter V. Norden, trOn the Anatomy of Development Projects~,
.mE Transactions gn :Engineering Management, Vol. »l-7, Noo 1 (March
].960), p. 41.
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project life cycle some of these activi.ties will appear in an ordered
temporal sequence, e.g., the customer pe~ceives the need for a product
before he actually releases funds to the firm. But it wi.ll be the
continuous changes over time of these underlying streams of activities
which will establish the events within the life cycle. And perhaps
most significant is the fact that these actions will continuously feed
back upon the other decision areas of the project to induce still
further changes.
The continuous activity phases that constitute a research and
development project are described below, listed in the order in which
they usually manifest th~selves initially in a life cycleo
1. A project life cycle begins when the customer or
the f'irm perceives the need for a new product 0 This
perception of the need involves an estimate of what the
product would be worth to the customer organizationo
2. Once the need for a product has been recognized,
the customer and/or the firm estimate the amount of effort
that will be required to develop the product, attempting
to take into account the manpower requirements and the
associated materials, facilities, and equipment that will
be needed t~ accomplish the end result.
30 Being cognizant of this effort estimate, the
customer and/or the finm attempt to judge the total cost
that will be required to develop the producto
4. The company now has two alt ernat e and parallel
paths availableo In the first path the £inm can prepare
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and then submit to the customer organization a request
for financial support.
5. The customer evaluates this request by comparing
its 6£timate of the worth of the product to its estimate
o~ the cost that will be necessary to complete the pro-
ject. If the c'ustomer reacts favorably to the £irm's
reques·t, after a long budgetary delay the customer will
commit funds to the project.
6. The alternate path of action available to the
firm is the decision to invest its own money in the pro-
ject. This decision involves riok to the finm since it
commits its own funds to the project before the customer
has made such a commitment. These paths (4 and 6) are
parallel in that both patlls lead to the commit1nent of
funds to the p~ojecto They are alternate in the sense
that in any given project at any given t~e either one
or both of the paths may be in active use.
7. As the finm obtains the funds from either
internal or external sources the fir-ill undertakes plans
and actions which include the hiring of engineering personnel
and their supporting elements.
8. The people who have been hired are employed on
the job and accomplish some progress on the job.
9. Both"the customer and the firm continuously attempt
to assess the extent of the progress that has been made. They
evaluate the state of completion of the job by comparing their
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current interpretation of the results that have been accom-
plished with their current perception of the end results for
the project that are desiredo
100 This continui.ng progress evaluation creates a
new estimate o£ work yet to be done on the project 0 The
new estimate essentially reinitiates the closed-loop cycle
that has been described above~ That is, the firm and the
customer both continue to estimate ~ffort needed ~~j cost
required to complete the jobo Similarly, the further accom-
plishment o~ progress on the job gives both the firm and the
customer a better understanding of the project and allows
them to make new better-in£ormed estimates of the ul timate
value of the project 0 On the basis of these newly obtained
est~ates of cost and value, new evaluations are made: 1)
by the firm, as to whether continued itiVestmen't in the pro-
ject seems appropriate; and 2) by the customer, as to whether
-the continuance of the project itself is deserved 0
110 This continuing cycle of activity leads to com-
pletion o£ the job when the desired results are achieved
or to cancellation at same point prior to full completion
of the project objectives 0
This life cycle is diagrammatically represented in Figure
1-1, where one readily observes the closed-loop system
character of research and development projects that was
described aboveo
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Figure 1-1 Dynamic System Underlying Project Life Cycles
These continuously occurring phases of research and development
activities have within them the potential of producing all the facets of
behavior that are commonly observed in research and development projectso
This life cycle includes the possibility of successful completion of the
job on schedule as well as the possibilities of late completion of the
task, of stretch-out in the process of doing the job, of acceleration
towards the completion of the task, and of failure to complete the end
result itselfo These various types of economic behavior can be observed
not only in military research and development projects but in commercial
new product development activities as wello Rand D efforts encompass,
at least on the over-~l basis, the li~e cycle of activities that have
been described above 0 Economic activities by Rand D finms which exclude
any phase included above will, upon close examination, be found to be
part of scme larger all-inclusive project entityo
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I
In the appendices to the next several chapters a mathematical model
will be developed to correspond with the evolving general description
of research and development project life cycleso The model will consist
of a series of linear and nonlinear, algebraic and difference equations,
corresponding in each appendix respectively to the phase of project
activity discussed in the nonmathematical portion of the chapter pre-
ceding the appendix 0 The equations will be in a form required by the
DYNAMO compiler and simulator program for the IBM 709 and 7090 computers. 4
The general format of these equations will be explained belowo The model j
when completed, is to be simulated on the digital computer by providing
a set of necessary inputs and allowing the computer to calculate Rand
D project time histories, using the model equations for determining the
desired calculationso "In general a model gives intuitive understanding
of the object or system modeledo The mathematical model, therefore,
serves the same function as the architect'g model; it enables its user
to grasp the tmportant structure of a problem in a simple and efficient
way.~5 This is our intended use of the research and development modelo
The model equations will relate specifically to phenomena described
in greater detail in the general chapter discussionso They will thus
constitute a precise statement of aggregated relationships fer typical
4See DYNAMO User's Manual, The MoloT. Press, 1961, by
Alexander LG Pugh, III, for complete details, or Appendix A of Indus-
trial Dynamics., by Jay W0 Forrester for a general discussion 0
5Albert H. Rubenstein and Chadwick Jo Haberstroh, Some
Theories of Organization (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Do Ii~in, Inco J
1960), po 100
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research and development projectso The equations will often be
explicitly derivable from the flow diagr~s which will also be used
to represent the earlier verbal descriptions. Both the diagrams and
the equations constitute at once a mode o£ abstraction and a mode of
increased tangibility. To one extent they ignore details, qualirica-
tions, and conditions that will be present in the verbalization4 This
will be particularly true of the flow diagrams, in which often only the
general relation between model variables is depictedo On the other
hand, the diagrams and equations require a degree of specificity totally
lacking in most word outlines. The diagrams visually present the set
of variables considered significant, show the directions of causal
relationships, often make clear overall interrelationships not other-
wise readily determinable. The equations themselves are even more exact
in their statements as to causal linkages, the forms of behavioral fUDC-
tions, and the values of system par~eterso Many of these aspects are
potentially testable, if only relevant data existed. But, in general,
research that would produce sample data meaningful to this model is as
yet nonexistento
Flow Diagrams
The type of £low diagramming which shall be used in these appendic2s
is that developed by the Industrial Dynamics Research Group of the MoIoTo
6School of Industrial Managemento It is used to represent a set of
relationships that can be conceived as £alling into two categories--
levels and rateso The levels represent those aspects of the real world
6See Chapter 8 of Forrester's Industrial Dynamicso
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in which accumulations of resources exist--inventories of goods or
ideas, balances of funds, pools of employees, accumulations of job pro-
gress. These will be represented in the flow diagrams by a simple
bleck, labelled inside to indicate the contents of the levelo
For example,
Engineers in
training
at firm
Fi~~re 1-2 Level Symbol
The second category o£ variable type, the rate, includes all of
the activities within the system--the flows of work effort and output,
the streams of information, the actual payments for expenses incurred 0
Here one type of symbol is used to indicate the actual decision function
which controls the rate, and a second set of symbols indicates the flows
themselves.
Thus ei.ther
Rate of
Hiring Decision
or
Rate of
Hiring Decision
Figure 1-3 Rate or Decision Function Symbols
could be used to represent the decision as to the number of people to
hire, whichever symbol fits more conveniently into the particular dia-
gram. The actual flows resulting from such decisions are subdivided
into six basic type~ and represented as followso
material
$ $ $ $ $ $ money
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manpower
000 a 0 0 a ~
)
--------------).-
Figure 1-4 Flow Symbols
orders
capital equipment
information
It is likely that not all of these flow symbols will be used in our
Rand D model diagrams.
Finally it will often be desirable for clarity and s~plification
that we break up a decision function into more elementary purts, called
auxiliaries, and represented by a circle.
Desired
Additional
Employees
Figure 1-5 AuxiliarJ' Symbol
Tne symbols shown thusfar might well be organized into a simple
flow diagram, illustrating an engi~eering hiring sectoro
Engineers
in
training
at :rirm
Rate of
Hiring
Decision
"
'-""' Dela!ein Hiring
,
- --,,'
Figure 1-6 Simple Flow Diagram
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The additional symbols used here are a cloud,~ , to indicate
a source or sink for some flow, and a solid underlining of a parameter
name, Delay in Hiring, to indicate a c~nstant tenma
Equation Writing
The equations to be used in developing this model will use variable
names corresponding as closely as possible to the described phenomena
for the purpose of mnemonic significanceo DY~O limits us to five
letters or numeric characters in making these name designationso The
time notation for the equations corresponds in a sense to the traditional
difference equation subscript notation, but in a manner ~ediately
admissible as input to a digital computer which has no facility for
reading subscripts or superscriptso Let us illustrate the equation-
writing techniques with an example of each basic equation typeo
The equation below is a level equation written in the notation to
be used in the modelo
ENITFoK = ENITFoJ + (DT) (ENGHFoJK - ENLTFoJK) 1-1, L
ENITF--ENgineers .In Iraining at the Firm (men)
DT--Delta lime, the time interval between solutions
of 'the equations (months)
ENGHF--ENGineering Hiring rate at the Eirm (men/month)
ENLTF--~NgineersLe&ving Iraining at the firm (men/month)
The equation says that the number of engineers in training at the pre-
sent time, .K, equals the number in training at the'previous time, oJ,
plus the change in the number of engineers in training that has taken
place between time J and time Ko (The postscripts oK and oJ correspond,
respectively, to the subscripts t and t-l in the traditional difference
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equation notationo) ENGHFoJK indicates the monthly rate of engineering
hiring which occurred during the time interval from J to K or oJK, and
ENLTF.JK designates the monthly rate of engineering departures from
training during the same periodo DT is a constant supplied to the
DYNAMO computer system to instruct it as to the time interval between
calculations of the values of all the model equationso If DT = 1 month,
the ENITF at the beginning of the current month, oK, equals ENITF at
the outset o~ the previous month, oJ, plus the net change caused by
the difference between last month's rates of acquisitions and departures,
ENGHF - ENLTFo However, DT may be selected as soma value smaller than
one month in order to insure numerical accuracy in the difference equa-
tions solutions, eogo, DT may equal 0$25 month, or about one weeko In
this case the equation will still be valid in the general form written
above. For DT = O~25 months, however, the computations·wilJ. produce
ENITF at the beginning of this quarter-month equals ENITF at the begin-
ning of the previous quarter-month plus one-fourth the new monthly rate
o~ change of ENITFo Finally, the designation 1-1, L at the extreme
right o~ the equation shows that it is Chapter l-Equation number 1,
and that the equation is a level type (L)o
We can check the dimensions of the terms in the above equation to
provide a necessary but not sufficient condition for equation consistencyo
men = men + (months) (men/month men/month)
ENITF = ENITF + (DT) (ENGHF ENLTF)
This reduces to the dimensional equality, men = men, to provide our
initial checko
The second type of variable type, the ra"te equ~tion, expresses the
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rate of flow, determined at the present time, .K, which rate is to
persist until redetermined at the next point in time, oLD Thus, rate
equations compute values which are to exist during the interval oKLo
Let us define the equation for the hiring rate to represent the fact
that the firm hires a certain average fraction of the number of addi-
tional employees desired each month.
ENGHF.KL = EADF.K
DH 1-2, R
ENGHF--ENGineering Hiring l--ate at Firm (men/month)
EADF--Engineers, Additional, Desired at Firm (men)
DH--Delay in Hiring (months)
During the next computation interval, the equation shows that the f'irm
will hire at a rate equal to l/DH t~es its present desires for additional
workers. If the hiring rate were maintained at this value, DI-I months
would be required to hire all the additional employees desired. The
number at the extreme right of the equation, 1-2, R, shoW's that the
equation is the second of Chapter 1 and is a rate equation (R).
Finally, let us specify an auxiliary equation to complete this set
of sample equations. For this purpose assume that the number of addi-
tional desired at the firm is the gap between the total number of engi-
neers needed and the actual number already available~ Such an equation
would then be:
EADF.K = TED~.K - ENGRF.K 1-3, A
EADF--Engineers, Additional, Desired at Finm (men)
TEDF---Total number of Engineers 12esired at Firm (men)
ENGRF--ENGineeR,s at the Eirm (men)
The number indicates the above to be the third equation in Chapter 1,
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and an auxiliary type (A) 0 All auxiliary equatioIls are used solel~~ be-
cause of convenience or preference, not necessityo They can be substi-
tuted directly into the pertinent rate equations, omitting the need to
define an auxiliary. For instance, the hiring rate equation could have
been written as:
ENGHFoKL = TEDFoK - ENGRFoKDH
The use of the allxiliary not only simplifies the initial rate equation
but also usually separately labels a concept o£ eignificance, here the
additional engineers desiredo By using these auxiliaries with the pre-
viously illustrated level and rate equation types, we shall be able to
define any phenomenon pertinent to our research and development system
in simple equation £o~o
Computer Simulation
Once the basic model has been developed in the form just specified,
it will be stu~ied by digital computer simulation methodso Simulation
has within the last few years begun to become a significant technique
for use in studying economic problems at the levels of the £inm, indus-
'1try, and economy 0 "Simulation is nothing more than the process of
7The sources listed below contain discussions of the applica-
tion of stmulation techniques to a wide variety o£ industrial and economic
problems: Io Adelman and F 0 Adelman, "Tne Dynamic Properties of the
Klein-Goldberger Model", Econometrica, Vol 0 27 (October 1959), ppo 596-
625; Robert Dorfman, "Operations Research", The .American Economic Review,
Volo L, Noo 4 (September 1960), ppo 602-605; Jay Wo Forrester, "Indus-
trial D~rnailics; A Major Breaktr~ough for Decis~on-Makers~', Harvard Busi-
~ Review, Vol 0 36, Noo 4 (July-August 1958), ppo 37-66; Go Ho Orcutt
eto alo, "Simulation: A Symposium", The American Econcmic Review, Volo L,
Noo ; (December 1960) , ppo 893-932; and Edward Bo Roberts, ~SUrrulation
Techniques for Understanding Research and Development Management K , ~
National Convention Record, 1959, part 10, ppo 38-430
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operating the model with selected inputs and recording the Qutputso
In a dynamic model the simulation proceeds sequentially 0 00 o from one
time period to the next for the duration cf the computer run, with
the inputs of one period carried over from the outputs of the previous
periodo n8 From such computer runs y graphs of project per£ormance can
be obtained quickly for many different assumed sets of underlying
characteristics or decision-making policieso The effects of different
factors can be separatedo The dynamic behavior of the research and
development system under changing ff'on~tt-ions, which is impossibl.e to
visualize intuitively, can be quickly and easily studiedo
To aid in these simulation efforts, the Industrial Dynamics
Research IGrOUp has developed a compiler and simulator program for use
on the IBM 709 or 7090 computers 0 This program, called DYNAMO (~amiG
MQdels) reads a deck of IBM cards on which have been punched the equa-
tions of the ~adel, does extensive checking for certain classes of
\
possible errors, produces a set of detailed ma~hine instructions for
computing the modelgs behavior, calculates the dynamic behavior of the
model for the desired duration of the simulation run j then prints data
and plots graphs of the requested variableS4 9 This prog~amls speed and
£lexibility makes very easy the task of obtaining computer results ~or
the basic syst~ under various sets of input and parametr~~c conditions 0
The big task is rather in developing the basic system and in mea~ngrully
8Stuart W. Cragin, Jro, et alo) Simulatior.-, Man~em.entlls'·
Laboratory (Cambridge: Simulation Associates~ 1959)~
9Complete instructions fOr program utilization can be found
in the D~N.AMO User vs Manual by Alexander L~ Ptlgh, 1110
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interpreting the results of the comp~ter runs provided by DYNAMO
Over-all Organization of the System Egllations
The formal mathematical model of the research and development
project system is developed in the appendices of the remaining chapters
of Part Io As a preView of these appendices~ Figure 1-7 shows the
interrelatio~hipsbetween the various seoto~ ~ the system and the
locations of the equations describing each sectoro The full model
will require about 250 variable equations j about 65 initial-conditioT
equations, and appro~j~.70 constants defining this particular
systeIll o
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CHAPTER II
THE PERCEPTION OF THE NEED F-QR AND VALUE OF A PRODUCT
The initial phase of the research and development life cycle
consists of the birth of the product idea, that is, the initial
percepl,ion of the need for some set OL results, for a particular
end product. Be:fore one can adequate~y discuss the way in which
the customer and the firm perceive the need for the product, this
concept itself of the need for a product should be discussed and
adequate~y explained.
The Underlying Need for ~ Product
In the consumer product area the concept of the need for a
product is tied first to the satisfaction of the physical needs
of individuals and then more generally to satisfying their psy-
cho~ogica~ needs.~ These psycho~ogical needs involve the prob-
lema of consumer wants and consLUner tastes which in part may
depend on the income or on the wealth of the individual and on
other in:fluences upon the psychological desires of people.
In the military area the concept of need for a product is
basically quite similar, although by no means is it a simple
matter to treat. In the military product market the need for
a product is certainly still tied to the set of end goals and
policies of the potential customers. Given the Uni~ed States
historical policy of nonaggression, however, the underlying needs
1 For a general discussion or this hierarchy of need
relationships within the individual, see Douglas McGregor, ~
Human~ of Enterprise, New York: MeGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960)"
pp. 36-42.
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~or military products in the United States are largely deter-
mined by the condition of world affairs and by the activities
of those who are currently, or at least potentially, our compe-
titors in military conflict. To be sure, the perceived needs
for various products may be the resultant of other~ perhaps
political or economic, pressures. But for the moment we are
concerned with those aspects o£ underlying need which relate to
the required usage of the product for society's benefit. This
implies, then, that at any given point in time the state o£
world affairs and the mi~itary preparedness and weapons of our
enemies will in fact strongly influence the need ~or offensive
and defensive weapons in our nation's arsenal. In turn, our
preparedness and activities have the same effect on the under-
lying need for weapons o-r our military competitors. This creates
the spiraling anms race j a feedback system which seems to have
difficulty in reaching an. "equilibrium." state of world power
balance.
The usefulness of any particular product will vary over time.
Prior to same point in time there will be little or no need for
a particular product. This need may increase as world tensions
in a given area increase, and finally the need for the product
may later decrease again as its usefulness begins to diminish in
the world arena. Thus the need for a product, in terms of its
basic usefulness to society, or in terms of the satis£action it
could potentially provide through an omniscient military organiza-
tion's use of the product, is illustrated by a curve of the type
37
shown in Figure 2-1. The gradual rise, the period of relatively
unchanging mature value, fallowed by a decline in the need for the
product is characteristic of the life cycles of all product types.
IN,R\~~\<:" ~£E.l:>
FoR F\. f'Ro-PUCT
TIME
Figure 2-1 Time-Path of the underlying Need for a Product
Thus far j this description of product need has been non-
quantitative, but in fact there certainly are quantitative charac-
teristics that are applicable to any discussion of the need for
various products. Individu~s and organizations recognize that one
product is needed more than another, thus implying a ranking in
terms of the signi:ficance of differel1t products. But even more
than this is implied by the way in which organizations and indivi-
duals deal with their need for dif:Cerent products. People are
willing to exchange things which they value for other products
which they need or desire. In our moneyed econoT">'~Y individuals ex-
change money for products. Consumers pay for the products that
they want to acquire. The amount that people are willing to pay
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to acquire a given product is an indication or measure of the ex-
tent to which the individual recognizes his need or desire.
The same is true in the military market. Different products
aI'e more or less able to satisfy the needs of the military. There-
fore the military ought to be willing to pay more or less money
corresponding to the extent to which the product can satisfy the
needs o~ their organizatiml. Thus a basic characteristic of any
product is its ability at different points of time to satisfy the
needs of: the potential using or&anization to the exte~1.t that the
user ought to be wil.lirlg to pay a certain dollar amount to acquire
the product at that point in time. This characteristic of the pro-
duct's built-in ability to satisfy the user's needs we shall refer
2to as the "intrinsic product value".
2 "Intrinsic product value" is obviously .~ measure of' the
product' s uu~t,ility" characteristics. The author does not choose
tc·~involve "himself 'at: -this .point in the historic controversy in
the economics literature regarding the nature of an individual's
attitudes towards the comparative utilities of more than one pro-
duct. There are some (ordinalists) who assume only that an indi-
vidual can rank product choices as to preference. Others (the
cardinalists) assert that the individual can associate some mag-
nitude of utility measure to the various products under considera-
tion. More significantly.., both approaches to utility theory have
led in the traditional literature to the de~initian of conditions
by which the decision~akermaximizes his personal utility in the
making of any economic decision. While theoretically decision-
makers might attempt such maximization or optimization of profit-
like variables, their conduct of research and development in the
real world does not take such a simple but impracticable form.
A more thorough discussion of the actual bases for research and
development decision-making will be postponed to the chapters
describing the individual decision £unctions.
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Now that the concept of i.ntrinsic product value has been
introduced, we can discuss the fact that the existence of a pro-
duct at any point in time can have negative as well as posicive
attributes. Many products require maintenance iL order to preserve
their existence. The use c;.>f nearly all products involves costs
of operation. Moreover, some products have dangers or hazards
associated with them which require special precautions and added
costs which begin as soon as the owner possesses such a product.
The old phrase, "holding a lion by the tail", desc:L~ibes just such
a phenomenon. The possession of a lion requires building or buy-
ing a cage or the use of same other measures of restraint. Owner-
ship and use of a nuclear reactorj for instance, necessitates the
disposal of radioactive waste with the large costs associated with
this activity. It may very well be that the technology of acqui-
sition of many products has developed more rapidly than the tech-
nology of disposal or control of the product. Thus, for such pro-
ducts, to have is in fact to be burdened. This class of products
is therefore characterized by the fact that during same ~hase
of time the value of actual possession of such a product is
negative--the utility of ownership of such a product would then be
less than zero· This characteristic is true of many products during
that phase of time when the potential customer I s need for the pro-
duct is either nonexistent or is "Very small. The negative attri-
butes of the product then overweigh the little positive benefits
~hat can be derived from the product to produce a net negative value
associated with that product entity.
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Of course, if the product is to became IDtaningfulJ it must
at some time of its li~e have a positive utility or value. In
other words the amount of positive satisfaction that a product
can provide by satisfying certain needs of the customer must be
able at some point in time to outweigh the negative attributes
of possessing such a producto This means that during the phase
of positive net value of the product~ fully-informed rational
customers should be wi.JMling to pay a positive price to gain the
use or benefits of the product. Any product worth a name, there-
rore~ has a potential phase of existence of positive value. In
fact ~ many products as we know them probably pass from the zero
value to the positive value phase and back eventually to zero
value~ entirely omitting the negative value phase described above.
The Actual Perception Process
To this point we have been discussing the intrinsic product
value concept.9 defined as the inherent worth of a product to society
if that product existed at any point in time. Of coursejl only
an omniscient and all-sensitive being could respond to this intrin-
~ value of the product. In actualityy decision-makers are :far
from all-mowing and are not at all full.y sensitive to the nature
of either the environment or of potential products within that en-
vironment 0 Decision-makers possess knOWledge to the extent t,hat
they receive j accept, and understand information. This informa-
tion in itself is delayed, noisy, and even biased and/or distorted.
The reception or perception, acceptance i and understanding processes
of the decisian~akermay similarly be characterized in tenms of
delays, noise~ bias~ and distortion. In addition, decision-
makers have lags in their sensitivity or responsiveness to new
understandings--they delay in translating their new understandings
into new actions or decisions 0 Thus we ought to now turn to
the problem o~ describing how the actual decisian~akers invo1ved
in research and development processes, the decision~akers in the
organizations of the customer and of the developing finn, do in
fact perceive the need for a product and the value of the product.
In trying to describe the way individuals or organizations
perceive the need for or value~<"f:c:a~)p'nodu"t,"l1.we· :soo.uLd J.fi'rst r·ecog·-
nize that we are dealing with the entire psychological concept of
perception as here applied to a particular area o~ product evalua-
tion · In Leavitt's text on meT\agerial psychology!i he very simply
defines the distinction between the perceptual world and the real
world.
Most of us recogni~e that the world-as-we-see-it
is not necessarily the same as the world-as-it-"reallyn-
is . Our answer depends on what we heard, not on what
was really said. The housewi:fe buys what she likes
best,,9 not what is best. Whether we feel hot or cold
depends on us, not on the thermomet-er. The same job
may look li5e a good job to one of us and a sloppy job
to another.
We can continue in the same vein as Leavitt to say that what
might look like a good product to one may not look like a good pro-
duct to another. In general j then, it is important that we recog-
:3 Harold J . Leavitt" Managerial Psychology (Chicago:
The University o£ Chicago PressJ 1958), p. 27.
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nize that what we perceive, particularly here as related to the
perception of the need for and value of a product, is determined
not solely by the external facts of the real world environment,
but rather it is determined jointly by these external conditions
and by the expectations y the past experiencesJ the needs, and the
goals of the decision-makers and their organizations.
It is most difficult for a military organization to establish
product need or value, particularly in economic terms. "The mili-
tary strategist has no such single quantitative measure of mi~i-
tary worth as industry profits. He must evaluate his programs in
qualitative terms, such as national survival, or minimizing the
risk of war by preparedness measures. n4 But regardless of these
difficulties the military does establish not only priorities but
also budget limitations on the flll1ds it is willing to provide for
the attainment of various new product objectives. Let us then
be specific about the kinds of phenomena which bear upon an organi-
zatian's perception of the need for and value of a particular mili-
tary product. First of all, this perception depends upon the intrin-
sic product value that was spoken of earlier. This intrinsic pro-
duct value is manifested in the real world events which are con-
tinuously occurring. These events may consist of statements by
leaders of the foreign countries or mi~itary actions by our enemies,
4 Richard B. Foster and Francis P. Roeber, "Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis for Strategic Decisions n , Journal of the Operations Research
Society of America? Vol~ 3, No.4 (November 1955); p. 485.
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or the testing of some new device by us or our adversaries. All
of these real world events and many other events of a similar
nature bear within them the inf'ormation that discloses, at least
potentially, the current value of a given product.
ButJ of coursej the things which take place in the real world
are only potentially an input to the decision~akerfsperception
o~ the need for a new product. Be~ore the decisian~akers of the
customer or the firm can at all be affected by these new real
world events, they must receive information about them. This
means that one of the influential determinants of the timing of
the perception of the need for a new product and~ hence, of the
value of the new product is the delay in acquiring the information
regarding these events. In part j problems of industrial security
and military secrecy determine the length of the delay in trans-
mitting and/or 8.cquiring such information. But also the time to
acquire such information at least in part depends upon the magni-
tude of the infonnation or of the events themselves. That is, the
more significant the occurrence, the greater the likelihood that
people will find out about it sooner.
HcweverJ the mere transmittal o~ information rega2~t1ing the
~vents does not in and of itself lead to the perception of a new
product, that iSJ of the need for or the value of such a product.
An additional delay enters into the perception process, this delay
being the time that it takes to absorb the new information and
theref'ore to recognize the current value of the product. This
absorption delay largely depends on the technical and managerial
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ability of the firm or of the ~ustomer; that is, on their ability
to compreheln.d the significance of the information about the events
which have 'taken place. The length of this comprehension delay
depends particularly upon the familiarity of the customer or the
firm with the specific (or with some related) technical area in
which the events have taken place.
The above factors largely serve to detennine the level of recog--
nized current value of a new product. However.? the decision to
invest in a research and development enterprise is based not on an
estimate of the current vlorth of a new product, but rather on an
estimate of what the product will be worth at some future time j
when it is expected that the project either will be available
or could be made available through the research and development
process. Both customer &"'1d firm estimate the future value of the
product based in part on their estimates of the current product
value. Thus the estimate of the current worth serves as a founda-
tion upon which the customer and/or the firm may extrapolate changes
or trends.
The second influence an the organization's perception of the
future value of a new product idea is the rate at which information
about new events is becoming availabl.e. The famous Mr Parkinson
(author of Parkinson's Law) appropriately remarked, "When the problem
is one of dispatching a spaceship to (say) the moon, news of progress
in Russia leads to frantic efforts in the United States; and the
news of these efforts leads to :fresh exertions in Russia. n5 When
5 c. Northcote Parkinson, ''Haste and Waste in Science")
Think, February 1960, p. 27.
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the state of affairs is changing rapidly, the organization tends
to extrapolate this rate of change into the future. As opinions
begin to shift in te1~S of the perceived value of a product, a
positive feedback ef:fect commonly knoitn as "cli.mbing on the band-
wagon" usually occurs. This phenomenon acts to induce mental
extensions of the changes one believes have been occurring into
the future. Thus the rate of change of the organization's current
estimate of product worth is a strang determinant of its esti-
mate of future value of the product.
A third factor which influences the estimate of the future
worth of a product idea is the organi.zation' s delay in revising
its estimates. This implies tha~ even though the organization may
have new information upon which it can base an estimate o~ the current
or future value of a product idea~ it does not necessarily immediately
respond to such information. Instead.o a delay occurs in revising
the estimates of the organization. This delay may in fact largely
depend on the exten.t of the org~~ization's commitment to the earlier
estimation. Thus the organizati.on may very well be faced with a
conflict situation--on the one hand~ it has a camnitment to an ear-
lier estimate that it has made; on the other hand, it can at least
SUbconsciously recognize the fact that the new information it has
received demands a change in the estimates already made 0 The con-
flict inheres in the fact that personal motivations tend to demand
the maintenance o~ the earlier estimations to which the organization
has been committed.9 whereas dedication to meeting the goals of the
organization demand the recognition of the new facts of life. Thus
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a psychological pressure gap exists j the magnitude o~ this pres-
sure being dependent on the difference between the previous commit-
ment of the organization and the estimation to whicl1 new facts
would lead the organization. This pressure gap will be a key deter-
minant of how long it takes the organization to face up to the
new facts that (correctly or incorrectly) it perceives.
The final influence on the or'ganization' s estimates of the
future value of a product j~s the time duration over which the
organization looks ahead" Ii:. is insufficient to talk about an
estimate of future product value witl10ut specifying how far ahead
in the future. The organization Which makes decisions on the basis
of its estimate of the future value ten years hence is in fact
going to make different decisions than the organization which
bases its actions on its estimates of the value one year hence.
Thus the time horizon or duration over which the organization
projects the expected changes in the value of the product is a deter-
minant of the organization vs perception of the future value. In
part, the length of this time llorizon depends on the willingness
of the organization to take chances5) since the further ahead the
organization projects itself in making estimates of the worth of
a product J the less certain is the state of the world an which the
organization can base these estimates~
In re'liewjI we find that the problem of perception of the need
for or the value o'f a product is not at all a simple matter 0 In
the first placey the state of world af£airs determines the intrin-
sic value of the product.Q but only an anniscient organization would
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really "know" this intrinsic value. "Real world" organizations
do not have access to knowing what this intrinsic value is. Real
organizations make their estimates on the basis of the information
that they receive about what is taki.ng place in the world. This
in.formation may be gained by various formal and infonnal sources
of comni'unication. By whatever means the information is obtained,
there are nevertheless delays involved in acquiringj absorbing~
and responding to this information Q 'l'he organization not only
estimates tl~e current value of the product J but it also attempts
to anticipate the value of the product at same later point in the
future,? particularly a't a point in the future when it believes
that the product can be made avai~able to the potential users.
Many different kinds of factors influence the firm a.rId the custo-
mer in making such perceptions J including such in~luences as their
O'WIl past experiencesJ present gcals.9 and present needs. These
inf'luences on percepti.on not only present bias or distortion to
the estimates j but also determine the length of time that it
takes for the organization to respond to new and different in£or-
mation regarding the need for and.Q hence,5' the value of a new pro-
duct 0 Psychological factors seem to be quite important in determining
the behavioral characteristics o£ the ~irm BIld of the custamero
Despite the fact that many o£ these notions are sti~l unexplored
areas of psychological resear~hJ we must recognize the kinds of
inf~uence these psychological factors have on the decisions, and
the direction of these ineluences J and we must attempt to assess
the magnitude of importance of these factors 0
48
~ Experiences ~ Value Estimation
The problem of properly estimating the value of products
proposed for development is not a new one. In a recent article
Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin cited an early example of this difficulty.
More than one hundred years agoy ~chael Faraday
was demonstrating his electromagnetic equipment to
a British government committee in the hope of ob-
taining government support. One member admitted he
was fascinated.9 but asked Faraday.~ "What practical
benefits can we expect?" "I can't answer that ques-
tion, ,t Faraday replied, "but I can tell you that one
hundred year~ from now you will be taxing something
like this. 1i
It is similarly easy to point to many more recent examples
in which the United States has shown lack of ability to estimate
properly the value of new developmentsJ both those of political
strategic nature and those of military strategic nature. For one
example of ~ continuously changing value estimate that we have made
in the political. area.9 we can readily point ·to the fact that the
United States or at least the Congress of the United States saw
little value in the I"eague of Nations as an institution itself,
or at least in our participatiol:l in such an institution. It took
until about twenty years later before the United States did per-
ceive the value cf a.n institution of such nature. Of course, the
intrinsic value of such international institutions has not yet
been detenninedJ nor will it be determined for some time~9 if ever.
As another ex~ple of the cn~~ge in our estimates of values in the
6 Dr. Eberhardt Rechtiny "Why the Space Race?"J I.R.E.
Student Quarter~ Vol. 7 j No~ 4 (May 1961)J p. 46.
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political area y we can point to the fact that at the end of
World War II the United States wanted Germany to cease being
an industrial state and to become an agricultural state. Yet
by 1946 we had already begun changing this value perception.
Today the value we see in West Germany is one of a very strong
industrial and military strength in the Western European Alliance.
In another area of political strategy we recall that the United
States felt that there was great value to being able to move
security questions out of the Uhited Nation's Security Council
and into the General Assembly. Our leaders failed to recognize
for a long time t:D-B.t with the many newly emergent countries in
the United Nat,ions there would come a time that the General Assem-
bly could in fact vote against the United States. Thus the per-
ceived value of this particular strategy move has changed in our
own eyes.
But let us now move on to areas that are more closely related
to the problems of research and development. .In 1937 a highly
appointed presidential committee under Harold Ickes on technology
and natural resources made no mention 0'£ jet engines in its evalua-
tion of transportation. Yet the Germans were flying jet aircraft
only seven years later. In the jet engine field the United States
was not the orJ.ly nation to demonstrate its inability to correctly
assess product value~
The only radical ir~ovation during the period (prior
to World War II] in aircraft engines, the turbojet,
was backed in the early stages neither by the govern-
ment nor by an established engine producer. This was
so in England and Germany as well as ir. the United
50
States. The first sllccessful turboje.J.~ design
was that of RAF flying officer Frank ~~ittle.
He was unable to interest the government in a
program to test his engine design and eventually
obtained financial backing through a rather ir-
regular arrangement with a small English invest-
ment banking firm It is interesting to
note that Whittle's only suggestion as to an imme-
diate practiGal ~se for his engine was for lang-
range mail planes. 7
In the area of nuclear energy the Ickes report had made no
mention of trle atom.,;> but two years later fission was achieved.
In that same yeary 1939, Einstein ~a·ote a letter to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, seriously discussing the potentiality of an atomic
bomb. It was not, however; until two and one-half years later,
after Pearl Harbor forced a change in the ba6es of our value esti-
mates.9 that the United States really got going on the problem
of developing an atomic bomb. Thi s same nuclear weapons area
provides good examples of a poor ability of the United States to
estimate tile future military pcsition of our enemies. This lack-
ing has caused us to seriously misjudge the value of certain weapons.
For instance, we underestimated the ability of the U.S.S.R. to de-
velop the 8.tomic bomb by five years. Even after this lesson we
were still wrong by three years in our estimate of when Russia
would be able to develop a hydrogen bomb.
In the area of missiles there are many examples wherein the
United States has revised its estimates of the value of some develop-
ment on several different occasions and where we have shown extremely
7Richard R. Nelson j "Invention j Research... and Development:
A Survey of the Literature", U.S. Air Fo~ce Project Rand ;Research
MemorandUl!!.9 RM-2146 (April 15; 1958)j pp. 40-41-
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poor perception of the values of other deveiopments. For instance,
although we even knew that Russia was going ahead on the develop-
ment of missiles during the entire post-war period, the United
States did not adequately perceive the value of such a weapon.
In part this was because of the fact that certain key pieces of
infonnation were kept from the decision-makers. From 1945 to
1951 the knowledge on atomic weapon development was kept from
many military men. Therefore they thought that tremendously accurate
guidance ability would be needed to have a long-re..age ballistic
missile destroy a target. In 1952J howeverJ the hydrogen bomb
was "discovered" as a weapon.9 giving us a power of major nlagni-
tude despite poor guidance systems J for ballistic missiles. The
development of these smaller hydrogen weapons and the recognition
that radioactive fall ...out i tsel.f was a maj or retaliatory weapon
changed our entire perception of the value of ballistic missiles.
Further in the missiles area the potentiality of the solid fuel
rocket was not recognized early enough, nor~ as has been very well
documented, was the value of the atomic submarine recognized with-
out much long and bitt~r struggle. Continuing in the area of
missiles the value of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile was under-
estimated for an extremely long period of time. The development
of this missile was strictly a bootlegged project~ being able to
con'tinue for a long period j largely because of the fact that its
deve10pment within a Navy laboratory was kept secret from the fund-
ing agencies of the Navy.
Mos~ of the foregoing examples relate cases wherein we have
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initially. seriously underestimated the value of the product. But
the many weapons which are obsolete when ready for use lend evidence
to possible errors in the other direction too. The Ittraditional
process has ...produced a great number of prototype aircraft that
have cost large sums of money and much highly skilled manpower
but which were never produced in significant quantities y if at
all. Presumably, in sameone's opinion, these were unsatisfactory
or unwanted aircraft ....Historically, these aeronautical curiosi-
ties far outnumber the airplanes that have received full implemen-
tation. US These were no doubt cases of initial gross overestima-
tion of the worth of som~ aircraft configuration. Thus i t se.~s
that the errors in our product value perception process have been
both of underestimation and the overestimation varieties.
And finally, be£ore closing this discussion on the way in
which people have perceived value in the military product market,
let us mention the nuclear-powered bc:mber. Here is a case where
the first real attraction of the possible weapon~ that is the basis
for the perception of value of this product J in at least same
areas of Congress j was that it was inexpensive--believed to be far
cheaper than the maintenance of ou.r foreign air bases. Now, after
having spent many hundreds of millions of dollars on the design
and development of a nuclear bomberj) "'lIe have filIally decided to
leave the development stage and go back to the research stage. Thus,
here again, the basis of the perception of value was completely
8 Robert A. Bailey, I1Application of Operations-Research
Teclmiques to Air-Borne Weapon System Planning n, Aeronautical
Engineering Review~ Vol. 13, No. 11 (October 1954), p. 74.
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wrong j as was perhaps the magnitude of the value perceived itself.
This preceding chapter has pointed out the fact that one can
do more th~'"l just make theoretical arguments as to the nature of
the perception of the val.ue of military products. It has been
easy to p(jint~ ou-c,!J despite the general secrecy and lack of pub-
lic documentation whicll characterize military research and develop-
ment projects:; that one of the notable problems in the management
of military Rand D is the perception of value of various poten-
tial products. The United States historical.ly has had difficul-
ties not only in the military product development area but also
in recognizing and properly perceiving the value of various poli-
tical and strategic developmentso Some of the reasons for these
mistakes have been pointed our earlier. The psychological fac-
tors~ the delays that are inherent in the large military organi-
zations, and many other factors all contribute to the problem of
adequately perceiving the value of sane new and major d.evelopment.
But yet the perception of the value of a new product is only
one of the several continuously on-going sets of activity that
underlie a research and development project. As discussed ear-
lier~ several other areas of activity exist in all such projects,
and bef'ore we can gain a full understanding of the problems of manag-
ing research and development~ we must look into these other areas
of activity.
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This appendix includes the flow diagrams and equations which
describe the perception of the need for and value of the product
by both the research and development firm and the sponsoring govern-
ment agency or customer. Figure 2-2 shows the over-all relation-
ships described in the foregoing chaptero The diagram iSjI of
coursejl an abstract of the information which was presented in the
verbal descriptiu-n in the chapter~~ and represents one mode of
aggregation of that detailed material.. A diagram of this sort
will help us to focus UpOIl the major variables which must be in-
cluded in the model of research and development projects~ which
model is to be developed in the following appendices:; even though
the model equations themselves will require same greater degree
o~ detail for producing mathematical camplete~ess and precision.
The numbers in the diagram symbols refer to equations or other
figures used later in this appendix.
Briefly following through the diagram we see represented the
fac~ that the nature of the real world environment defines the
changes in the intrinsic product value of any product under con-
sideration e Information as to the intrinsic product value is al-
ways in the process of being communicated to those interested i par-
ticularly to the potential customers and to the potential research
and development firms 0 The diagram here represents either or
both the firm and the customer, since the process of perception
of product need and value is common to both 0-£ them. The f'irst
number listed in each block re£ers to the detailed in£onmatian for
the firm and the second refers to the customer. The rate of recog-
nition o~ product value is dependent both upon the actual informa--
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tion as to product vn1 ue which is being communicated~ and on the
d.elay in recognizing this information. The diagram further shows
that this delay in recognition is dependent both on some minimum
delay in recognizing such information about product value and upon
the level of related blOW-how of the pote~tial receiver of the
information 0 As the new information about product value is re-
ceived it builds up the level of product value currently recognized
by either the customer or the firm. In addition to affecting this,
the customer and the ~irm take cognizance of the average (or smoothed)
rate of recognition o~ the product value. That iS J they are
aware not only of what they currently believe the product to be
worthy but also of how this belief has changed over time. These
two influences primarily produce a projection of the future pro-
duct value.
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This projection depends upon the trend iIi changes of
the rate of recognition of product value, smoothed)
and on the extent of time tha"t. -t.he firm or the customer is project-
ing this trend ahead. This extrapolation time has been labeled
in the diagram as the t'iprojection horizontt • The projection hori-
zan in turn is shown as depending upon the basic planning period
of the organization and its wil~ingness to accept riskJ a measure
of risk-taking propensity or conversely of the conservatism of
the organization. As the projected future product value changes~9
this begins to build up an influence on the organization to change
its actual esttmateJ held ~or decisian~akingpurposes J as to what
the future product value will. be. The rate of change of this esti-
mate depends upon what the current estimate of f'uture value is,
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and what tlle current projected in.formation would produce as
an estimate. The- gap between the two is the strong influence
to revise the estimate, this influence being modified by same
normal delay in adjusting this estimate of the future product
value.
Now that the diagram has been described j let us go on to
the wr-iting of t~e actual equations needed to represent the model.
The first equation writtenJ Equation 2-1J is for a basic input to
the research and development model, the intrinsic product value.
Here in a table of constants are stored the numbers Which over
time represent the intrinsic product value of the particular
product under consideration in the research and development pro-
ject. From one computer simulation run to another~9 we may change
this table of values to see what effect different product value
environment considerations would have upon the project life
cycle. The equation for selecting the product value from this
table of stored numbers is~
IPV.K = TABLE (PVTABj- TIME .K~~ O,~80~~; 6) 2-l, A
IPV--Intrinsic Product Value (dollars)
TABLE--a notat ion used by the DYNAMO compiler to
indicate the ~act ·~ha~ a set of tabular values
will be utilized to pl-ovide the specific num-
ber for the variable IPV
PVTAB--Product Value TABlej) the name of the table of
input values fer IPV (dollars).9 in which values
have been inserted at 6-:-month intervals from
TIME = 0 to TIME = 180 months
TIME--the simulated project time starting from time = a
and proceeding until the end of the computer run
.(months)
Although this intrinsic product value inplrt shall be varied
later to determine its effect upon the researcl1 and development
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project outcome, we shall start by providing a set of values for
the product value table which seem to be a plausibl.e and reasonable
set. As specified in the eqllation for IPV, this table will con-
tain values stored at six-month intervals from month 0 to month 180.
We wi~l then be able to make computer simulation runs for -this
entire period of time, the equivalent of 15 years duration. F~gure
2-3 pictures the initial input specified by the product value table
below the graph. In the constants listed below the graph, the
--
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are in dollar amounts.
This information as to the intrinsic product value becomes
recognized over a period of t~e by the organization and incorpora-
ted into its level of recognized 0urrent product value. This
delay consists of two basic parts~ first~ the constant mini-
mum delay which is a function aolely of the process of cammuni-
cation or the nature of secrecy related to the particular product;
secondly~ a variable delay which probably depends upon the basic
know-how and understanding of the organization attempting to
receive the in:formation as to the product value. Figure 2-4
pictures a relationship for such a delay which seems feasible.
FigQ~e 2-4 Delay in Recognition of Product Value
At the Firm
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Here what we see pictured, a-t the extreme left of the diagram,
is the ~act that with no knowledge relevant to ~he product area,
the delay in transmitting the information as to the product vaJ_ue
will be extremely large. As the related know-how increases:; the
delay in receiving appropriate infcrmation of tbis sort steadily
decreases. With a large amount of effective knowledge re~evant
to the product area this delay in product value information trans-
mission decreases to the minLmum level illustra~ed in the dia-
gram. Two equb."tions are used to represent the delay described
above. The first equation (Equation 2-2) indica~es that the delay
in recognition of product- value at the firm is equal to the mini-
mum delay in recognizing such information plus a variable additional
de~ay in the firm f s recognition time. This variable additional
de~ay (Equation 2-3) declines exponentially from it,s maximum value
as the firm's related product know-how increases. This added
de1ay becomes approximately zero when the level of the firmvs
knowledge becomes large.
DRPVF.K = DMRV + DVRVF.K
DVRVF •K = (DRPVT) e -KLEVF •K/12
2-2.9 A
2-3, A
DRPVF--Delay in Recognition o£ Product Value at the Firm
(months)
DMRV--Delay, ~imumJin Recognition of product Value
(months)
DVRVF--Delay, Variable, in Recognition of product Value
at the Firm (months)
DRPVT--Delay in Recogrlition o£ Product Value, Time
constant (months)
e--base of natural logarithms, equals 2.7183---
KLEVF--Know-how LEVel of the Firm (effective man-months
of effort)
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In setting the values of the two constants used in the above
equatians j we shall follow the practice of using parameters which
seem to be plausible for the system being described. We shall
not concern ourselves with vihether these particular numbers apply
to any snecific compatlY, customer, or project. We can at any
timeJ by simply changing the values selectedJ determine the effects
or such changes upon system. behavior through the use o-r the silnu-
lation runs. Taking into account how ~ong information in the
military produc~t area requires for transmission and also the
delay in actually attributing value to the information received,
we shall set the constants as:
DMRV = 6 months
DRPVT = 60 months
These constants say that in the absence of related product know-
ledge, 66 months will be required for the firm to receive and inter-
pret information about changes in the world situation which create
corresponding changes in the intrinsic value of the product. Thi s
time delay, a period o£ 5 1/2 years, is langer j for example j than
the lag in United States inf'ormation about the Soviet progress in
developing their first atomic bomb or regarding the U.S.S.R state
of: preparedness in the long-range missile area Bl~t no doubt
there are some cases in which this maximum product value informa-
tion delay may rise to as much as 240 months or 20 years. At the
other extreme, the DMRV constant indicates that even if the firm
possesses a very substantial amount of info~ation in the related
teclu1.ical area, a minimlllD. time of 6 months is still required for
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taking account of the potential value or the product which is
indicat~'d by new information receivedQ The reader's experiences
and tastes may prefer longer or shorter constants for eithpr of
these two numbers; but for the purpose of our demonstration
runs, we shall proceed with the selected values.
We would now like to be able to describe the level 01 recog-
nized current product value at the firm as merely some delayed
function of the intrinsic product value7 utilizing the delay just
defined above. Specificallyy we would like to assume that this
recognized value is a third-order exponential lagged relationship
of the intrinsic product value. 9 Howevery a technical restriction
in the DYNAMO program which ~~ll be used to study the research and
development project model prevents the use of a variable delay,
such ~s DRPVF, in a third-order delay equation. Therefore, we shall
create a set of three subordinated first-order delays to create
the desired third-order result for the recognized product value.
This situation is shown in Figure 2-5.
9 The distinctions between the various forms of lagged
relationships of the exponential delay form are explained in Chapter 9 of
Forrester's Industrial pynamics.
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Figure 2-5 Inf'onnation as to Product Value
Being Communicated to the Firm
Thusy the first thing that shall be done is to de£ine a
variable which is equal to one-third of this above defineJ. delay,Sl DRPVF,
and utilize this new auxiliary variable in our technically required
equations.
"DFl.K = DRPVF .K/3 2-4.1 A
DFl--Delay at the Firm, 1 (months)
DRPVF--Delay in Recognition of a Product Value at
the Firm (months)
We can now define the three level equations which ~~ll be necessary
to create the third-order lagged effect of the IPV term. Each equa~
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2-5.1 L
2-6, N
2-7~ L
2-8, N
2-9, N
2-10, N
between
LEVF2.K DT= LEVF2.J + (DFl.J)(LEVFl.J - LEVF2.J)
LEVF2 = 0
LEVF1--LEVel at the Firm~ 1 (dollars)
DT--Delta Time (months)~ the time interval
computer solutions of the equations
DFl--Delay at the Firm, l (months)
IPV--Intrinsic Product Value (dollars)
LEVF2--LEVel at the Firm~ 2 (dollars)
LRPVF--Level of Recognized current Product Value
at the Firm (dollars)
RPVF--Rate of recognition of Product Value at the
Firm (dollars/month)
tion produces a first-order smoothing of the input variable.
LEVFl.K = LEVFl·J+(Dii.J)(IPV.J - LEVFl.J)
LEVFl = 0
LRPVF = 0
LRPVF . K = LRPVF. J -;.. (DT ) (RPVF . JK)
Since we shall be j~nterested in the rat·e of ChaIlge of the
firm's recognized current product value~ Equation 2-9 above which
defines the level of recognized value has been written in a slightly
different manner from that used :for the two intermedi.ate level equa-
tions. The level o.f recognized current product value at the firm
is written as the summation of all previous changes in this levelJ
and the rate of change itself is defined in Equation 2-11 below.
The N-type equation after each level above provides the iNitial
value for the level. Here we are beginning from a state of absence
of any perceived product value by the fi.rm. Hence..., all of the
levels are initially set equal to zeroo
The input to the final output },evel, the level of recognized
product value of the fi.rm] LRP\TF, is defined by the next equation for
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RPVF:
2-11 j R
RPVF--Rate of recognition of Product Value at the Firm
(dollars/month)
LEVF2--LEVel at the Firm, 2 (dollars)
LRPVF--Level of Recognized current Product Value at
the Firm (dollars)
DFl--Delay at the FirmJ 1 (months)
This equation in effect makes LRPVF of the same form as LEVFl
and LEVF2. All are first-order information delays with time-
constants equal to one-third of the over~all delay in recognition
of product value at the firm~ DRPVF. The three delays in sequence
form a variable third~order delay with time-constant DRP/F.
In each of the three level equations above.~ the constant DT,
Delta Time, was used to specify the time period between calcula-
tions of solutions of the equations of this model. This is a
parameter of the computer solution procedure rather than of the
research and development system itself 0 The value for this should
be specified not an the basis of personal taste but rather on the
technical requirements for mathematical accuracy in our equation
sys-tem solution.. As ill.llstrated in Appendix D of Industrial Dynamics?
the solution interval should be less than one-sixth of the smallest
length of time represented in any third-order delay in the system.
Since we are going to use a third-order delay constant. as short
as two months in the research and development systemj the solu-
tion time interval shall be:
DT = O. 25 months
This means in essence that the computer will be solving the equa-
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tions of the entire system approximately every week. Such
~requent computer solution will insure numerical accuracy o£
the results without introducing any significant computational
errors.
Returning now to the definition of equations for the firm's
perception of product value$ we next take account of the fact
that over a period of time the firm becomes aware of the average
trend in its own recognition o"E product value. We asswne that in
using this mental averaging process, the firm weights more heavily
recent changes in its product value recogniti.on and gradually for-
gets about changes which have taken place further back in the past.
This assumption is readily incorporated into a first-order expon-
ential smoothing (or averaging) equation.9 which smoothed variable
is appropria.tely labeled the "Rate of recognition of Product Value,
Smoothed)' at the Firm" .10
RPVSF.K = RPVSF.J + (DS~)(Rr~F.JK - RPVSF.J)
RPVSF = 0
2-12~ L
2-13, N
RPVSF--Rate of recognition of Product Val.ue, Smoothed,
at the Firm (dollars/month)
-DSRPV--Delay in Smoothing Recognition rate for Produet
Valtte (months)
RPVF--Rate of recognition of Product Value at the
Firm (dollars/month)
As explained above this average rate of change of the recognized
product value takes into aCcollllt all previous changes in the f'inn r s
10 This first-order smoothing approach is explained in
Appendix E of Industrial Dynamics.
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estimates of current product value, most heavily weighing the
recent changes made in this estimate.
The typical near-sightedness of the firm leads it to respond
rather quickly to changes which it in fact has already recognized.
The firm tends to forget quickly the recognized events of the past
and both judges the present and guesses the future by the recog-
nized events of the most recent few months. Thus, the smoothed
rate of recognition of product value is assumed to depend pri-
marily an the latest three~onth periodis recognized occurrences,
and therefore:
DSRPV = 3 months
This does not imply that the lirm recognizes a basic market change
in so short a. "time. That delay in recognition (Eq1~ation 2-2)
ranges between 6 and 66 months. Rather this constant means that
whatever the firm does recogIlize §..QQll. causes it to change its be ...
liefs as to the futm-e value e:Kpectations for the product area.
In the situation characterized by much short-term randan and con-
flicting pieces of informationJ such a short smoothing period would
potential~y produce relatively short-term swings o~ the firmis
confidence in the merits o~ any given product areaQ Such behavior
is common~y encountered in research and development" companies.
Companies basically recognize that for them to be ef~ective
in the research and development business, they must at least try
to anticipate the f'uture demands of their customers. Thus.9 using
its perception of the current level of recognized value as a base-
line, the firm projects ahead the trend in its own beliefs as to
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changing product value to form an initial projection of the
future value of the product.
PFPVF.K = LRPVF.K .... (RF'lSF.K)(PHF) 2-14, A
PFPVF--Projected Future Product Value of the Firm
(dollars)
LRPVF--Level of Recognized current Product Value
of the Firm (dollars)
RPVSF--Rate of recognition of Product Value, Smoothed,
at the Finn (dollars/month)
PHF--Projection Horizon of the Firm (months)
The "projection horizon" of the firm determines how far
ahead the firm is willing to project this trend that i·t has de-
tected in order to anticipate the future product value. This
projection horizon depends not only an the normal planning period
for the firm, but also on the basic conservatism or,canversely,
the willingness to accept risk that characterizes the firm. The
basic pl~~ing period expresses the max~um amount of t~e over
Which the firm would normally make such a projection.9 whereas the
willingness to undertake risk indicates the extent to which the
firm is willing to guess that far into the future in m~ki'ng a value
estimate upon which it is going to base ~portant decisions. Thus
the firm's willingness to accept risk determines that fraction of
its maximum planning period which it will use to project the recog-
nized value changes.
PHF = (PLPF)(WARF)
PHF--Projection Horizon of the Firm (months)
PLPF--Plarming Period of t~he Firm (months)
WARF--Willingness to Accept Risk by the Firm
(percentage)
2-15, N
The firm ~pl"obably ought to work on programs based on needs
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very distant in the future. But in fact very few firms even
"venture beyond their front pastures" in considering the impli-
cations of changes in the current world situation. For the maxi-
mum planning period of the firm we shall delect a value of four
years:; probably much longer than that period used by most com-
panies.
PLPF = 48 months
The effective projection horizon of tlle firm is determined not
solely by this planning period~ however. The firm's willingness
to accept the risks of basing its decisions on estimates that are
highly uncertain also constrains the projection horizon of the
company. InitiallY.9 we shall represent a firm with maximum risk-
taking propensity.? and later vary this parameter to determine its
effect on project behavior. Thus the canpany's risk-taking pro-
pensity is set at 100%, or:
WARF = 1.00 (decimal percentage)
We now return to a discussion made ~ar more extensively ear-
lier in this chapter; namely~ that the projection of this trend
would ordinarily lead the firm to one estimate, namely the projected
product value. However~ the :firm has already made a commitment to
a dif~erent estimate of the future product value. The gap between
these two values, the projection and the previous commitment y con-
stitutes pressure on the firm to change its actual estimate of the
future product value. This change decision and its resul.t are
incorporated in the following set of equations. The first equation
below (Equatiarl 2-16) indicates that the firm gradually recognizes
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a fraction of the di~ference between its value projection and
its previous future value estimate. The fraction recognized
depends on the average response time of the firm to such gaps in
the estimates; i.e., the longer the firm takes to respond to the
influence of the gap in its estimates, the smaller will be its
rate o~ modifying its previous commitment.
Before using the value projection, however j we will check
to see if we have encountered the condition under wlu.ch this linear
trend extrapolation produces a negative future value estimate.
This will be done ~or two reasonso First, it is actually unlikely
that military products today pass into this negative value region.
They more likely get retired to some secondary usage, but main-
tain a small j positive value. This fact indicates that the extra-
polation should be a nonlinear one, rather than the linear formu-
lation which produces this difficulty. Secondly, and perhaps
of greater current importance j projecting the product value into
the negative region produces possible technical problems with
the existing model formulation. Thus the convenience is adopted
here of restricting the range of the projection.to.nan-negative
values only. This is a weak model-building practice to follow,
but it is unlikely to affect the over-all dynamic system behavior
in this particular case. Thus Equation 2-17 below produces a usable
projection value that is positive only.
RCEVF KL _ UPPVF.K - EFPVF.K
· - DAEVF
UPPVF.K = MAX(PFPVF.Ky 0)
2-16, R
2-17, A
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RCEVF--Rate of Change of Estimate of future Value
at the Firm (dollars/month)
UPPVF--Used Projection of Product Value at the Fi~
(dollars)
EFPVF--Estimate of Future Product Value at the Firm
(doll'3rs)
DAEVF--Delay in Adjusting the Estimate of Value at
the Firm (months)
MAX·--a notation used by DYNAMO to iIldicate that the
maximwn of the two parameters named within the
parentheses shall be taken and used to determine
the value of the variable, UPPVF
PFPVF--Projected FutUfe Produc t ;.V"alue:-j '<i>fil.lthe,·)Firm (months)
The firm's delay in resolving the difference between its pro-
jected estimate and its previous value est~ate commitment can
conceivably vary greatly between different companies and different
situations. No data exists to help define this delay numeriqally.
We wi~l adopt a constant of six months duration (possibly somewhat
on the lower end of the feasible range) and test the model later
with a much 2anger delay in the firm's adjustment of its product
value estimate. Thus, at least temporarily,
DAEVF = 6 months
The rate of change of the estimate of value produces.? in
a cumulative fashion, the level equation £or the currently held
estimate of future product value o~ the firm. 0 This equation for
the future product value estimate completes the description of
the finm's process o£ perception of the need for and value o£ the
product.
EFPVF.K = ~FPVF.J + (DT)(RCEVF.JK)
EFPVF = 0
2-18, L
2-19, N
EFPVF--Estimate of Futll.re Product Value at the Firm
(dollars)
RCEVF--Rate of Change of Estimate of future Value at
the Firm (dollars/molltll)
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A similar set of equations to those of Equations 2-2 through
2-19 a~so describes the behavior o~ the customer. There is no
reason to believe that the customer's process of perception of
product value is any different from that of the firm with the
exception of the particular parameters or coefficients Which might
fit into the appropriate equations. The first aspect of the CllS-
tamer perception to be described is the customer's delay in recog-
nition of the current product value. This delay is a :function of
the customer's level of related product know-how, the delay de-
creasing exponentially as the customer's knOWledge increases.
Figure 2-6 corresponds to Figure 2-4 which showed the delay fune-
t ion for the firm.
~ElPt~ IN Re.cOGN \,1 bN
CD~?\I C -- !"\ONT\-\S)
-...---.- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
o
Figure 2-6 Delay in Recognition of Product Value
At the Customer
KNOW-HoW
LE'IEL (\::.LC'/C.)
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The two equations needed to describe the above curve corres-
pond to Equations 2-2 and 2-3 which described the delay in recog-
nizing the product value information for the firm .
DRPVC.K
DVRVC.K
..- DMRV + DVRVC ..K
= (DRPVT)e-KLEVC .K/12
2-20, A
2-21., A
DRPVC--Delay in Recognition of Product Value at the
Customer (months)
DMRV--Delay, Minimum, in Recognition o£ product Value
(months)
DVRVC--Delay, Variable, in Recognition of product Value
at the Customer (months)
DRPVT--Delay in Recognition of Product Value j Time
constant (months)
e--base of natural logarithms, equals 2.7183---
KLEVC--Know-how LEVel of the Customer (effective
man-months of effort)
The values of the two constants in these equations were defined
earlier in this appendix 0 DMRV equals 6 months and DRYVT = 60 months.
This makes the maximum delay in the custaner value perception pro-
cess be 66 months and the minimum be 6 months. These figures are
exactly the same as those used for the firm.
The customer's recognition of current product value is repre-
sented as a third-order lagged relationship of the intrinsic pro-
duct value. Figure 2-7 shows the three first-order delays used to
achieve this relationship, given DYNAMO's restriction against the
use of "lariable third-order delay time-constants 0 This diagram
is s~~ilar to that of Figure 2-5 used to represent the ~irm's
recognition process.
The equations which correspond to this diagram are similar to
Equations 2-4 through 2-11 used for the firm 0 The first equation
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Figure 2-7 Information as to Product Value Being
Communicated to the Custcwer
below takes one-third the value o£ DRPVC (Equation 2-20) for use
in the three first-order in£onnation delays.
DC1.K = DRPVC.~3 2-22,9 A
DCI--Delay at the Customer, 1 (months)
DRPVC--Delay in Recognition of Product Value at the
Customer (months)
We can now define the three level equations needed to produce
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the third-order lagged effect.
LEVC1.K = LEVC1.J + DT - LEVC1.J) 2-2J!J L(DCl.J)(IPV.J
LEVel = a 2-24, N
LEVC2.K = LEVC2.J + DT 2-25, L(nCl.J)(LEVCl.J - LEVC2.J)
LEVC2 = a 2-26, N
LRPVC.K = LRPVC.J + (DT) (RPVC .JK) 2-27, 1.
LRPVC = 0 2-28, N
LEVCI--LEVel at the Customer, 1 (dollars)
DC1--Delay at the Customer, 1 (months)
IPV--Intrinsic Product Value (dollars)
LEVC2--LEVel at the Customer, 2 (dollars)
LRPVC--Level of Recognized current Product Value at-
the Customer (dollars)
RPVC--Rate of recognition of Product Value at the
Customer (dollars/month)
The rate o~ change of the recognized current product value
at the customer makes LRPVC a first-order smoothing of LEVC2.
RPVC KL = LEVC2.K - LRPVC.K
· DCloK .2-29, R
RPVC--Rate of recognition -,of Product Value at the
Customer (dollars/month)
LEVC2-.-LEVel at the Customer, 2 (dollars)
LRPVC--Level of Recognized current Product Value at
the Customer (dollars)
DCl--Delay at the CustomerJ 1 (months)
The customer also becomes aware of the trend in his own recog-
nitian rate of new product value and takes this into account in
his projection of the future value of the product under considera-
tion. This is described below in Equations 2-30 through 2-33 which
in turn correspond to the earlier Equations 2-12 through 2-15 which
described these activities for the firm.
DTRPVSC.K = RPVSC. J + (iisRPV)(RPVc.JK - RPVSC.J)
RPVSC = 0
PFPVC.K = LRPVC.K + (RPVSC.K)(PHC)
PHC = (PLPC) (WARe)
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2-30, L
2-31, N
2-32, .&~
2-33, N
RPVSC--Rate of recognition of Product Value,
Smoothed" at the Customer (dollars/month)
DSRPV--Delay in Smoothing Recognition rate for Product
Value (months)
RPVC--Rate of recognition of Produet Value at the
Customer (dollars/month)
PFPVC--Projected Future PrOQ\lct Value of the Customer
(dollars)
LRPVC--Level of Recognized current Product Value of
. the Customer (dollars)
PHC--Projection Horizon of the Customer (months)
PLPC--PLanning Period of the Customer (months)
WARC--Willingness to Accept Risk by the Customer
(percentage)
The above equation set shows that the customer projects the changes
in his own belief's as to product value into the future. He uses
his level of' recognized current prod.uct value as a base-line and
extrapolates the smoothed average of his own rate of change of this
recognition. The extrapolation period, or the projection horizon,
of the customer is that fraction of his maximum planning period
which his risk-taking propens~ty influences him to utilize.
The time period of reacting to changes in the customer's recog-
nition rate, DSRPV~ is taken as 3 months>, just as was done for the
firm. This means that the customer tends to respond to his recent
perceptions and to quickly forget his earlier experiences. The
customer is aecus'tamed to having long lead-time requirements. His
planning period therefore might well be longer than that of the
firm. It is chosen here as being five years. Therefore~
PLPC = 60 months.
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Of course] the customer does not really commit himself to pro-
grams based on e-stimates that distant. His conservatism or rela-
tive unwillingness to accept risk} influences the customer to
restrict his vision to nea~er sights. The customer will be regarded
as relatively cautious initially, suggesting a 50% value for the
customer's willingness to ac~ept ri~k.
WARe = 0.50 (decimal percentage)
The projection of the trend in the customer's rate of recog-
nition of product value leads to a di£ferent figure than the cus-
tamer's previous estimate o~ future value. The customer therefore
undergoes the same type o£ pressure as the finn to change llis con-
victions as to the estimate of futUl.~e product value. The gap
between the projected value and the customer's previous cammit-
ment to an estimate of future value constitutes the force which
will create the rate of chan~e of· the customer's ccmunitment . As
was done wi-th the firm, the projected valuE ic first limited to a
positive range only before being u~ed as ~~ influence upon the rate
o~ change o£ the cllstaner' s estimate of future product value.
The fractional part of the gap between the projection and the pre-
viously committed estimate which enters as a change in the custo-
mer's estimate is determined by the customer's average delay in ad-
justing this value estimate.
R{':~·.7C .KL = IJPp,rC ·t: - EFPVC .KDAK"vC: 2-34, R
UPPVC.K = MAX(PFPVC .Ky 0) 2-35, A
78
RCl~VC-~.Rate'."df;·;Chapge i ~6f Estin1a+:? of future Value at
the Customer (dollars/month)
UPPVC--Used Projection of Product Value at the Customer
(dollars)
EFPVC--Estimate of Future-Product Value at the Customer
(dollars)
DAEVC--Delay in Adjusting the Estimate of Value at
the Customer (months)
MAX--a notation used by DYNAMO to indicate that the
maximum of the two parameters named within the
parentheses shall be used to determine the value
of the variable, UPPVC
PFPVC--Projected Future Product Value at the Customer
(dollars)
Due to the g7'eater organizational complexity of the customer,
relative to the firm, it is likely that his delay in adjusting
value estimates is probably somewhe.t. longer. We shall select a value
of eight months, reserving the right, as before, to test the model
with a much larger value later. Thus J
DAEVC = 8 months
The final variable to be specified in this chapter is the actual
estimate of future product value at the customer. This level is
a simple integration of all the estimate changes which have taken
place from the earliest embryonic phase of the project onward.
EFPVC.K = EFPVC.J + (DT)(RCEVC.JK)
EFPVC = 0
2-36, L
2-37:; N
EFPVC--Estimate of Future Product Value at the
Customer (dollars)
RCEVC--Rate of Change of Estimate o~ future Value
at the Customer (dollars/month)
This completes the specifications of the model equations and para-
meters which correspond to the Chapter 2 text.
CHAPTER III
THE ESTIMATION OF PROJECT EFFORT AND COST
The second phase of activity to appear in research and develop-
ment projects is the est~ation of the e£fort required to complete
the jobo Following the procedure used in discussing the perception
of the value of a product, this chapter shall proceed by first treating
the underlying situation as related to the ef£ort required to do the
jobo Then it will describe how the decision-makers in a research and
development project, that is the customer and the developing fi~,
make their est~ates of the effort neededo
The Underlying Determinants of Project Effort
Again, s~ilar io the concept of intrinsic product value that was
introduced in the earlier discussion, we shall now introduce the concept
of the intrinsic size of the .job 0 By this we mean that inherent in the
development of any new product is some set of tasks, whose magnitude is
defined by the nature of the product itselfo There are, of course, ma~
aspects to the product which create this magnitude of the jobo They
include the physical size of the job, the complexity of the prOduct,
the stringency of environmental requirements as demanded o£ the pro-
duct, including of course the reliability that is expected of the pro-
duct 0 The magnitude of effort required for an Rand D project is reflected
in the t~e needed for developmento For example,
From conception to operational status in quantities,
the time required for an entirely new aircra£t design
may vary from 4 to 8 years, depending on complexity
and urgency 0 Fighters, for example, might reach
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combat wings ready for combat in 4 years, whereas
medium and heavy bombers may take as long as 8 1
years or more to reach operational status in quantityo
In addition, whereas the intrinsic size of the task increases al3 com-
plexity increases, the steady trend in military research and develop-
ment has been towards heightened complexity a The curve below indicates
the number of electronic parts being used in modern aircrefto 2 This
indicates the trend in the sizes of research and development jobso
NUM~eR OF ELec.'RoN'<.
COM~oN~riT -PA~T~
('T"t+oUSANl'S)
,'to I.---------t-------t-----.------t:--------r-
bO I.------~-----+---
:to
<80 L...--------I-------+------r--- "----I--+-------r
taoL-------f------+------;------t---r-----r
\00L----.-+------+--------r-------t:;r-=----~
\~ 'i sa t, sS \9''0
Figure 3-1 Trend in Product-Complexity
~obert A, Bailey, tlApplication of Operations-Research Tech-
niques to Air-Borne Weapon System Planning", Aeronautical Engineering
Review, Volo 13~ Noo 11 (October 1954), ppo 73-740
2John Eo Hickey, Jro, ltWhat· Price Reliability?- Elect;ronic
Industries, Vol 0 20, Nco 9 (September 1961), po 1420
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But given these factors as describing the nature of the end product
desired, there is in fact a magnitude of task inherently associated with
the nature of this job. Thi's magnitude effectively describes the amount
of efficient effort that would be required to translate existing know-
hoW' in the technical area of the product into an equipment design for
the producto We ought to immediately recognize that one basic charac-
teristic of the job is the amount of effort that would be required to
desigr the end product even if all the product know-how needed to do
this design were already in existenceo But in fact, in the usual course
of events in the research and development pTocess, not only is it neces-
sary to translate existing know-how into an equipment design but in fact,
it is also necessary to develop the know-how itselfo
This brings us to the seuond ba~ic characteristic that determines
the amount of effort that is optimally needed to develop a new producto
The second characteristic is the available technological effectiveness,
otherwise known as the state of the arto
-- -- -- --,-.
The state o~ the technological art at any given time is the amount of
the then-available know-how which is necessary to design the producto
The amount of effort that a firm has to invest into the accomplishment
of the end result is dependent upon the e~ent to which it can mak~ use
of available technological know-how 0 Looked at from the opposite direc-
tion, the ef~ort required of the firm depends on the extent to which it
has to develop the technological know-how itselfo
In the activity of invention, as in most goa~-directed
activities, the actor has a number of alternative paths
amongst which he must chooseo The greater his knowledg~
of the relevant £ields the more likely he will be eventu-
~lly to find a satisfactory path, and the fewer the expected
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number of tried alternatives be~ore a satisfac-
tory one is found 0 Thus the greater the under-
lying knowledge, the lower the e~ected cost of
making any particular inventiono 3
The ~portant dynamic characteristic, therefore, that determines
how much effort will have to be invested to develop a new product is
this changing state of the technical arto The state o£ the art in any
technological area is always changing in an increasing fashion, and as
it changes the potential technological effectiveness of engineers wor-
king on the job is increasing 0 Figure 3-2 below illustrates what two
different curves of potential technological effectiveness might look likeo
Each corresponds to what might be a different rate of gro~h of the
,. ec:.r\NO\..Oc:,\C ~\..
..;=,:,s c:.,' VEN€SS
TJ:.ME
Figure 3<-2 Comparative Curves of Tecnnological Cirowth
3Richard R. Nelson, "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific
Research--A Th~oretical Analysis l1 , U-oSo Air Force Project Rand Research
Memorandum, P-1288 (April 28, 1958), ppo 6-70
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technological state of the art curve in the technical area related to
the product under developmento In the computer industry, for instance,
the state of the art of comput~g technology apparent in the new products
~
which became available to the computer user improved between 1950 and
1960 by an average factor of ten each year o These changes can be
measured~ for example, by the changes in cost per million arithmetic
operations which accompanied the successive release of such machines
as the IBM 604 j 650, 701, 704, 709, and 70900 These advances in the
end product reflect earlier changes in the state of the art of design
knowledge available to the engineers who were working on the develop-
ment of these new computerso
One can s~ilarly point to the changes in the state of the art of
any other technological area as factors reducing the effort re~uirements
for new developmenteo Examples from two different fields were specified
in recent testtmony to the United States Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Scienceso In the general area of materials the Assistant
Director of Research of NASA pointed out: "The next chart (oooProgress
in Strength of Materials) shows how the strength of materials has been
~proved over the yearsooooSince, in most cases, we are'talking about
materials having a constant density, the weight of the material is in-
versely related to the strength uf the metal--if we double the strength,
we can cut the weight in half~ Thus these new high-strength materials
appear to be very attractiveo ll4
4aichard V. Rhodes, NASA Scientific and Technical Programs,
Hearings before the Committee .Q1l Aeronautical and Space Sc:ences , United
States Senate, February 28 and March. 1, 1961 (Washington: UoSo Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961), ppo 421, 4240
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Figure 3-3 Progress in Strength of Materials
Their use can reduce the propulsion requirements of the booster vehicle
or make the task of the design engineers less dif£icult by easing the
weight restrictions on their con£igurationso A second partic~pant in
the hearings test~fied as to the increased p~load capabilities expected
from new more powerful rocket engines being developedo This technological
advance in propulsion ability was said to have in£luence on reducing
development effort required for p~load designso "This increase in pay-
load size and weight capability will greatly assist the payload designers
in their efforts to ~prove reliability, lower costs, and still include
essential functions in their p~loadson5 Thus the level of technological
ef~ectiveness available in the existing state of the art is seen to be
a dynamic factor which apparently is signi~icant in all technical fields
6
of product developmento
5Col Donald Ho Heaton, NASA Scientific and Technical Progr~s,
Hearings,~o cito, po 3270
6Here one of the distinctions between the real world and that
world which is described by the traditional microeconomics appears very
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The technological effectiveness potentially available in a given
area of product development is of course dependent upon the accumulation
of the previous growth of the state of the art, external to the firm
that is i tsel:f joing the development of the new prodl1ct 0 However, a
lengthy delay is encountered by any firm in determining and then uti-
lizing the current available level of technological know-howo First
there is the delay in transmitting the new knowledge from the firms
that have developed it to the firm which is in the position o~ applying
it to a parti~ular product development activitYo This delay in trans-
mitting new information is in part due to the secrecy or security
restrictions on such communication, and is in part due to the desires
of companies to preserve their own rights to information they have
clea.rlyo One of the fundamental notions o'E microeconomics is that of
a static set of technological capabilities of the £i~, which are repre-
sented by what is known as the ~inmvs production £Unc;ioDo !Pis produc-
tion £Unction shows as a static quantity the m~~um amount o~ product
that a finm can produce given various quantities oe production inputso
But in fact research and de'velopment activity in the real world is the
process of developing the techno19gical datum of the firm ioeo, the tech-
nological basis of the finmus production ~nction~ to the point where a
firm is ef£ective enough to be able to produce products acceptable to
the customer in terms of the cost and time requ..i.redo In the same vein.9
the traditional micrceconomdcs again ignores the fundamental basis of
research and development and of technological effect in its usual treat-
ment of the concept of technological external econamieso In Bishop's
text, he maintains J "Technological external economies are apt to be
rather isolated and trivialo u7 And yet, in the field of ~esearch and
development, the activities of one firm in a development project pro-
duce new know-how that in itself is used by other ~inms in their later
development projectso The cost to develop new products is constantly
being affected by the technological external economdes which come about
because of changes in the level of ~owledge in a technological area
or in a given industryo Here the effects of the external economies of
the technological type are certainly not trivial nor are they isolatedo
They are the essence of everJ day life in the research and development
area 0 .
7Robert Bishop, EQonomic Analysis (unpublished manuscript of
textbook), Book Two, Chapter Io po 290
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developed 0 With respect to the problems due to secrecy, over-classifi-
cation hampers progress because people are restricted fram communicating
with each other, thereby making the delay~in transmitting new know-how
much longer 0 The problem of "need to know"' also hampers such tra~smittals 0
Many different agencies of the government may be requesting research and
development work on projects which are essentially related in a techno-
logical fashion 0 But restriction of connnunication to only those peop~e
who have "need to know" on the particular project very often constrains
engineers and scientists who are technologiaally in the same area, even
within the same compa.~v, from communicating with each other 0 This often
prevents the flov of developmental information which could improve the
technological effectjveness o:f either or both of th\9 parties to the
potential cammunicatioDo
A second, perhaps more ~portant, influence on the delay in trans-
mitting and using know-how developed outside of the £irmvs own activities
is the SIN 0 I oHo factor" 0 ··The device or technique that was "Not Invented
Here" inevitably seems to have basic flaws to the engineer or scientist
working on the projecto Resistance to change, reluctance to give up the
old way of doing things, hesitation to accept a new approach, all relate
to the psychological barriers which delay the communication and use of
an advanced technology~
In addition to these two sources of delaYi the del~ in receiving
in£o~ation about changes in the state of the art is in part dependent
upon the decision to allocate effort for acquiring such new knowledgeo
This decision tacitly manifests itself in the company managera.~ attitude
toward permitting or encouraging workers to perfo~ searches of the
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literature before undertaking development activity in a new areao It
shows up in the manager's willingness to allow his engineering personnel
to attend scientific conferences in their areas of activity, and in his
enthusiasm (or lack thereof) for having his engineering personnel take
refresher courses at universities, participate in industrial symposia,
or take part in other profession~. engineering societies and activitieso
The attitude of the manager towards using outside consultants also in
part reflects his policy towards attempting to acquire outside techno-
logi.cal know-how for application to the development of a new product 0
The engineer~s own attitudes also determine his willingness to take time
to learn from the outsideo This t±me-allocation decision is influenced
not only by rational considerations of the alternatives, but also by the
individualVs personal educational objectives, his ego, and by the NoI~Ho
factor mentioned aboveo These manifoid poii~es and pressures determine
in part the delay in acquiring for use in the campanyUs Rand D projects
the new knowledge that has been developed outside or the ~irmis in~ernal
activities 0
In addition to the delay in transmitting and receiving the new
knowledge.? there exists the usually much longer delay in absorbing the
new know-how, in developing competence in the techniques, or experience
with the ne-w knowledgeo To illustrate
quickly recognize that it is totally ina.dequa.te to have read a book
containing all the elements of good oriving (either automobile or golf)
skilJ 0 For before we can accomplish the driving we,must absorb the know-
ledge that the book includes by developing experience in working with
these particular skillso And so it is in the technological area of
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developing new productso It ~akes a long t~e to adequately develop
competence in handling something like solid fuels o~ in "growing"
crystal materials 0 Thi.s tJPe of ttskills" information is extremely
hard to transmito The "art" is more difficult to acquire than the
"science" and is not well conveyed by wordso Thus, there is the
lengthy t~e span from the initial development of a new idea in a
technological. area through to the time when that idea is ready for
applicability 0 In fact each portion of this time period, the time
delay for transmitting the knOWledge, absorbing the knOWledge, and
acquiring experience in areas related to the knowledge, is usually
quite lengthyo
Thus for a task with a given intrinsic job size, the key factor
infl.uencin~ the achievement of the end product is the accumulation of
related know-howo With this as a background, it is easy to understand
the discussion by Borgatta and Meyer of the nature of invention:
it is just to attribute ~portant movements in
inventions to individuals only in l qualified senseo
The extraordinary individual works on the material
and psychic fund already present and if the situa-
tion is not ripe neither is he ripe6 From this
standpoint we can understand it is almost never
possible to attribute any great modern invention to
any single persono When the state of the science
and the social need reach a certain point, a number
o£ persons are likely to solve the same problemo 8
In a similar vein, Oro Eberhardt Rechtin has said:
it is true of science in one sense that no great
discoveries are made until the technology is ready
8
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for them; and when that time comes, the discoveries
are often made independently by a wide number of
researchers 0 The underlying principles of physics
presumably always have been the same; and yet, dis-
covery of motions of the solar system had to await
development of the telescopeo Formulation of the
laws of' electromagnetism had to await development
of simple electrical components ~irsto Now the
amount of science which can be accomplished in
space must await the launching o£ larger and larger
pay loads, better and better communications, guid-
ance, control, etc0 9
Finally, in still further concurrence with these viewpoints is a
statement made by Karl Taylor Compton while he was President of MoIoTo
"Anyone familiar wit~ scientific literature realizes the enormous number
of contributions, most of them small and riot very significant, but each
and all gradually raising the level o~ understanding in the storehouse
of knowledge until finally the stage is reached at which a great scien-
tific discovery or a mighty proctical application can be madeo wlO
In brief summary, all ()r the foregoing indicates that the amount
of ·effort needed to accomplish a significant research and development
task is dependent not only on the intrinsic size of the job, but also
upon the available tec~nologyo As the technological state of the art
~increas·es, the ability of engineers and scientists to apply llew knowledge
to their particular development project increases; hence, their technical
effectiveness increases 7 and the development effort required is reducedo
The Actual Estimation Process
Let us now turn to a discussion of how research and development
9Dro Eberhardt Rechtin, "Why the Space Race?W, IoRoEo Student
Qua!terly, Vol 0 7, Nool (May 1961).9 ppo 47-480
10
·fl.' Karl Taylor Compton, A Scientist Speaks (Cambridge: MoloTo
Press, 1955), po 620
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managers ~oth in the developing firm and in the organization of the
potential customer and user, go about estimating the amount of effort
required in a particular research and development undertakingo This
discussion will be broken into three basic areaso We shall first take
up the problem of how the initial estimate of the size of the job is
made, then we shall discuss the initial estimation of technological
effectiveness on the job, and finally we shall discuss how revisions
in both these estimates are made during the course o~ the proje~t lifeo
The Initial Estima~e
In a recent report by McKinsey and Company, one of the nation 1 s
largest consulting firms, to a major government research and develop-
ment sponsoring agency, the consulting firm said the following about
the problem of estimating project effort requirements: "No unerring
formula can be used to estimate the total number of man-years required
to car~J out a given project in terms of (a) supporting research, (b)
development of subsystems and components, (c) staffing of project-manage-
ment teams, and (e) technical and administrative support for each o£
these activitieso"ll This kind of general statement reflects the in-
herent nature of research and developmento The exact character of an
Rand D task is indefinite J the specific technical requirements are un-
certain, and the abilities of people to perform in areas of advancing
technology are even less specifically knoWDo Thus the initial estimates
of the wmount of effort required to do a research and development job
l~cKinsey and Company, Inco, An Evaluation of NASA's Con~ract
Policies, Organiz~tion and Performance (Washington: National Aero-
nautics and Space AdministratioD j 1960), pn 2-l9o
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are largely determined by factors other than the wreal underlying
facts of the situation", regardless of the degree of detail used in
outlining the project tasks or the planned: milestone accomplishment,
or even in defining elements of the so-called "development networkW
for use with currently popular techniques, such as PERTo
In making its initial es·tiI4ate of the intrinsic size o:f a research
and development task~ the firm and/or the customer is influenced by the
relationship of its previous job experience to the size of the project
under consideration, as well as its general overall managerial and
teahnical abilitY<t Enlarging on the first influencing force, we
should recall that each job has been defined as having an intrinsic
underlying job sizeo The company whose experience has included jobs
of ~his magnitude will be £ar more capable of estimating correctly the
scope of ~he anticipated undertaking than will other firms which have
not had any experience with this size of jobo To the extent that the
experience of the customer or the f~ has been with larger or smaller
jobs than the one under consideration its initial est~ate of the scope
o£ the Rand D task will be biased 0 That is, the company which has on
the average handled larger jobs in the past will probably from its
experience tend towards over-estimating the size of the current "jobo
This is inherent in the estimation process because of the indefinite
nature of research a.nd development contracts a
nTraditionally, Rand D estimates have been made by comparing the job
12
at hand with jobs previously completedo rt " If a campany 2s past experience
l2peter Vo Norden, "Curve Fitting for a MOdel of Applied R
and D Scheduling", IBM Journal of Research and Development, Vol 0 2, Noo 3
(July 1958), po
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has lead it to believe that a certain method of approach of managing
the job has turned out to be successful, it will generally think
that this same method of approach should be applied to future projectso
The compa~ which has handled large jobs will have acquired experiences
in which for the most ~art the degree of planning and organization
£or the conduct o£ activity tends to be largeo Such a campa~ will
regard other jobs as being best managed by the same approach 0 The
finm will thereby attribute as part of the e£fort the need £or a
major planning and organizational activitYo If the actual job under
consideration is intrinsically smaller than those which the company has
handled in the past, one which does not require the same degree of plan-
ning and organizatioD j then the compa~ will tend towards over-estimat-
ing the size of the jobo In fact, i~ the company is grant~d the con-
tract, the way in which it will go about managing the activity will no
doubt produce a job that in fact is larger in its total ef£ort outlay
than was necess~o
The same kind of beha~ior is true of the customer organizationo
An old armed forces adage said that in running an operation you needed
cooks for the drivers and drivers for the cooksno A highly placed
expert on the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line said that the Air Force
had estimated the cost of an early warning system at forty billion
dollars 0 Such a cost might in fact have been realistic for the Air Force~s
staffing estimate of 300 men per baseo However J a specially-convened
summer study group in 1952 ~eccmmeTI.ded that the DEW line be staffed wfth
twelve men per baseo rue system actually ended up utilizing fifteen men
per baseo Tne ~r Force's experiences, or perhaps the traditivnal practice
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to which the adage above referred, led it to this major over-estima-
tion of job magnitude and casto
Similarly, a company whose experiences have'largely been with
jobs that are much smaller in size will have a tendency due to its
experience of underestimating the overall scope of the Job; Such a
company will probably have di~ficulty in recognizing the magnitude of
the task be£ore them 0 It will probably not understand the necessary
requirement of initial organization and preplanning which is character-
1stic of a large undertakingo Thus the company whose experiences have
been with smaller jobs in the past will be influenced to underestimate
the 3ize of the jobo
Another variable af£ecting the nature of bias in effort estimations,
more general than the in£luence of the campanyls past experience, is an
overriding tendency to underest~ate all jobs 0 This comes about due to
the motivations of the customer to see a job as being relatively inexpen-
sive, that is to recognize the job as being within the realm of economic
feasibility 0 It comes about because the firm has a tendency to under-
estimate the scope of the job in its hopefulness that the customer will
undertake the task and that the ~i~ itself will be able to acquire the
contract 0 On the basis of its pioneering attempt to analyze the results
of twenty-two Air Force contracts, the Rand Corporation reported the
following opinion as to the reason for these underest~ationso
The optimistic bias is not hard to understando
Contractors are anxious to have their proposals
acc~pted by the military, and the military itself
is anxious to have developmental proposals sup-
ported by the Department of Defense and Congresso
The incentive to make optimistic est~ates is thus
very strongo On the other hand, the contractual
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penalties ~or having been over-optimistic are
generally smallo 13
Thus we might say that before the job has ~een started there is a
general 'tendency for both the contractor and the military agency to
underestimate the over-all scope of the jobo On the other hand the
relative experience of the company ~nd of the customer, in terms of
the si~ es o:f the jobs that they have :-.. na~taken in the past, will add
a further bias to the nature of their initial estimates of the size of
the jobo
Interacting with both of these tendencies towards distortion of
the estimation of the intrinsic job size is the managerial and technical
qUality of the finm or customer itselfo Despite the fact that tendencies
exist towards biasing estimates of job size in one direction or another
the competent firm is by definition less likely to be swayed by these
tendencies 0 Influenced by the same basic tendencies due to general
psy~hological considerations and/or previous job-size experience, the
less competent firm will tend to be further off in its estimates of the
job size than the CX) mpany whose managerial and technical capabilities
are higho
One writer comments on this factor as follows:
Same persons wishi~~ to "look gOOd", consciously
or unconsciously, inevitably underestimate the
potential value of their proposed project 0 On the
other hand, there are incurable optimists who think
that they can produce results worth millions, at
very low cost, in a very short time. A success:ful
research and development executive is someone who
lJA• Wo Marshall, and W. H. Meckling, lfPredictability o:f the
Cost, Time, and Success of Development", Rand Corporation Report, P-1821
(Decem~er ll, 1959), po 22~
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can take the estimates given him by his staff, and
by knowledge of ~he individuals, of the type of work
to be undertaken, etco, can derive a "truthified"
~Te:I'sion (in view of later, actual reSlllts) of the
e,;Jtimates 0 14
These tl~ee factors then combine to produce the initial est~ate
of the size of the job: 1) the general over-all tendency to under-
estimate the job size; 2) the relationship of the previous jOb-size
experience of the firm or the customer to the current projectUs
intrinsic job size; and 3) the over-all managerial and technical
quality of the firm or customer agencyo
This estimate of tl1e intrinsic size of the job is only one of the
two inputs to the initial estimate of the total amount of effort that
will be needed to get the job doneo Earlier discussion pointed Qut the
importance of estimating the amount of technical effectiveness that is
currently available or which will potentially became available for
application to the jobo This means that the estimating organization
has to attempt to evaluate how efficient or effective their engineers
and scientists will be on the particular research and development pro-
ject being consideredo To do this the organization must not only think
about the amount of technical knOWledge that is currently availableo
It must also assess the rate of growth of the technical state of the
art and try to guess at the future growth of knbw-how which will be
available for application to the job under consideratioDo
In initially estimating the current effectiveness of engineers
14aaoul 3. Freeman, "A Stochastic Model for Determining the
Size and Allocation o£ the Research Budget",. IRE Transactions Qg Engi-
neering Management~ Vol 0 EM-7, Noo 1 (March 1960), po 30
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working in the ~inm, there are two principle influencing forces at
work 0 First of course is the actual effectiveness of the producing
engineers and secoIld is the atti tude of optimism or con£idence of
the firm or of the customero The actual e~~ectiveness o~ engineers
working for the firm will be discussed in a later chapter discussing
engineering productivityo Initially, ioeo, before work on ~he project
as a project has begun the engineering effectiveness of relevance here
is that of engineers believed to be available within 0r outside of the
Rand D compa~o The principle task to be discussed now is the esti-
mation of the effectiveness of engineers in the contemplated projecto
Thus we are discussing how people estimate the e~fectiveness of applying
men of given ini.tial skills and knOWledge to solving unkno~s in the
anticipated research and development taskso The estimators no doubt
start with an aura of uncertainty as to what is the state of technology
in the related problem areao This lack of certainty regarding the exact
details for solving th~ particular Rand D problem leads most estimators
to underestimate the technology that is initially available~ especially
within the available work force~ and hence leads to underestimating
the current technological effectiveness of the engineers 0 Of course
this underest~ation (or alternately, overestimation) depends on the
degree of optimism of the firm or customer and upon the con~idence
in the fi~~s engineering talentso Thus while we earlier maintained
that in general a strong tendency exists to underest1mate existing
engineerinr effectiveness in the contemplated problemo The two
hypotheses act in opposite directions and would tend y in and of
themselves; to cancel each other Quto We vii.ll. soon see hoW'
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other factors contribute to the errors commonly observed in Rand D
effort est~ateso
The second factor determining the initial estimate of technological
effectiveness is the estimate of the £uture changes in the state of the
art which viII be able -to be ysed in the contemplated project 0 This
is largely dependent on the related technological progress observed
by the customer or firm and the organizationis relative optimism as to
the continuation of this progress rateo If, for example, a finm is
considering a project in an area where break-throughs and advances in
techniques have been occurring steadily, it no doubt will assume that
such events will continue 0 Thus it will est~ate the future technologi-
cal effectiveness of its engineering force as being much greater than
the engineers u current capabilities in the new product area under studyo
A good example of this typical practice of progress curve extra-
polation is shown in a thorough discussion in 1953 of British aircraft
engine developmento "There is [pictured] a series of curves showing
British progress in the last decade and what m~ be expected by 19600000
These curves are self-explanatory, indicating a stea~ improvement in
15eI].gine performance during the last 10 years 0 n Several of the curves
depicted are shown belovo What is of particular interest is the obvious
fact that in no case does the anticipated technology do other than extend
the trend lines of past progress--no radical departures in the rate of
advance of state or art, not even a~ signs of nonlinearities due to
such commonplace effects as diminishing rate of returnso These curves
15Fo Ro Banks, "The Birth of an Engine", Aeronautical Engi-
neering Review, Vol 0 12, Nco 6, (June 1953), ppo 40-410
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lend weight to the assertion that the usual practice in forecasting
technological effectiveness is that of continuing the observed
or believed progress trend lineso Ellis Johnson, a veteran of many
studies of military planning problems, confi~ed these observationso
He said, "The technical forecast 0 o ofor any particular 'time frame is
based on existing trends in their relation to the values and objec-
tives chosen, and it makes a prognosis of situations that may arise
in a future period if these trends continueo n16 The extrapolation
shown in the curve of Figure 3-3 (page ) still further supports this
cant entioD 0 Only in cases of extreme optimigm or pessimism does it
seem likely that deviations would tend to occur in such estimating
methods 0
Let us now summarize this discussion on the initial pre-start
determination of estimates of effort required to do an Rand D pro-
jecto It was pointed out that the estimate of ef£ort is based on
(1) an est~ate of job size and (2) an estimate of technological
effectiveness 0 The prime influences on the firm or custamerVs ability
to estimate job size correctly were a general psycholoiically-based
tendency towards underestimation, the relatedness of previous jOb-size
experience to the contemplated project, and the over-all managerial
and technical quality of the organizatioDo The estimate of the tech-
DOJQiical effectiven~ss that engineers will be able to apply during the
project life cycle is based on the believed current "efficiency rating"
l6Ellis A Johnson, "The Crisis in Science and Technology and
its Effects on ~lita~ Development", Operations Research, Vol 0 , Noo
(January - February 1958), po
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of the engineers and the expected changes in this efficiencyo These
factors in turn depend upon the actual level and historical rate of
progress of the applicable technology and the optimism and confidence
of the customer and/or the firm in the ability of the eng~neers to
utilize these potentialities and in their expectations of continuation
of progress advancements 0
Revisions in the Effort Estimates
All o£ the above has described the process of effort estimation
which takes place prior to the £inmvs initiation of much engineering
work on the projecto But the passage of time and the new experiences
produced by the work process provide new inputs to both firm and cus-
tomer, upon which infonmation they base their revisions in the esti-
mates of effort requirementso This section will look into the factors
determining these estimate revisions during the project li£eo ~et us
look at the reasons behind modifications in the estimates of the first
input to the effort requirements, namely, the basic size of the jobo
Based on their assumptions of the technical capabilities of the engi-
neering stafr, the customer and the firm establish an estimated schedule
of completion of tasks, problems, milestones, program elements, or what-
have-you within the over-all projecto Thus for the assumed effective-
ness level, the total engineering ef£ort applied up to any point in
til\~ had an expected and scheduled perceut-of-job campletioDo In
addition to referring to this previous schedule, however, both organi-
zations continually assess the progress actually made up to that point
in timeo (The way they estimate the project progress is discussed in
Chapter 60) To the extent that an organization can recognize its
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anticipated schedule as deviating from its CUI~ent beliefs as to
actual progress on the job, the organization can modify i~s earlier
estimate of the size of the jobo An importa.nt question is wl:lether the
organization responds to such a gap quickly or not. Usually the degree
of responsiveness is a function of how far along in the project the
organization is or believes it iso In the early phases of the pro-
ject not only is it difficult to detenmine the existence of gaps be-
tween the scheduled and the believed actual progress, but moreover it
is easier psychologically to .blame the gap on "initial organizing
problems" or on some other excuse than it is to revise the estimate of
job magnitudeo However, later in the job such gaps in progress begin
tobecome more Obvious, and are harder psychologically to ignore 0 Thus
as the project evolves in time the significance of these estimation
errors becomes greatero Recognition of their signi£icance results in
changed size-or-job estimates 0
But if thds recognized gap between scheduled and believed actual
progress causes revisions in the estimates of job size, what other
factors cause revisions in the estimates of the technological effec-
tiveness that will, in the course of the project, be applied to getting
the job done? Fi.rst, of course, are the observed changes in related
technology and the attitudes towards expecting the continuation of such
advances 0 These two factors were discussed thoroughly in earlier pages
which described the initial estimate of future technological effective-
ness, and the a:rguments need not be repeated hereo More important is
the contribution to revisions of the effectiveness est~ates that re-
sults from belated recognition of the gap between believed accomplish-
ment and actua~ accomplisrmento Note the difference in concepts between
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this paragraph and the preceding oneo Typically at some mid-point
of the project life cycle, we could argue that the scheduled (or
anticipated) progress exceeds the believed (or currently estimated)
progress, which in turn probably exceeds thE actual progresso The
gap between the first two measures was discussed in the last para-
graph on jOb-size estimates, while it is here maintained that the gap
between the latter two factors influences revisions in the estimates
of engineering effectivenesso When something happens in the project
to demand recognition of this gap betwe·~n the believed and the actual
level of project achievement, eogo the missile engine blows up on the
launch pad~ both finm and customer are influenced to revise their
previously-held est~ates of the technological effectiveness of the
engineering work-forceo The del~s in making these revisions, too,
are dependent on the organizationUs characteristics, and on how far
along in the project they areo The argument made earlier holds here,
also~ since during the early stages o£ a project it is extremely dif-
ficult to become aware of gross technical errors which might stimulate
revisions in the effectiveness estimateso The product model-building j
fabrication, pilot assembly, or testing y all of which occur during
later phases of a project life, produce the tangible evidences which
usually force recognition of unexpected inefficiencies (or much less
likely, vice versa) 0
Cost Estimation
The precediD~ portion of this chapter has concerned itself with
the bases for effort requirements in an Rand D project and with the
w~ in which these requirements are estimated by the fi~ and the potential
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customer ° But in making a decision as to the advisability of a
pa:_...ticular rest;arch and development undertaking, the customer
explicitly takes into account the expected dollar cost of the
project g if for no other reason, because the budgetary l~itations
on the contracting agency are expressed in dollar termso Thus, it
is necessary at all stages of an Rand D project to go from the effort
requirement described earlier to a cost requiremento However, despite
the fact that inputs other than labor, eogo materials, machines, facili-
ties, enter into the productive process of research and development,
the prime ingredient j even from a dollar viewpoint, is engineering
and scientific manpowero Arter analy~ing several Rand D projects
at IBM, Norden reported J "Costs of materials, tools, test equipment 9
and purchases~ etco~ do not seem to have a functional relationship
to the difficulty of the projecto,,17 Furthering this finding is
Asherus report of a Rand studyo
Materials cost in the case of engineering [ioeo,
the Rand D phase for an aircraft project] is
usually smallo Engineering cost is essentially
the labor cost of engineers, draftsmen, and other
skilled technical personnel and the overhead neces-
sary to support these peopleo In the case of cost-
plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts [the usual Rand D
contractual arrangement]yooothe contractors are reim-
bursed for overhead costoooby applying the negotiated
fixed overhe~d rates to the actual direct-labor dol-
~.8.rs cha.rged to tIle ccntra~t 0 18
Both of these references point to the effort requirement as being
17Norden, I1Curve Fitting for a Model of Applied Rand D
Scheduling"; opocito~ po
18Harold Asher, ncost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe
Industry", Project Rand Report, R-291 j July 1, 1956, po
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the major determinant of project casto This conclusion seems to have
'been found also in many economic surveys of research and development
activities in various industrieso These studies almost uniformly sum-
marize their findings as to Rand D cost by citing an average annual
dollar Rand D cost per engineer 0 For example, the following situation
was acted by two engineers in their report on Rand D cost estimation
practices~
Past experience has shown this company that all
engineering ~acilitating activities (computers j
draftmen, supplies J test equipment j etco) may be
prorated and considered in the cost of one engineer 0
For example, on the average~ in this company it costs
approximately $30,000 per year for one engineer and
all of the facilitating activities that are required
for his 8upporto
It is interesting to note that the figure $30~OOO
was developed intuitively from experience 0 However i
another large corporation which is known to the w-riters
and which does hundreds of millions of dollars of work
for the government each year uses the same systemo Their
figure is derived from detailed cost analysis and is cor-
related with current economic indicatorso Their figure
for the same time period was $27,000019
This type of "dollars-per-man" assumption seems adequate for most
purposes in project budgeting j and this practice is apparently used ex-
tensively in industryo20 Thus same average relationship between effort
19Vernon Lo Lambert and Hubert Fo Sackett, "Research and
Development Cost Estimation", TIRE Transactions on Engineering Management,
Volo EM-6, Noo 1 (March 1959),~ 100
20See, for example, the report of the BOQz, Allen, and
Hamilton field surveys on research and development activity~ Wilson Co
Randle, "The Problems of Rand D Management", Harvard Business Review,
Volo 37.1 Noo 1.9 (January-February 1959), po 1320 The National Science
Foundation has collected information on the costs of Rand D on this
"per-engineer" basis for the various industries in the United Stateso
A good refer~nce source for this data is: National Science FoundatioD q
Funds for Research and Development in Industry, 195" (Wasrington: United
States Government Printing Office~ 196 ), po
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required and cost is utilized both initially, prior to the projectis
"£ormal" start, and throughout the project life cycleo The cost esti-
mates are of course subject to the same kinds of errors that were indi-
cated in the discussion of effort estimation: the "natural~ tendency
to underestimate, the eZfect of previous exPeriences with projects of
similar scope; and, modifying these other influences, the fact that all
the estimates necessarily reflect subjective evaluations whose accuracy
depends on the managerial and technical ability of the organizationo
Lambert and Sackett, quoted above, report from their survey study, "All
the companies contacted had one thing in common in their engineering
cost estimation procedure, this being judgment based on experienceo
All organizations interviewed agreed that the ability of the men who
do the actual estimating is of prime importance.~2l To be effective
the estimators at least have to possess reasonably valid beliefs as to
the natu~e of the problems to be encountered, the extent of difficulty
involved in their solution~ and the approximate number of people,
materials, computer time, etco, required to achieve the solutionso This
task requires extraordinary~-c~petence~ombined with elements of strong
intuitive insight and applicable experienceo
The cost est~ates thus formed are held internally by the customer
and the firm separately, and may differ noticeably from the cost figures
used in the c0Dtracting processo But this problem is better discussed
in the next chaptero
2~ambert and Sackett, loco cit.
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Past Experiences in the Est~ation of Effort and Cost
This chapter has thus far pointed out (1) the underlying deter-
minants of optimal effort and cost in a research an~ development pro-
ject) and (2) the main ~actors in~luencing the way individuals make
estimates of the real resource need for such a jobo The demand for
such a discussion of the fundamental aspects o~ resource require-
ments in research and development arises from the problems which
exist in this estimation areao One need not go far to find evidence
o£ this kind of problem in research and development projectso First
o£ all any research and development manager can speak from his own
experiences of the great difficulties ~properly est~ating the
amount of effort which will be required to successfUlly complete the
development 0
On a less subjective basis} same tangible evidence exists to
back up thi.s above statement about the general experiences of Rand
D managers 0 A Rand Corporation report cited earlier documented a
major effort which attempted to gather data on and analyze the mili-
taryCs experieuees in product deve1opmento 22 On each o~ twenty-two
major items of Air Force equi:PJIlent the authors calculated the ratio
of the latest available es~imate of the average cost of production
of such equipment ~o the earliest such estimate that could be foundo
Of the twenty-two projects examined, two were found in which the pre-
dicted average costs were correcto The other twenty projects incurred
costs which differed from their initial estimates by amounts ranging
from 20 per cent to 5,760 per cent greater than the initial cost
2~rShal1 and Me~kling, Ope cito, po 110
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est~ateo Examining the figures by class of project, in nine air-
craft fighter development projects the cost estimates were found to
be off by an average of 240 per cento In three bomber projects the
estimates were off by 450 per ~ento In four projects aimed at develop-
ing and producing cargo and tanker aircraft the average estimate was
off by a mere 30 per cento Finally, in six~missile projects the
estimates were found to be off by 1~710 per cento In this last case
even if one excludes the particular exceptional project mentioned
earlier which was o£f by a factor of 5,760 per cent in its cost esti-
mation, the other five missile projects still erred in their est~ates
by 900 per cento In summarizing their analysis of this data, the
authors Jaid~
The data presented above are neither as comprehensive
nor as unambiguous as one would likeo Nevertheless,
they do give a reasonably accurate picture of recent
experience with predicting the outcome of development
projects 0 The truth is that estimates have been quite
inaccurate 0 Cost increases on the order of 200 per
cent to 300 per cent and e=~tensions of development
t~e by a third to a half are not the exceptioDy but
the ruleo In addition, the size of the error in esti-
mates has varied widely from one weapon to anothero 23
Reporting a ~imilar RAND study of slippages in development schedules~
Klein and Meckling stated:
Out of thirteen [aircraft] engines studied, four
passed the 50-hour [acceptance] test 2-4 years later
than the date estimated when development was begun;
another four were 1-2 years late in passing the test;
while five completed the test within twelve months o~
the estimated time of completioDoooThe development of
electronic (quipment appears to be even less predictable
than the development of aircraft engines 0 Types of air-
borne electronic equipment whose development initially
23Ibi~Q, ppo 21-22.
108
appear to present the same order of technical
difficulty are not uncommonly 3-5 years apart
in reaching an acceptable standard of ofera-
tional usefulness and reliabilityo 24 .
To further support this already strong evidence produced by
the RAND Corporation, a f01~er Crder Scientist of the United States
Air Force said in a recent infonmal talk that a 2955 survey of JOO
military research and development projects pointed out the £act that
only one contract Qut of the 300 had been done in the initially esti-
mated timeo More than 50 per cent of the contracts took over twice
the initial estimated time to complete, more than a third took over
three times as long to do as had been earlier anticipated, with the
data consistently indicating this type of pattern extending out to
projects which required ten t~es as long to complete as had initially
been estimated·o He further remarked that the record of costs incurred
in such project~ showed a similar relationship to their initial esti-
mates as did these records of the completion timeso 25
The records thus speak out very clearly--we have historically
found major di~ficulties in estimating the amount of e~£ort that will
be required to successfully complete a project undertakingo The data
sighted here is even bi~sed to the extent that it generally comes from
projects which were in fact completed, excluding the many projects
which have never reached completioDo or course many of theSe latter
24surton Klein, and William Meckling, "Application of Opera-
tions Research to Develonment Decisions"g Operations Research j (May-
June 1958), p •
25Guyford H. Stever, informal talk to Mol.T. Seminar on
Research and Development for ~litary Purposes~ February 15, 19610
109
cases were cancelled because of the exorbitant cost and effort that
was discovered to be required for completion of the project goalo
Such awakenings often take place a:fter much time and money have al-
ready been spent to develop the end product with but little or no side
benefits to compensate for such expenditureso
The phases of underlying project activity considered in these
past two chapters, the perception of value, and the estimation o~
effort and cost requirements, have dealt largely with influences
provided intrinsically from the product environment"; and from the
psychological and experience-based characteristics of the Rand D
£irm and customer organizationso Many problems for research and
development management have already been describedo The next chapter
will begin to recognize how the more overt policies by the customer
and firm combine with these other characteristics to make still mare
complex the inter-relationships between research and development
activities 0
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
As was done in the Appendix to Chapter II, we shall in this
appendix indicate the appropriate flow diagrams and equations which
describe the material covered in the preceding texto The first
diagram, Figure 3-5, includes those factors re]~a.ted to the develop-
ment of the est~ate (by either the firm or the customer) of the jobo
At the top of the diagram, we see indicated the fact that the real world
product requirements define the intrinsic size of the job, ioeo, that
level of advanced know-how which is needed for the development of the
productu This is a basic input to the initial job size est~ate o~
either the finm or the custamero We have labelled this est~ate the
"believed needed know-how for the development of the product":l
However, both organizations in their est~ating procedures are in£lu-
enced by factors other than the real job sizeo These other factors
include the estimation bias due to their past experiences, the general
tendency to underest~ate the complexity of a job, and the technical
and managerial ability of the organization, all of which affect the
initial est~te of job sizeo This initial estimate then provides a
starting point for the organizationis continuous redetermination of
job size, ioeo, needed product know-how, thrOughout the life cycle
of the prcducto During the project life cycle, changes are made in
this initial jOb-size est~ate as required by the organizationVs res-
ponse to gaps which it detects in the scheduled engineering accomplish-
mento These gaps exist between the scheduled percentage completion
of the job, as based upon the amount o£ engineering effort that has
been put into the task and the organizationis est~ate of the current
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Figure 3-5 Estimate of Job Size
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effectiveness of this efrort, and, contrasted to this, the organi-
zationUs over-all estimate o£ the believed percentage completion
of the project to dateo The fraction of this gap which is recog-
nized at any t~e and taken into account in changing the existing
est~ate of job si.ze is dependent upon the stage that the project
is ino As was explained in the earlier parts of this chapter, during
the early phases of the project it is very diffi~~lt to recognize any
errors in the scheduleo This task, however, becomes somewhat less
dif~icult as the project advances towards completion 0
We shall begin by listing the equations £or the firm 0 Its
est~ate of the job size may be described by a level equatioDo This
equation states simply ~hat the fi~gs current belief as to the know-
how needed for development of the product is what it believed before
plus any changes from its previous estimate 0
BNKPFoK = BNKPFoJ + (DT) (RGEJFoJK) 3-1, L
BNKPF--Believed Needed Know-how for development of the
Product by the Fi~ (effective man-months of
e£fort)
RGEJF--Rate of recognition of Gap in Estimate of Job
size at the Finm (effective man-months/month)
Initially, before the firmus experiences on the project have became
the key determinants of this jOb-size estimate, other factors create the
fi~~s beliefso These influences determine the extent to which the finm's
initial size estimate will err from the intrinsic size of the product
development jobo Thus the initial condition equation below states that
the believed needed know-how for the product is the intrinsic needed know-
how multiplied by a modifying factor, discussed on the next page, which
includes the error-producing ef£ects of such factors as experience, ability,
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and environment 0
BNKPF = (MSEF) (NLKP) 3-2, N
BNKPF--Believed Needed Know-how for development or
the Product by the Firm (e~fective man-months
of ef£ort) .
MSEF--Modifier or the job Size Estimate of the Fi~
(percentage)
NLKP--Needed L~vel of Know-how for development or the
Product (effective man-months or effort)
The constant NLKP speci£ies for any given project simulati~n the
~ount of effective engineering effort required to develop the producto
This is an input characteristic of the product and will of course be
changed in many sDnulation runs to test the ef£ect of different job
sizes on project Qutcomeso NLKP is the measure of built-in scope and
complexity of the jobo It is stated in te~s of effective ef~ort rather
actual efforto If, for example, engineers working on the project aver-
age a twenty percent effectiveness, then the actual total Jeffort needed
to complete the project will be five times NLKP: an average effective-
ness of fifty percent will require twiee NLKP, and so ono Initially
let us start with NLKP = 6000 effective man-months of efforto This
means the jOb size calls £or 500 effective man-years of engineering
work 0 Figuring, for instance, on an average e£fectiveness of 25 per-
cent, 2000 man-years of engineering would be needed to complete the
product development 0 At an average of $30,000 per engineering man-
year of work (including Bupporting personnel), a cost requirement Of,
about 60 million dollars is indicatedo This gives a "ball-park" idea
o~ the size undertakings that are to be considered in this undertakingo
The factors which cause the firm to make errors in its attempts
to estimate NLKP are shown in the next diagramo Figure ,3-6 indicates
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Figure 3-6 other I~~luences on the Job Size Est~ate o£ the Firm
that the past experience of the company (relative to the intrinsic size
of the present task) combines with a general tendency to underestimate
job size to produce one influence on the firm~s belief as to the amount
of know-how needed for development of the producto This influence is
in turn modified by the over-all ability of the finm, based on the theory
that the more capable the firm, the smaller the error in its job size
estimate a
These influences are incorporated in the two curves and several
equations that follow a The first curve combines the effects of the
previous experience and the general tendency to underestimate the size
of research and development tasks a On the horizontal axis we have the
percentage difference between the average job size handled in the past
by the company and the size of the present job being s~ulatedo The
vertical axis presents the percentage estimating error that would tend
result from this experience, ignoring for the moment the modifying effect
ll;
of the finmvs over-all capability 0 The general tendency toward under-
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Figure 3-7 Influence of E~erience on the Job Size Estimate of the Firm
IETAB* = -0095/-090/-083/-075/-065/-.50/-.25/0/106/3
previous jobs being exactly the same as the size of the present job
(PDPEF = 0) the firm would tend to initially underestimate the job size
by 50 percento The table of constants below the curve shows the error
percentages at intervals along the curve separated by 20 percent incre-
ments in the previous experienc~ gap 0
The equation for this effect on the Job size estimate is:
IESEF = TABLE (IETAB,PDPEF, -1, +l~ 002) 3-3, N
IESEF--Influence of Experience on the job Size
Est~ate of the Finm (percentage error)
IETAB--In£luence of Experience TABle, a table of
stored input numbers which w·ill. produce
the appropriate value of IESEF for a given
value of PDPEF
PDPEF--Percent Deviation of Past Experience of the
Firm (percentage)
The table of values for IETAB is shown immediately beneath Figure 3-70
~ an initial input describing the finm we shall assume that the average
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size of the jobs that the £irm has handled in the past is 25 percent
smaller than the job being considered currently 0 Thus
PDPEF = -0025 (decimal percentage)
This constant will be changed in later simulation runso
It is reasonable, however, that the firm with more capable manage-
ment will not err as greatly in its job size estimation as tIle finn
with poor managerial abilityo The effect o£ the general quality o~
0.50 o.'s 'JoO /: )
QUAL.. I TY of T~e F I Rtvl L c/o
Effect of the Firm's Ability on its Est~ation Error
0.,2.5
Figure 3-8
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the firm is taken into account in the curve below 0
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When the quality of the firm is at its maximum possible value (QF = 1),
the previous size of job experience of the firm produces no additional
tendency to err in its initial estimates of the job sizeo When the
quality of the fi~ is 0, the full effect of the previous experience
(from equation 3-3), shows up in the es''Cimation erroro When the quality
of the finm has any intermediate value between 0 and 1, a part of the
ef£ect of IESEF is felt as a modi£ier of the size estimate o£ the ~i~o
The particular value is selected from Figure 3-8 by use of a-DYNAMO
table hook-up ~nction in the equation:
EAEEF = TABLE (EAETB, QF, 0, 1, 001) 3-4, N
EAEEF--Effect of Ability on the Estimation Error
of the Firm (percentage)
EAETB--Effect of Ability on estimation Error, Table,
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a table of stored constants, shown under
Figure 3-8, which produce the appropriate
value of EAEEF for a given value of QF 0
~-----Quality of the Firm (percentage)
Initially the firm will be assumed to be extremely able, and will
be assigned a 100 percent quality measureo Thus,
Q,F = 1000 (decimal percentage)
This value will cancel out the f'irm as initial estimation error 0 In
later simulations, QW will be set at other values between 0 and 1, thus
varying the effectiveness of the potential estimation error and also
modifying the finm's behavior in other ways, not yet discussed 0
Both the experience and the ability effects came togetheL in deter-
mining the estimation error, which acted to modify the intrinsic job
size constant in the initial value equation for BNKPF (Equation 3-2)0
MSEF = 1 + (EAEEF) (IESEF) 3-5, N
MSEF--Modi£ier of the job Size Estimate of the
Firm (percentage)
EAEEF--Effect of Ability on the Estimation Error
of t~~ ¥i~ (percentage)
IESEF--Influence of Experience on the job Size
Estimate of the Finm (percentage error)
This completes the specification of equations needed to provide the
initial condition for BNKPF, the Believed Needed Know-how for develop-
ment o£ the Product by the Fizmo
As Equation 3-1 shows~. the job size estimate continuously changes
during a project in response to the rate of recognition of errors in
that estimate 0 The estimation error which is gradually recogn~zed, is
here called the gap in engineering accomplishment, GEAF, and indicates
the percentage deyiation between the estimated schedule and the believed
progress to {'::. ~e in terms of percent completion of the projecto This
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Ttds percentage deviation is multiplied in Equation 3-7 below by the
believed size of the job, BNKPF, to produce the gap in the esttmated
size of the job, GENKF, in consistent units of man-months o~ efforto
This term then is multiplied by FOGRF, which indicates the percent-
age of that error gap which the firm reccgnizes in a~v month, to pro-
duce the rate of change of the fi~vs previous commitment as to the
estimate of the job size, RGEJF (Equation 3-8)0
GEAF K = ESPCFoK - BPPCFoK
o BPPCFoK
GENKFoK = (GEAFoK) (BNKPFoK)
RFEJFoKL = (GENKFoK) (FOGRFoK)
.:3-6, A
3-7, A
.3-8, R
GEAF--Gap in Engineering Accomplishment at the
Firm (percentage error)
ESPCF---Estimated Scheduled Percent Completion of
the project at the Firm (percentage completion)
BPPCF--Believed Percent of Project Completion by the
Fi~ (percentage completion)
GENKF--Gap in the Estimate of Needed Know-how at the
Firm (effective man-months of effort)
BNKPF--Believed Needed Know-how for development of
the Product by the Firm (effective man-months
of effort)
RGEJF--Rate of recognition of Gap in Estimate of Job
size at the Fi~ (effective man-months/month)
FOGRF--Fraction Of Gap Recognized by the Fi~ (per-
centage of gap recognized/month)
The scheduled percentage completion takes into account the actual amount
of effort that has been put forth, the believed e££ectiveness of this effort,
and the believed amount of total effective effor~ which would be necessary
to complete the jobo
ESPCF K = (TEEFoK) (ETEFoK)
o BNKPFoK 3-99 A
ESPCF--Estimated Scheduled Percent Completion of
the project at the Firm (percentage com-
pletion)
TEEF--Total Engineering Effort at the Firm (man-
months of effort)
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BNKPF--Believed Needed Know-how for development
of the Product by the Firm (effective
man-months of effort)
The equation s~ply states, for ex~ple, that if the firm had
expanded 100 man-months of engineering effort, which it had previously
estimated to be 50 percent effective, into a job which had been esti-
mated to require 500 effective man-months of engineering effort, then:
ESPCF = (100) ·(0050) = 2Q 0 10500 500 = 0
In other words the finm would have estimated that 10 percent of the
job would have been doneo I~ in fact a different percentage of the
task were actually completed, then over a period of time one might expect
the firm to recognize that its estimates were mdstaken and to gradually
revise theme This is the process described by Equation 3-8 and later
by Equation 3-240
D~xing the early stages of project life the finm is unable to
sense the di££erence between its scheduled progress and its real pro-
gress since in general it gets very £ew real indications of how the pro-
ject is goingo However, as the project nears p~sical camp~etion, test
results and the physical manifestation· of progress begin to indicate
to the £inm technical measures of the·state of completion of the jobo
For instance, once the job is in fact one hundred percent complete and
is actually working, it will not take very long before the firm recog-
nizes this facto - On the other hand, the ~i~vs est~ating procedure for
determining the-·percent of completion of the job m~ well begin to pro-
duce estimates that appear to be nearing completion long before the job
itself does 0 Under such a circumstance, the finm gradually begins to
recognize that while its estimates say that the job is well on its way,
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the careful review of progress that becomes necessitated as the job
supposedly nears completion begins to reveal flaws in the firm's esti-
mating processo Thus we have a situation which appears to have three
aspects to ito First, if both estimated and real percent progress are
small, the £inm is unable to recognize an existing error in its esti-
mate because it has almost no available measures of the progresso
Secondly, as the job really nears completion with the estimate lagging,
the tangible facts o~ product test per~ormancewill indicate to the
finm the need to revise its completion est tmate0 Thirdly, as the esti-
mated progress nears completion with the real accomplishment lagging '.
the same facts of product test performance will not yet show the project
completeness previously estimatedo Thus again the £irm will recognize
the need to revise its estimate 0
In general these factors are incorporated into the curve for the
Fraction Of Gap Recognized by the Firmo The vertical axis shows the
percentage estimation error recognized each month while the horizontal
~() '00 :DOI"\.H""'" PPC
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of Project on Gap-Recognition
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As explained above the indicator which dominates the recognition of
estimation error is the larger of the estimated or the real percent-
age completion of the projecto The fractional part recognized is found
by the DYNAMO table look-up function in Equation 3-10 and the duminant
progress indicator is determined by Equation 3-110
FOGRFoK = TABLE (IPPGR, DPPCFoK, 0, 105, Gol)
DPPCFoK = MAX (PPCoK, BPPCFoK) 3-11, A
FOGRF--Fraction Of Gap Recognized by the Fi~
(percentage of gap recognized/month)
IPPGR--,Influence of Phase of Projeet on Gap
Recognition~ a table of those numbers
which indicate the value of FOGRF as a
function of DPPCF
DPPCF--Dominant Percent of Project Completion at
the Firm (percentage completion)
PPC--Percent of Project Completion (percentage
completion)
BPPCF--Believed Percent of Project Completion by
the Firm (percentage completion)
This completes the description o~ the factors which produce the
firmvs changing estimate of the size of the jobo We can now examine
the firmQs estimation o£ the technical effectiveness of its engineerso
As shown in the next diagram, Figure 3-10~ exogenous technological
developments create changes in the state of the technical art which
integrate to produce the current real state of the art~s technical
ef~ectivenesso Because of the time delays in communicating technologi-
cal inf'ormation from the source of the breakthrough to the area of the
application, there is a distinction between this real state of the art
ef~ectiveness and the state of the art which is available to any given
project organization under consideration~ The rate o~ change in the
available state of the art in any organization is a function of the
gap between the state of the art previously available to t~e firm and
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Figure 3-10 Estimate of: Technical Ef£ec"tiveness
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that wr~ch existed in technology in general, as well as the length of
the delay in transmitting and absorbing this new knowledgeo As the or-
ganization receives new inIonmation about the state of the art, it takes
this into account over a period of t~e through a process which recog-
nizes some average believed rate of technological growth 0 Thinking about
how much of the job is completed, and hence how much of the job is left
to be completed~ the organization projects this rate of technological
growth into the future, estimating the technical effectiveness that will
be available for use on the remainder of the job 0 This extrapolated
technological growth is added to the basic est~ate of current technical
effectiveness 0 The est~ate of current technical effectiveness is, in
turn, the resultant of the initial estimate of current technical effec-
tiveness combined with the changes in the estimated effectiveness which
take place as technology evolves and also with the correctior!s 'Which
are made to previous effectiveness estimateso
The actual technical effectiveness that is possible within the
existing state of the art changes over t~e and is supplied as a basic
input to the modelo It, of course, as the other previously specified
basic inputs, will be changed from one computer run to another to see
the effects of such changeso
TEoK = TABLE (TETAB, TIME 0 K, 0, 180, 6)
TE--Technical Effectiveness within the state
of the art (percent effectiveness of engi-
neers)
TETAB--Technical Ef£ectiveness TABle, a table
of 3tored numbers which wilJ give the
appropriate value for TE as a function
of the project life cycle
3-12, A
As can be seen from the equation, values for TE are stored in the table
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at six-month ~.;intervals from TIME = 0 to TIllIE = 180 months 0 For the
initial model simulation the state of the art will be assumed to change
over time in a manner shown in Figure 3-110 The table belo~' the curve
specifies the values of the Technical Effectiveness that is within the
state of the art as time and technology evolvesa
TEC.\otNoLO (:,tc..~L..
100 =F~cCT IV EHESs"
(0/0)
7S
50
o
Figure 3-11
12.0
Technological State of the Art
TETAB* = 025/'\)25/' 025/Q25/ 026/ 027/028/030/032/035/038/042/0 46(051/057/
06.3/ 0 70/ 0 77s1082/ 086/089/ 0 91~/093/094/095/096/097/ 0 98(099/
0995/100
Proceeding as before, we shall now describe the equations which
determine the estimate of technical effectiveness for the finmo The
first equation will describe the level of the state o£ the art which
is available to the firm as distinct ~rom ·the state of the art available
to technology in generalo The available state of the art is represented
as a first-order exponential smoothing of the input technical effective-
nesso This means that over a period of time indicated by DTITF, the
Delay in Technical Information Transmittal to the Firm, the firm
acquires the in£ormation relating to the exogenous state of the art and
has it available £or its own project engineering useo
ATEFoK = ATEFoJ + (DT) (RCTAFoJK)
ATEF = ITE
RCTAF KL = TEoK - ATEFoK
o DTITF
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3-13, L
3-14, N
3-15, R
ATEF--Available Technical Effectiveness at the
Firm (percent effectiveness of engineers)
RCTAF--Rate of Change of Technology Available at
the Firm (percent effectiveness/month)
ITE--Initial Technical Effectiveness (percent
effectiveness of engineers)
TE--Technical Effectiveness within the state of
the axt (percent effectiveness o'E engineers)
DTITF--Delay in Technical Information Transmitted
to the Finm (months)
ITE represents the initial value of the table of technical effectiveness,
which is assumed also to be available to the firmo From Figure 3-11 we
see that TE initially shows a 25 percent effectivenesso Therefore,
ITE = 0025 (decimal percent effectiveness)
For the highly skilled firm being represented in this project simula-
tion (QF has been initially set equal to one·), the delay in finding out
about new technological breakthroughs is relatively shorto Here it will
be set as eight months and changed in later studieso
DTITF = 8 months
As changes take place in the state of the art avail.able to the
ri~, the firm gradually recognizes this rate of technological growth 0
STPRFoK = STPRFoJ + (DT(l!DRTPF)(RCTAF·oJK - STPRFoJ) 3-16, L
STPRF = 0 3-17, N
STPRF--Smoothed Technological Progress Rate at
the Firm (percent effectiveness/month)
DRTPF--Delay i.n Responding to Technilogical Pro-
gress at the F-irm (months)
RCTAF--Rate of Change of Technology Available at
the Firm, (percent effectiveness/month)
As can readily be seen from examination of Figure 3-11, technical
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effectiveness is initially in an unchanging stateo Thus the initial
condition for the average rate of recognized technological change,
found in Equation 3-17 above j is zeroo The delay in responding to
this technical progress rate is visualized as being very short, meaning
that the £irmQs opinion of technological growth changes rapidly as it
becomes knowledgeable about new breakthroughs 0 For this purpose,
DRTPF = 2 months
The esttmate of the current technological effectiveness made by
the firm really represents the summation of all of the changes and
corrections in the est~ate since the beginning of the projecto
ETEFoK = ETEFoJ + (DT)(RCEEFoJK + RCPEF~JK) 3-18, L
ETEF--Est~ate of current Technical Effective-
ness by tIle Firm (percent effectiveness
of engineers)
RCEEF--Rate of Change of Est~ated current Effec-
tiveness by the Firm (percent ef~ective­
ness/month)
RCPEF--Rate of Correction of Previous e£fort
Est~ate by the Firm (percent effective-
ness/month)
The initial estimate of the techn~cal effectiveness of the firm
represents a combination of the in£luen~es of the actual effectiveness
of the firm as engineers arId the relative optimism of the firm as expres-
sed in its estimating procedureso The relative opt~ism o£ the firm is
taken as being analogous or basically s~ilar to the finmis willingness
to accept risk that was used in an earlier formulationo This charac-
teristic of the finm produces a bias fa~tor which is modified by con-
sideration of the actual qualifications of the firmns management, as
was done in the formulation of BNKPF, Equation 3-2, on an earlier page
in this chapter 0 The influences on the initial effectiveness est~ate
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are pictured in Figure 3-12 belovo
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Figure 3-12 Initial Estimate of Current Technical Effectiveness
of the Firm
The three equations which follow incorporate the in£luences show~
in the flow charto First, the initial estimate of technical e£fective-
ness itsel£ is the engineering productivity per engineer at work multi-
plied by a modifying factoro The modifier, Equation 3&-20; incorporates
the effect of the firmvs ability on the estimation erroro The ability
effect was already discussed in reference to Equation 3-40 Finally the
equation for IWARF below uses a DYNAMO table look-up to combine the
specific risk-propensity effects with a general tendency for the firm
to underestimate technical effectivenesso
ETEF =@:)MTEF) 3-19, N
MTEF = 1 + (IWARF)(EAEEF) 3-20, N
IWARF = TABLE (IWTAB, WARF, 0, 1, 002) 3-21, N
ETEF--Estimate of the current Technical E£fec-
tiveness by the Firm (percentage effective-
ness of engineers)
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ENPRF--ENgineering PRoductivity at the Firm
(e£fective man-months/month)
ENAWF--ENgineers Actually at Work at the Firm
(men)
MTEF--Modifier of Technical effectiveness Esti-
mate by the Firm (percentage)
IWARF--In£luence of Willingness to Accept Risk
by the Firm (percentage)
EAEEF--Effect of Ability on the Estimation
Error of the Firm (percentage)
IWTAB--IIl.iluence of WilJ=ingness TABle, a table
of stored numbers which gives a value
for IWARF for each input value of WARF
WARF--W'illingness to Accept Risk by the Firm
(percentage)
The influence of the firmvs willingness to accept risk on the
estimates of technical effectiveness is pictured in the diagram below,
Figure 3-13, which incorporates the values selected for the initial
IWTAB~ This table of numbers also accounts for the general tendency to
underest~ate technology before actually getting into the projecto
\SO
-so
tWARl=
(~)
Figure 3-13 In£luence of Risk-taking Propensity on Estimates
of Technology
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Th~ firmvs willingness to accept,risk was specified in the Appendix of
Chapter II as equal initially to 100 percent.
The actual changes in the firm's estimate of technical effective-
ness are of two types: first, the updating of the estimate to recognize
the firmvs current progress rate; secondly, the correction of the esti-
mate to take account of recognized earlier errors which have led to mis-
taken percentage completion estimates. Figure 3-14 shows these two
cha~ge sources with their inputs, with equation numbers for'the customer
also indicated:
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The actual rate of change of the firm's est~ate of its current
effectivAness shows a shift towards the effectiveness which the ~inm
detects in its current engineering effortso This shi£t by the firm
takes place over a brief period of time of DRTEF months, where
DRTEF = 2 months
RTEFoK - ETEFoK
RCEEFoKL = DRTEF 3-22, R
RCEEF--Rate of Change of Est~ated current
Effectiveness by the Firm (percent
effectiveness/month)
RTEF--Realized Technical Effectiveness by
the Firm (percent e~fectiveness of engineers)
ETEF--Est~ate of current Technical Effectiveness
by the Firm (percent effectiveness of engi-
neers)
DRTEF--Del~ in Recognizing Technical Ef£ective-
ness by the Firm (months)
The realized technical effectiveness or the firm is the firm's
belief as to the current progress rate in te~s of the effective man-
months per month that is being accomplished divided by the number of
engineers who are actually at work during the given periodo
(PRBFoJK) (BNKPFnK)RT~-oK = 3-23, AENAWFoK
RTEF--Realizad Technical Effectiveness of the
Firm (percent effectiveness of engineers)
PRBF--Progress Rate Believed by the Firm (percent
completion/month)
BNKPF--Believed Needed Know-how ~or develop-
ment of the Product by the Finm (effec-
tive man-months o~ effort)
ENAWF--ENgineers Actually at Work at the Firm
(men)
The rate of correction of the previous effectiveness estimate' is
a fraction per month of the error magnitude indicated by the product
of ETEF and the percent error in project completion believed by the
firm 0 The fraction of this amount recognized each month is specified
by 1 divided by the delay in recognizing actual achievement at the firm 0
RCPEF.KL ;: (PEC~~~~TEF.K)
RCPEF--Rate Qf Correction of Previous efrec-
tiveness Estimate of the Firm (percent'
effectiveness/month)
PECBF--Percent Error in Completion Believed
by the Fi~ (percentage erro~)
ETEF--Estimate of current Technical Effective-
ness by the Firm (percent ef£ectiveness
engineers)
DRAAF--Delay in Recognizing Actual Achievement
at the Firm (months)
131
3-24, R
The estimate of the future technical effectiveness is base'd on the
current estimate and on an extrapolation of the rate of technological
growth that the firm has perceivedo
EFTEF oK = ETEF oK + (XPTPF oK) (STPRF oK)
EFTEF--Esiimate o£ Future Technical Effec-
tiveness by the Firm (percent effective-
ness of engineers)
ETEF--Esttmate of current Technical Effective-
ness by the Firm (percent ef£ectiveness
of er€,ineers)
XPTPF--eXtrapolation Period for Technical Pro-
gress by the. Finm (months)
STPRF--Smoothed Technical Progress Rate at the
, Firm (:reroarlt, efrectiv~eness/month)
3-25, A
This extrapolation period recognizes the fact that if technology
continues to grow at its current rate, then, on the average, only half
of the increase in technology from now until the end of the project will
be available for uLilization in the project worko Thus, the period de-
penda upon consideration not only of the normal project duration, but
also of the percent of the project left to be campletedo
XPTPF.K = (BP~IF.K~ (~)
XPTPF--eXtrapolation Period of Technical Pro-
gress at the Finm (month)
BPPIF--Believed Percent of Project Incomplete
by the Finm (percentage)
NPD--Normal Project Duration (months)
3-26, A
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rllJ.e Llo::-'nlal duration of the project will initially be set at two years
and changed in later runso Thus,
NPD = 24 months
To complete the initial.description o~ the equations for Chapter
III let us now turn to Figure 3-15 which pulls together the outcomes
of the previous two sections into the factors relating to est~ating
the actual effort and cost requirementso In the diagram, it .is .clearly
.,
shown that the "estimate of effort required is fonmed by taking into
account the total amount of engineering effort that has been done to
date and adding to this the amount of engineering that is expected to
be required in the future 0 The future requirements are determined by
the est~ate of the job size, the est~ate of the future technical
effectiveness, and the believed percent of the job left to be doneo
Once the estimate of effort required is determined, one can readily
find the estimate of total cost required by combining the effort esti-
mate with the average monthly costs per engineer 0 Subtracting from
this amount the total cost to date produces an est~ate of the cost
to complete the projecto
Let us now write the equa~ions for this final sector, starting
with the equation for the estimate of e£fort requiredo
EERFoK = ~EEFoK + (BPPIFoK)(B~~FoK/EFTEFoK) 3-27, A
EERF--Est~ate of total Ef:fort Required by the
Firm (man-monthS of effort)
TEEF--Total Engineering Eff'ort by the Firm (man-
months of ef£ort)
BPPIF--Believed Percent of Project Incomplete by
the Finm (percentage)
BNKPF--Believed Needed Know-how for development
of the Project by the Fi~ (effective man-
months of e£fort)
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EFTEF--Estimate of Future Technical Effective-
ness by the Firm (percent effectiveness
of engineers)
Tnis equation adds to the effort already expended, TEEF, the esti-
mate -of additional effort neededo The latter is found by multiplying
the believed job size by the percent of the project believed to be
remaiuing to be done. This produces the estima~ed additional effective
I work needed, and when divided by the ~xpected future effectiveness of
the engineers gives as a result ~the estimated additional ef£orto
The estimated total costs reflect -this effort requirement and
the cost per engineer, taking into account in dete~ining the average
cost ~actor the absenteeism of the engineers 0
ETCPFoK = (EMECF)(EERFoK) 3-28, A
EMECF = (MESOH) (ABSCM) 3-29, N
MESOH = ESOHR/12 3-30, N
ABSCM 1 3-31, N= 1-~1\V/l.BS
ETCPF--Estimated Total Cost of the Project by
the Finm (dollars)
EMECF--Estimated Monthly Engineering Cost Factor .
(dollars/man-month)
EERF--Estimate of total E:Cfort Required by the
Firm (man-months)
MESOH--Monthly Engineering Salary and OverHead
(dOllars/man-month)
ABSaM--ABSenteeism Cost Modifier (percentage)
ESOHR--Engineering Salary and OverHead Rate
(dollars/man-year)
AVABS--AVerage ABSenteeism (percentage)
From the studies· cited earlier in this chapter $30,000 seemed to
be an average figure for annual salary1overhead, and support costs of
scientists and engineers in military-oriented research and development
work 0 Thus,
ESOHR = 30,000 dollars/engineering man-year
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The average absentaeism of engineers, i.ncluding actually the effects of
holidays and vacations, as found in an earlier study of engineering
costs, amounts to approximately 11 1/2 percent o~ the scheduled work
26days during the year~
AVABS = 00115 (decimal percentage)
Finally, the estimated cost to complete the proje~t. is s~ply .;equal
to the total cost estimate minus the cost that has been incur~ed thus
'£aro
ECCPFoK = ETCPFoK - TECFoK 3-32, A
ECCPF--Eatimated Cost to Complete the Project
at the Firm (dollars)
ETCPF--Estimated Total Cost of the Project at
the Firm (dollars)
TECF--Total Engineering Cost to the Firm (dollars)
The above equations which describe the firm's process of estimating
project effort and cost also certainly apply to the customer's similar
efforts 0 Thus these equations will be repeated below for the customer
with very little added explanatioDo The customer's estimate of the
size of the job has the same f;crm as the firm is estimate, Equation 3-J- 0
BNKPCoK = BNKPCoJ + (DT)(RGEJC~JK)
BNKPC = (MSEC) (NLKP)
BNKPC--Believed Needed Know-how for develop-
men.t of the Produet by the Customer
(effective man-month$ of effprt)
RGEJC--Rate of recognition of Gap in Estimate
of Job size by the Customer (effective
man-months/month)
MSEC--Modifier of the job Size Estimate of the
Customer (percentage)
3-33, L
3-34, N
26Edward Bo Roberts, "The Digital Computer as an Element of
a Financial Control System" (unpublished Master of Science thesis, MoloTa
Department of Electrical Engineering, June 1958), po Al-27~ 280
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NLKP--Needed Level of Know-how for development
of the Product (effective man-months of
effort)
NLKP was earlier set equal to 6000 effective man-months of effort.
The factors which cause customer errors in its estimates of NLKP
are shown in Figure 3-16, which is a replica for the customer of the
earlier diagram, Figure 3-6, for the firmo
,
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Figure 3-16 Other Influences on the Job Size Estimate of the Customer
Equations 3-35) 361 and 37 parallel Equations 3-3, 4, and 5 which were
used for the firm 0
IESEC = TABLE (IETAB, PDPEC, -11 +1, 002)
EAEEC = TABLE (EAETB, QC, 0, 1, 001)
MSEC = 1+ (EAEEC)(IESEC)
3-:-35,N
3-36, N
3-37, N
IESEC--Influence of Experience on Size Estimate
of the Customer (percentage error of the
job)
IETAB--Influence of Experience TABle, a table of
numbers which gives an appropriate value
for IESEC for every value of PDPEC
PDPEC--Percent Deviation of pt~vious Experience
of the Customer (percentage)
EAEEC--Effect of Ability on the Estimation Error
of the Customer (percentage)
3-38, A
3-39~ A
3-40, R
3-41, A
3-42, A
3-43, A
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EAETB--Effect of Ability on estimation Error,
Ta~le, a table of stored constants,
shown under Figure 3-8~ which produce the
appropriate v~lue of EAEEC for a given
value of QC
MSEC--Modifier of the job Size Est~ate of the
Customer (percentage)
QC--~ality of the Customer (percentage)
IETAB is shown beneath Figure 3-70 As an initial input describing the
customer we shall assume that the average size of his previous projects
is 17~5 percent smaller than the job being considered currently 0 Thus,
PDPEC = -O:l75 (decimal percentage)
TW-s constant will be changed in later simulation runs 0 The customer
will initially be assumed to be of slightly above average capability,
and will be assigned a 60 percent quality measureo Thus,
QC = Oc60 (decimal percentage)
The next group of equations are just repeats for the customer of
the finmv~ Equations 3-6 through 3-110 The equations will just be
stated here for completeness, without further cammento
GEAC K = ESPCCoK - BPPCQoK
o BPPCCoK
GENKCoK = (GEACQK)(BNKPC~K)
RGEJCoKL = (GENKCoK)(FOGRCoK)
ESPCCoK = (TEEFoK)(ETECoK)
BNKPCoK
FOGRCoK = TABLE (IPPGR, DPPCCoK, 0, 105, Ool)
DPPCCoK = MAX (PPCoK, BPPCCoK)
GEAC--Gap in Engineering Accomplishment at the
Customer (percentage error)
ESPCC~~EstimatedScheduled Percent Completion of
the project at the Customer (percentage
completion)
BPPCC--Believed Percent of Project Completion by
the Customer (percentage completion)
GENKC--Gap in the Est~ate of Needed Know-how at
the Customer "( ef-fective man-months of effort)
13$
BNKPC--Believed Needed Know-how for 'development
of the Product at the Customer (effective
man-months of effort)
RGEJC--Rate of recognition o£ Gap in Est~ate of
Job size at the Customer (effective man-
months/month)
FOGRC--Fraction Of Gap Recognized by the Customer
(percentage of gap recognized/month)
TEEF--Total Engineering Effort at the Finm
(man-months of effort)
ETEC--Est~ate of current Technical Effectiveness
by the Customer (percentage ef~ectiveness)
IPPGR--Influence of Phase of Project on Gap Recog-
nition, table of stored numbers which gives
the appropri~ate value for FOGRC for any
given value of DPPCC
DPPCC--Dominant Percent of Project Completion to
the Customer (percentage completion)
PPC--Percent of Project Completion (percentage
completion)
We can now represent the process of customer estLm~tion of the
technical effectiveness of the fi~~s engineers a The following equations J
3-44 through 3-48.9 correspond to the earJ.ier equations for the firm num-
bered 3-13 through 3-170
ATECoK = ATECoJ + (DT)(RCTACoJK)
ATEC = ITE
TEoK - ATECoKRCTllC 0 KL = .;;;;;.o;;;;;;........... .........~............__
DTITC
STPRCoK = STPRCoJ + (DT)(l/DRTPC)(RCTACoJK -
STPRC = 0
3-44, L
3-45, N
3-46, R
STPRCoJ) ,3-47 , L
3-48, N
ATEC--Available Technical Effectiveness at the
Custom~r (percent effectiveness of engineers)
RCTAC--Rate of Change of Techn010gy Available at
the Customer (percent e£fectiveness/month)
ITE--lnitial Technical Effectiveness (percent
- ef£ectiveness of engineers)
TE--Technical Effectiveness within the state of
the art (percent effectiveness of engineers)
DTITC--Delay in Technical-Information Transmitted
to the Customer (months)
STPRC--Smoothed Technological Progress Rate at
the Customer (percent effectiveness/month)
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DRTPC--Delay in Responding to Technological
Progress at the Customer (months)
The customer is able to determine info~ation as to the nature of
technological breakthroughs from a great number of finmso Thus, despite
the lessened over-all competence of the customer relative to tIle firm
in the initial simulation parameters~ we assume that the custameras
delay in receiving new technical information is shorter t·han the firm's
For this reason,
DTITC = 6 months
The customer is regarded as responding quickly to base his opinion about
the changing stat e of the art on the most ree ent e', lnt s which he has
recognized 0 Thus,
DRTPC = 2 months
The estimate of current technological e£fectiveness made by the
customer is similar to Equati.on 3-18 0
ETECoK = ETECoJ + (DT)(RCEECoJK + RCPECoJK)
ETEC--Estimate of current Technical E££ec-
tiveness by the Customer (percent·
e~rectiveness of engineers)
RCEEC--Rate of Change of Estimated current'
i' Effectiveness by the Customer (per-
cent effectiveness/month)
RCPEC--Rate o£ Correction of Previous effort
Estimate by the Customer (percent
ef£ectiveness/month)
3-49, L
The influences on the initial value of ETEC are pictul-aed in
Figure 3-17, which is similar to Figure 3-l2 for the firmo The customer JO
through his relationships with the firms working in the -technical area,
has information about the available state of the arto How~ver.? the
custamer~s confidence in the firm biases his jUdgment as to the rirm~s
capabilities 0 In addition, the customer also responds to his own optimism
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(or willingness to accept risk) in generating an initial est~ate o~
ef~ectivenessG The error due to this latter cause is modified by the
over-..all ability of the customer 0
TIle ~actors shown in the diagram are represented in the next three
equations 0 The first equation, number 3-50, indicates that the initial
effectiveness estimate is the product of the customerVs knOWledge as to
the available technology, his con£idence in the firm, and other modifying
influences 0 Equations 3-51 and 3-52 correspond to Equations 3-20 and
3-21 which were used in representing the firm;s estimate 0
ETEC = (MTEC)(ATEC)(CNFC)
MTEC = 1 + (IWARC) (EAEEC)
IWARC = TABLE (IWTAB, WARe, 0, 1, 0 G 2 )
3-50~ N
3-51, N
3-52" N
ETEC--Estimate of current Technical Effective-
ness by the Customer (percent effective-
ness of engineers)
MTEC--Modifier of Technical effectiveness
Estimate by the Customer (percen~age)
ATEC--AvailabJ.e Technical ~frectiveness at the
C-l1~+·ollH;;r (percent effectiveness of engineers)
CNFC--Confidence iN Firm by the Customer (percentage)
IWARC--Influence of WiJ_lingness to Accept Risk by
the Customer (percentage) .
EAEEC--Ef£eGt of Abil~ty on the Est~at~on Error
of the Customer (percentage)
IWTAB--In£luence of Willingness TABle
WARC--Willingness to Accept Risk by the Customer
(percentage)
. Initially we shall assume that the customer has had slightly better
(
than average relationships with the firm and has 60 percent confidence
in the firmvs abilityo
CNFC = 0060 (decimal percentage)
The customerns willingness to accept risk was specified in the Appendix
of Chapter II as also equal initially to 60 percento
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The actual changes in the customeris estimate of technical
e~fectiveness are similar to the firmvs revisionso The relationships
are sho~~ in Figure 3-140 Equations 3-52 to 3-55 below correspond to
the firmus EquationVs 3-22 to 3-240
RCEECon RTECoK - ETECK 3-53, R= DRTEC
RTECoK = (PRBCoJK) (BNKPCoK) 3-54, AENAWFoK
RCPECQKL = (PECBCoK) (ETECoK) 3-55, RDRAACoK
RCEEC--Rate of Change of Estimated current
Effectiveness by the Customer (percent
effectiveness/month)
RTEC--Realized T~chnical Effectiveness by the
Customer (percent e~fectiveness of engineers)
ETEC--Estimate of current Technical Effectiveness
by the Customer (percent effectiveness of
engineers)
DRTEC--Delay in Recognizing Technical Effective-
ness by the Customer (m-nths)
PRBC--Progress Rate Believed by the Customer
(percent completion/month)
BNKPC--Believed Needed Knov-how for development
of the Product by the Customer (effective
man-months of effort)
ENAWF--ENgineers Actually at Work at the Firm
(men)
RCPEC--Rate of Correction of Previous effective-
ness Estimate of the Customer (perce~t
effecti,veness/inonth)
PECBC--Percent Error in Completion Believed by
the Customer (percentage error)
DRAAC--Delay in Recognizing Actual Achievement at
the Customer (months)
The shift by the customer to adopt its current realization of the finmus
engineering effectiveness take place quicklyo DRTEC has thus beer! chosen
to equal eight months 0
DRTEC = 8 months
The customer also forms an estimate of the future technical effec-
tiveness taking into account the extrapolation period which depends upon
3-.'57, A
3-56, A
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his beliefs as to the percent o£ project left to be campletedo
Elt"TECoK = ETECoK + (XPTPCoK)(STPRCoK)
XPTPC.K = (BPPICoK)(~D)
EFTEC--Estimate of Future Technical Effec-
tiveness by the Customer (percent
effectiveness o£ engineers)
ETEC--Estimate of current Technical Effective-
ness by the Customer (percent effective-
ness of engineers)
XPTPC--eXtrapolation Period for Technical Pro-
gress by the Customer (months)
STPRC--Smoothed Technical Progress Rate by the
Customer (percent effectiveness/month)
BPPIC--Believed Percent o£ Project Incomplete by
the Customer (percentage)
NPD--Normal Project Duration (months)
These two equations are similar to Equations 3-25 and 3-260
Combining these'factors, as was done before, the customer comes
"up with his projection as to the estimated effort requirements of the
project as well as the total cost and additional cost to complete the
jobo They are incorporated in the final three equations of this appendix"
EERCoK = TEEFoK + (BPPICoK)(BNKPCo~EFTECoK)
ETCPCoK (EMECF) (EERCoK)
ECCPCoK = ETCPCoK - TECF~K
3-58., A
3-;9.9 A
3-60~ A
EERC--Estimate of total E£fort Required by the
Customer (man-months of effort)
TEEF--Total Engineering E~rort by the Firm
(man"'months of ef£ort)
BPPIC--Believed Percent of Project Incomplete
by the Customer (percentage)
BNKPC--Bel!eved Needed Know-how for development
of the Product by the Customer (effective
man-months of ef£ort)
EFTED--Estimate of Future Technical Effectiveness
by the Custo~r (percent effectiveness of
engineers)
ETCPC--Estimated Total Cost of the Project by the
Customer (dollars)
EMECF--Estimated Monthly Engineering Cost Factor
(dollars/man-month)
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ECCPC--Estimated Cost to Complete the Project
for the Customer (dollars)
TECF--Total Engineering Cost to the Finn
(dollars)
This completes the modeling for the estimation of project e~fort
and costo
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Figure 3-5 Estimate of Job Size
CHAPTER IV
FUNDING THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
. .
Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the ways in which both the customer
and the firm determine their estimates of the worth and the cost o~
the projecto These elements are essential to the activities req~ired
for providing funds for the project undertakingo The activities include
three possible phases~ (1) the firm's request for support of engineering
effort; (2) the customer~s eValuation of this request for funds and his
response in the granting of such funds; and (3) the finm:s decision to
invest its own money in the project activitYo The text of "this chapter,
therefore, will be divided in.to three corresponding sectorso Of course,
all three of the activities ~o be discussed are continuously taking place
...during the project life cycle~ as are the ac~ivities of value perception
and effort and cost estimation di.scussed earlier (.
Research and development companies j as a matter of necessity,
amploy at 13ast a small number of people who are constantly looking
into new product possibilities 0 "Wi.th such large investments in equip-
ment, factories and personnel 0 0 olarge firIns cannot afford to.ait idly
by, ~aiting for the military to decide that a certain piece of equipment
is need~do They must go ahead on their own, anticipating mi+itary
needs, and carrying out the preliminary planr~ng at their own cost-
and at their own risko"l The people who do this studying may be
lcreighton Mo Marcott} "The Challenge of Space"; Electronic
Industries, April 1960 j po 1100
1~_7
part of what is called a research laboratory, an advanced projects
group, a preliminary design area~or they may just be regular members
of the engineering team who are looking into the extensions of some
product ideas beyond the current contracted research and development
. - .
projects 0 As the finm engages in such activities J it develops some of
the insights which aid the perception of the need for and value of a
product, as was discussed in Chapter 20 Similarly, the firm begins ·to
estimate the amount of effort and cost required to complete such pro-
jectsQ For what may amount to a long period of time~ the firmgs assess-
ment of the value of the product versus the coot of the product may
lead the firm to think that the customer will not yet deem the project
economically feasibleo . Based on its own attitudes towards company-
sponsored effort (Which attitudes will be discussed in greater detail
in the final section of this chapter), the company will, to at least
some extent~ conti·~ue .these stu,jy ac.tiviti.eso However.9 as the firm
begins to feel ~hat the'resulting proj ect idea might be ·\faluable enough
for both it and the customer to further consider $ it wil.l probably attempt
to get the customer to support 9.t least a portion of the costs of this
initial study phaseo When this condition is reached,? the fi.rm will. re-
quest that the Cu.3tomer S1.lpport the so-cal.].ed nresearch~ activities by
means of a ~'study contract" 0 The firm will probably con"tinue to request
funds for such study contracts until it feels in a position to make a
sound proposal of a-project which it expects will be viewed as economic-
ally feasible by the customero This~ ~henJ involves the firm in a caID-
parison not solely of its own estimates of project cost and value, out
in addition in a comparison of the estimates o~ cost and value which i~
believes that its potential customer will holdo
As time evolves~ as the study activities conti~ue, and as the
estimates of project value and expected cost change, the firmvs assess-
ment of these factors will also changeD In timeJ the Rand D firm
may begin to feel that the customer deems the project a worthwhile
undertaking~ as well as one in which the firm itself is willing to
participat'eo The firm may apply many different criteria in deter-
mining its own willingness to participate in a development projecto
~or example~ the firm may not be interested in taking part in 'any
development project of size or expected profitability smaller than
some minimal amount 0 The firm may be concerned with the long-run
effects on the companyVs technological growth of participating in such
a project undertakingo It may also consider the amount of concentration
within some technical area to which the research and development pro-
ject would leado Thus there are several prerequisites which the firm
may feel are necessary before it is willing to even try to obtain a
larger-scale development projecto
Once the firm is willing to go aheadJ it must consider the reason-
ability that the customer will support such a research ~nd development
project 0 Under diff,erent sets of relationships between the potenti.al
customer and the Rand D firm~ different specific factors might affect
the fi.rmv s evaluation of the probability of achieving customer support 0
There is, of course, a great deal of discussion between the marketing
and engineering activities of'the firm and the contracting agencies of
the customer, with the intent of exchangi.ng views on the new ideas of
the firm and the newly-found needs of the customero These continuing
relationships give "thefirm a fairly good idea 8.8 t.othe customer ~s
position on any given potential projecto As a result~ in most large-
scale undertakings the firm which obtains the Rand D contract has
from an early stage participated in discussions with the customer
about his product needs in that area. The author is awar-e of several
as yet unpublished company studies which have found from analyses of
their ownprQposal and contract activities that the vast proportion of
their business has resulted from these early negotiationso Through
such discussions· and negotiations, the firm forms its own belief as
to the likelihood that the customer is willing to go ahead on a pro.lec t ,
When this confidence-point is reachedj the firm intensifies its nego-
tiation,vmarketing, and solicitation acti.v'itiesand/or submits an un-
solicited proposal to the customer agency 0
This whole process i.s succinctly stated by 'theManaging Editor
of Electroni.c Industries in the article cited earli.ero
To compete for oovernnent defense project a, a firm
must 'be willing to spend a good deal of its own money
on researcho For instance, the usua.l.form of the
military defense project wl.l1 work s<?mething like this:
The defense firmooowill 'foresee the need for a certain
type of weapon for countermeas~re gear or detection
equipment, etco Using their own funds they will inves-
tigate the prob'l.em to determine whether i.t is fea.siblejI
whether there is a possibility of intereating the mili-
tary Ln providing' funds for such a development 0 The
money that goes into the initial studYJ which can be
quite considerable, will be completely lost if the Govern-
ment cannot be convinced that there is a future in this
kind of equf.pnent, If the Government is interested,
the second stage of the project beginsj probably partially
supported by Governm~nt fundso If the second stage indi-
cates that this piece of hardware can be successfully
developed and serve a useful military purpose~ stage
three beginso This stage will be completely financed by
the Governmento2
2
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Before discussing the specific nature of contents of project
proposals by the firm, it is worthwhile to pause and reflect upon
what is here being said about the nature of research and developmento
In effect, the basic difference between that "research" and i;h.&.t "develop-
ment"· which constitute the typical·R a.ndII project i.B Qllg of attitude
and scope, not of basic work corrbent, During thr phase ·Jf time vhen the
firm believes that the estimate of cost versus value is such that there
is little likelihood that the customer will support a program~ the firm
may still continue ~ctivities toward developing new know-how, new tech-
niquesjl and new ideas relative to the potential projecto The fLtnds
that it requests for support during this phase of activity may well be
labeled "research funds" or study contractso However, as the attitude
of the firm cha.nges toward the relationship of cost and value, iihe
firm also changes what it is willing to re~uest and what it expects the
customer is willing to provide for the Rand D undertakingo When the
firm finally believes the project has reachE:d or will soon reach what
might be deemed by the customer to be a condition of economic feasi-
bility~ tne firm will request the funds necessary to support a larger-
scale or wider-scope Rand D undertakingo Moneys granted under this
request are commonly known as a "develop~ent contract" or a develop-
ment projecto The prime distinction between the actions of the firm
during the earlier phase discussed above and the phase i.nwhich 11
begins to undertake the development cycle is Q.D.g largely due j& its
attitude towards potential support, which attitude ~ from its
assessment of the cost-value relat.ionship in the pro.iecto
This ~ attitude question distinguishes ihg customer's feelings
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during these two so-called phases of the typical research and develop-
ment projecto For example, during 1960 the Director of Research of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration made the following
statement: "Our research on supersonic transports has reached a
stage where we believe a design and development program is feasibleo~3
However, it has been well known long before 1960 that it;wa.sphysi.-
cally possible to build such a supersonic transport plane 0 Thus the
statement seems really to mean that the study program has advanced
enough so that the expected costs to produce such a supersonic trans-
port are now'within an economically feasible range of the expected
value of the aircraft 0 This in part explains the confused attempts
of so many people to distinguish research from developmento The source
of conrust.on is the fact that J except in the case of extremely pure
basic research (which is so very hard to find i.nexistence), the
remainder of the gamut from what is called "applied research" through
"developmentu through "production engineeringil is in reality a ·multiple
labeling of engineering efforts aimed at reducing the costs of being
able to physically achieve the existence of some desired end producto
These different labels are created only by the fuzzy distinctions in
mental attitudes a.sto economfc-feasibilityo When 'thefirm feels that
the customer might be willing to support a larger-scope undertaking,
what factors detet'lllinethe characteristics of the financial proposal
that the firm then submits to the customer? Prima,rilyJ of cour-se, the
figures submitted- are influenced by the firm~s current estimate of the
3Ira Ho Abbott, "Research Plans and Programs", NASA--
Industry Confer.enceReport, July 28-29, 1960J po 140
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amount or error·t and cost required to complete the job, as well as
the firm's estimate or the worth of the end product to the potential
customer. But it is very unlikely that these initially-held interna1
.... - - --- .--'"
estimates are identical to the figures which appear in the ri~'s pro-
posal to the custaner. Another basic influence enters in the prepara-
tioD and submis·sion of a. proposal to the customer. This is the firm.' s.
integrity. Many people have masked the fundamental nature of this
integrity influence by referring to the problem of Itassessing the can-
petitive situation". By this, they mean that a company recognizes that
the low bidder has. greater likelihood of receiving the contract 0 There-
fore, many firms attempt to assess .what its canpetitors are like~ to
" '-
.
bid and, it at all possible, "Justify" a bid below that of their com-
petitors. Regardless or how one attempts to rationalize such practices,
~he tact is that questionable integrity on the part of the .bidding firms
infl.uences the size or the request 'tor funds in the proposals submitted
to the custcaer. That "everybody's doing it" does Dot minimize :the
influence· of this integrity factor. Some companies are more 8uscep-
tible to practices ot this sort than otherso These oompanies one
could describe as having a lower integrity characteristiQ_than the
less susceptible type ot cqmpa~. The lower the integrity or the
CQ1DP~, the more it wi11 be .-i.11ing to "adjust n or ·reass~s~· the
cost and effort e8t~ates which are internally held before submitting
- .
such estimates to the custaner organization•
•
Som~. peop1e treat this integrity inrl.uence under different labels,
tor instance the ·Wishf\t1 Thinking" used by the writer next quotedo
.But even his termino1ogy points up the integrity aspeat.
1;3.
When the company is anxiously seeking 'new business •••
the Judgement or the company management is· frequently•••
distorted'by wishful thinking. In these cases; -over~
optimistic est~ates are not only accepted at their
face val.ue:l but are even·.encouraged 'by the sal.es - ..
department anq the company managemeDt~ As "a result,
i t is Dot uDccDmon to find" both schedule and budget
estimates processed throug~ al.1 levels at the COlD-
pany with such a strong element or hope that the
degree of selt-deception in an otherwise reasonably
intelligent organization' is truly remarkable. 4
"This discussion on integrity is Dot an attempt to find moral.
.,',
.~
- .
rault in the cODlpa~· procedures tor. haDd~ing research and developllent.
Rather, i t is an attempt to identity those factors which influence the
behavior that is manifested in research and developllent projects. The
presence or absence of integrity in the practices ot the developllent
t1~ will have a bearing OD the proposal. requests that are sullDitted
to the custaaer aDd consequently OD the contracts that are granted by
the custCIDer. Thus 1t 1s important to recognize the influence or the
integrity factor in these.~~b~ctding ac~ivities. .~ ~.~.~
What have been described thus tar are the factors which determine
when aDd how the potential. developing firm requests funds from the
customer"~organizatioD, first tor support or sp-cal1ed stu~y activities,
.and later tor support or 8o-cal.le~ larger-scal.e deve10pnent pr~Jects •
The question might well be asked, ·Under what conditions does the firm
change its request for funds, i.e., ·revise its submitted est~ates at
the do~lar ..ount which will. be necessary to canplete the ~ob?· During
the early phase ot ·stu¢y-contractn activities, whenever the ti~ tee1s
4A• L.Stanl7.. -Logic and 1110gio in Engineering and IIilnage-
m~nt·, IRE Transactions OD Engineering llanagement, Vol.. .-5, No~ 1
December 1958), ~. 145. . ---- E
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that the study project is worthy of more investment, it will then
request additional study funds and try to convince the customer of
the reasonability of granting such additional supporto Similarly,
during the larger-scale project undertaking, the fi~ will revise the
cost estimates it has provided the customer, whenever it expects that
the over-running costs or possibly the excess of funds is large enough
so that it should take actioDo The firm will then request additional
money or reduce its request for fundso Under either of these condi-
tions, the in£luence of integrity still exists and in part determines
the extent of the requests for revision in the customeris support of
the projecto
~ Customer's Evaluation of the Funds Request
When the customer receives an unsolicited request for support
either of stu~ activities or of a large-scale development program,
it must make the decision-as to ~hether or not and to what extent it
should £inancially support these undertakingso In addition, of co~rse,
actively considering its own needs, the customer will often initiate
requests for such proposals, which in turn will result in the require-
ment of providing financial resources to some contracting organizationso
It would be desirable, at least theoretically, to be able to describe
the formal procedure used by the milita~ contracting organizations to
evaluate all such requestso However, this is impossible because no such
formal criteria existo Among other reasons for this lack of formal
rationale is the fact that, "the contracting activities of large govern-
ment·agencies have become instruments for achieving ~ndirect objectiveso-
These include (I) assisting small business, (2) channeling pUblic funds
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into depressed and labor-surplus areas, (3) maintaining a broad
national industrial base for mobilization, and (4) supporting aca-
5demic and institutional programso"
These ma~ factors tend to make the government's project evalua-
tiOD decisions quite complex in structure, with their basis far less
than obvious fram evidence only out of the public knowledge on research
and developmento To define the understanding of the project evalua-
tion area more clearly, the author has undertaken a research study
under NASA sponsorship which seeks a sharper picture o£ actual govern-
ment evaluation practiceso
All of these complicating factors, however, can teI'lporarily b7'/
regarded as merely same random elements super~posed upon the under-
lying stream of evaluation activitYo One can also recognize that the
customer i S evaluation of the reasonabi1.ity Jf supporting a proj ect is
dependent upon the w~ he perceives the need for or value of the pro-
duct versu~· the way'he est~ates the amount of effort or cost required
to achieve the producto The specific ways and means by which he com-
pares these two factors, the cost and the value, comprise the relation-
ship which is difficult to pin dOWDo From an economic-theory point of
view, the customer should discount back to the present the stream of
~ture costs and value which will result from the project undertaking,
6
using someapp;r-opriate interest rate as a discount factor II In regard
5 McKinsey and Campa~, Inc., An Ey:alyation of NASA's Con-
tract Policies, urianization and Performance (Washington: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1960), po 1-40
6In a very interesting and different approach, Stephen
~glin of Harvard University has attacked the traditional view that
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to this, however, one article maintained, nMost sophisticated indus-
trial solutions depend on the use of a discount factor to permit the
summation of cost and income, or of profit, over t~e, ioeo j the calcu-
lation of the present value of a future stream of incomes and costso
In the military case, ,there are considerable difficulties in the way
of establishment of an appropriate discount rate for future expendi-
tures, and eyen greater obstacles to integrating effectiveness over
- 7
future years 0 If Even were these difficulties nonexistent , it is
unlikely that the military customer would utilize the theoretically
advisable approach to the evaluation decision-makingo In nearly all
investigations o£ investment decision-making practices, evidences of
the use of the approach advocated by economic theory have been aLmost
nonexistent. 8
The literature which describes research and development proje~t selec-
tioD by private companies may shed some light on how the military cus-
tamer actually evaluates and selects new product development projects~
has said the choice for investment is the alt'ernative which has the
current highest discounted cash £lowo He calls this the "MYopia Rule"
since it nearsightedly ignores the possibility of a t~e sequence of
investments which create highest total discounted flow, but in which
the current investment may not be highest in this regard 0 Mr 0 Marglin I s
full discussion of this approach is in preparation for publicationo
7Richard B. Foster and Francis P. Hoeber, "Cost-Effective-
ness Analysis for Strategic Decisionsn , Journal of the Operations
Research .Society of America, Vol 0 3, Noo 4 (November 1955), p. 485,.
8See, for example: Wo lNo Heller, "The Anatomy of Inv"est-
ment Decisions", Harvard Business Review, March~ 1951~ ppo 95-103;
J 0 Fo Ebersole, ".The Influence o-r Interest Rates" J Harvard Business
Reyiew, 19.38, ppo 35-39; Ho Do Hendersqn, "The Significance 0"£ the
Ra~e of Interest", OY~ord Economic Papers, October, 1938, ppo 1-13;
and John Ro Meyer and. Edwin Kuh, The Investment Decision, Harvard
University Press (Cambridge, 1957)0
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Nelson's survey of the literature points to several different
analyses of project selection proceduresa
A large number.of companies state that they have no
specific fonmal plan for selecting projectso In these
companies the personal influence of the director is
of great importance a 0: 0 0 a Of the two hundred companies
interviewed by the National Science ~oundation, forty-
six have formal methods for computing returns on re-
search and development projects 0 Many of these com-
panies, however, calculate returns ~-post as an in-
dicator of how well the laboratory has done in the past,
and do not use the method for the purpose of predicting
returns from alternative new projectsaoooo Where the
Rand D computing methods were used ~to compute relative
worth of alternative projects that the company might
undertake, the methods usually seemed arbitrary to
the point of bei~g worse than u~elesso A major petro-
leum company assigns "points tt to a project proposal
on the basis of chances of success, pay-off, capital
required in order·to produce the product developed
in the laboratory, etco Project proposals must have
a certain number of points before they are acceptedo
The "point table", however, seems to be built on no
rational baaeoo This does not seem to be atypicalo 9
These evidences are supported by a MIT-sponsored survey of some
thirty-seven laboratories operated by twenty-nine large industrial
companies, most of whom maintain substantial research and development
p:r:-ogramso The report says in part,
Although research executives and company managers have
had little success in applying mathematical fo~ulas to
the evalu&tion o~ research and development, many con-
tinue to try to develop valid quantitative yardsticks
such as a "prof'it and loss" function or an "index of
return" fo~lao They use such £o~las to decide, in
advance, whether a particular project is worth under-
taking, as ~ell as to appraise the general value of
research project~ a~ter completioDo Here are several
illustrative methods described by respondents:
9Richard R. Nelson, "Invention, ResearchJ and Development:
A Survey of the Literaturen , Ua So Air Force Project Rand Research
Mem?randum, RM-2146 (April 15, 1958), pp. 55, 56, 57.
Payout period =
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"Results are evaluated beforehand by comparing the
five-year estimated revenue with the total estimated
development expense 0 They are evaluated afterwards
by comparing the estimated two-year savings with the
actual savings for machine improvement developmento"
ItResults are eval'u.ated by these formulas:
__ New earnings (after taxes)Return on investment Total investment involved
Capital outlay on projects "
New average annual revenue (after taxes)
"Direct returns expressed on an annual basis are com-
pared with expenseso Rand D is credited with the
returns for the first three years of commercial appli-
cation of the worko"
"Only a few such formulations have been described in
the literatureo The best-known formula is the nindex
of return" developed by a division of the Olin Mathie-
son Chemical Corporation (before it became part of O-M)
several years agoo This formula credits research with
the stUn of process savings for one yea!- and a fixed per-
cent of sales of new products and ~proved products for
given tIme periodso The actual percentages and time
periods have been subject to change during the years
the formula has been in useo The r'Tali.dity of most for-
mulas has been challengedo Also their originators have
generally been careful to point out the arbitrary nature
of some of the numbers used and the nec"essity for com-
pany-wide agreement on the manner in Wllich Rand D "takes
credit" for economic resultso 10
Finally, the Director of Research and Development of the United
States Air Force offered his analysis of the project selection baseo
"Since 'IN"e normally have twice as much work as money, some system o£
priority must be developed~ In applied research the priority is based
upo~ the future operational need., the mil~.tary advantage to be gained,
the technical deficiency, the cost B.nd the risk involvedo It is at
this point that the program formulation relies heavily on the judgment,
10 . 4 o.Albert Ho Rubenste1n, "Settlng Cr1terla for Rand D",
Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1957, po 980
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and knowledge of the research and development personnel 0
The only generalization that can be drawn from the above evi-
dence is that companies practically uniformly consider in same fash-
ion both the potential val.ue and ~he expected cost aspects of an Rand
D projecto The specific w~ in which they relate these di£fers from
company to company and from. lab to lab., It is ·no doubt true thai; the
military customer also considers both the value and cost aspect~ of
a proposed developmento Similarly, however, there is probably no set
sufficiency criterion that the relationship of cost and value must
passo The greater the value that the military customer does consider
as the expected value o~ the project, and the lower the expected cost
to develop the end results, the more favorabl.e the relationship be-
tween these two aspectso The higher the value relative to the cost,
the greater the likelihood that the customer will undertake sponsor-
ship of a development e£fort in this areao The customerQs willing-
ness to support a project thus depends upon this value-cost ratioo
The amount of money the customer is willing to spend is therefore
related to his expectations that the end results of the project will
be favorable, according to his own 'criterion of favorabilit~o During
the early phases of a project life cycle, when the firm is merely re-
questing support for study activities being carried out with relatively
small amounts of funds, the customer will support such activities to
the extent that he senses this area as having potential value, despite
II Major General Mo Co Demler, Speech to the National
Aeronautical Electronics Conference, Dayton, Ohio, May 4-6 j 19590
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its current lack of "objective" meritso Support of such undertakings
is justified by the customer under the label of "supporting research~,
seeking general knowledge rather tllan seeking a final product 0 Here
the willingness of the customer to undertake risky ventures will cer-
tainly influence the kinds of activities he will be willing to supporto
The process of discussion and negotiation between the customer
and the firm, which was discussed earlier in this chapter J provides the
customer with the finmqs public estimate of the cost and value of the
proposed projecto The customer is influenced by these estimates sub-
mitted by the firm to the extent to which he has cor£idence in the
firmls knowledge and abilityo This means that following the receipt
of a proposal from the firm, the customer may well adjust his estimate
of both the value and the cost of the project, moving to at least some
extent closer to the estimates expressed by the firmo On the basis of
these estimates of value and cost accepted by the customer, the custc-
mer will determine the extent to which he is willing to support the
financial requirements of the projecto In tpis w~ the customer de~er-
mines the total allocations which he desires ~o make for the particular
project under considerationo The actual allocation rate~ however} is
dependent not only upon these desired allocations J ·but also upon the
availability of sufficient funding authoriiy for the desired alloca-
tion levelo The customer is not able to exceed any .authorization
limitations that may have been placed upon himy and even within these
bounds will certainly not allocate the f"ull desJ.red amount immediatel.yo
There is a delay involved in carefully considering the request for funQ
funds and the requirements for the project,' and i.n fact, in deciding
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to allocate the necessary ~undso
The time required to establish and coordinate a
general operational requirement for a large system
often runs into years even after the fundamental
need for a system is fairly well understoodo In
part, the time is spent in convincing many more or
less independent officials of the needo In part,
it is spent in elaborating and refining the require-
mentsooooo A del~ which might be called decision
time usually follows 0 The larger the system, the
more deliberation is required by all of the offici-
als who must make decisions and the more officials
get into the acto Like requirement time. decision
time increases more raridlY than the size and com-
plexity of the systemo 2
Thus a delay in actually allocating the funds to support the
firm's activities may in fact, as the cited author mentioned, be re-
lated to the size and complexity of the project undertaking, and it
certainly may be related to other factorso There is no doubt a mir~-
mum budgeting delay necessary for handling the formal paper work and
obtaining the minimal number of approvalso Beyond this.9 there are
additional delays that in part depend upon the amount of money that
is involved, and in part upon the obviousness of the projec+ justificationo
If the project is a questionable one in the customer~s opinion~ it will
no doubt take longer to acquire an a1.1of~ation of fund,s than i.f the sitution
is one in which the need is overwhelming and the ~ost is tiny, just to cite
an extremeo These same bas·ic factors will affect the customer's allo-
cation of funds at any stage of the project life cycle, whether it is
before the major work effo~t has begun or later in the project li~eo
The customer may, as the project evolves j change his earlier estimates
l~o Richard Co Raymond, "Avoiding Obsolescence in System
PlanningU (General Electric Technical ~litary Planning Operaticn,
May 1959), po 40
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of cost or valueo Such estimate changes may of course result from
the request for additional funds by the firm or, on the other hand,
from the customerfs own internal investigations or intuitioDo Under
such circumstances, the decision to allocate funds may amount to a
decision to cancel a certain portion of the allocation in just th~
same sense that it can be a'decision to add additional funds to the
previously allocated amountso
Although the customer may already have allocated funds for a
given project, this does not necessarily mean that the customer has
released these funds to the finm to spendo For instance, during the
phase of project life that h~s been referred to as the study contract
phase, the customer in general does not fully support the costs of
the firmo T!le customer here expects that the firm will invest some
of its own money in such a study contract in anticipatiun that a
successful effort will lead "to a much greater project later on, bringing
additional profits to the firm' Recent changes in practices by mili-
tary organizations have in fact strengthened this policy of providing
ori1y partial funding, and today the customer usually pays about half
of the so-called research costs during these ~~udy phaseso In addi-
tion, of course, the customer may feel that he should not bother to
support any research activity by the firm, unless this activity is
becoming to some extent substantial 0 The customer may well have a
minimal threshold level of research activity below which he will ex-
pect the firm to fUlly support the engineering effort out of the fi.rm~s
own fundso Thus until this effort rises above such a tt~eshold, the
customer will not release any support funds to the firm(
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During th~ portion of the Rand D life cycle which is usually
labeled the "design and development phase", the customer will make
available to the finm funds which do not exceed the actual costs
incurred by the firm 0 The amount of the allocation which is made
available at any given t~e de~ends upon the schedule which the cus-
tomer and firm negotiateo As the project eVOlves, however, the cus-
tomer may adJust the project scheduleo This usually occurs as the
customer's evaluation of the merits 0'£ the project begins to change 0
For example, his est~ate of product value may decrease, or his esti-
mate of costs increaseo In such a case, the custamer may well begin
to stretch out the project, extending the project duration with the
same total of fundso Thus the customer can sloW' down the expenditure
rate of the firm, giving himself more t~e to see what is what while
not spending too much additional money. In this manner, the custo-
mer has more or less direct control over the expenditure of his own
funds and thereby exercises indirect control over the amount of effort
that is put forth by the finmo This general process that we have
described thus £ar--the customer's evaluation of the funds request,
his granting or allocation, and his release of the funds--incorporates
not only the initiation of large-scale activi.ty, but also the possibility
of cancellation of the project. Such cancellation can take place
directly by reducing the allocation that has been made to the project,
and less directly by gradually stretching out, even to an in£inite
duration, the project life and gradually with-drawing the funds from
the project.
164
The Firm's Investment Decision
The firm which does research and development work for the
military product market engages in the same kind of eValuatioD j allo-
cation, and ~nd release sequence as has just been described for the
-
customer 0 The earlier discussion pointed out the difficulty of properly
selecting and/or eValuating research and development projectso The
research or engineering supervisor pl~s a great role in determining
which projects shall b.e undertakeno In his study of an Rand D labora-
tory, Marcson found that, "The supervisor is not certain whether the
research suggestion will prove impracticalo Under these circumstances
he hedges against the possibility of erroro He takes a chance on a
suggestion, but only a small chanceo He permits the staf':f man to
spend part of his time on a suggested idea--usually a very small
part of his timeo ",13
By this backhanded method, the projects which after-the-fact
are usually labeled "research- are orten startedo In an earlier dis-
cussion we pointed out that the attitude in undertakir~ these pro-
jects is that one does not ~ediately recognize the economic feasi-
bility of such a proposed undertakingo The study efforts of the firm
are thus determined in this relatively infozmal mannero Quoting from
Marcson's report again,
The choice of ideas £or research is one of the
crucial problems of the laboratory 0 This is gui:ded
by a concern for the development of goods and ser-
vices 0 This is not always discernible, and it
13
165
raises the continuous question as to which ideas,
which projects, lend themselves to such a courseo
There is, then, alWays the problem of choice and
decision. The guide lines for such decisions are
inadequate, but I [the director of research] have
to make a decision. 1 4
An amusing comment as to who does the project selection is quoted by
Nelson:
The best person to decide what research work shall
be done is the man who is doing the research. The
next best is the head of the department. A£ter
that, you leave the field of best persons and meet
increasingly worse groups. The first of these is
the research director who is probably wrong more
than half th.e timeo Then comes a committee, which
is WI'ong most 01- tne i.i.me 0 F.i.llea.lly, th~z:.a io Ci. ~ow.-
mittee of company vice presidents which is wrong
all of the time. 15
But, of course, regardless who makes the project selection
decision, he will try to make it intelligentlyo
A rationally planned inventive effort will only be
undertaken if the expected revenue of the invention
exceeds the expected casto In many instances the
economic utility of a particular invention is so
great that an inventive e£fort is economically ra-
tional, even though the underlying scientific know-
ledge is scanty, hence the expected cost of making
the invention is greato Edison's attempt to develop
an incandescent l~p, Goodyear's attempt to ~prove
the characteristics of rubber, are cases in pointo
In these cases, since there was little useful under-
lying scientific knOWledge, the invention procedure
was trial and error, the next trial being roughly--
but only roughly--indicated by a very loose theory
fonmulated as the research proceededo But though
the invento~~s knew that it would probably prove
costly to achieve their objective, they believed that
the gains, if they were successfUl, were sufficiently
14Ibido, po 420
15Richard Ro Nelson, "Invention, Research and Development:
A Survey of the Literature", £20 eito, p. 580
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16great to make the effort profitable.
,
The same fundamental considerations apply to the finm doing re-
search and development for the military marketo The amount of money
which it is willing to invest in the project depends upon its expecta-
tions as to the ultimate profitability of the resulting project, and
upon its own willingness to gamble (i.e., invest with no contract
assured) its expected profitso Thus the maximum amount of funds that
the finm is willing to invest in a particular project depends upon its
estimate of the likelihood that the customer will later support that
project, its estimate of the profits which would accrue fram such sup-
port, and its willingness to accept the risk of investing same fraction
of those anticipated profits. As time evolves ... and its estimates of
product value and development cost change, the firm also changes its
estimate as to the probability that the customer will undertake large-
scale developnent 0 Any actions taken by the customer which show an
increased (or decreased) willingness to support the project a£fect
the fi~ls assessment of the situatioDo
Thus the firm continuously decides ·upon a total amount which it
is willing to investo It also decides upon a rate of expenditure of
these £Unds, taking into account both the likely dura+ion of its own
required support and the availability of company £Unds for such a pur-
pose. The finm will continue to support the project effort at the
rate its investment evaluation process deems appropriate y even after
the customer begins partial support through a study-type contracto
19aichard Ro Nelson, "The Simple Economics of Basic Scien-
tific Research--A Theoretical Analysis", po 70
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On the other hand, once tI.te customer has approved a larger-scale pro-
ject effort, the finm usually withdraws additional support funds, and
allows the customer to determine the project funding and, hence, sched-
ulingo However, when the customer enCOllnters funding delays, or cuts
back on project support, the finm may again provide additional money
to the project if such support is in line with the fi~IS usual invest-
ment evaluation practices.
Thus the dual funding paths initially described in Chapter 1
have been more thoroughly treated here. In the first path the finm
requests financial support from the customer organization, the custo-
mer evaluates this request based on his own evaluation policies, and
may allocate and release funds to the firm for research and develop-
ment activitieso In the second path the ri~ assesses the likelihood
of later obtaining customer support and risks some portion of its
expected profits in the project effort investmento Both paths may
be in active use simultaneously. Both involve continuous assessment
and reaction to the cost-value situation, as determined by the latest
available product and project information. Both paths lead to the
-provision of funds prerequisite to the acquisition of resources and
their productive employment, which activities will be described in
the next chapter.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1,\'
The first section of this appendix shall be concerned with those
factors which affect the firm's request for funds from the customero
Figure 4-1 portrays. tt:ese factors 0 The diagram shows that the firm
takes into account its current monthly research costs, projecting
them on an annual basis, and requests from the customer support of
these research activitieso During this period of time the firm is
also considering the expected suitability of the project to the custo-
mer. In doing this, the firm tries to take into account the invest-
ment criteria of the customer, the expected cost of the project to
the customer, and the customer's estimate of the product value, to
whatever extent the'ri~ is knOWledgeable about these customer opinionso
.As the finm b~gins·to fe~i that the project would be regarded as suit-
. . .
able by the customer, he changes from'requesting funds for support of .
e ..
research to requesting funds for a development project. This change
might take place in response to the customer's request for a proposal,
or it may be self-initiated by the firmo In determining its request
for project funding, the firm takes acoount of its estimate of the total
project costso However, this total estimate is modified by the integ-
rity of the firm 0 A£ter initial project funds have been granted, the
firm compares the amount of funds that it has previously requested to
its changing est~ate of total project costso The expected overruns
or underruns in project funding ellter into the request :for changes in
the project funding 0 The equations describing this part of the firm's
activities_now followo
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The projected annual costs of research at the firm m~rely ex-
tend the current monthly rate by the twelve-month factor to get the
yearly rate.
PACRF.K = (12)(TCEF.K) 4-1, A
PACRF--ProJected Annual Cost of Research o~
the Firm (dollars)
TCEF--Total Current monthly Expenditures at
the Firm (dollars/month)
Tlle firm's requests for research support are pictured belowo
Here we see that the maximum research support cannot exceed the
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estimated cost to complete the jobo U~til the ~i~ gets into the
large-scale project it will request this amount of research supporto
A few months are needed to prepare the request and send it to the cus-
tomero These are incorporated in the four equations belovo
The maximum research support level takes into account the fact
that the research support requests would not exceed the estimated
cost to complete the project i.f these requests were coming at a late
stage of project lifeo
MRSLFoK = MIN (PACRFoK, ECCPFoK) 4-2, A
MRSLF--Maximum Research Support Level at the
Firm (dollars)
MIN--a DY~O notation indicating that the smaller
of the two values in the parentheses is taken
to det ermine the value of the variable MRSLF
PACRF--Projected Annual Cost of Research at th@
Firm (dollars)
ECCPF--Estimated Cost to Complete the Project at
the Firm (dollars)
The fi~ will request this maximum support level as long as it
is still in a phase of activity that it regards as researcho Once the
actual development project has begun, the firm will no longer request
additional funds to support these research activitieso There is a
del~ between the determination of this support level and the actual
request for support of these annual costso The total research grants
desired by the firm, taking into account the amount that the customer
has previously supported, is merely a summation of the current request
level and the previous support provided by the custamero These facts
are incorporated in the following equations:
SACRFoKL SWITCH (MRSLF GK, 0, RFPF oK)
RACRFoKL = DELAY)" (SACRFoJK, DRSCF)
4-3,0 R
4-4, R
TRGDFoK = TECCaK + RACRFoJK
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4-5, A
SACRF--Supportable Annual Cost of Research at the
Firm (dollars)
SWITCH--a DY~O not~tion indicating that if RFPF
is not equal to zero, then SACRF will be
set equal to OJ and if RFPF equals zero,
SACRF will equal MLSRF
MRSLF--Maximum ~esearch Support Level at the
Firm \Qollars)
RFPF--Requested total Funds for the Project by
the Fi~ (dollars)
RACRF--Requested Annual Costs of Research by the
Firm (dollars)
DELAYJ---a DY~O notation indicating that RACRF
is a third order exponential delay fonm
of SACRF
DRSCF--Delay in Requesting Support of Costs by
the Firm (months)
TRGDF--Total Research Grants Desired by the Firm'
(dollars)
TECC--Total Engineering Costs to tLe Customer
(dollars)
The finm does not need very much t~e to frepare its requests for
research supporto Let us therefore set this processing delay equal
to two months 0
})RSCF = 2 months
The equations describing the requests for changes in project
funding, as distinct from changes in research support, are diagrammed
in Figure 4-3. These requests encompass both the initial request for
project funds and the later increases or decreases in that requested
amount. The firmis integrity will determine the fraction of the ex-
pected total costs it feels are biddable. This fraction changes as
the project progresses, since the firm recognizes it must eventually
face up to the full expected costs in order for it to receive adequate
project funding. When the biddable amount is significantly more than
the current funds request, the firm will ask for more mOneYa Similarly,
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Figure 4-3 Requests for Changes in Project Funding
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if the firm expects actual costs to be significantly below the current
funds request it will noti~ the customer of the decrease in the fun-
ding requirement.
The first equation below says that if the firm has not yet re-
quested funds (RFPF = 0), then the rate of requested changes is deter-
mined by the initial request equation; if instead th~ firm -l.s changing
an earlier request, the rate of requested changes is determined by the
TRQCF equatioDo
RQCPF 0 KL=SWITCH (RQFIF 0 K, TRQCF 0 K, RFPF 0 K)
RQCPF--ReQuest for Changes in Project funds
. by the Firm (dollars/month)
RQFIF--ReQuest for Funds Initially by the
Firm (dollars/month)
TRQCF--Trial ReQuest for Changes in funds by
the Firm (dollars/month)
RFPF--Requested total Funds for the Project by
the Firm (dollars)
4-6, R
The firm will not take the initiative of requesting funds until
it feels that the value-cost relationship from the customer's point
of view exceeds the investment criterion that the customer utilizeso
Her~it is assumed that the customer utilizes a return-on-investment
criterion which seeks inv9stments whose ValUES are a particular mul-
tiple of the expected casto This relationship is portrayed in the
next equatioDo
RQFIFoK = CLIP (TRQCF~K, 0, VCRCoK, ROICC) 4-7, A
RQFIF--ReQ,uest for Funds Initially by the
wirm (dollars/month)
CLIP--a DYNAMO notation indicating that if VCRC
exceeds ROICC, then RQFIF will be set equal
to TRQCF; if VCRC is less than ROICe, then
RQFIF will equal 0
TRQCF--Trial ReQuest for Changes in funds by the
the Firm (dollars/month
1(5
VCRC--Value-Cost Ratio of the Customer (percentage)
ROICC--Return On Investment Criterion of the Cus-
tomer (percentage)
The above equation says that until the value-cost relationship is
satisfactory to the customer, the firm will not request funds for
project supporto It will continue requesting research funds as des-
crlbed in the equations for RACRF aboveo The customer is here viewed
as being willing to undertake only those projects in which he expects
the value to be received to be much greater than the cost of the pro-
ject. Recognizing that other projects are competing for the customer's
limited funds, and that the customer is further aware that final costs
are likely to exceed current expectations, the customer seeks projects
which initially seem to be able to yiel'd a return that is some multiple
of his costo In this case the multiplier (Return on Inves~ent Cri-
terion of the Customer) is viewed as being equal to two, meaning that
the expected value must at least equal twice the expected costso Thus}
ROICC = 2000 (decimal percentage)
When the firm decides that it has become suitable to request
project support, it will request the ~ount designated by the following
equation for TRQCFo This equation, the tlial request ~or changes in
funds, is also the equation which describes the basic variables uti-
lized during any later stage of the project when changes, either in-
creases or decreases, in requested funds are being made by the firmo
TRQCF 0 K = TRQIF 0 K + TRQDF 0 K
TRQCF--Trial ReQuest for Changes in funds by
the Firm (dollars/month)
TRQIF--Trial ReQuest for Increases by the Firm
(dollars/month)
TRQDF--Trial ReQuest for Decreases by the Firm
(dollars/month)
4-8, A
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Thus the above equation has been written generally to include both the
request for increases as well as decreases 0 It says that the request
for changes is the sum of the request increases and the request decreases.
Naturally, at any one time only one of those two terms 'Would be non-
zero.
Let us first look at the factors that lead the finm to request
increases in the amount of funded support for the project that it
has already beguno As the firm proceeds in a project, its changing
estimates of total cost of the project are continuously compared to
the amount of funds that have been allotted to ito When the expected
overrun in costs increases to the point where the firu1 feels it must
request additional funds from the customer, the finm will request such
additional fundso These factors are included in the next several equa-
tiona, which are thoroughly described beloW' the equation listingo
TRQIFoK =CLIP (RQRIFoK, 0, BORFFoK, BPFRFoK)
RQRIFoK = BORFF.~DT
BORFFoK = BFRFoK - RFPFoK
BFRFoK = TECFoK + (IMBFoK)(ECCPF.K)
BPFRFoK = (BP)(RFPFoK)
4-10, A
4-11, A
4-12, A
4-13, A
TRQIF--Trial ReQuests for Increases by the Firm
( dollars/montIl)
RQRIF--ReQuest Rate of Increase by the Firm
(dollars/month)
BORFF--Biddable OverRun in Funds by the Firm
(dollars)
BPFRF--BreakPoint in Funds Request by the Firm
(dollars)
BFRF--Biddable Fund Request by the Firm (dollars)
RFPF--Requested total Funds for the Project by
the Firm (dollars)
TECF--Total Engineering Costs to the Firm (dollars)
IMBF--Integrity as a Modifier of Bids by the Firm
(percentage)
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ECCPF--Estimated Cost to Complete the Project by
the Firm (dollars)
BP--Breakpoint Percentage :percentage)
The first equation, TRQIF, says that when the amount of project
overrun which the firm feels it can request from its customer exceeds
some threshold level of request, the finm will in fact make the request
for this additional amount of fundso Equation 4-13 s~s that the
threshold fund request is some percentage of the current total requested
funds for the projecto This indicates that if the firm already has
requested funds, unless it intends to make a substantial change in
the request, at least greater than whatever BP percentage is, the
firm will not bother to make such a request 0 The biddable overrun in
funds is indicated by Equation 4-~1 as being simply the total biddable
funds minus the funds that have been requested by the project thus faro
The equation of particular interest is 4-12, in which we define this
concept of the biddable funds request by the firma This equation takes
into account the fact that the firm wi.thout complete integrity will not
reveal to the customer the full extent o~ its expectations as to the
total cost of the project, but rather will indicate only a fractional
part of the additional cost to complete the job 0 The IMBF factor in-
dicates the fraction of the expected additional costs that the firm
will reveal to the customero This fraction changes as the project
progresses, as will be described in Equations 4-14 and 4-150 Thus
Equation 4-12 says that the amount of total requests that are biddable
in the firm's opinion is the sum of the total costs to the firm thus
far plus some fraction of the e~ected additional costs, this fraction
determined by the 'firm's integrityo
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The percentage expected overrun which the ~irm can tolerate
before requesting more money is an indicator of how rapidly it lets
its customer know of expected (and biddable) changes in project costso
Here we have initially selected a five percent breakpointo If BP = 0,
the firm would continuously in£onm the customer of biddable cost changeso
BP = 0005 (dec~al percentage)
The way in which integrity acts as a modifier of the bids submitted
by the firm is incorporated in the next two equatio~so The basic in-
tegrity coefficient of the firm determines how it will initially modify
its expected costs in presenting this est~ate to its customer 0 How-
ever, as the project goes on, the firm recognizes that if it is to be
able to recover its total costs , it must gradually admit to i.tG full
expectations 0 The equations for IMBF indicate this type of behavior
by the firmo
IMBFoK = reF + (l-ICF)(IMBFloK)
IMBFloK = TABLE (IMTAB, BPPCFoK, 0, 105, 0025)
IMBF--Integrity as a Modifier of Bids of the
Firm (percentage)
ICF--Integrity Coefficient of the Firm
(percentage)
IMBFI--Integrity as a Modifier of Bids of the
Fi.rm, 1 (percentage)
IMTAB--Integrity Modifier TABle, a table of
percentile values for determining IMBFl
BPPCF--Believed Percent of Project Completion
by the Firm (percentage completion)
4-14, A
4-15, A
The integrity coefficient of the firm will certainly differ from
one company to another, and we will want to make several computer runs
using di£ferent values of this integrity coefficiento Let us start
off, however, with a coefficient tilat represents the firm that is al-
most completely straightforward in its processing of its request for
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funds, and which understates its expected cost estimate by a mere
caution factor of 10 percento The integrity coefficient) therefore; is
reF = 0090 (decimal percent)
The extent to which the firm will stick to this degree of underesti-
mation of costs depends on how far along in the project the firm be-
lieves it iso If the project has just begun the firm will see little
need to revise its degree of underestimation. However, pressure to
admit to the full costs will increase as the project evolves and as
the fi~ tends to get more concerned about receiving adequate project
funding 0 The table of values, IMTAB, will be used to indicate the per-
centage of the gap between the normal integrity coefficient of the firm
and the full recognition of costs that the firm will concede in its
estimating procedures as the project evolves 0
IMTAB* = 0/0/0/0060/1/1/1
This table shows." with the help of the information of Equation 4--15,
that the :firm vs basic integri.ty coefficient will determi.ne the cost
underestimation that i.s intentional until the project is felt to be
fifty percent complete 0 Then the firm will gradually admit to the
higher cost expectations, ~lly recognizing them by the time the job
has been completedo
The preceding equa~ion group, including Equations 4-9 to 4-15,
described what happens when the firm thinks it has requested less ~unds
than it needs for the research and development projecto On the other
hand, when the firm feels that it has requested more ~nds than it is
going to require y it will also notify the customer and request revis-
ion downward in its previous request for fundso This factor works
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on the same basic principle as beforeo The expected underrun (Equa-
tioD 4-18) is the difference between the current request ~or project
funds and the expected total cost ~or the projec~o When this under-
run is greater than the threshold (or breakpoint) level at which the
firm will make a change in its request for funds, the firm requests a
dOvffiward revision in RFPFo These facts are incorporated in the fol-
lowing ihree equations o
TRQDFoK = CLIP (RQJIDFoK, 0, EURFFoK, BPFRFoK)
RQRDFoK = -EURFFoK/DT
EURFFoK = RFPFoK - ETCPFoK
4-16, A
4-17, A
4-18, A
TRQDF-~Trial ReQuest for Decreases by the Firm
.. ( dollars/month)
RQRDF--ReQuest Rate Downward by the Firm (dollarsl
. month)
EURFF--Estimated UnderRun of Funds by the Firm
(dollars)
BPFRF--Breakpoint in Funds Request by the Firm
. (dollars)
RFPF--Requested total Funds for the Project by
the Firm (dollars)
ETCPF--Estimated Total Cost of the Project by
the Fi~ (dollars)
All of the above requests for changes in the project funding
integrate to create the total level of requested funds for the projecto
RFPFoK = RFPFoJ + (DT)(RQCPFoJK)
RFPF = 0
RFPF--Requested total Funds for the Project
by the Firm (dollars)
RQCPF--ReQuested Changes in Project funds by
the Firm (dollars/month)
4-19, L
4-20, ~ N
The total current request for funds by the firm is the larger of
the two previously described requests, the request for project funds
and the request for research grantso
TC{tFFoK = MAX (RFPFoK,'IRGDFoK)
TCRFF--Total Current Requests for Funds by
the. Firm (dollars)
RFPF--Requested total Funds for the Project
by the Firm (dollars) .
TRGDF--Total Research Grants Desired by the
Firm (dollars)
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4-21, A
Figures 4-4 and 4-10 describe in general the customer's continuing
evaluation of the suitability of the project, both before and during
the period of the customer's actual support of the project, as well
as the customer's funding response to this evaluation a Figure 4-4
examines those aspects pert~ining to the evaluation and the actual
allocation of funds by the customero The diagram shows that the cus-
tomer is concerned with determining the suitability ~f the project for
investment 0 This detenmination consists of the customer taking into
account an estimate of costs, project value, ,and his own investment
criterion, a.nd deciding to what extent he is then willing to support
the costs o£ the firm 0 Both the cost estimat~~and value est~ate which
are actually used by the customer in this determination indicate th&t
the customer pays some attention to the estimates presented to him by
the research and development firm, modifying his own internal-ly-held
estimate of these factors to some extent based on the information given
to him by the firmo The extent to which this modificati on takes place
depends upon the customer:.B confIdence in the firmo
As was mentioned earlier, the·finm's request for project funds
reflects not only the finm's own estimate of what the costs are going
to be, but also takes into account the int~grity (or lack thereof) of
th~ :firm 0 Th.is same set of facto::rs is also present in the firm 1 s value
estimate that is presented to the customero Not only is th~ ~irm9s
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Figure 4-4 Customer Project Evaluation
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internally-held estimate of future project value taken into account,
but in addition, the finm's integrity may influence it to modify this
estimate in t~ying to convince the firm. that the project is, in fact,
more worthwhile than the firm itselr believeso
On the basis of the customer's determination of the suitability
of the project for investment, the customer will determine his willing-
ness to support the costs of the projecto The project suitability,
the cost estimate accepted ~or use by the customer, and the firmRs
own requ~st for funds, determine the maximum amount of allocation that
the customer will be willing to makeo The suitability of the project
in the customerVs opinion will also determine to some extent how long
it takes for the customer toactually make the approval of the project
and begin to allocate fundso If the customer deems the project ex-
tremely worthwhile, then he will begin to allocate £unds as soon as
the minimum ~aper-processing has been completedo On the other hand,
the more doubtful the customer is about the justifiability of the in-
vestment, the longer he will take before actually beginning to allo-
cate funds for this purposeo These factors will finally enter into
determining the customer 2 s actual allocation rate, which will shift
from those generally available to the customer (if there are, in
~act, sufficient funds actually available) into the actual level of the
funds allotted to the particular project under consideratioDo
~. I
Let us now turn to develop the equations which go along with the
previous diagram, Figure 4-4r First, we shall take account of the fact
that the estimate of, the total cost which has been accepted for use by
the customer combines not only the customer's internally-held cost
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estimate, but also to some extent takes into account the firmgs requests
for fundso These considerations are shown in Figure 4-50 Here the ac-
cepted total cost estimate is indicated as the sum of the customer's
internally-generated estimate plus some fraction of the difference recog-
nized by the customer between its own estimate and the finmRs requested
funds for the project~ The customer's confidence in the finm determines
the extent to which he will substitute the fi~'S request for his own
estimate 0 Two time-dependent factors also enter into the diagramo
First, until the finm submits a bid to the customer (formal or informal)
the customer does not have the firm's estimated cost available to ito
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Secondly, even after receiving the finm's request, several months
expire before the customer responds to the finmis estimate and begins
to change his own estimate to take account o~ the firm's proposal pro-
ject casto
The equations which correspond to this diagram are listed belowo
The first equation, Equation 4-22, indicates that the cost estimates
used by the customer in his decision as to the suitability of the pro-
ject takes into account his own internal estimate, ETCPC; and some
fraction of the difference between his own estimate and the estimate
presented to him by the firmRs request ~or funds. The extent to which
the firm 2s request is actually taken into account depends upon the
custamer;s confidence in the firma For instance, if the customer has
no con~idence in the £irm, the confidence indicator will be zero, and
the equations indicate that the estimate of cost accepted by the custc-
mer will be wholly his own internally-generated estimateo On the other
hand, if the customer has complete confidence in the rirm, then the
estimate will gradually move to be the amount represented by the custo-
mer's request for project funding 0 This change would take place over
a period indicated by the delay, DRRFC, in the equation for DECFCo
This is merely a smoothing of the actual difference between the firm's
request and the customerVs previously internally-held estimate, as in-
dicated in Equation 4-25. This latter equation also takes into account
the fact that the firmis cost estimate will not in general be known to
the customer until he actually submits a bid for funds for the projecto
The fact of such submission is indicated by the equation for IBF, Equa-
tion 4-260
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ETCACoK = ETCPCoK + (CNFC) (DECFC oK) ~-22, A
DECFCoK = DECFCoJ + (DT) (l/DRRFC)(DECRCoJK DECFCoJ) 4-23, L
DECFC = 0 4-24, N
DECRCoKL = (IBFoK)(RFPFoK - ETCPCoK) 4-25, R
IBFoK = SWITCH (0, 1, RFPFoK) 4-26, A
ETCAC--Est~ated Total Cost Accepted by the
Customer (dollars)
ETCPC--Estimated Total Cost of the Project by
the Customer (dollars)
CNFC--Confidence iN the Firm by the Custome'l·
(percentage)
DECFC--Difference in the Estimates of COST
between the Finm and the Customer
(dollars)
DRRFC--Delay in Responding to Requests for Funds,
by the Customer (months)
DECRC--Difference in Estimated Costs, Rate of
Change (dollars/month)
IBF-- Indicator of Bid by the Fi~ (dimensionless)
RFPF--Requested total Funds for the Project by
the Firm (dollars)
In Chapter 3 the customerVs confidence in the finm was discussed in
reference to the customerqs estimate of the technological effectiveness
of the firm, There CNFC was set equal to 60 percent for the initial
runs 0 The second constant used in the above equations was DRRFC, the
"Delay in Responding to Requests for Funds, by the Customer~o This
delay indicates how long it takes before the customer takes into account,
in forming his own cost estimate, the funds request of the ri~o It
shall here be assumed to equal three months 0 Therefore,
DRRFC = .3 months
The s~cond aspect that enters into the customer's detenmination
of suitability of the project is his estimate of value of the projecto
The same type of procedure as was used above in discussing the cost
estimate will be used in discussing the value estimate accepted for
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use by the customero The customer modifies his own internally-
generated estimate of the future product value by some fraction of the
difference between this estimate and that which is presented to him by
the firmo This e~ent again is dependent upon the customer's confidence
in the firmo The firm's estimate that is presen~ed to the customer
represents what the firm believes to be its self-interest in trying to
magnify the ult~ate worth of the project by overstating the firmvs
internally-held beliefs as to the max~ value of the producto The
degree of overstatement depends on the firmts integrityo The equations
expressing these facts are:
EVAUCoK = EFPVCoK + (CNFC)(FEVPCoK ~. EFPVCoK)
FEVPCoK = EMXYFoK + (I-IeF) (EMXVF.~K)
EWCVF oK = MAX (EFPVF oK, LRPVF oK)
4-27, A
4-28, A
4-29, A
EVAUC--Est~ate of product Value Accepted for
Use by the Customer (dollars)
EFPVC--Est~ate of Fut\l~e Product Value by the
Customer (dollars)
CNFC--Confidence iN the Firm by the Customer
(percentage)
FEVPC--Firmas Estimate of product Value Presented
to the Customer (dollars)
EMXVF--Est~ate of MaXimum product Value by the
Firm (dollars)
ICF--Integrity Coefficient of the Firm (percentage)
EFPVF--Estimate of Future Product Value by the
Firm (dollars) .
LRPVF--Level of Recognized current Product Value
by the Firm (dollars)
T"ne lattel~ equatj.on indicates the fact that the firm q s estimate that
is presented to the customer is based on the larger of the two estimates
of the firm, the future value or the current value of the product out-
come 0
On the basis of the estimate o~ value and cost just prepared, the
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customer now can determine how sui'~able the project is according to his
own investment criteriono This process is illustrated in the next dia-
gram 0 Taking into account his accepted product value estimate and his
expectations as to the costs needed to complete the project, the cus-
tamer determines the ratio of value to cost for the projecto Comparing
this to his investment criterion, a desired value-cost ratio, the custo-
mer decides how suitable the project appears for his investment purposeso
This then determines the extent to which the customer will be willing to
finance the costs of the projecto
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Figure 4-6 Suitability of the Project for Investment by the Customer
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The first equation in the following group indicates that the
value estimate is compared not with the total project cost estimate,
rather with the estimate o£ the cost to complete the projecto This
indicates that the customer does not consider sunk costs in his in-
vestment decision makingo Economic theory tells us that this is the
way in which people are supposed to make investment decision~, that
is, disregarding sunk costso However, there are many who would ques~
tion Whether, in fact, this practice is followed. Here we are adopting
for representation in the model the theoretically advisable practice
and could if we wished, in later variations of the model equations,
adopt any other type of value-cost comparison that is desired~
The second and third equations, Equations 4-31 and 4-32, take
the ratio of this value-cost relationship to the return on investment
criterion of the customer (vbich in turn expresses his desired value-
cost relationship), and l~its this ratio to numbers less than 10
The 1 ltmit indicates that the customer thi~s the project is 100 per-
cent suitable for his investment purposeso The final equation indi-
cates that the probability of customer support is a tabular function
of the-relationship between the values, costs, and investment criterion
of the customero The equations now follow:
VCRCoK ~IAUCoK 4-30, A= ECCPCoK
T·SPICoK VCRCoK 4-31, A= ROICC
SPINCoK = MIN" (TSPICoK, 1) 4-32, A
WSCFCoK = TABHL (PCSF, SPINe oK, 0, 1, 001) 4-33, A
VCRC--Value-Cost Ratio at the Customer
(percentage)
EVAUC--Est~ate of product Value Accepted for
Use by the Customer (dollars)
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ECCPC-- Estimate of Cost to Complete the Project
by the Customer (dollars)
TSPIC--Trial, Suitability of Project for Inves-
ment by the Customer (percentage)
ROICC--Return On Investment Criterion of the
Customer (percentage)
SPINC--Suitability of Project for INvestment
by the Customer (percED tage)
WSCFC--Willingness to SUPPO!~t the project Costs
of the Firm by the Customer (percentage)
TABHL--TABle, High-Low, a DYNAMO notation which
indicates that the PCSF table will be used
to supply the value of WSCFC corresponding
to the current value of SPINCo Should SPINe
exceed the high limit of 1 or the low of 0,
WSCFC will be set equal to the value which
corresponds to the appropriate high or low
extreme 0
PCSF-·-Probability table of Customer Support of the
Firm (percentage)
The return on investment criterion of the customer, ROICC, was earlier
set equal to two, indicating that the customer desired to invest in
projects in which the expected value was at least twice the expected
additional costo
The willingness of the customer to support ·tl-.LC: firm depends upon
the suitability of the project for investment to the customer, as
defined in Equation 4-32 by the ratio of the value-cost relationship
to the investment criterion of the customero The probability of this
customer support is pictured in the diagram on the next page, Figure 4-7.
Based on his willingness to support the project and upon his esti-
mates of the total cost to complete the project, the customer determines
the total amount of funds that he is willing to put into the project.
The amount that he actually decides to allocate is the smaller of
this total amount that he is willing to spend and the amount that
has been requested by the firm, and recognized by the customer 0 There
is some delay before the customer responds to the finm~s funding requestso
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Figure 4-7 Probability of Customer Support o-r the Project
The values pictured in the diagram are specified at increments of
001 in the value of SPINe by the table for PCSF- as follows:
These relationships are shown in Figure 4-80
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The first equation below says that the customer is willing to
support a fractional part of the expected project costs, that fraction
indicated b~ his willingness to invest that was represented in Equa-
tion 4-33- The second equation shows that the customer will not grant
more than the firm has actually requested 0 Finally, Equation 4-,36
indicates that it takes a few months before the customer is fully
aware of the firm's current request for funds and can take this
factor into account in its allocation decision.
TFWCCoK = (WSCFCoK)(ETCACoK)
:MADe 0 K = MIN (TFWCC Q K, RRFC 0 K)
4-34, A
4-35, A
RRFCoK = RRFCoJ + (DT)(l/DRRFC)(TCRFFoJ - RRFGoJ) 4-36, L
RRFC = 0 4-27, N
TFWGC--Total Funds Willing to be Committed by
the Customer (dollars)
WSCFC--Willingness to Support the project Costs
of the Finm by the Customer (percentage)
ETCAC--Estimated Total Costs Accepted by the
Customer (dollars)
~--Ma~um level of Allocation Desired by the
Customer (dollars)
RRFC--Recognized Request for Funds by the Custo-
mer (dollars)
DRRFC--Delay in Responding to Requests for Funds~
by the Customer (months)
TCRFF--Total Current Requests for Funds by the
Firm (dollars)
DRRFC was established as three month, following its use in Equation 4-230
The equatiolls continue with the two level equations for the cumu-
lative allocations by the customer and the funds available for additional
allocation by the customer. With these two levels is also the rate equa-
tiOD for the financial input to the customer. This equation provides
a single pulse of a very large amount of money at the input time for
the customer 0 Financial restrictions in the customer's funds can be
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considered by altering either the dollar value o£ VLARG or the t~ing
of INTMC.
AAe.K = AAC.J + (DT)(RFAC.JK) 4-38, L
AAC = 0 4-39, N
FAC.K = FA.C~J + (DT)(FINC.JK - RFAC.JK) 4-40, L
FAC = 0 4-41-, N
FINe.XL = PULSE (VLARG, IN'IVC, VLARG) 4-42, R
AAC--Actual Allocations by the Customer
(dollars)
RFAC--Rate of Funds Allocation by the Customer
(dollars/month)
FAC--Funds Available to the Customer (dollars)
FINC--Financial INput to the Customer (dollarsl
month)
VLARG--VeT'J LARGe number (d~ensionlesa)
IN~C--INput T~e of funds for the Customer
(month)
VLARG is set equal to one billion, to insure no runout of customer
funds in the projects to be considered. The input t~e o~ these fundS
is initially set at T~ = 0 and will be varied in later project simu-
lations. Thus,
VLARG = ~EI0,
IN'WC = 0
Th~ £ollowing figure represents the fact that the fund allocation
rate of the customer may be constrained either by the desired rate
or by the available funds. The desired allocation rate reflects the
customer's continuous att9mpt to have his actual allocations to the
project equal his desired level of allocations. The customer tries
to implement this attempt over a period of time designated by his vari-
able delay in budgeting £unds. Since this rate may either allocate
additional monies or cancel previous allocations, the diagram also
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recognizes that the customer cannot cancel more than the allocations
to the firm which have not already been spent.
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Figure 4-9 Rate of Funds Allocation by the Customer
The equation :for the funds allocation rate by the customer, RFAC,
takes into account the fact that the funds desired to be allocated,
TRFAC, may not be available to the customer in his'balance o~ unallocated
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funds, FACo The maximum rate that can be allocated, MRFAC, is the
amount that would deplete the available f'llnds in one solution time-
interval of the equations 0
MRFACoK =
RFACoKL = MIN (TRFAC~K, .MRFACoK)
FAC~K
DT
RFAC--Rate of Funds Allocation by the
Customer (dollars/month)
TRFAC--Trial Rate of Funds Allocation by
the CustOIDrr (dollars/month)
MRFAC--Maximum Rate of Funds Allocation by
the Customer (dollars/month)
FAC--Funds Available to the Customer (dollars)
4-43, R
4-44, A
The rate of allocation desired by the customer represents the
customeris adjustment to the difference between his desired total
allocation and the actual allocations that he has made thus faro His
delay in actually budgeting these funds depends upon, first, the mini-
mum delay in processing the paper work for these funds, and secondly,
the extent to which the customer is enthusiastic about the project.
If the customer is enthusiastic about the project, then he can push
through the allocation wi th the mj.nimum delay. However, if his en-
thusiasm is at all questionable: there is reason to believe that the
{
customer will take much ..longer to make up his mind to actUally. allo-
cate the fundso These factors are included in the equations belovo
In addition, the equations below recognize that at times the customer
will feel'that he has overextended himself and allocated too much money
to the project under consideration. In this circumstance, the custo-
mer's allocation rate ~~ll actually be an allocation cancellation rate,
which cancellation rate is limited to the amount of ~locations which
have not yet been spent by ~he firm.
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TRFACoK = MAX (RFADCoK, - LCRAFoK) 4-45, A
RFADCoK MADC.K - AACoK 4-46, A= DBFCoK
LCRAFoK UCAF.K 4-47, A= DT
DBFCoK =DMBFC + (DBFTC)(l-SPINCoK) 4-48, A
TRFAC--Trial Rate of Funds Allocation by the
Customer (dollars/month)
RFADC--Rate of Funds Allocation Desired by the
Customer (dollars/month)
LCRAF--Limitation to Cancellation Rate of Allocated
Funds (dollars/month)
MADC--Maximum level of Allocation Desired by the
Customer (dollars
AAC--Actual Allocations by the Custamer (dollars)
DBFC--Delay in Budgeting Funds by the Customer
(months)
UCAF--Unspent Customer Allocations to the Firm
(dollars)
DMBFC--Delay, Minimum, in Budgeting Funds by the
Customer (months)
DBFTC--Delay in Budgeting Funds, Time Constant
," (months)
SPINC--Suitability of the Project for INvestment
by the Customer (percentage)
A reasonable value for the minimum delay in the customer's processing
of the allocation requests is one-half year with a probable maximum addi-
tional delay of another year 0 Thus,
DMBFC = 6 months
DBFTC = 12 months
In any case the customerVs own desired maximum level of allocation,
MADG, serves as a restraint on the allocation rateo
Figure 4-10 completes the pictorial presentation of those factors
which relate to the customer's continuing evaluation of the project and
his response to these evaluationso This diagram specifically examines
the aspects relating to the customeris project control measures a The
customer attempts to exercise control over the project through his
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Figure 4-10 Customer Project Control
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scheduling of the duration of the project and through his control over
the release o~ his own funds for reimbursement of the firmRs expendi-
tureso Both of these measures are, of cours~, indirect and~can there-
fore have only indirect effects on th~ actual control of research and
development progresso In determining the scheduled project duration,
the customer takes into account the camplet~on time that he would nor-
mally expect for the project, given the normal total project duration
and the believed amount of project left to be doneo In addition, the
customer takes into account his desires for stretch-out or speed-up of
the projecto lhe~e are the customer's responses to his continuing eval-
uation of the relationship between the expected costs and the expected
value of the projecto If the project seems to be very worthwhile in
terms o~ the value-cost relationship, the cus~omer may desire to speed
up the project and get the benefits of these results somewhat earli.erD
On the other hand, if the value-cost relationship of the project begins
to look poor, the customer may react by starting to stretch out the
expenditure of funds on the projecto This is accomplished by extending
the project duration while maintaining the same total amount of allo-
cated fundso The customer thereby induces pressure upon the fi~ to
~ut cack its level of activities, and the customer "will then perhaps
gradual:+y eliminate the project from his funding support 0 These schedule
considerations determine the rate at which the level of unspent customer
allocations will, in fact, be spent during the Itfe of the research and
development projecto
During the earlier phases, prior to approval of large grants of
development funds, the customerVs support of the finmis research activi-
ties will similarly be dependent upon the amount of to~al allocations
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that have been made to the firm, but will be restricted more by the
firm 1 s own rate of activitYo As was mentioned earlier in this chapter,
the customer will generally feel that the firm ought to support a
certain amount of research activity out of its own fundso In addition
to this, the customer will in general not support more than about 50
percent o~ the total research expenditures of the firmo These factors
detenmine the customer;s expenditure rate out of the pool of unspent
allocation money that had been allotted to the firmo These factors
are included in the equations listed belowo
We shall begin with the level equation for the unspent customer
allocations 0
UCAFoK = UCAFoJ + (DT) (RFACoJK - RECFFoJK)
UCAF = 0
UCAF--Unspent Customer Allocations to the
Firm (dollars)
RFAC--Rate of Funds Allocation by the Customer
(dollars/month)
RECFF--Rate of Expenditure o£ Customer Funds
by the Firm (dollars/month)
4-49, L
4-50, N
Out of this pool of unspent but designated funds comes the rate
of actual expenditures on the project by the customero This rate, as
is shown by Equation 4-52, will never exceed the total current expenses
at the £irm, and in general will be limited below this amount either,
during research, because of the customer 7 s policies of inducing the
firm to support its own research efforts, or during development, by
the customer's considerations of the scheduled project duratioDo
RECFFoKL = ARECFoK
ARECFoK = MIN (TCEFeK, MREPCoK)
MREPCoK = SWITCH (MRERCoK, MPERC.K, IBFoK)
4-51, R
4-52, A
4-53, A
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RECFF--Rate of Expenditure of Customer Funds
by the Firm (dollars/month)
ARECF--Auxiliary, Rate of Expenditure of Cus-
tomer funds by the Firm (dollars/month)
TCEF--Total Current Expenditure rate by the
Firm (dollars/month)
MREPC--Maximum Rate of Expenditures Permitted
by the Customer (dollars/month)
MRERC--Maximum Research Expenditure Rate by the
Customer (dollars/month)
MPERC--Maximum Project Expenditure Rate by the
· Customer (dollars/month)
\IBF--Indicator o£ Bid by the Fi~ (dimensionless)
Equation 4-53 indicates that the limitation of customer expendi-
tures permitted is determined by one policy ~~ring the research phase
and another policy during the phase of larger-scale developmental
activities 0
Let us now go on to first looking at the customer support policies
in existence during the early phase o£ the project li~e cycle, which,
for the sake of convenience, we have called the research phaseo The
diagram and equations below incorporate the fact that the customer
allocations for research are usually for some scheduled period of
research which period will therefore be a determinant o~ the maximum
research expenditure rate permitted out of the custamer's ~unds.
Secondly, they show that the customer will not support more than 50
percent of the current expenditures o~ the firm during the research
period 0 The rest of the expenditures must be absorbed out of the
firm's own fundso Figure 4-ll and Equations 4-54 through 4-56 repre-
sent the above descriptioDo
MRERCoK = MIN (MREDCoK, MREACoK) 4-54, A
MREDCoK UCAFoK 4-55, A= SRP
MREACoK = (00 50) (TCEFoK) 4-56, A
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Figure 4-11 Max~ Customer Research Support Rate
MRERC--Max~Research Expenditure Rate by
the Customer (dollars/month)
MREDC--Maximum Research Expenditure rate Desired
by the Customer (dollars/month)
MREAC--Jdax~Re$earch Expenditure rate Allowed
by the Customer (dollars/month)
UCAF--Unspent ~lstomer Allocations to the Firm
(dollars)
SRP--Scheduled Research Period (months)
TCEF--Total Current Expenditure rate by the Firm
(dollars/month)
The type of funding covered by the above equations is of the naturd
o~ continuing study contracts, usually granted on an annual basiso
Thus,
SRP = 12 months
During the development period, the maximum permitted allocation
rate of the customer's funds is determined by the customeris determi-
nation of the scheduled project duration 0 This fact is modified only
by the policy that in general the customer will not support a very small
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project, here indicated to be one whose cost magnitude is that incurred
by the effort one man per month or lesso The diagram and equations
for this consideration follow:
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Figure 4-12 Maximum Customer Project Support Rate
1MPERoK = UCAFoKSPDCoK 4-57, A
MPERC •K = CLIP (TMPER 0 K, 0 , TMPER 0 K, MRESe)
MRESC = (1) (MESOH)
4~58, A
4-59, N
TMPER--Trial Maximum Project Expenditure Rate
(dollars/month)
UCAF--Unspent Customer Allocations to the Fi~
(dollars)
SPDC--Scheduled Project Duration by the Customer
(months)
MPERC--Maximum Project Expenditure Rate Qy the
Customer (dollars/month)
MRESC--N[nimum Rate of Expenditu~e for Support by
the Customer (dollars/month)
MESOH--Monthly Engineering Salary and OverHead
(dollars/man-months)
The scheduled project duration consists of two parts--the nonmal
project completion time, which at any time depends upon how much of the
project is left to be done, and the changes in this scheduled completion
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time, which depend upon the customer's relative satisfaction with the
progress on the job. Figure 4-13 pictures this relationship 0 As the
customer's lack of satisfaction with the job increases, as indicated
by the percent overexpenditure expected by the customer, the customer
stretches out the job schedule according to the curve shown.
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When no Qverexpenditure is expected~ the scheduled completion time
is just the normal project duration 0 When the relationship is re-
versed, and the customer actually expects to have a very favorable
relationship between project value and cost, the project schedule may
be accelerated and the project duration decreased to the minimum pro-
ject value, pictured as MPCTCo
The scheduling phenomenon of Figure 4-13 is represented ~n the
model by the equation"for the scheduled project duratioDo This dura-
tioD consists of the sum of the believed minimum project completion
time and the additional scheduled project duration, which is respon-
sive to the customerUs funding desireso The min~ project completion
time is here represented as half the exp.ected normal completion time,
which in turn equals the normal project duration multiplied by the
fraction of the project believed remaining to be completedo
SPDCoK = MPCTCoK + ASPDCoK
MPCTCoK = MAX (MPTCloK, DT)
MPCTloK = (BPPICoK)(NPD)(Oo5)
4-60, A
4-61, A
4-62, A
SPDC--Scheduled Project Duration by the Customer
(months)
.~ MPCTC--Minimum Project Completion Time by the
Customer (months)
ASPDC--Additional Scheduled Project Duration by
the Customer (months)
MPCT~-~~nimumProject Completion Time, 1 (months)
BPPIC--Believed Percent of Project Incomplete by
the Customer (p~rcentage)
NPD--Normal Project Duration (months)
Equation 4-61 keeps the schedule at least as long as one equation
solution intervalo The normal project duration was initially set in
Chapter 3at two yearso
The customer 1 s desired stretchout or speedup of the project is
205
diagrammed in Figure 4-140 The diagram serves as an accessory to
Equations 4-63 through 4-69-which will now be describedo
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Figure 4-14 Customer's ~esired Project Stretchout or Speedup
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The first two equations below indicate that the additional scheduled
project duration is exponentially related to the effect of'expected
overexpenditure on the projecto If the Qverexpenditure effect, EXPO,
is zero (when expected additional project cost equals the expected
value), then the additional scheduled duration just equals NPD - MPCTCoK.
Under this condition of value of the total scheduled project duration,
Equation 4-60, would just equal the normal project durationo If the
ratio of expected value to cost is very high, indicating an exception-
ally good project situation, ASPDC will be approximately zero and the
customer will be desirous of speeding up the project to its min~
duration, MPCTC, so as to benefit sooner from the completed producto
However, if expected cost begins to exceed expected product value, the
customer will respond by gradually stretching out the project funding
period without increasing the total project allocation, thus cutting
back on the customer support rate for the firmls expenses.
ASPDC.K = (XPDC.K) e EXPD.K
XPDCoK = NPD - MPCTCoK
ASPDC-·-Additional Scheduled Project Duration
by the Customer (months)
XPDC--eXtra Project Duration by the Customer
(months)
EXPD--Effect of overeXpenditure on the Project
Duration (percentage)
NPD--Normal Project Duration (months)
MPCTC--Ninimum Project Completion Time by the
Cllstomer (months)
4-63, A
4-64, A
The next two equations produce the effect of Qverexpenditure
expectations as a multiple EOESD of the percent overexpenditure expected.
EOESD indicates the extent to which the customer responds to such expec-
tationso Equation 4-65 limits this effect to 75 or less, since DY~O
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will not calculate an exponential which has a power much greater than
750
EXPDoK = MIN (BEXPDoK, 75)
BEXPDoK = (EOESD)(POEEC.K)
4-65, A
4-66, A
EXPD--Effect of overeXpenditure on the Project
Duration (percentage)
BEXPD--Basic Effect OL overeXpenditure on the
Project Duration (percentage)
EOESD--Effect of OverExpenditure on the Scheduling
Decision (dimensionless constant)
POEEC--Percent OverExpenditure Expected by the
Customer (percentage)
The multiplier which partially designates the amount of effect
that overexpenditure expectations shall have on the scheduling decision
of the customer will be set equal to 200 Thus,
EOESD = 20
This means that when additional project cost is expected to exceed value
by' five percent, EXPD will equal one, and ASPDC will approximately equal
Finally, the last three equations of this section represent the
fact that until the customer has actually allocated some funds to the
project, he is not concerned with possible Qverexpenditureso But after
he has funds committed, the customer continuously thinks about the cost
versus the value of the project, relating the difference between the two
to the estimate o~ value of the worko Here the customer recognizes
that even if the product value itself dropped to zero, there is still
at least gained some very small benefit from the research work performedo
POEECoK = SWITCH (0, POEEloK, AACoK) 4-67, A
POEEloK ECCPCoK - EVAUCoK 4-68, A= EVAUC 0 K + MVRC
MVRC = VSMAL 4-69, N
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POEEC--Percent Over Expenditure Expected by the
Customer (percentage)
POEEI--Percent OverExpenditure Expected, 1
(percentage)
AAC--Actual Allocations by the Customer
(dollars)
ECCPC--Estimated Cost to Complete the Project
by the Customer (dollars)
EVAUC--Estimate of product Value Accepted for
Use by the. Customer (dollars)
NWRC--~nimumValuation of Research by the Cus-
tomer (dollars)
VSMAL--Very SMALl number (d~ensionless)
The percentage overexpenditure, just as the customer's earlier compari-
son of expected value and cost of the project, is determined by com-
paring the relative gap between the expected costs to complete the
project and the expected value of the projecto Thus, again, sunk
costs are ignored in the anticipation of project overexpenditureso
Though this is theoretically justified, some readers may prefer an
alternate fo~ulation of the overexpenditure equation. Such could be
tested in other simulation runs.
So that results are not in£luenced by the customerVs minimum
evaluation of research, this shall be set almost equal to zero. VSMAL
shall be chosen for this purpose as one hundred-thousandth.
VSMAL = 0000001
The final portion of Chapter 4 discusses the firmvs investment
decision and is pictorially indicated by Figure 4-150 Starting from
the bottom of the diagr~, we see that on the basis of the firm's expec-
tations of the customer's willingness to support the project, the fizm
estimates what its expected profitability might be on the projecto This
factor, combined with the finm's willingness to accept risk, determines
the maximum investment which the firm will be willing to put into the
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Figure 4-15 Firm's Investment Decision
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project. Limited only by the funds available to the firm, this maximum
desired investment and the firm's anticipation as to the expected dura-
tion of the project. 'determine the firmis rate of allocation of funds
for the projecto The employment of engineers on the job creates. the
total current expenditure rate on the project, which expenditures, when
not covered by the customer's support rate, bring about the residual
rate of actual investment by the firmo
Let us start with the equations which describe the firm's expec-
tati.ons as to the suitability of the project to the customero The
value-cost ratio of the project~ Equation 4-70, compared to the return
on investment criterion that the firm believes the customer uses will
determine the suitability of the project, Equation 4-710 This produces
an expectation as to the probability that the customer will support the
project costso
VCRFoK EFPVFoK 4-70, A= ETCPFoK
SPCBF.K = VCRFoK 4-71, AROICF
EPCSFoK = TABHL (PCSF, SPCBFoK, 0, 1, 001) 4-72, A
VCRF--Value-Cost Ratio of the Firm (percentage)
EFPVF--Esti.mate of Future Product Value at the
Firm (dollars)
ETCPF--Estimated Total Cost of the Project by
the Firm (dollars)
SPCBF--Suitability of the Project to the Custo-
mer, Believed by the Finm (percentage)
ROICF--Return On Investment criterion of the
Customer, believed by the Firm (percentage)
EPCSF--Expected Prob~bility of Customer Support
to the Firm (percentage)
PCSF--Probability table of Customer Support to
the Firm (percentage)
we shall start with the firm correctly estimating the investment
criterion of the customero This criterion was shown by the value of
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ROICC, which was set equal to two 0 Thus,
ROICF = 2000 (decimal percentage)
This correct perception will be changed in later project simulations 0
The probability of customer support of the firm was earlier sketched
out in Figure 4-7 and the accompanying table of PCSF valueso
The expected profitability on the job is the product of the
expected profit rate, the expectations that the customer will support
the project, and the expected total costs of the projecto
EXCFCoK = (EPCSFoK)(ETCPFoK)
EXPRFoK = (EPRF)(EXCFCoK)
4-73, A
4-74, A
EXCFC--EXpected Cost to be Financed by the
Customer (dollars)
EPCSF--Expected Probability of Customer Support
to the Firm (~ercentage)
ETCPF--Expected Total Cost of the Project by the
Firm (dollars)
EXPRF--EXpected PRo~its to tre Firm (dollars)
EPRF--Expected Profit Rate to the Firm (percentage)·
The contract profit rate allowed to the finm on a research and develop-
ment project usually varies over the range frcm about 6 to l2 percento
Let us initi~ly use a nominal value of 10 percento
EPRF = 0010 (decimal percent)
The fi~ is willing to invest a certain fraction of its expected
profits on the project, the fraction being determined by the degree of
conservatism, or conversely, the willingness to accept risk, of the firmo
The firm's release of this potential allocation takes place over a
period of time determined by the firmvs expectations as to the project
duration 0 In no event, however, does the firm cut its allocation rate
below the amount necessary to support a minimum continuing research
activity whose level is detenmined by policy of the firm 0 These factors
212
are incorporated in the following diagram, Figure 4-160
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Figure 4~16 Maximum Desired. Rate of Allocation by the Firm
Equations 4-75 and 4-76 express the maximum investment level
desired by the finmo As a trial amount, 4-75 indicates that the firm
is willing to invest that fraction of its expected profits which cor-
responds to its risk-taking propensity coefficiento Equation 4-76 for
MIDF ~ecognizes that somet~es the firm will already have invested more
than that desired amounto
TMIDFoK = (WARF)(EXPRFoK)
MIDFoK = MAX (DAIDFoK, TAIFoK)
4-75, A
4-76, A
TMIDF--Trial, Maximum Investment Desired by
the Firm (dollars)
WARF--Willingness to Accept Risk by the Firm
(percentage)
EXPRF--EXpected PRofits by the Firm (dollars)
MITDF--Maximum Investment Desired by the Fi~
(doll~rs)
TAIF--Total Actual Investment by the Firm (dollars)
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In Chapter 2 the firm's willingness to accept risk, WARF, was initally
set equal to 10000
Ttle additional amount the firm wishes to invest is the difference
between its desired and actual investment levelso The firm desires
to invest this amount over a period of time EPCTF, as shown in Equa-
tioD 4-780 Equation 4-79 shows that this trial allocation rate by the
firm does not drop below the basic rate needed to support the montr~y
engineering sala~ and overhead cost of LEI engineers (Equation 4-80)
MAIDFoK =.. MIDFoK - TAIFoK
MDRAFoK = MAIDFo~EPCTFoK
TRAF 0 K = A!AX (MDRAF 0 K, BRAF)
BRAF = (MESOH) (LEI)
MAIDF--Maximum Additional Investment Desired
by the Firm (dollars)
MIDF--Maximum Investment Desired by the Firm
(dollars)
TAIF--Total Actual Investment by the Firm
(dollars)
MDRAF--Maximum Desired Hate of Allocation by
the Firm (dollars/month)
EPCTF--Expected Project Completion T~e by the
Firm (months)
TRAF--Trial Rate of Allocation by the Firm
(dollars/month)
BRAF--Basic Rate of Allocation by the Finm
(dollars/month)
MESOH --Monthly Engineering Sala~ and OverHead
(dollars/man-month)
LEI--Level of Engineers Initially (men)
4-77, A
4-78, A
4-79, A
4-80, N
As has often .been-mentioned the firm is assumed to begin with but one
engineer working in the area related to the project under considerationo
This means that
LEI = 1 man
The actual rate of rund allocation by the ~irm is dependent upon
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its desired rate, expressed by TRAF above, and any constraints that
may be placed upon it by the availability of funds in the firmo
RFAFoKL = MIN (mAFoK, MFRAFoK)
MFRAFoK = FAFoK/DT
RFAF--Rate of Funds Allocation by the Firm
(dollars/month)
TRAF--Trial Rate o~ Allocation by the Firm
(dollars/month)
MFRAF--Max~um Fund Rate of Allocation by the
Firm (dollars/month)
FAF--Funds Available to the Firm (dollars)
4-81, R
4-82, A
The level of funds available to the firm for allocation to the
project is increased by receipts of financial inputs to the £inm and
depleted by the firmvs rate of investment in the projecto Initially
the finm is regarded as having available a base research budget, and
receiving a very large financial input (VLARG) at month INTMFo The
amount and t~ing of this input can readily be changed 0
FAFoK = FAFoJ + (DT)(FINFoJK - IRFoJK)
FAF = BRBF
FINFoKL = PULSE (VLARG, IN'D4F, VLARG)
4-83, L
4-84, N
4-85, R
FAF--Funds Available to the Firm (dollars)
FINF--Financial INput to the Firm (dollars/month)
IRF--Investment Rate by the Firm (dollars/month)
BRBF--Base Research Budget of the Firm (dollars)
VLARG--Very LARFe number (dimensionless)
INTMF--INput ~e of the Finm (month)
The level of unspent investment alloca.tions at the firm is s~pJ_y
the accumulation of the new rate of ~und allocation minus the expendi-
ture of these funds minus the cancellation of previous allocations by
the fi~o This initially is just the base research budget, which in
turn provides the basic monthly rate of allocation ~or the length of
the budgeting periodo
215
UIAFoK = UIAFoJ + (DT)(RFAFoJK - IRFoJK - CAFoJK) 4-86, L
UIAF = BRBF
BRBF = (BPER)(BRAF)
4-87, N
4-88, N
UIAF--Unspent Investment Allocations at the
Firm (dollars)
RFAF--Rate of Funds Allocation by the Firm
(dollars/month)
IRF--Inves~entRate at the Firm (dollars/month)
CAF--Cancellation of Allocations at the Firm
(dollars/month)
BRBF--Base Research Budget at the Fi~ (dollars)
BPER--Budgeting PERiod (months)
BRAF--Basic Rate of Allocations by the Firm
(dollars/month)
The finm pr~bably reviews its engineering budget periodically, at
quarterly or semi-annual intervalso For tl'.is purpose, let
BPER = 6 months
The equations below add the possibility that at the end of each
bUdgeting period the fi~ can cancel the excess of the previously
allocated fundso In other words, if the firm allocates the funds for
the purpose of supporting engineering costs on a project, but either
does not acquire sufficient engineers to cover these expenditures or
has some of the expenditures supported by the customer, the £inm will
not accumulate the unused allocated funds indefini,telyo Rather, the
finm will cancel the excess of funds and continue to review the invest-
ment budget on this periodic basiso Equation 4-91 d~termines the dif-
.
rerence between the level of unspent ~nds and the base research budget,
Equation 4-90 checks to see that it is an excess and not a deficiency,
and the CAF equation, 4-89, can(}els this 8!!lount at the appropria.te
budget periodso
CAFoKL = PULSE (CXAFoK i BPER, BPER) 4-89, R
CXAFoK = MAX (XUAFoK, 0)
XUAF 0 K = (l/DT) (UIAF 0 K - BRBF)
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4-90, A
4-91, A
CAF--Cancellation of Allocations at the Firm
(dollars/month)
PULSE--a function indicating that for the duration
of one DT the amount specified by CXAF will
be used to determine the value for the vari-
able, CAFj the timing of this occurence will
be at each successive interval specified by
the length of BPER, starting for the first
time at TTIME = BPERo
CXAF--Cancellable eXcess Allocations at the Finm
(dollars/month)
BPER--Budgeting PERiod (months)
XUAF--eXcess Unspent Allocations at the Firm
(dolla:r:-s/month)
UIAF--Unspent Investment Allocations at the Finm
(dollars)
BRBF--Base Research Budget at the Firm (dollars)
Finally~ we recognize the fact that the actual investment rate by
the firm is not directly controlled by the firm, but rather is the in-
direct result o£ its own policy of acquisition and employment of engi-
nears and of the custamerUs pOlicy with respect to supporting the firm's
e~enseso Thus the invest~ent rate at the finm is the difference be-
tween the total current engineering costs and the current rate of sup-
port by the customero This rate of investment by the firm accumulat~s
over a period of t~e as the level of total actual investment by the
company 0 Initially this investment equals the total engineering costs
to-date, since the customer has provided no support prior to TIME = 00
IRFoKL = TCEFoK ARECFoK
TAIFoK = TAIFoJ + (DT)(IRFoJK)
TAIF = TECF
IRF--1nvestment Rate at the Firm (dollars/
month)
TCEF--Total Current Expenditure rate by the
Finm (dollars/month)
4-92, R
4-93, L
4-94, N
2~7~.
ARECF--Auxiliary, Rate of Expenditure of
Customer funds by' the Firm (dollars/
month)
TP~F--Total Actual Investment by the Finm
(dollars)
TECF--Total Engineering Costs to the Fi~
(dollars)
This completes the specifications of the equations for the variables,
initial conditions and parameters describing the funding of the research
and development projecto
CHAPTER V
THE ACQUISITION AND UTILIZATION OF ENGINEERING MANPOWER
The activities described in the preceding chapter result in the
provision o£ funds to the firm either from the customer's.support of the
firmvs ~ngineering activities or from the fi~IS own investment moneyso
~
Regardless of their source o£ origin, available funds are necessary in
order for the finm to undertake the acquisition of the productive resour-
ces that will be needed for a research and development projecto These
productive resources include men, materials J machinery, and facilitieso
Of these, the most critical element is the engineering manpower, the
pe+sonnel vital to the conduct of any new product development enterprise 0
This chapter will J therefore, discuss the activities related bo~h to
acquiring and then productiv~lyutilizing engineers in the pursuit of
the research and development project objectiveso The chapter will be
divided into two parts, discussing first the flow of engineering man-
power, both.into and out of the research and development firm, and
secondly the factors in£luencing the productivity of the engineering
~
work force employe~ by the firma
r'
The Flow of Engineering Manpower
Earlier chapters have pointed out that in all research and develop-
ment companies one or two engineers, or perhaps only a "fraction" of
an engineer, are doing work in areas of potential new product possi-
bilitieso These people are the first who occupy the pool of productive
engineering employees in the finm~ As these engineers work the activities
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of value perception (Chapter 2), cost and effort estimation (Chapter
3)~ and the provision of f~nds (Chapter 4) are all being undertakeno
As funds are obtairled for ~ork in the project area under consideration,
whether from external or internal sources, the finm can begin to hire
the manpower it is able to support or to trans:Cer present employees
from ~~ther'work to the projecto The first question to be asked in
..
regard to the firmis policy for acquiring engineers is, "What determines
the number of engineer~ that the firm desires to have on the project?W
An obvious answer to this question is that the amount of financial
support that the firm has available determines the desired engineering
employment level 0 But even here the question can still be raised as
to whether the firm should wait until it receives support before begin-
ning the recruiting processo If it plans ahead, recognizing the long
length of the hiring time, the company might begin to hire engineers
in anticipation of future £undingo One factor creating the lengthy
a'rerage delay in tdring new personnel is the phenomenon 0'£ college
graduation, whereby most of the new engineers and scientists are pro-
vided to the recruiting firms. Companies must anticipate their needs
long in advance a~d begin their work early in the school yearo Marcson
points out in regard to recruiting, "The purpose of the contacts made
is to plant a seed with the young scientists who are nine months away
1from getting their degreeso" One writer suggests that the real del~
in college recruiting is even longer than the nine months spoken of
above. He recommends that a company "maintain a cooperative educational
1>imon Marcson, The Scientist in American IndustrY (Prince-
taD, New Jersey, Industrial Re1ations Section, Princeton University,
1960), p. 53.
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program with a recognized unj.versity which gives you the opportunity
to acquaint technical students with your compa~, its operations, and
your productooo[and further that it] maintain relations with the engi-
neering colleges in your area, acquainting them with your needs, there-
by enabling them to refer previous graduates to you who may be particu-
larly skilled in your line of worko n2 Such recommendations clearly in-
dicate that the erre~tive delay in recruiting engineers is quite lengthyo
Thus, the finm which waits l\ntil the funding is provided before it be-
gins seeking recruits may well lose much valuable time :from the projecto
This delay in engineering acquisition is, of course, shortened when
engineers are available for transfer from other parts of the campanyo
But even beyond the points raised thuB far is the question of
whether the firm does hire up ,to the maximum support level that has been
provided 0 Most engineering firms are concerned with the problem of 'P10-
viding labor stability, especially to their professional employeeso
Therefore,:: such firms are unwilling to hire new engineel·~ unless they
feel fairly certain that they will be able to utilize these personnel
for a rea~onable length of timeo Thus, to many firms, the stability
or the engineering support over a long duration is a more important in-
\
fluence on their hiring policies than is their current support ~evel.
Most firms adopt a mid-road policy by taking account ,not only of the
amount of support that they have available (or can expect soon to be-
come ayailable) but also of the exp.ected duration o£ such support 0
~ichard C. Swander, nProselyting---Good Business?ft, IRE
Transactions .9n Engineering Management; Vol 0 EM-6, Noo 1 (March 1959),
po 380
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However, even after the £irm has decided how many engineering
employees it wishes to acquire, it still has to concern itself with
determining the rate of acquiring these people. In all likelihood,
the finm is not able to even atte~nt to hire all the people it needs
right away 0 The first reason for this is the limited size of the
personnel department in the usual engineering-type fi~o This restricts
the amount of recruiting and interviewing activities that can be sup-
ported at any given timeo To some extent,' experienced engineers have
· to be taken off their cu~rent jobs in order to go to the colleges or
other prime sources of trained manpower fer the purpose.of recruiting 0
As evidence Marcson found in his study of the "P 0 Eo Coli laboratory,
"Systematic visits are made to universities which produce graduates in
the fields of research of interest to the Po Eo C. laborato~o These
visi ts are invariably made by members of the scientific staff. n 3 Same
firms m~ therefore also limit their rates of acquiring new engineers
because of~un~llingness to take current employees aw~ fram other pro-
ductive dutieso For these reasons, a firm at any given time is probably
actively rec~liting only a fraction of the gap between the desired and
the expected numbers of engineerso The number of expected employees
of course is merely a summation o£ the firm's present employees plus
those· expected to join the company as a result of offers already made
minus those whom the company feels are leaving either voluntarily or by
the company's: :oWD(dectsiono
3Simon Marcson, "Role Adaptation of Scientists in Industrial Re-
search", .mE. Transactions on Engineering }lanagement, Vol 0 EM-7, No 0 4,
(December 1960), po 1590
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One final influence upon the rate at which the finm attempts to
hire new engineering employees is the firm's policy for training its
....
new personnel 0 Most firms recognize that whether the new employee comes
fresh out of college or has been obtained after much experience with
another company, there is no doubt a strong need for orientation, and
training of the new individual. In order to train these new employees,
more experienced personnel have to at least in part be diverted from
their current activities to act as .trainerso Different companies vary
greatly in their attitudes towards the need for or usefulness of train-
ing programs for their new employees 0 Some canpanies will severely
restrict their rate of engineering biring 'so that they will be ~ble to
fully indoctrinate and train their new personnel under their available
experienced and particularly competent engi~eerso Other companies re-
gard training in a much more casual manner and are not so concerned with
the problem of providing extra coaching ?r on the job instruction to
their recruitso AFar example,ooo in the best lab circumstance [in
twenty-three selected labora~~ries surveyed by the management consult-
iIig firm of BOQz, Allen, and Hamil:ton], about a third of the personnel
seldom or never were given on the job inst~ction, and in the poorest,
almost two-thirds did not receive ito In view of the relative youth
and immaturity of lab personnel, _this would ap~ear to be severe neglec~
or an expected supervisory runctiono u4
The basic problem in determining a policy regarding a company training
4C 0 - Wilson Randle, "Problems or Rand DManagementIJ , Harvard
Business Review, Janu~J-February 1959, po 134.
program is the "double-edged-swordtt nature of the situatioDo On the
one hand, if the firm does not provide adequate training to its new
people, the longer run ability of these people will be hindered rather
greatly 0 On the other hand, however, an attempt to provide a thorough
training program for these personnel will force the firm to take aw~
its most effective people from the product-oriented work which they
had previously been doing. Different fi~s solve this enigma in di£-
ferent w~s, some of them by b~ing their heads in the sand and ignor-
ing the existence or the problemo Whatever the policy finally adopted
by the compa~, however, it will in~effect determine bot~ results--
the £Uture productivity of the finmvs engineers as well as the current
availability for project work of their experienced personnelo
At the completion of their training prog~am (even one of zero
duration) the new engineers of the firm enter the status of fully
employed and experienced personnelo They are available on essentially
a ~~11 time basis to apply themselves to the process of accomplishing
progress on the research and development project. These full time people
constitute the category of worker about which the ri~ constantly thinks
when estimating the amount of engineering effort that is required to
get the Job done. On.the.othe~ hand, these people serve as the resource
pool from which both trainers are drawn to assist the new people and
managers are selected to supervise the work of the research and develop-
ment operation 0 As discussed earlier the compa~ls policy towards its
training program largely determines the number of "£ally experienced
engineers" who will be siphoned orf into the training function. How-
ever, the need for managers is not as easily dismissed as being dependent
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solely on an overt pOlicy decision by the finm. The employment of a
number of people requires some concept of supervisory, administrative,
or managerial functi.ons, and therefore the people necessary to carry
out such functionso "The supervisory structure of engineering organi-
zations, according to a survey of 395 laboratories, requires at least
25% o£ all the engineers in the organizationo n5 This study finding
clearly shows the manner by which the very hiring and utilization of
engineers requires the trans£erring of other engineers away from per-
forming direct engineering design and development work into the less
direct areas of contribution to the task objectives. Both types of
. ~
functions are essential to the ~esearch and development projectc
The preceding paragraphs have discussed some aspects of the prob-
lema o-r recruiting: hiring, training; fully utilizing, and transferring
to non-engineering functions the people who originally entered the
firm as part of the engineering manpower. To comple"te a discussion of
this nature,p the question o£ leaving the firm or the project must also
be consideredo -It was earlier mentioned that ma~ fi~s consider the
maintenance of engineering work stability as an important part of their
policy for hiring new engineerso Some aompanies do not hire any new
engineers unless they are fairly confident that they will be able to
productively utilize these people for a lengthy period of timeo What-
ever the compaI\Y policy toward the initial requisition of these engi-
neers, however, most companies :race a considerable problem when the
5I~' Hirsch, .W. Milwitt, 'WoJ. Oakes, and RoA. Pelton, tiThe Re-
lation of Utilization to the Shortage o£ Scientists,tt, IRE Transactions
Qn Engineering Management, September 1958, po 940
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services of same fraction of their engineering work force are no
longer requiredo This difficulty most often occurs during the final
phases of a research and development- project when the job is coming to
an end and fewer engineers are needed to complete the finishing touches
on the project or to go on to some further efforto Because of the an-
ticipated harm£ul effect on their later ability to hire engineers, most
companies are very reluctant to lay orf or fire engineering employeeso
An additional reason £or the reluctance in releasing an engineer from
the ri~is employ is that research and development companies usually
consider their great~Bt asset to be the productive ability o£ their
I
engineering work force, which they often regard as a team~hat has
r~quired a number of years to build to high effectivenesso Such com-
. panies, thererore~ hesitate before getting rid of an individual whose
technological knowledge can produce further profitable ventures for the
fi~. nIt takes approximately t~~ee years before the average new ~mp10yee
in a company can become fully productive, and this makes it ~practic-
able to hire and fire Rand D people on a short term basis and still
6
retain the competence necess~ for successful developmento ft These
di~£icultieB often influence the amount of ~nds that the finm is
pressured appropriate for what amounts to company-sponsored research
efforts. These e££orts, when instituted under such pressures, are
really stop-gap measures to maintain the employment of the company's
current engineers 0 In many situations, however, the firm which has
6Ellis A. Johnson, ~The Crisis in Science and Technology and
its Effect on ~litary Development", ~ations Research, January-
February 1958, pp. 23-240
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done a good job of planning, and has been successful in making its
plans materialize, is able to transfer the engineers being freed from
one project to work on another project activity. Dependent on the
managerial ability of the firm a company will take a long or a short
time to recognize that engineers are no longer needed on the project.
and will then transfer tl'iem to some other work. The more able firms
will anti~ipate availability of engineers long enough in advance so
that they can make plans to utilize the engineers on another jobo
Some inefficiencies will usually enter in such a transfer process be-
cause of the time delays necessary for the finm to recognize the avail-
ability of the engineer, to arrange for his transfer to some other work,
or if necess~ to give the engineer a reasonable noti~ication o£ lay-
orf or :firing.
Voluntary transfers by individual engineers rather than campany-
instituted transfers domin~te job turnover in the research and develop-
ment industry 0 Marcson 's study found, tI Technical starr members are
rarely discharged" •• [but voluntary movements occur such] that about
7half the laboratory's staff turns over every five yearsan Hirsch
:round even higher turnover rates in his larger sample. "According to
survey reau1ts, the average engineer changes jobs once ,in every 303
years. Therefore, an average engineering organization would have a 30%
8turnover per yearo W Financial considerations certainly do seem to be
important in the voluntary decisions by individuals to leave an organizationo
7 Mar~,son, ~ Scientist in American Industry, p. 83.
8Hirsch, et al, p. 86.
;
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However, considerations o~ motivation, prestige, family desires, indi-
vidual satisfaction with the job, personal aspirations, and other fac-
tors all enter into the decision of the individual to quit a job and
move elsewhere 0
The first section of this chapter has discussed the £low of
engineering manpower through the firm. Before going on to discuss
the nature of engineering productivity» it seems appropriate to summa-
rize at this point the nature 0'£ this flow 0 Initially, once the firm
has (or expects to obtain) ~nds to support an eng~neering effort, it
must consider the decision as to the number of engineers it wishes to
hire or transfer from other jobs in the firm. This decision as to
desired number of engineers is in part based on the level of the com-
panyls funding and in part on its concern for providing stable employ-
ment to the new recruits. Once the company decides the number of engi-
neers it desires to have, it begins to attempt to recruit engineers for
the purpose of filling this desired quota 0 It usually takes a leDgt~
time for the company to hire such people and often several months are
required
'
even to effect an internal transfero Arter being hired, new
1
recruits report to the firm where they undergo, generally, a training
program, formal or in£ormal, to orient them to the company and to their
new work environment. The second company policy area that was discussed
in the chapter concerns this point,' namely, the determina;tion of a cam-
pany policy towards trainingo Companies are perplexed by the fact that
in order to train people to produce more effectively in the future,
they must take engineers away from current productiva effort. The
managerial abi.lity of the firm is the strongest influence on the wisdom
228
of the training policies adopted 0 As engineers are trained, they come
into the status of fully em.plo:red and experienced engineers and begin
to work full time on the research and development project. However,
out of this full-time group same engineers must be transferred to be
used as trainers for the training program even if only on a part-time
basis; and other engineers, often a large fraction of the engineering
work rorce~ must be transferred to handle administrative and managerial
duties. Finally, after residing in the category of experienced engi-
neers, many engineers are fired, laid off, or more usually, transferred
to other jobs when their services are no longer needed on the current
project. Company attitudes as to this problem were also discussed in
the preceding paragr~phso The last topic that was discussed be£ore
closing the section on engineering manpower was the question or volun-
tary turnover of engineering employeeso Here it was pointed out that
a vast number of considerations affect the individual!s decision to
leave his job and go to work for some other firm.
Engineering Productivity
Any discussion of engineering productivity tends inherently to
become highly complex. This tendency is caused by two basic factors.
First, there exists little sound knOWledge as to the nature of human
productivity, especially in those areas tending towards the more crea-
tive endeavors, such as the engineering and scientific work utilized
in research and development projectso Secondly, the factors which
can readily be seen to bear on the productivity of engineers constitute
a group which is both large and highly unst~lcturedo This segment of
the chapter will attempt to bring most of these factors into fOCUS,
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then will discuss those factors which seem of most consequence in the
detenmination of the ef£ectiveness of an engineering work forceo
The first factor to be discussed is the basis of productivity,
that is, the level of related technological knowledge that can be
applied to the problem area in question. This topic was discussed
quite thoroughly in Chapter 3, where it was pointed out that the level
of technological know-how determines essentially the degree o£ poten-
tial effectiveness of the eng-ineering work :Coree. As technology grows
over a period o£ t~e, at least the potential effectiveness of an engi-
neering staff also grows. This chapter will not attempt to ~epeat
the lengthy discussion of Chapter 3, but will just mention same impor-
tant points regarding the utilization of technology.
First, there is a del~ before the know~edge of the teahnological
state o£ the art becomes available to the firm. This delay is depen-
dent upon the amOllnt of effort the firm is itself putting fortll in
technological areao It may more directly be related to the firmvs
policy of obtaining and transferring into its own usage knowledge which
is being developed outside of the fi~as own activitieso Ma~ dirrer-
ent factors relate directly or indirectly to determining the delay in
bringing outside information into the firm. The most obvious of these
is the extent to which the engineers in the firm exchange technical in-
formation with other professional colleagues. Perhaps one of the less
obvious factors is the number of years away from college of most of the
staf'f. (The younger people have been taught the new techniques in c.ol-
lege and often bring these methods into the finmo) Encouraging continu-
ing education can also aid in bringing new know-hoW' into the firm more
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quickly 0 The alternatives available were neatly summed up by one
writeris questions: "Are you adding to the skills and capacities of
the engineers and technical p~ople you have now by sponsoring after-
hours scholarships for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate work?
Do you encourage membership and committee activities in scientific
and professional societies, independent research, and the writing of
technical papers? Have you ever talked with your men about teaching,
or invited other scientists and educators to meet with your staff?W9
In addition to the delay in becoming cognizant of the new tech-
nical state of the art, there· is the additional delay of actually ab-
sorbing the in£ormation and making use of it. The time taken for absorp-
tion of outside discoveries and developments is quite lengtnyo It con-
stitutes the longer portion of the delay between the discovery of new
knowledge in one place and the actual utilization of this know-how at
some other time and location by engineers in another finm.
The actual changing state of the art and the delay in becoming
aware of and utilizing this know-how do fo~ the basis for the potential
productivity o£ an engineering te~. However, many other factors
affect the actual productivity that is achieved by a group of engineers
working on a research and development project. The first of these to
be discussed is the effect of on-the-jOb experience on the abilities
of the engineerso One article discussed the increased productivity re-
suIting from experience as being analogous to the "learning curves".
that have been applied to manufacturing organization efficiencies.
9Swander, loco cit.
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"The engineer, whose job is much more cam.plex than that of a produc-
tioD worker, becomes mora proficient when he knovs the company- proce-
dures and policies; has learned the important fo~al and in£onmal cam-
munication channe~s; has determined where he can obtain assistance in
solving critical problems; is familiar with the technical aspects of
the company's products; and has learned the technical errors which
were made previously so that he can avoid the same pitfalls 0 This.
learning process ~ontinues at a diminishing rate as long as the engi-
neer is associated with the company 0 The learning curve takes account
of the diminishing learning, since it increases by a smaller factor
each year."lO or course, some ccmpanies have already learned that
this diminishing rate of gro~h of an engineer's e£~ectiveness need
not set iDo Through symposia, seminars, attendance at university
"short courses", and even more extended sponsored and encouraged
graduate and post-graduate education and research progr~s,companies
such as IBM in particular seek to maintain the rate of personal develop-
ment of their emp~oyees.
In addition to these general benefits which can be attributed to
greater eA~eriencewith the company or on the particular project, there
are certain factors which tend towards increasing productivity which
result from the development of specific know-how on a given project.
To a high degree" many of the problems which are encountered through-
out a project li£e cycle are similar in content or in the factors con-
tributing to them.
lOH· hJ.rsc ,
Thus, as knOWledge is built up during the earlier
et alo, p. 96
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phases of the project life cycle, the firm's engineers are gathering
information and new techniques that will be applicable to some parts
of the later phases of the projecto In the aggregate, then, the pro-
ductivity of the engineers working on the job tends to increase as the
job progresses from the influence of these job experience factorso
In addition to the e~rect that job eA~erience has on engineering
productivity, one should also consider the effects on productivity
that can readily be associated with the various worker categorieso
As discussed in the :Cirst half of this chapter, there are basically
four categories of engineering employees: engineers being trai~ed,
those doing the training and supervision, those who are more or less
fully employed 8..nd experienced, and finally those men who are in the
process of quitting, being laid off, transferred, or fired. The work
classification of the engineer is no doubt a good indicator of his re-
lative average productivity 0 For example, the new recruit just joi.ning
~he firm cannot be expected to be nearly as effective as the engineering
eUl'ployee who has been fully employed by the firm for a period of time 0
This is not due merely to the over-all number of years of engineering
experience of the various engineers, since new recruits may very well
come :Cram other jobs with many years o£ engineering bac;kground 0 The
survey which has already been quoted several times goes into this ques-
tion of trainee productivity in great detailo
Turnover is costly and wasteful to engineering
utilization, primarily because of the time whict.L
must be spent in becoming re-oriented to the new
environment 0 No matter how skilled and proficient
a scientist or engineer may be, some time must be
spent on learning the operating system of the new
company, its physical layout, and his new associates;
DISCLAIMER OF QUALITY
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understanding the requirements of the new job;
and determining communication paths both to his
superiors and subordinateso
There are other significant factors involved when
relocating in new geographic locations; probably
not the least of these concerns the family and
psychological adjustments that inevitably affect
output of worko
...~SurelY-! the ~t1me :lost _.in reorientatiqn varies greatly
with the individuals and the organizations, but
assuming a 30 percent turnover per year it is our
estimate that losses directly attributable to job-
changing represent a decrease of output of about
20 percento11
An earlier study of the RCA Laboratories found a similar resulto ·One-
half year wasooo(used] as an estimate of the time it takes for a new
staff member to get accl~ated and to achieve some result upon which
he can report: This six-month adjustment period represents the median
based on the records of the persons employed after the start of the
sample periodo n12
In general those engineers who are working as trainers or managers
also have their direct job productivity decreased substantially 0 Look-
ing~.:rirst at the trainer, few can question the necessity or importance
of his role in the organizationo In the long run his contributions to
the project show up in the enhanced productivity of the engineers wham
he helps to developo In the short run, however, the trainer's direct
contributions.to the solution of the design and development problems
of the project are decreased substantially because of the smaller po~tion
llHirsch, et alo, p. 86
12Alexander Go Grasberg~ UMerit Rating and Productivity in
an Industrial Research Laboratory: A Case Study", .mE Transactions on
Engineering Management, Vol. EM-6, Nao 1 (March 1959), po 340
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of his time available for this direct engineering W'orko The amount
of effective engineering (rather than training) work that the trainer
will be able to do depends to a large extent upon the number o£ trainees
who have been placed under his guidance or directions.
Those engineers who have been made "engineering managersft also
usually have their task-oriented productivity decreased substantially.
This is not a necessary, but is rather a usual, result o£ the job
position changeo The highly ef£ective manager of an engineering organi-
zation applies himsel£ to laying out the direction of attack on the prcb-
lem j clarifies the job requirements to save the time and effort of
others, provides systems coordination i etco, all o~ which are very much
a part of the engineering task in a research and development projecto
He stays close to the oritical job problems through council with his
engineers and sometimes through participation in the making o£ -key de-
sign decisionso However, very few engineering managers have such high
effectiveness 0 Most managers do not manage at all. Instead they admini-
stero They typically spend vast amounts of time on performance ratings
of their engineers and on pay raise evaluations. They prepare multiple
budgets which serve not as job planning tools, but rather for organi-
zation accounting purposeso They entertain customer visitors, attend
higher-level sta£f meetings, file and collect reports in such numbers
and details that the meaningfulness of these to the real management
of 'the project seems OlUY a remote possibility. Those who express
concern for the underutilization of engineers might more profitably
examine the underutilization of engineering managers who waste much
time and talent on such administrative triviao To be sure, the functions
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performed may well be important to the organization, b1.lt they have
little direct relevance to the project tasko Thus, except for the
~ew engineering managers who do perform the managerial role outlined,
the others have their task-oriented productivity severely decreased by
their work activitieso
The third catego~ of workers whose effectiveness is decreased
because of the nature of their work situation is that group of engi-
neers who are in the process of leaving the company or project, whether
f:or volur...tary or involuntary reasons 0 The time informally consumed by
transfer activities, the loss of enthusiasm ·ror the job which is being
aompleted, and ve~ orten the poor attitude towards the organization
or project which the engineer is leaving, all contribute to a decreased
technical efficiency of the engineer while he is working in this statuso
Finally i one can consider the so -c8.;lled fully-employed eng~neer0
He has been selected as the standard of engineering productivity who
on the average is supposedly able to manifest in his work the available
and utilizable engineering productivity which was discussed earlier 0
However3 the job experience erfect, mentioned earlier, also in£luences
the fully-employed engineer, as do the-erfects of management which will
be discussed belovo
T~ an extent, one can recognize another, partly over-all cat~go~
of worker, namely the engineer not on the job due to sickness, vaca-
tions, holidays, or incidental personal reasonso Though this appears
basically as random noise in the system, it does have a strong seasonal
component due to vacationso An earlier study by the a~thor in an engi-
neering department of the General Electric Company showed that this
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off-the-job time amounted to an average of about 12 percent of the
year's total potential work-days.l3
Now turning to other factors which influence engineering produc-
tivity, "Experience has shown that the leader is probably the most
important single factor influencing team perfor.manceo w14 Despite
the apparent breadth of this generalization as to the next-to-be-
discussed factor or productivity, ma~ other researchers have agreed.
-The engineering supervisor may be considered the most vital factor
in achieving the full utilization of engineering potential"15 It is
easy to see the poor organization ot work, the hiring o£ less compe-
tent personDe:L~ lack o£ proper util:f.zation of outside technological
resources~ and many other £actors all are attributabl.e to the quality
of management or a firmo This can 1.ead to lower utilized technologi-
cal effectiveness than that which is potentially available to the
f'"irmo Thus, "Good supervision is basio to high Rand D eff'ective-
neaso In this respect, research does not differ materially fram
other company areas 0 Yet management orten excuses poor supervision
on the basis that Rand D work does not lend itself to direction,
that the scientist works better when unrestricted, or that the experi-
ence and education of the scientist poorly tit him.for- handling .others 0
l3Edward B. Roberts, "The Digital Computer as an Element of a
Financial Control Sys~em·, unpublished Master's thesis, MolaTo, June
1958, po Aol-27, 280
l~ed Eo Fiedler, "The Leader's Psychological Distance and
Group E:rrectiveness'" in Group Dynamigs , Research !md Theory, Second Edi-
tion, edited by Darwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (Evanston, Illinois:
Row, Peterson and Compa~$ 1960), p~ 586=
l5Simon ~cson, "Role Concept o£ EngineerinR Managers·, !HI
Tran~aQtiQns QIl Eneineerin~Manaiement, Vol 0 EIL-7, I Noo 1 (March 1960), po 300
Here is where many companies run into trouble_ K16
There are many w~s in which the quality of management enters
in determining the effectiveness of the engineering work team. Princi-
ple among these is that the able management will effect policies that
enable group leaders and working engineers to see their particular task
in the perspective of an over-all organizational objective. This
assists everyone in the project to see the forest as well as the trees
thus providing a more intelligent basis for individual engineering
decisions 0 The capable management will establish a pena~ty-reward
system in the ri~ which encourAies initiative and creativity, not for
their~ sakes, but towards defining and accomplishing project goals.
~ Management of high quality will design a penalty-reward system which
encourages objectivity and the organizational integrity that permits
quick recognition and communication o£ project problems and bottle-
necks 0 Such a set of attitudes allows the people of the organization
to ~ the communication and control system needed for effective project
management, without dependence on the artificial and ineffective devices
for project evaluation and review whose proponents current~ clutter
both the management literature and mailbago
Such an environment both establishes good leaders and ef£ective
working engineerso It provides worker motivations which derive from
pride and involvement in the work group, and tl1e effective performance
~
which results from such motivationso Through policies which enhance
these characteristics, the quality of the firm's management creates a
26Randle, po 1340
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major e£fect on engineering productivityo
A second managerially-related e~fect upon the productivity of
engineers in the firm is the size o?·tt~e engineering work fore. In an
article specifically oriented to the difficulties relating to the size
o£ engineering groups, Kershner said, "Above a certain level, the assign~
ment of additional personnel to a large project may not only not reduce
total time proportionately, but in fact may increase total time to '
accomplishment, andooooma~ organizations today engaged in complex engi-
neering tasks are operating at a level in which this fact is trueoo.o
They could speed up the accomplishment of their tasks by reduction of
engineeringpersonnel. n17 From his studies at the Axmy Operations Re-
search Office, Ellis Johnson also :round that having too ".II&QY; :...1.er8
":18
working on a project increases the length of time for development.
The communications problem is particularly great as the size of
the engineering team increases 0 "While the laboratory was a small
organization, the research executive would participate knOWledgeably
in the on-going research and so in£luence its direction personal1y_
As the laboratory grew in size, knOWledge about specific on-going re-
search projects grew away from him, and he seemed to spend more time
on budget and personnel matterson19
Finally9 as the organization solidifies into this
large engineering group.9 the next thing that happens
-because Y9u ~ve too many peqple is that you became
•
1-'
17RoBo Kershner, uThe Size of Research and Engineering Teamsn~
IRE Transactions on" Engineering Management) June 1958, p. 35.
18 .Johnson J cpo cito, po 250
l~cson, The Scientist in American Industry, p. 990
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heavily involved with the well-known problem of
organizational inertiaoooA large organization
simply moves mOlle slowly 0 There are more elaborate
controls; there is much more paperwork; there is
more sitting down and writing memos that must gc
through several channels and finally wind up on
a desk that is already overwhelmed with memos;
there is more waiting thre~ weeks before the proper
signature can be optained~to authorize purchase
of a paper clip to hold all the memos. This
process is a very well-known one6 but it is, ofcourse j ~ extremely serious. 2
There is strong reason to believe that the tight organization,
that is the one that has both a meager budget and staff, can in fact
accomplish objectives significantly out of proportion to its size.
There have been a few cases of major programs
carried out very successfully with extreme~ small
engineering starfy which might serve as indications
of the appropriate level of efforto Notable among
these is the Sidewinder programo This progr~,
with a tiny engineering stafr at NOTS, led to an
extremely successful guided missileo The group
was small enough that the approach could be kept
completely coordinated and all major technical
decisions· were made by one man, Willi~ McLeano
Mro McLean was recently awarded a special Civil
Service prize for his accomplishment in this pro-
gram and riclily deserved ito But in addition to
being a test~ent to the brilliance of one indi-
vidual, the program. serves also as a striking illus-
tration of the efficiency achievable with a small
engineering staffo 21
Another relatively recen·t example of the ability of a tightly or-
ganized team to perfonm efficiently and effectively is the feat of the
Von Braun rocket group at Huntsville, Alabama. After a long and rather
typical development program :for the Vanguard satellite had failed in
its first two attempts to launch a satellite for the United States, the
20Kershner, po 370
2lIbido~ po 38
Von Braun group was given the gO-ahead to make an attempt under Army
auspices 0 Eighty-four days after receipt of the authorization, the
Von Braun group successfully launched Americaus first satellite, the
Pioneer Io To be sure the satellite and rocket were not developed in
this brief periodo The organization had many years of experience in
related areas, had previously developed the· launch vehicle, and had
thought about and done preliminary work on the problems of earth satel-
liteso But this type of background is exactly that which is necessaa-y
to an effective project teamo The people need deep understandings of
each other J of the technical problems, of the related science and, more
important, of the required arto These elements enable a group, such
as Von Braun~s9 to run with the ball once given an opportunityo Both
the Sidewinder and Pioneer I provide good ex~ples, of the effects of
a small, well-directed work team combined with top-notch managerial
capability and the presence of strong motivation for accomplishment
to produce the impressive results that were achievedo
A third way in which the ability of the'manager can affect the
overall productivity of the work force enters in the manageris decision
to allocate engineering effort to the different types of work that have
to be done on a projecto From unwise decisions of this class arises
gross waste of scientific and engineering talent, not only in the use
of engineers for jobs which could more effectively and efficiently be
done by someone elseo More importantly, such waste comes from the poor
decisions which provide engineering resqurces to the vast percentage
of projects, cited in the Introduction, which never result in satis-
factory finished productso In the same vein, the engineering manager's
allocation of his own ttme also can have a great effect on the work
productivity of his groupo
The study on engineering utilization by Hirsch and others, cited
several times earlier, went into great detail on the reasons behind
the misallocation of manpowero
We believe that the mass engineering philosophy
represents the most serious waste of engineering
manpower today 0 Mass engineering is an expres-
sion used to describe a situation where several
engineers are assigned to a job which could be
adequately accomplished in the same length of
time by any one campetent engineer properly sup-
ported by technicianso MUch of the incentive for
the mass engineering approach seems to stem fran
the £lexibility penmitted under the cost-plus-
fixed-fee type of contracto Under this type of
contract, which is used almost universally by
the military and defense projects, the normal
competitive stimulus is removedo The efficient
engineering organization is penalized to an ex-
tent, because with reduced costs came reduced
profits 0 22
Hirsch relates this difficulty to the qUality and training of the
managers of such engineering firmso "Many modern engineering execu-
tives are products of the cost-plus-fixed-fee erao As such, they
have not obtained a true appreciation of the value of running an
ef£icient organizatioDo The competitive stimulus where profits are
proportional to efficiency does not existo Because of this, the execu-
tive lacks a desire, and sometimes the ability, to increase the prOduc-
tivity of his scientists and engineerso n23
The last £ew paragraphs have examined the effect of the management
of the engineering company on the productivity of its engineerso Man-
agament aspects relating to general organizational effectiveness, engi-
neering motivation, the ef£ects of size of the work force on efficiency,
22Hirsch, eto alo, po 900
23Ibido, ppo 91-92.
243
and the effects of allocation of engineering m~~power to different prob-
lems were all discussedo . The Hirsch study summed up its findings re-
garding factors such as these, plus many others which they listed, as:
"Our best estimates at this time indicate that improved utilization
of the scientific manpower available could result in increased yields
by a factor ur to 100 times--with a more probable increase of about
10. ~imesK This would mean that by improving utilization methods alone,
ioe o j without increasing the supply~ about ten times as much output
could be obt~ined from. our scientific supply.,,24
In re-examining thi~ entire last portion of the chapter devoted
to the pr~blems of engineering productivity, it suffices to say that
the productivity o£ engineers in any research and development project
is based upon the t'echnology available to them plus many modifying fac-
tors·o These modifiers include the engine~rs2 experience on the job,
their work status within the e~gineering qrganization, and the ef£ects
of management of the firma These managerial effeats, in turn, relate
to the areas of a penalty-rewa~d sy~temo These in turn effect motiva~
tion, si~ze of the organization, and allocation of erf·ort 0. All of these
combine to ~rqduce the existing level of effectiveness of the engine~rs
who are working '£or,thE:: company on the research and development project
at any given time, and the chan~es in this effectiveness from time to
time 0 The integration of the applied man-hours of work with this level
o~ effectivene~s produces the progress on the job which will be further
discussed in the next chapter 0
24Ibid 0, p. 88.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V
The presentation of the flow diagrams and model equations in
this appendix shall follow the breakdown used in the descriptive
part of the chapter. First we shall discuss the flow of engineer-
ing manpower and then delve into the question of engineering pro-
ductivity. Figure 5-1 presents visually the flow of engineering
manpower. As a result of recruiting activity by the firm~9 new
engineers are recruited and join the firm. They go through a
formal training or informal indoctrination period during which
their skills gradually increase to those of the average langer-
term employee oi 't,he firm. Some of the more experienced engineers
are reassigned to training and supervisory roles as these needs
arise. Similarly, when their services are no longer required on
the particular project llilder consideration they are transferred
to another job, or occasionally are actually fired from the firm's
employ. Those Who are being transferred out require scme period
of t~e for paper work before they actually leave the project.
This continuing inflow and outflow of engineers into and from the
firm cumulatively produces the level of er~ineers actually, as
well as those expected, on the project.
All of these basic changes take place in response to the firm's
efforts to adjust i.ta actual engineering level to the number it
desires. These desires are based on considerations both of main-
tenance of a stable engineering work force and of the firm f s ability
to profitably support the engineering force.
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Figure 5-1 The Flow of Engineering Manpower
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Let us start the equations of Chapter 5 with the information-
level equation for the engineers actually employed by the firm
on the project, regardless o~ their status. This level is a con-
tinuous summation of the engineers joining the firm minus those
leaving the firm .
.ENGRF oK :: ERGRF'oJ +(0'1') (ENCJF oJK. - ENCLF .JK)
ENGRF = LEI
ENGRF--ENGineeRs in the Fi~ (men)
ENGJF--ENGineers Joining the Firm (men/month)
ENGLF--ENGineers Leaving the Firm (men/month)
LEI--Level o~ Engineers Initially (men)
5-1, L
5-2, N
The engineers desired j as contrasted to the actual ones, cer-
tainly cannot exceed those whom we expect to be able to support
financial-ly. However, in sane cases the project needs or other
policies may restrict the desired level to less than our supportable
level.
ENGDF.K = MIN(SENGF.K, WENGD.K) 5-3, A
ENGDF--ENGineers Desired at Firm (men)
SENGF--Supporta-ble number o£ ~Gineers at Firm (men)
WENGD--Weighted number of ENGineers Desired at Firm (men )--.,,:
The number of engineers considered supportable is based on
the estimated funding that will be available in the future. This
. estimate rests on two factors: the average funding that has. recently
been available from the customer and/or the firm itself; and the
recent changes in the funding which are expected to continue. The
period of future planning on this funding takes into account the
hiring lead-time (if available funds are increasing) and the engineering
transf€:t· time (i£ f~ding is ,on the ,decline) 0 These considerations
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are shown in Figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-2 Supportable Number o£ Engineers
The first equation of this group, Equation 5-4, indicates
that the number of engineers who can be supported on the expected
funding equals the expected monthly funding' rate div'ided by the
average monthly support cost per engineer.
EERAF.KSENGF.K = MESOH 5-4, A
SENGF--Supportable number of ENGineers at the Firm
(men)
EERAF--Expected Expenditure Rate Available to the Firm
(dollars/month)
MESOH-~onthlyEngineering Salary and Over Head
(dollars/man-month)
The expected expenditure rate available is, in general, an
extrapolation of the recent changes in funding £ram the customer.
Should this support. from the customer be falling, the firm knows
that his own basic support rate can be provided if necessary. The
expected funding from the custaner, Equation 5-6, is equal to the
current expenditure rate available pl.us any change in this flllld-
ing which is expectted in the next few months. The firm antici-
pates that the changes in the near future will be similar to the
recent changes in the funding available. The last equation listed
below says that the expenditure rate available is the larger of
the amount permitted by the custaner and that being allocated by
the firm.
EERAF •K = MAX(TEEAF •J, ERAF)
TEEAF.K = ERAF.K + (RCEAF .K)(TPEAF .K)
ERAF.K = MAX(MREPC.K, RFAF.JK)
5-5, A
5-6, A
5-7, A
EERAF--Expected Expenditure Rate Available to Firm
(dollars /month)
TEEAl'-- ...rrial EX1irapolation of Expenditures Avail-abl.e
to Firm (dollars/month)
BRAF--Basic Rate of Allocations by Firm (dollars/month)
EF.AF--Expenditure Rate Available to Firm (dollars/month)
RCEAF--Rate of Change of Expenditures Available to Firm
(dollars/mont~month)
TPEAF--Time for Pr~ojection of Expenditures Available
to Firm (months)
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MREPC-~aximumRate of Expenditure Permitted by
Customer (dollars/month)
RFAF--Rate of Funds Allocated by the Firm
(dollars/month)
In trying to estimate the £unding that will be available,
the firm averages over the recent past the funding that has been
available. The averaging, or smoothing, equation written below
takes an exponential average of the expenditure rate available,
ERAF, over the past DRCEA months.
SERAF.K = SERAF.J + (DT)(RCEAF.J)
SE-RAF = BRAF
RCEAF •K = ERAFD~cEASERAF •K
5-8, L
5-9, N
5-10, A
SERAF-~oothed Expenditure Rate Available to the Firm
(dollars/month)
RCEAF--Rate of Change of Expenditure Available to the
Firm (dollars/month/month)
BRAF--Basic Rate o~ Allocations by the Firm (dollars/month)
ER..~F--EA-penditure Rate Available to the Firm (dollars/month)
DRCEA--Delay in Recognizing Change in Expenditures
Available (months)
Since the firm is very quick to take cognizance of any changes
in the project flIDding available, DRCEA is estimated at one month.
DRCEA = 1 month
The final variable taken into account in Figure 5-2 was the
t~e for projection of the changes in expenditure rate available.
Equation 5-11 states that when ~unding is increasing, the finm pro-
jects ahead the duration of the recruiting time. This period is
used because the £irm is trying to anticipate the additional num-
ber of engineers it should acquire, if the firm relies on the
expected increased support. On the;other hand, if f'lIDding is falling,
the firm projects the support:change for the duration of time needed
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to transfer engineers from the project. This is done so that the
firm can effect the transfers by the time its support rate :Calls
further.
TPEAF.K = CLIP (DRCE, DTRE, RCEAF.K, 0) 5-11, A
TPEAF--Time for Projection of Expenditures Available
to the Firm (months)
DRCE--Delay in ReCruiting Engineers (months)
DTRE--Delay in TRansferring Engineers (months)
RCEAF--Rate o£ Change of Expenditures Available to the
Firm <dollars/month/month)
The delay in recruiting the engineers, an the average, is an
the order ora several months. This takes into account the fact
that same engineers will be available in a very short period from
elsewhere in the firm, while others, particularly when the firm is
seeki~g special skills, a large number of engineers, or new college
recruits, will not be available for as much as 3. year or even more.
,
Averaging these together the recruiting time will be set at six
months. The transfers out o:f the project:; or even canplete~y out
of the f'irm, can be implemented, once the finn makes the decision,
in about one month. Thus,
DRCE = 6 months
DTRE = l month
When deciding upon the number of engineers it desires to have,
instead of considering just the number of engineers whom they can
support in the near future, the firm also takes into' account the
assumed need for maintaining as much stability as possible in the
engineering work force. Thus before hiring additional engineers
it will contemplate the duration of need for these engineers. Di:ff-
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erent firms will weigh this factor to various extents. In
general, however, the relative weighting between the support
level of engineers and those who are expected to be needed for
the project duration is dependent upon the stage of the project.
That is, the policy that sets the number of engineers desired
tends to depend on the support level during the early project
phases and gradually moves towards dependence on engineering
work force stability considerations as the project moves for-
ward. These ~actors are illustrated in Figure 5-3.
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Equations 5-12 through 5-14 indicate that the weighted num-
ber of engineers desired takes into account both the stable work
force level of engineers (SWENF) and the number of engineers
supportable on the anticipated funds (SENGF). The weighting is
dependent on the stage of project progress. At the beginning of
the jobJ the believed percent incomplete is lOO%? and EDPSl = 0
with EDPS2 there:fore equal to 1. Thus at the beginning of a pro-
ject the weighting considers only the support level. As the job
progresses, the weighting depends more and more an stable work
force considerations. By the time the project is completed,
EDPSl = 1 and EDPS2 = 0, thus causing WENGD to be Wholly depen-
dent on work force stability factors.
WENGD.K = (EDPS1.K) (SWENF .K) + (EDPS2 .K) (SENGF .K) 5-12, A
EDPSl.K = 1 - BPPIF.K
EDPS2.K = 1 - EDPSl.K
5-13, A
5-14; A
WENGD--Weighted number of ENGineers Desired at firm
(men)
EDPSI--Engineers Desired Policy Switch 1 (percentage)
SWENF--Stable Work force level of Engineers Needed by
the Firm (men)
EDPS2--Engineers Desired Poliay Switch 2 (percentage)
SENGF--Supportable number of ENGineers at the Finn (men)
BPPIF--Believed Percent of Project Incomplete by the
Firm (percentage)
The equation which indicates the stable work :force level of
engineering determines the expected man-months of effort remaining
in the project (ECCPF.~OH) and divides this by the expected
time left for completion of the project. This determines the num-
ber of engineers who can be steadily employed until project com-
pletion, given the expected effort needed and the project scheduling.
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5-15, AECCPF .KSWENF.K = (MESOH)(EPCTF .K)
SWENF--Stable Work force level of Engineers Needed
by the Firm (men)
ECCPF--Expected Costs to Complete Project by Firm
(dollars)
MESOH-~onthlyEngineering Salary and OverHead
(dollars/man~anth)
EPCTF--Expected Project Completion Time by the Firm
(months)
In trying to adjust the number of engineers to its desired
level, the firm needs to recognize its actions, already initiated,
which will bring new engineers into the firm or separate sane of
the current engineering employees from the firm. Thus we need
to designate the level of engineers Which t he firm expects to
have, based on all. of its hiring and transferring actions taken
thusfar.
EENGF.K := EENGF.J + (DT)(ENGHF.JK - ENGTF.JK)
EENGF = LEI
5-16, L
5-17, N
EENGF--Expected number of ENGiileers in the Firm (men)
ENGHF--ENGineering Hiring rate at the Firm (men/month)
ENGTF--ENGineering Transferring rate at the Firm
(men/month)
LEI--Level o-r Engineers Initially (men)
The gap between the number of engineers desired and those
expected is next defined by a simple subtraction operation.
ENGPF.K = ENGDF.K - EENGF.K 5-18, A
ENGPF--ENgineering Gap at the Firm (men)
ENGDF--ENGineers Desired at the Firm (men)
EENGF--Expected number of ENGineers in the Firm (men)
This gap .constitutes a need for either hiring into or trans-
ferring out of the project the number of engineers indicated by
ENGPF. Let us first examine the hiring sequence. Figure 5-4 shows
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that the engineering gap combines with the firm's delay in changing
the level of engineers to produce a desired rate of change in engineering.
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Figure 5-4 Engineering Hiring Rate
The delay represents the fact that only a fraction of the per-
sannel requests Shown by the engineering gap can be processed in
•
•
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any single montho However, the firm restricts its hiring rate
not only because OI its own l~itatians in recruiting capability
nor solely because of the limits ~posed by the lack of immediate
availability of qualified engineers. In addition to these, the
firm takes account of its own ability to absorb new people into
the organization, to train them and make them an integral part
o~ a productive team. We shall here recognize a policy, formal
or more usually implicit, that the rate of hiring of new engineers
be restricted to that number which the firm feels its fully inte-
grated staff can handleo
Equation 5 ...19 expresses this policy that the max~um number
of relatively new engineers desired at any time is limited by the
nwnber of experienced engineers, both those working full. time on
the project task and those already partly engaged in training the
new engineers on the projecto The number of recruits each ex-
perienced engineer can supervise ef£ectively is a £unction the
number each can usually handle (TPSF) multiplied by the current
training efficiency of the staff (TEl). The last equation in the
group below says that the level. of engineers expected in training
is a continuous summation of" the :firm's hiring rate minus the rate
of engineering completions of training minus the firm r s transfers
o-r new engineers from the project ares 0 The following equations
apply to these factors:
MEITF.K = (TPSDF) (ENFEF ~K + ENATF .K)
TPSDF = (TEI)(TPSF)
5-19, A
5-20, N
EEITF.K = EEITF.J + (DT)(ENGHF.JK - ENLTF.JK - EI'r'IIF.J)
5-21J L
EEITF = 0
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5-22, N
MEITF--Maximum number of Engineers In Training at
Firm (men)
TPSDF--Trainees Per Staff Desired by Firm (me~men)
ENFEF--ENgineers Fully Experienced at Firm (men)
EliATF--ENgineers Assigned as Trainers at the Firm (men)
TEI--Training .Efficiency Index (dimensionless)
TPSF--Trainees-Per Staff at the Firm (men/men)
EEITF--Expected number of EngLleers In Training a:t Firm
(men)
ENGHF--ENGineering Hiring rate at Firm (men/month)
ENLTF--ENgineers Leaving Training at Fj.rm (me~month)
EITTF--Engineers In Training Transferred by the Firm
(men/month)
The normal number of trainees which an experienced engineer
can supervise (on part-time basis) will be set initially at 2.5
men. This will be modi:fied in essence in several computer simula-
tiona by changing the training efficiency index, TEl, from its
initial unity value:
TPSF = 2.5 men/men
TEl = 1.00
The maximum hiring rate permitted under this policy is there-
fore the rate which (during one computational interval.) would bring
the expected number of trainees up to the specified limit. If, as
Equation 5-24 shows, this amount is not positive, the firm will do
no hiring. The desired engineering rate of change, Equation 5-25,
is a fraction of the engineering gap, the fraction indicating how
long it usually takes for the firm to process engineering requests.
I£ this desired rate of change is positive, the firm will attempt
to hire; if not, it will hire no one and will consider transferring
same engineers from the project. The actual hiring rate, ENGHF j
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is the desired hiring rate, TENHF, unless the maximum ra~e des-
cribed above restricts hiring still further.
MEHTF.K = ME,ITF.~ ~ EEITF.K 5-23, A
MENHF.K = MAX(NEHTF.K, 0) 5-24, A
ENGCF.K ENGPF.K 5-25, A= DCEF
TENHF.K = MAX(ENGCF.K, 0) 5-26, A
ENGHF.KL = MIN(TENHF .K, MENHF .K) 5-27, R
MEHTF--Maximum Engineering Hiring to be Tried by
the Firm (men/month)
MEITF--Maximwn number of Engineers In Training at Firm
(men)
EEITF--Expected number o~ Engineers In Training at Firm
(men)
MENHF--Maximum ENgineering Hiring rate at Firm (men/month)
ENGCF--ENGineering rate of Change desired at Firm (men/month)
ENGPF--ENGineering Gap at the Firm (men)
DCEF--Delay in Changing the Engineering level at the Firm
TENHF--Tried ENgineering Hiring rate at Firm (men/month)
ENGHF--ENGineering Hiring rate at Fi:l.~ (men/month)
When new engineers are needed for the project, an average of about
three months is needed to process the specifications. Thus,
DCEF = 3 months
Once engineers have been hired, several months usually pass
before they can free themselves o£ current cormnitment~it:~8nd report
£or duty to the firm. Their rate of joining the firm is represented
as a third-order exponential de~ay of the hiring rate ,. When they'
join the firm, the new engineers supplement others who are in
training at the firm. The number in training, ENITF, is depleted
by tho~~.:completing the training program and. by those transferred
out of training and from the project by the firm. Those not being
transferred remain. in tr~ining (ENRTF) until they complete the pro-
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gram after a period of about DETF months. Upon completiol.l of
training the engineers take on the same responsibilities as the
other experienced engineers.
ENBRF .K = ENBRF. J + (DT ) (ENGHF . JK - ENGJF. JK )
ENBRF = 0
ENGJF. KL = DELAY3 (ENGHF •JK, DRCE)
5-28, L
5-29, N
5-30, R
ENITF.K = ENITF.J + (DT)(ENGJF.JK - ENLTF.JK - EITTF .J)
5-31, L
ENITF = 0 5-32, N
ENRTF.K = ENITF.K + (DT) (-EITTF .K) 5-33, A
ENLTF.KL = ENRTF.K 5-34, RDETF
ENFEF.K = ENFEF. J + (DT) (ENLTF. JK - ENFI'F. J - ENREF. JK)
5-35, L
ENFEF = LEI 5-36, N
ENBRF--ENgineers Being Recruited by the Firm (men)
ENGHF--ENGineering Hiring rate at the Firm (men/month)
ENGJF--ENGineers Joining the Firm (men/month)
DRCE--Delay in ReCruiting Engineers (month)
ENITF--ENgineers In Training at the Firm (men)
ENLTF--ENgineers Leaving Training at the Firm (men/month)
EITTF--Engineers In Training Transferred by the Firm
(men/month)
ENRTF--ENgineers Remaining in Training at the Firm (men)
DETF-- Delay in Engineering Training at the Firm (men)
ENFEF--ENgineers Fully Experienced at the Firm (men)
ENFTF--ENgineers Fully experienced Transferred by the
Firm (men/month)
ENREF--ENgineering REassignment rate at the Firm
(men/month)
LEI --Level of Engineers Initially (men)
The equation for ENRTF takes into account the £act that engineers
currently being transferred out of training will not be available
for the normal completion of training that is treated by ENLTF.
Earlier in this appendix the recruitment timeJ DRCE, was specified
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as six months. The time required to fully indoctrinate and train
the new engineers up to the average effectiveness of the more
experienced engineers is the subject of major disagreement. Some,
quoted earlier in this chapter, estimated the time at six months;
others were quoted with estimates as high as three years; still
other people have privately indicated a belief that as much as
five years are required for this training. As an initial com-
promise DETF wil~ be set at one and one-half years, and the project
will be simulated later under varying values of the DETF para-
meter. Therefore, initially,
DETF = 18 months
Whether formally indicated or not, the pressures of new em-
ployees require some of the fully experienced engineers to spend
a portion o~ their time supervising or helping to train or break
in the new recruits. In the model, we shall explicitly recognize
tl't..i.s reassignment of ef:fort. The average experienced engineer is
assumed to be ab~e to indoctrinate (or manage) an average number
(given by TPSF) of new employees. The reallocation of effort
by these engineers of course results in a decreased direct personal
productivity, as wj..ll be modeled later. Equation 5-37 states that
the number of engineers desired as trainers equals the number of
new engineers expected divided by the number of recruits each
experienced engineer can train. Corresponding to this desired
level, equation 5-38 gives the actual number of engineers engaged
in training and/or supervisory work as a resultant of reassignments
to and from the full-time engineering category, also taking into
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account the transfers o~ some of these trainers out of the project
area 0
ENDTFoK = EEITFoK 5-37, ATPSF
ENATFoK = ENATFoJ + (DT)(ENREFoJK - ENTTFoJ) 5-38, L
ENATF = 0 5-39, N
ENDTF--ENgineers Desired as Trainers by the
Firm (men)
EEITF--Expected number of Engineers In Training
at the Firm (men)
TPSF--Trainees Per Staf£ at Finm (meq/month)
ENATF--ENgineers Assigned as Trainers at the
Firm (men)
ENREF--ENgineering REassignment rate at the
Firm (men/month)
ENTTF--ENgineering Trainers Transferred by the
Firm (meq/month)
The fi~ desires to reassign engineers so as to close the gap
between the desired and the actual number of engineers assigned as
trainers 0 It takes a short period of time to arrange for ·this, if in
fact the additional experienced engineers needed are availableo When
the firm is transferring engineers out of the project (at the end or
the project, for example), it does not bother with the fo~a1itieB o£
first reassigning the trainers back to full-time status on the ta~k­
oriented engineering worko These actions are shown in Figure ;-50
The equations for the reassignment follow the logic Just descri-
bedo The re~s8ignment rate desired is a fraction of the gap between
the desired and actual number of trainers6 1£ enough engineers are
available (ENARF), then this desired rate detenmines the reassignment
rate possible (Equation 5-41)0 During periods of transfer of engineers
from the project, trainers are transferred out directly without first
being reassigned to the ENFEF paolo This is expressed by the equation
for the reassignment
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Figure 5~5 Sta£f Reassignment Rate
rate itself, ENREF.
ED~TF.K = ENDTFD~ ENATF .K
ENRPF.K = MIN (EDRTF .K, ENARF .K)
ENARF K - ENFEF.K
• - (DT)
ENREF.KL = CLIP(O, ENRPF .K, 0, ENGPF .K)
5-40, A
5-41, A
5-42, A
5-43, R
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EDRTF--Engineers Desired for Reassignment as Trainers
by Firm (men/month)
ENDTF--ENgineers Desired as Trainers by the Firm (men)
ENATF--ENgineers Assigned as Trainers at the Finm (men)
DRET--Delay in Reassigning Engineers as Trainers (months)
ENRPF--ENgineering Reassignments Possible at the Firm
(men,/month)
ENARF--ENgineers Available for Reassignme~ at Firm
.(men/month)
ENFEF--ENgineers Fully EXILerienced at Firm, (men)
ENREF--ENgineering ··RtassigimIent rate at, the Firm
(men/month)
ENGPF--ENgineering GaP at the Firm (men)
In Equation 5-42 above ENARF is the largest possible rate of reassign-
ment of experienced engineers into the pool of trainers. That rate
would immediately utilize all engineers not yet assigned for hand-
ling training responsibilities. In general, about one month is
required to arrange fOI'and"accamplish the reassignment ,0£ the .engineers 0
Thus,
DRET = 1 month
When, after taking account of all the factors discussed ear-
lier relative to the formulation of the desired number of engineers,
the firm finds itself with an excess of engineers, it transfers
the requisite amount from the project (and perhaps from the firm).
The diagram illustrSfing this transfer process is Figure .5-6. In
i t we can see that the firm exercises this transfer un.less in fact
some of the people it wants to transfer are not yet available. The
total available for transfer are those experienced engineers who
are currently employed full-time on the project task, those who
are assigned as trainers, and those new recruits still in training.
Those employed as trainers are transferred from the project first.
If more transfers are needed, the engineers still in training get
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transferred. Finally, if still more engineers should be re-
moved from the project, some of the full-time experienced en-
gineers are transferred out of the project (and, if really
necessary~ out of the firm itself).
The first three equations say, respectively, that: (1) when
the firm expects more engineers than it desires (ENGPF is less
than zero), the firm transfers at the rate of ENGTD engineers
per month; (2) that transfer rate is the ENTRF unless sufficient
engineers are not available for transfer; and (3) ENTRF is the
amount needed to adjust the engineering gap~ ENGPF, immediately.
ENTDF.K = CLIP(ENGTD.K, 0, 0, ENGPF.K) 5-44, A
ENGTF.K = MIN( -ENTRF .KJ TEATF.K) 5-45, A
ENTRF.K = ENGPF.K 5-46, A
'DT'
ENTDF--BNgineering Transfer rate Decision at the Firm
(men/month)
ENGTD--ENGineering Transfer rate Desired (me~manth)
ENGPF--Engineering GaP at the Fird (men)
ENTRF--ENgineering Transfer Rate at the Firm (men/month)
TEATF--Total Engineers Available for Transfer by the
Firm (me~month)
The total engineers available for immediate transfer are those
assigned as trainers, plus those in training, plus the fully-exper-
ienced engineers who are working directly an the project effort.
TEATF.K ETATF.K + EITAF.K + ENARF.K
ETATF.K = E~F.K
EI~AFd{ = E~~F.K
5-47, A
5-48, A
5-49, A
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TEATF--Total Engineers Available .. for Transfer
by the Firm (men/month)
ETATF--Engineering Trainers Available for
Tr~nsrer by the Firm (men/month)
EITAF--Engineers In Training Available to the
Firm (men/month)
ENARF--ENgineers Available for Reassignment by
the Firm (men/moI1,th)
ENATF--ENgineers Assigned as Trainers at the
Finm (men) "
ENITF--ENgineers In Training at the Finm (men)
Equations 5-48 and 5-49 recognize that the max~um rate o£ transfer
of engineers out of the two categories is that rate which would deplete
the level 'in one computation intervalo
The actual transfer rate is composed of those transferred ~rom
each of the three available pools mentioned above 0 First those as-
signed as trainers get transferred; then, if more need be shifted,
those in training are taken; finally, if still more engineers are to
be transferred out, the fully experienced engineers are movedo In
no case, of course, can the transfer rate out o~ a~ individual sec-
tor exceed the maximum rate available from within that sectoro These
provisions are included in Equations 5-50 through 5-55 below 0
\
ENGTFoKL = ENTTFoK + EITTFoK + ENFTF.K ;-50, R
ENTTFoK = MIN (ENTDFoK, ETATFoK) 5-51, A
ENTANoK = ENTDFoK - ENTTFoK 5-52, A
EITTFoK = MIN (ENTANoK, EITAFoK) 5-53, A
ENTFNoK = ENTANoK - EITTFoK 5-54, A
ENFTFoK = MIN (ENARFoK, ENTFNoK) 5-55, A
ENGTF--ENGineering Transfer rate at the Firm
(men/month)
ENTTF--ENgineering Trainers Transferred by the
Firm (men/month)
.EITTF--Engineers" In" Training Trans:t:erred by the
Firm' (men/month)
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ENFTF--ENgineers Fully-experienced, Transferred
by the Firm (men/month)
ENTDF--ENgineering Trans~er rate Decision at the
Firm (men/month)
ETATF--Engineering Trainers Available for Trans-
fer by the Firm (men/month)
ENTAN--ENgineering Transfers, Additional, Needed
(men/month)
EITAF--Engineers in Training Available to the
Firm (men/month)
ENTFN--ENgineering Transfers, Final, Needed
(men/month)
ENARF-~ENgineers Available for Reassignment by'
the Firm (men/month)
If the engineers are being transferred to ano'ther project within
the same firm some time is usually taken up by the transfer arrange-
ments. If the engineers are actually going to leave the firm's em-
ploy, a nominal notification period is usually giveno These factors
cause noti£ied engineers to remain in the project for an additional
short period of time while they are being transferredo
ENBTFoK = ENBTFoJ + (DT)(ENGTFoJK - ENGLFoJK)
ENBTF = 0
ENGLFoKL = ~oi
ENBTF--ENgineers Being Transferred at the
Firm (men)
ENGTF--ENGineering Transfer rate at the Fi~
(men/month)
ENGLF--ENGineers Leaving the Firm (men/month)
DTRE--Delay in TRansferring Engineers (month)
5-56, L
5-57, N
;-58, R
ENGLF actually represents the engineers leaving only the project as
well as those actually departing from the firm. D'IRE was, at an
earlier point in this appendix, set equal to one montho
Figure 5-7 treats the remaining aspect of the Chapter 5 discussion,
n~ely the topic of engineering productivityo The diagram shows the
dependence of actual effective production rate in engineering on the
267
Wb~,,_~
A<...\"UA-L.L'(
A., \AJO~~
\
cl
,?E.~~E \'..\. T
A\!~et4,... \S'M,
\
\,
(
\ ,
~
t't:l!'C.~~T 0
TJ'E~.1'lT' 01=
"";lr 'tCN~-~D W
o~ ~t=\~M
nA\--\c;~ii·W2W't)
'\D ,H;:
~u5""'O ~.~ ~
\
\
\
I<I\\OW- ,~o~
LE::V&:L- OF
,\-\. t:.'-' S TO IW\E
~S-kq
\(NOW- '-+Ow
L1:\/e:-L- Of=t
\~ F-leM \
~--6J? ,
,
,
,
,
~E1- A-T\ \Jc
p~" b\)c-T' tJ,'T'r
~,c liNer, ~t.=E:R") i
ACTVAU-Y WD~.\~
e"o S-&O
,
I
/
------
~G-\ t--\E£1l\~
~ftOD'-t:.,\V'TY R~Te
~ 0·- III '"
"- ,
SMOOTHE"t>
\(N 0LJ - t-\ £) W
LaV.'- () F
111-~ f=-\ f< M
=- ~-167)
(
,
\
r
tI
~E£'"'&'~lKt) U:V--L-
oF- \<~OW"'~DW
Fb'R "ev~EFNT
OF P'Roe.uc.T
Figure 5-7 Engineering Productivity
268
number of engineers, the degree to which they possess utilizable skills
(some are less trained than others, some have a portion of their efforts
drawn off to non-directly productive tasks, etco), and the general level
of this putential engineering utilizatioDo The latter point is shown
to be based on the available state o£ the art and management's ability
to help the engineering force make use of this potentialo The final
factor shown in the illustration as contributing to the engineering
production rate is the finm's experience on the current project, based
on the extent of its earlier accon~lishments on the job which have
been absorbed and ~dde available for further exp~oitationo
Let us start our equations £or this sector or the model with one
for the utilized technological e~fectivenesso This was said to depend
upon both the available technology and the competence of the firmo
UTEF 0 K = (Q.F) (ATEF 0 K)
UTEF--utilized Technological Effectiveness
at the Fi~ (percent)
QF--Quality of the Firm (percent)
ATEF--Available Technological Effectiveness
at the Fi~ (percent)
Initially, this quality factor was placed at 100 percento
5-59, A
Next let us treat the formulation of the contribution o£ current
project experiences to engineering productivityo Whatever know-how
is developed in solving the Rand D project problems, some ttme is
required for it to be adequately absorbedo Then, as the experiences
cumulate, the firm's engineers supplement their non-project skills
with these new more specific insights and approaches to the tasko
Increments to the engineering effectiveness are larger initial1y than
later, since the number of engineering problems yet unsolved on the
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project decreases as the project progresseso This lessens the likeli-
hood that new project accomplishments made late in the life cycle will
find still further use on this projecto Thus, the multiplicative
effect on the engineering productivity of the project achievements
themselves probably looks like the curve of Figure 5-80
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Effect on Productivity of Project Achievements
The time required to adequl.itely absorb the know-how is represented
by the smoothing equation, 5-600 It is this averaged knowledge which
is used in Equation 5-62 to create the multiplicative e~fect of project
experience on the engineering productivity, as shown in:
SKLVFoK = SKLVFoJ + (DT)(l/DCKN)(KLEVFoJ - SKLVFoJ) 5-60, L
SKLVF = KLEVF
MEPIKoK = 1 + (MPBFK)(l-e-(3)(SKLVFoK) /NLKP)
SKLVF--smoothed Know-how LeVel of the Firm
(effective man-months of effort)
DCKN--Delay in Changing KNow-how (months)
KLEVF--Know-how LEVel of the Firm (effective
man-months of effort)
;-61, N
5-62, A
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MEPIK--MUltiplier to Engineering Productivity due
to Increased project Know-how (percent)
MPBFK--Maximum Productivity Benefit From project
Know-hoW' (percent)
NLKP--Needed Level of Know-how for development
of the Product (effective man-months of
effort)
In all likelihood several months go by before the engineers on the
project are able to effectively utilize their newly-found know-how
on other project problemso This is true both because o£ the engineers'
own learning time and because of the probable lapse in time before a
problem requiring the same understandings comes up in the projecto
DCKN will thus be assumed as a half-yearo
DCKN = 6 months
The value o£ MPBFK specifies the extent to which the £irm vs produc-
tivity bene~its from its project know-how 0 Arbitrarily, since no
data exists to guide this choice otherwise, the Jllaximum increase will
be set as sixty percento
~FK = 0060 (decimal percentage)
Before taking account of these above-defined factors, we can
express the basic relative productivity of the engineers employed on
the projecto This recognizes the different degrees of effectiveness
of the less trained f·rom the more experienced, those fully employed
on engineering frClll those busy with handling administrative tasks or,
finally, from those preparing to transfer out of the projecto
REPRFoK = (PRIT)(ENITFoK) + (PRAT)(ENATFoK) + (PREBT)
(ENBTFoK) + (loO)(ENFEFoK) ;-63, A
REPRF--Relative Engineering PRoductivity o~ the
Firm (effective man-months of effort/month)
PRIT--PRcductivity of engineers In Training
(months of effective erfort/months or work)
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ENITF-~ENgineers In Training at the Firm (men)
PRAT--PRoductivity of engineers Ass{'tned as
Trainers (months of e£fective effort/
months of work)
ENATF--ENgineers Assigned as Trainers at the
Firm (men)
PREBT--PRoductivity of Engineers Being Transferred
(months of e£fective effort/months of work)
ENBTF--ENgineers Being Transferred at the Firm
(men)
ENFEF--Engineers Fully Experienced at the Fi~
(men)
The constants used above, PRIT, PRAT, and PREET, all are defined
relative to the base productivity of the ~lly experienced engineers,
ENFEFo New engineers generally have some relevant experiences gained
elsewhere, and they soon increase their effectiveness during their
init~~~ training periodo Thus, we shall set PRIT to represent 40
percent of the effectiveness o£ the more experienced engineers o The
more experienced engineers assigned to training will devote only part
o£ their e££orts to this indirect training work, to the extent that
their effectiveness will drop by 30 percento Finally, because of
either confusion or demoralization, the engineers being trans~erred
will be regarded as only 20 percent as effective as the fully employed
engineers, used here as a standardo Therefore,
PRIT = 0040 eff'ective man-months of effort/
month of work
PRAT = 0070 eff'ective man-months/month
PREBT = 0020 effective man-months/mcnth
Equation ;-63 represents the potential base productivity of all
the engineering employeeso However, same are occasionally absent or
not working because o£ a holiday or vacation periodo On the average,
AVABS percent or the engineers are out of work at any given timeo
Thus the percent of workers actually at work is 100% minus AVABS percent 0
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The actual relative productivity reflects this factor.
PWAW = 1 - AVABS
RPEWFoK = (PWAW)(REPRFoK)
PWAW--Percent of Workers Actually at Work
(percent)
AVABS--AVerage percent ABSenteeism (percent)
RPEWF--Relative Productivity of Engineers
actually Working at the Firm (effec-
tive man-months/month)
REPRF--Relative Engineering PRoductivity at
Firm (effective man-months of effort/
month o£ work)
5-64, N
;-6;, A
Combining all of these in£luences on productivity--the basic
~~upuwer and SK1l1s factors of RPEWF, the gains fram experience of
MEPIK, and the fundamental dependence on technology and managerial
ability as expressed in UTEF--we can now write the equation ~or the
actual. productivity rate of the firm, in terms of the ef'fective man-
months of output developed per month o~ the £i~IS project activityo
This rate of course changes as any of the contributing factors change
dUl"ing the project 11feo
ENPRFoKL = (UTEF oK) (MEPIKoK) (RPEWF oK) ;-66, R
ENPRF--ENgineering PRoductivity rate of' Firm
(e££ective man-months/month)
UTEF--Utilized Technological Effectiveness at
Firm (percent)
MEPIK--~tiplier to Engineering Productivity
due to Increased project Know-how (per-
cent)
RPEWF--Relative Productivity of Engineers
actually Working at Firm (effective man-
mont~hs/month)
This continuing rate of productivity adds to the previous job
accomplishments to produce the level of real progress on the job,
which we have identified here as the level o£ really relevant knOW-how
o£ the finmo Through his communications with the customer, the firm
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transmits a certain fraction of this know-how to the customero
KLEVF oK = KLEVF oJ + (DT) (ENPRF.JK)
KLEVF = VSMAL
KLEVe 0 K = (PKFTC) (KLEW 0 K)
KLEVF--Know-how LEVel of the Firm (effec-
tive man-months of effort)
ENPRF--ENgineering PRoductivity rate at Firm
(effective man-months/month)
VSMAL--Very SMALl number (dimensionless)
KLEVC--Know-how LEVel of the Customer (effec-
tive man-months of effort)
PKFTC--Percent of the Know-how of the Finm
Transmitted to the Customer (percent)
5-67, L
5-68, N
5-69, A
We shall assume that the firm is effective (due to its own or the
customer's qUalifications) in communicating 80 percent of the project
lmow-how developed to the customero
PKFTC = 0080 (dec~ percentage)
This completes the equation-writing and par~eter specification
describing the fi~'s acquisition and effective employment of engineers
on the research and development project.
CHAPTER VI
THE CONTROL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS
Introduction
The purpose of control is to assure that the R
and D activity is performing as expected and to
provide a basis for corrective action if it is
nato The control process involves these opera-
tions~ (1) establishini criteria governing the
information output of the Rand D functionoooo;
(2) .observing the in£ormation output continuously
or by frequent samples: (3) comparing the actual
information output with the expected output; (4)
takin~ action to make changes in Rand D activity
or in the conditiona und,er \tlhich ·it operates, if
judged necessaryo Effective control requires
that corrective action be taken quickly, when in-
dicatedo 1
The problems involved in measuring and responding to progress in a
research and development project are central to the management of R
and Do They shall be discussed in this chapter in much the same se-
quence as the phases listed in the quotation aboveo
In the same article cited above~ Rubenstein introduces the
problem:
Attempts to apply standard control and evalua-
tion techniques to the research program have
proved verj" disappointing in many companies 0
They have led to misunderstandings between re-
search and management personnel and have often
placed barriers in the way of effective research
programming 0 Sometimes these difficulties arise
from control and evaluation procedures which are
basically inadequate for any of the company; s
activities, but more frequently they came from
applying procedures which are effective in other
parts of the company but not in researchG 2
lAlbert Ho Rubenstein. "Setting Criteria for Rand D", Haryard
Business Review, Vol. 35, Noo 1 (January-February, 1957), po 1020
2 Ibid ., po 96
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These distinctions vhich show up between the research and develop-
ment department and manufacturing j for example, reflect the degree of
tangibility of the outputs of the two organizationso In manufacturing,
cost accounting tools and physical counting of output usually serve
the purpose of measurement of progresso Management somehow defines
its output volume and cost goals and knows its degree of success in
meeting these goals by s~ply looking at production records or accoun-
ting statementso To be sure, other factors of consequence to the manu-
facturing organization are less tangible, more difficult to measure,
and therefore usually ignoredo Such things as product quality and cus-
tomer satisfaction can also be regarded as manufacturing outputs, but
they are seldom considered until they actually cause a crisis in the
organizatioDo
The research and development manager has a situation which is per-
haps similar in substance but certainly different in degreeo He too
has a need for measurement of his organizationUs progress, but he even
lacks any ~~adily-defined physical means of determinatioDo Furthenmcre,
in all Rand D situations the intangible quality and satisfaction mea-
sures are obviously consequential but not so obviously available for
measurement. Many schemes have been tried in attempting to keep track
of Rand D progress, including the establishment of project milestone
schedules, sophisticated computer reporting techniques, as well as
much just plain guessworko But these processes are generally felt· to
be quite subjective, and the capability of research and development
management enters more into the picture in deciding, for the record,
Whether or not milestones have been achieved, what types of inputs to
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provide to the computer systems, and what factors ought to enter into
their estimateso Perhaps it is only the folklore that such processes
cannot be objective which keeps research and development managers from
trying otherwiseo Certainly some organizations have been successful
in defining noncontroversial measures of project progress, and in
using information regarding the accomplishment of these to help in
their management efforts 0 But such successes are exceptional and not
at all typicalo For example, the author has examined one large com-
pany's survey of several hundred engineering progress reports, in
which the project leaders were so often confounded as to what pro-
gress had actually been achieved that during about 80 percent of the
actual time span of a project 9 the supervisors reported the job to
be about 90 percent completed 0 It is likely that many of the predesig-
nated stages of progress in this job were meaningless or basically
undefined 0 It is also true that, at least in theory, a projectis
tasks can be defined such ~hat tangible measures are associated with
the progressive accomplishments of the projecto But very few firms
have yet developed their project planning skills to the extent ~eededo
The type of experience cited above has been shared by a good
many people other than just the author 0 For instance, Norden writes,
"It has been suggested that the spectrum from basic research to pro-
duction is calibrated by the degree of accuracy with which one can
specify (a priori) the nature and measure of the outcomes, and the
numerous configurations of all operations required, for any task to
be doneo This i.s comparatively easy in manufacturing, and next to
Lmpossible in basic researcho Applied research and development
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appeared to be a twilight zone in which we are just learning to specify
the methodology.W)
Even those who are asserting the use of sophisticated computer meth-
odology for keeping track of project status recognize the inherent diffi-
cuIty of initially setting down the sig.nposts to guide the way in one's
evaluation techniqueo Early in his discussion of the PERT approach, Pearl-
man points out, "The planning of technical objectives and the accompanying
measurement of success is perhaps the most nebulous aspect of program m~-
agement. An organization whose growth depends upon innovation has diffi-
culty in studying and measuring quantitative obJectiveso w4
And finally, Nelson1 whose writings have been cited several times
earlier, addresses himself to the problem as £ollOJs:
There is considerable uncertainty as to the outcome of an
Rand D program, the uncertainty being, of course, closely
related to the degree of knowledge in the relevant fields
and to the adv~nce sought in the programs. Attempts to
develop an object that represents a marked advance in the
state-of-the-art are subject to great unoertainty; attempts
to ~prove an existing obJe~t are subject to relatively
little uncertaintyo
The attempt to plan a development program in detail will
lead to frustration and failure i£ the program represents
a signi£icant leap forward ~ UsuaJ..ly j not just sometimes,
unexpected obstacles are discovered, and many expected
ones prove relatively easy to solveo'
To some extent in a large project the random elements which contribute
to these unexpected events probablY tend to cancel each other Quto
)Peter V. Norden, "On the Anatomy of Development ProJects", IRE
Transactions .QD EnKineeriDi' ManAiement, Vol 0 EM-7, Noo 1 (March 1960), po 410
4Jerame Pearlman, "Engineering Program Planning and Control Through
the Use of PERT, .IRE Transactions Qll Engineering Management, Vol 0 FJl-7, No~ 4
(December 1960), po 12;0
5Richard R. Nelson~ WInvention, Research and Development: A
Surveyo£ the Literature",~~ Force Project~ Research Memoran-
~, ~2146 (April 15, 1958), ppo 19-200
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However 9 th~ nopr~ndom elements~ the detenministic bias that comes
from assuming everytrdng will go in'the best possible way, is what
gets so ma~ projects into so much troubleo This was discussed in
great detail in Chapter 3 and need not be further developed hereo
But since we are describing what takes place in todayis research and
development projects, we cannot act as if these planning problems
can be talked out of existence 0 Perhaps they are present because of
the failure of competent people to attempt their solution; perhaps
they are present because their di£ficulty overwhelms even the routinely
competent and in fact all but an exceptional few able Rand D managers.
For whatever the reasons, meaningful project planning in research and
development is an almost universally lacking accomplishment.
Thus, because of these intangible~ imprecise, and uncertain fac-
tors, the accomplishment o~ a significant research and development
undertaking cannot be naievely charted out as easily as one plots the
best route to take in traveling between two cities in the United States.
In such a map exercise, we can look at several alternate routings from
source of destination, add up the links between signposts or towns,
and find out which route constitutes the shortest route between the
two pointso If we then took one of these roads, we would feel rather
certain that signposts would exist on the way to mark our progress at
any given pointo The map might not tell us, however, that the shortest
route is also the more popular route, and therefore crowded with tra-
velers and slow to traverseo Or it might not warn us of the bridge
that washed out in one of the small highway linkages, thus creating
the need for a long and time-consuming detour. But although this
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analogy between attempting to plan a research and development pro-
ject and attempting to select a travel route can be carried further
to some degree, it is naive even to believe that a research and
development project could be nearly as well defined as the markings
on a highway mapo In research and development each of the development
linkages is uncertain; each of the roads may be marked by a poten-
tial washout, creating the necessity for major detour. And even
when one selects the well-traveled development path, he may only pro-
ceed up to a certain dead-endj the same development path which has
"been commonly used before may be limited by its very nature against
handling the particular ·problem being undertakeno
It is unfortunate that this survey of the literature and analysis
of the state of the art of project planning has to paint such a bleak
picture 0 But the author feels quite justified in observing this major
weakness in research and development management capabilities 0 The
hope resides in the fact that so few Rand D people make any overt
attempt to do the needed project planning seriouslyo O£ the remain-
ing large number of "unitiatedn'managers, th9se who seriously (not
superficially, as some current fads seem to encourage) undertake to
lay thorough foundations for their project commitments can probably
realize ten to one improvements (or perhaps even more) in their re-
sear~h and development e££ectivenesso
In addition to the fact that projects are poorly planned initially,
these general problems still exist during the life of the project,
when the Rand "D manager attempts to reassess his project goals and
redefine his objectiveso The remainder of the chapter will attempt
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to go into each of these phases in more detail, to analyze what prac-
tices have been adopted by industry for both establishing criteria
and measuring progress, and hopefully to constructively evaluate the
merits of ihese practiceso
Establishing Criteria for Progress Measurement
In order to control any kind of process, one must start with an
objective function toward which he is aiming. As the customer and
the finm in a research and development project contemplate the job
before them, they too recognize an objective function--not necessarily
the immediate maximization of profits, but rather the development of
some particular end producto The concepts describing these technical
objectives m~ very well change during the life cycle of the project,
particularly during the early phases of relatively 1.ow level of engi-
neering efforto But as the customer and the firm get £urther along in
the Rand D project life cycle, they begin more clearly to recognize
the specific nature of the task before them, including perhaps some
subset of requirements which must be met for the project to be com-
pletedo nIt appears that each operational group goal has associated
with it a set of 'task requireme~tsV which must be satisfied if pro-
gress toward the goal is to take placeo,,6 But despite the fact that
such a subset of tasks no doubt can be clearly seen as having existed
after the fact of project completion, it is not necessarily true that
before the fact the impressions of either customer and firm were other
6Dorwin Cartwright and AIyin Zander, Group Dynamics, Research
and Theory, Second Edition (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and
Company, 1960) ~ po 3540
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than highly uncertaino As argued earlier, the ability to recognize
these specific requirements rests on the general managerial and tech-
nical ability of the firm and/or customer, and more particularly on
their understanding as to how to use these capabilities in the initial
project designo
In Chapter 3 it was stated that both the customer and the firm
view the nature of the development effort under contemplation by
basing their estimates on consideration of the believed job size and
~pon their assessments of the technological effectiveness of engi-
neers. The combination of those two factors, the job size and the
technological effectiveness j was described as producing the estimate
of total effort that would be required to complete the research and
development undertakingo If this be the case, then one can readily
present the only meaningful definition of progress on a research and
development job; ioeo, the accumulation over the period of time of
the project of those effective manhours contributed by the engineering
work forceo As discussed in Chapter 5, the rate of progress is depen-
dent upon the number of engineers at work, their qualifications, the
ability of engineering management in general, and the state of the
art in the related technological areaso Thus as effective effort is
applied over time, problems are solved, breakthroughs are made, sub-
tasks within the job are completed, and in general, less effort re-
mains for completion of the total projecto Such statements are ob-
vious ones, but their simplicity belies a very basic fact of research
and developmento There is no intrinsically correct measure either of
engineering effectiveness; £)r of problems solved, ~ ~ the task left
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to be doneo For these reasons, the difficulties are encountered in
attempting to control a research and development projecto
Some statements made in the literature highlight the confusion
regarding this problem 0
Shartleooooreports on the basis of extensive re-
search in formal organizations 0 0 0 othat responsible
executives can state their perceptions of the goals
of the organization and the degree of progress made
toward them at a~ given timeo He proposes that it
will be possible to construct a goal achievement index
which denotes the ratio of the total distance to the
goal in relation to the amount of progress that has
been achievedo It must be added, however, that the
methodological di~ficulties of constructing such an
index quantitatively have not yet been overcomeo 7
Thus we combine here the assertiou that one can claim to know the state
o~ progress with the recognition that such statements cannot quantita-
tively be measured or verifiedo
Such a situation brings us ~o the methods that are actually used
in research and development projects, wherein people are willing to
state what progress has been made but where no necessarily relevant
measurements are available to verify or deny such statementso Thus~
we have a case similar to the general problem referred to by Barnardo
UWhen we are obliged in a practical sense to deal with intangible
things chiefly characterized by relationships rather than by sub-
stance, we have to symbolize them by concrete things or personify themo w8
This is particularly unfortunate, since the obvious concrete measurable
7cartwright and Zander, ~. cito, First Edition (1953),
p. 3070
8Chester I. Barnard, Ib£ Functions of the Executive (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, ~938/, po 740
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variables may be basically unrelated to the amount of effort required
to getting the job done 0 This can be readily seen if we talk, for
instance, about a fund-raising objective to COllect, let us say, $100,000.
It seems reasonable to argue that the effort required to get the first
$50,000 through such a drive may be of an entirely different order of
magnitude than the effort required to get the final $50,0000 For the
first part of the drive, those who have always given in the past will
continue to give againo The large contributors who account for a
substantial fraction of the gift may be among the first to contribute,
and thereby 50 percent of the dollar goal may be achieved with a rather
minimal amount of efforto The remaining 50 percent of the fund goal
may require rallies and campaigning,~door-to-doorvisitation, much
time-consuming effort on the part of committee workers, and perhaps
a much longer elapsed duration of timeo Another campaign of the same
exact sort may encounter entirely different problemso Here the rate
of gro~h of the total funds collected may start very slowly, gradually
gathering momentum, accelerating more rapidly, and finally going over
the top at a very advanced paceo For such a project, many people say,
trGetting organized is half the jobo" Thus from looking at these two
different types of ttme histories of a fund-raising campaign, one can
readily see that the amount of effort may be Wholly unrelated to the
most obvious physical manifestation of results of that effort, in these
cases the actual dollars collectedo The dangers of reliance upon the
easiest-to-obtain tangible measures are significant not just in research
and development but throughout the corporationo Considering the often
sophisticated methods that have recently been introduced into research
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and development programming, it seems rather shameful that so little
is known about the basic determinants of Rand D progress u
Fundamental to all attempts to establish criteria for measuring
and controlling research and 1evelopment progress is some plan for
the actual technical accomplishmento A recent paper describing this
kind of activity at the Bendix Corporation stated: ttFormal planning
on the part o£ the project engineer begins with the development of
the project schedule chart, whi.ch presents in convenient form, numeric
and graphic information about the projecto To complete the informa-
tion required on this form, it is necessary for the engineer to think
out the steps he must go through to complete his project on time. n9
Describing the experiences at Sylvania, another writer said, "One of
the first administrative measures in developing a real-time system
program will be to layout a schedule with appropriate milestoneso
This is not easy; and the more detail is in it, the less likely it is
10to represent the facts as they unfoldo" At General Electric, their
approach to the sam.e problem was described as follows:
Next, the plan or operating program is established
to accomplish the objectiveo This plan is broken
down into the steps which must be per~ormed in
terms of the lead time each will take to meet the
requirements of the plano Let's call these steps
operations 0 An operation may be a stated require-
ment of engineering release for the procurement of
raw materi~lo It is stated in terms of the lead
9Ro W. Haine and Wo Lob, "The Application of Closed-Loop
Techniques to Engineering Project Planning", ~ Transactions .Q!l Engi-
neering Management, Vol~ EM-7, Nco 3 (September 1960), po 970
lOWo Ao Hosier, "Pitfalls and Safeguards in Real-Time Digital
Syst~~s with Emphasis on Programming," IRE Transactions gn Engineerin~
Management, Vol 0 EM-8, Noo 2 (June 1961), po 1l4o
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time it will take to procure in order to meet the
requirements of the plano Another operation may
be the requirement of an engineering release to
allow manufacturing to proceed, utilizing the raw
material previously releasedo This, too, is iden-
tified in terms of lead time-. 11
Trying to adhere to these types of planning procedures is very
difficult indeed in research and development. The literature of R
and D control is basically misleading in the general ~pression that
j.t often presents as to the relative simplicity of making up such
plans. As one example, "To simplify project planning, :the approxi-
mate date for the completion of intermediary phases of the project
is empirically established by the project engineer, as well as the
12fina1 date for completion and shipment of the work." The ~portant
question is whether such approximate dates listed in these plans ha~e
any meaningful relationship whatsoever to the actual dates that are
finally achieved in the Rand D projectso In an earlier chapter, the
United States experiences in conducting many different product develop-
ment undertakings were describedo The;RAND Corporation findings, as
others, pointed to a great and an historical lack o£ ability to' prop-
erly est~ate the time and effort required to complete research and
development jobs 0 There is no reason to believe that we have progres-
sed in our ability to handle this difficulty beyond the stage reported
in those studieso
The diffi~ulties of making realistic estimates of time and ef£ort
l~alPh Medros, t'lntroducing New Jet Engine Production with
Reduced Lead T~esn, paper presented at the SAE National Aeronautic
Meeting, April 2-5, 1957, po 4.
12H e 97a~ne and Lob, po 0
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requirements was recently cited in a letter writted by a reviewer for
the IRE Transactions on Engineering Management in his comments about
the PERT system. "We have taken the time to study a great many trees
of researchoaooand even when these relate to the ~development' of new
drugs, we have found that you could not with knowledge available at
the time have predicted the sequencing of events, a priori. We have
checked this in other labs 0 0 o oAt any given stage 7 you have the prob-
ability of new knowledge--which is why you do the research--but you do
not know how many steps or what specific events are going to take place
before the new knowledge appears. ,,13
All the evidence cited merely strengthens the initial point made,
that it is .extremely difficult though not impossible to establish
criteria for measuring progress in research and development efforto
Even a system of project milestones, which system basically states the
subtasks required to complete the end re~ult, still has the potential
failings due to the uncertainties inherent in research and develop-
mento Nevertheless, most companies do go ahead in their planning
efforts to map out such a set of project linkages or milestones which
will be met before the job has been completedo The capable managers
of Rand D can use this approach effectively. For example, when the
milestones tllemselves are noncontroversial in their measurability, the
likelihood that the firm will have at least some form of tangible guide-
posts increaseso One report gives a good example of a basis for the
l3Editorial column, lRE Transactions on Engineering Manage-
ment, Vola EM-7, NoD 3 (September 1960), po 81.
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kind of milestones to which we are referring. "Turning now to the
rate of engineering dev·elopment ~ the design of an axial type turbo-
jet of 8,000 to 10,000 ?ounds static thrust absorbs about one year,
and a further 12 months or more will be required to build the first
prototype engine--or, say, two years from the first line on the draw-
ing board to the test bench, ready to runo Then, in the following
three years] there should be completed 8,000 to 10,000 engine hours
of bench running and about 2,000 hours of flight testingo From 3,000
to 4,000 engine hours of bench running is a good yearly £igure in the
4th and 5th years.,,14
These expected project perfonmance data, if acceptable as mile-
stones, can be checked as the project proceeds to determine whether
or not the job is behind normal schedule for such an undertakingo But
variables other than the percent of job completion are of ~portance
to those who are managing a research and development projecto "In
addition to the technical problems, the elapsed t~e and the amount
of money spent must be consideredo It is evident that all three---
technical accomplishment, elapsed time, and the remaining funds--are
of concern to the project engineer.,,15
In regard to this, Nelson says,
The scheduling of man-hours, money, expenditure,
and progress by project is apparently becoming
increasingly popularo However, these schedules
seem to be taken seriously only for projects
1~. R. Banks, "The Birth of an Engine", Aeronautical Engi-
neering Review, Vol 0 12, NoD 6 (June 1953), po 390
15Haine and Lob, p. 97.
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involving relatively little uncertainty; they are
seldom if ever taken seriously for broadly defined
research projectso The use of periodic reports is
even more cammon than the use of scheduleso About
75 of the laboratories respo~ding to a Harvard Busi-
ness School questionnaire said that regular checks
were made on project costs, manpower, and estimated
completion dateo16
One grand approach to the measurement of progress in research and
development seems, unintentionally, to use the management mistakes
which created pervious project life cycles as the standard of excellence
for current projectso In the originator's words:
"Normalized Cllrves tl represent a means of eValuating
the relationships of time, total expenditures, sub-
contraot expenditures, and a number of activities
and even-:ts 0 They I'epresent data on previous con-
tracts that have been categorized and reduced to
connnon scaleso "Normalized curves" can indicate
that on a research and development contract for
product fiX" which will result i.n the delivery of
one system J the following should have occurred
when 50 percent of the time has passed from the
start of the contract until the delivery of the
system~ 30 percent of the total anticipated funds
should have been expended; 22 percent of the antici-
pated subcontract funds should have been expended;
40 percent of the total contract direct man-months
to completion should have been utilized; all of the
bread-boards should have been previously fabricated;
and 87 percent of the preliminary schematics should
have been releasedo 17
To a great extent such efforts as these described seek relation-
ships between the superficialities of a few projects while neglecting
to recognize that fundamental reality of reseerch and development
projects--the great uncertainty to which so much time has been devot~d
16Nelson, "Invention, Research and Development: A Survey of
the Literature", po 590
17Do W. Kornreich, "Utilization of Normalized Data for Defense
Contracts", Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Meeting of the Opera-
tions Research Society of America, May 25-26, 1961, ppo 3-40
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in this discussioDo It is easy to criticize these various approaches
to establishing measures of progress in research and developmento It
is much more difficult to propose an alternative which has both sub-
stance and validity, rather than just theoretical merito The author
himself admits to having been responsible for one of the earliest of
the sophisticated computer-oriented approaches to help control progress
in Rand D projects. 18 This effort, the author now feels, was equally
as devoid of substance relevant to real progress in research and devel-
opmen~ as are the methods critic~zed in the preceding pageso
The articles cited thusfar do not even provide a clue as to an
alternative appro~ch to the problems of establishing criteria for pro-
gress measuremento However, the passing comment of a'writer from
Hughes Aircraft Company does suggest some ideaso "Speculation as to
the degree of difficulties involved in solving a new problem is partic-
ularly vulnerable to emotional thinking, since the assumed factors tend
to be exaggerated disproportionally when the speculator has an emotional
motivation for wanting to take a certain routeo 1l19 This motivational
factor, which has been largely ignored in the design of Rand D control
systems thusfar, can certainly serve to modify behavior of engineers
and managers in research and development projects 0 MUch of the key to
the project planning and measurement planning problems may well lie in
the lack of incentive for bettering the Rand D planso There is no
l8Edward B. Roberts, "The Digital Computer as an Element of
a Financial Control System", unpublished Master v s thesis, Mo loT C", .Tune, 19580
19A. L. Stanley, "Logic and Illogic in Engineering and Manage-·
ment", mE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol 0 EM-5, Noo 4
(December 1958), po 1470
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real reward for success in planning or penalty for failure 0 Thereftore,
planners or managers do not use their failures as a basis for learning.
This comes largely f'rom the McGregor "Theory X" dif'f'iculty20--the
attempt to exert exterior control and authority on research and develop-
mant, without incentives for the Rand D people to strive toward the
same erlds 0
When we recognize that people no~ally react to pressures, even
those from measurement and evaluation systems, from the viewpoint of
their own objectives, we can begin to better understand the causes for
failure of many progress evaluation schemes 0 Let us examine some of
the current Rand D progress comparison schemes from this motivational-
factor perspectiveo Rubensteings survey of 37 laboratories found that
"to appraise progress, 15 companies used comparisons of actual and bud-
geted expenditures; 6 used proportion of budget spent; 3 'used output
of information to groups that applied f'or research datao n2l With only
slight exaggeration to help make the basic point clear, comparing
"actual to budgeted expenditures" creates an incentive to increase
budgets, regardless of need, and to hold down expenditures, regardless
of progress; checking "proportion of budget spent" creates pressures
on the manager or engineer to be sure he spends the money, whether or
not on something useful; and counting "output of information to groups
WhiCh applied for research data" emphasizes long reports about work on
2°Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), ppo 33-570
2laubenstein, "Setting Criteria f'or Rand Dat, po 980
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short-term crises in which the rest of the company is currently invol-
vedo The encouragements provided by other Rand D progress measures
are also obvious, for instance 9 the results of counting the number or
square feet of en~ineering drawings releasedo None of these criteria
relate to the excellence of engineering accamplishmento Same of these
measures in fact create incentives detri~ental to good project perfor-
manceo Obviously, the company ability which shows up in the design of
its incentive-evaluation system, can have great bearing on research
and development successo
Progress Measurement
The approach to control outlined at the beginning o~ this chapter
presented a four-step process: (1) establishing criteria, (2) obser-
ving, (3) comparing., (4) taking actiono To this point in the chapter,
only the first aspect, the establishment of criteria for the measure-
ment of research and development progress has been discussedo The
diffiCUlty of separating the observation phase fram the comparison
phase will be illustrated in this sectioDo It will also try to take
into account the underlying elements in the process of observing and
comparing progress in a research and development operatioDo Let us
start with a critique of some of the detailed methods for research and
development measuremento
The determination of the physical completion at any
given time presents some problemso Asking each engi-
neer at a given time (ti) what the physical completion
of his work is, would canstitute a maJoI' problem.
First of aJ..l, each engineer would'~ have a different judg-
ment factor; second J the number of engineers involved
may make such a task prohibitive; and third, having
gathered the various percentages of physical completion,
one may now know whether such percentages are additive,
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fonm a series, or have any other kind of relation-
ship 0 Furthermore, it is not known what segment
of the budgetary curve pertains to the reported
physical completiono 22
Thus, one measurement suggestion has been made and discarded by its
own authoro The collection of completion estimates by each individual
engineer working on a job and their aggregation into same over-all
measurement is not recommendedo
Another suggestion was presented thusly: "Technical objectives
are difficult to defineo Measuring their attainment has posed even
greater problemso The solution to this problem has been the design
reviewo n23 Pearlman goes on to say that in one department of the
General Electric Company si.x design review sessions are held for
each project, one each at the end of six defined-as-distinct phases
of engineering developmento The desire is to intensely examine each
portion of the design at these reviews, highlighting observed short-
comings for correctioDo Thus the majority vote or the consensus o£
the group acts as the determinant of the progress or lack of progress
that is measured by the design review cammitteeo
A third observer reports his companyU s d:lfficulties in gaining
periodic measurements of progress o
Prior to the use of project schedule charts, a
monthly progress report for each project was
prepared by project engineers 0 This report
included a statement of the projectis completion
22H: Versteege, "Analysis of' Engineering Performance"} IRE Trans-
actions on Engineering Management, Vol 0 EM-5, Noo 2 (June 1961), po 720
23Jerome Pearlman, "Engineering Program Planning and Control
Through the Use of PERT", 1M Transactions QIl Engineering Management,
Vol 0 EM-7, Noo 4 (December 1960), po 12;0
293
percentage 0 Our experience with this method indi-
cated that the shortcomings of the concept, 'per-
cent complete', were sufficiently great to negate
its valueo While projects tended to make rapid
progress towards completion when work first began
it took an inordinately long t~e to get from 90
percent to 100 percent complete~ The 'percent com-
plete' l~itation h~s been circumvented by having
the project engineer subdivide his project into
the milestones of technical accomplishment by which
progress can be evaluatedo For ease of recognition,
these milestones usually have definite identifiable
beginning and end pointsooooln addition to subdivi-
ding each project into milestones, each segment is
l~ited to a relatively short t~e period, which
results in two ~portant advantageso Breaking the
project down into bits and pieces allows the prepa-
ration of more accurate project est~ateso It also
permits us to evaluate progress functionally in
terms of the task requirement and accomplishmento 24
The experiences described are evidently taken fram a company which
formerly used ~or their progress measurements est~ates of percent cam-
pletion that were devoid of consideration of the accomplishment of par-
ticular technical acbievementsr. ~lestone charts are here treated as
something wholly distinct from percent completion reportso What the
writer seems to ignore are two thingso First, ~lestone charts have
been used in the aerospa~e industry for many years with no notable
success in the industry in tenms of the two ~portant advantages
cited in the quote aboveo Secondly, even if an engineer could wholly·
objectively report the a~camplishment or the lack of accomplishment
of a particular milestone, the achievement of one or any number of
milestones is no indicator of the extent of the project work that has
been done, or, more ~portantly, of the extent of project work that is
~emainingo Thus even with milestone reporting, one has to estimate how
2~aine and Lob, po 99.
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many more man-months of engineering effort are le£t to be done, and
how ma~ mo~e dollars are to be spent before the contracted job will
be ~inishedo Furthermore, milestones do not just have the two-fold
state of either being accomplished or not being accamplishedo At
any given time, many tasks are partially completeo This is true even
if one breaks the task down into smaller bits and pieceso Row does
an engineer estimate the additioDcl time and effort that he expects
will be required to complete the current milestone on which he is
working? There is no magic sure-fire ro~ula for success in such
estimations 0 It seems, then, that the continuous nature of work
e~fort and work accomplishment in a research and development project
denies separation of the concept of percent complete £rom the concept
of projec·t milestone achievementso The two are linked together,
whether or not one recognizes this fact explicitly or noto
The apparent current rage in methods o£ planning and· measuring
progress in research and development projects is the system known as
PERT--Program Evaluation and Review- Techniqueo Pearlman, cited earlier,
discusses the utilization of this approach 0
Program time status is readily obtainable from the
PERT/PEP networks 0 Every two weeks the following
information, which has been £ound most useful, is
obtained: (1) status of those events that should
have been started or completed during the reporting
period, (2) a ~orecast of the start or completion
date of the next most immediate events, and (3)
any major network alterationso This information
is obtained on a personal basis by program-plan-
ning engineers, These data are used to calculate
a new critical path, and a status is forecastedo
The time to attain the end event on the critical
path is compared to a contractual requiremento
Hence, the program is classified as to whether it
will be qahead v , Vequal toi, or ibehind' schedule 0
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On a monthly basis~ a reportooooois generated for
management 0 25
The statement of this procedure is clear, but whether or not
one has gained much from it is still questionableo The fundamental
reason for questioning this is the second category of "information-
that is listed above as obtained for PERT reportso All forecasts of
the start or completion dates of the next events have within them
uncertainties at least as great as do any attempts to report either
percent completion of a job, or percent of :ilestone accomplishment
of a job, or engineering hours or dollar costs left to be spent for
completioDo All of these est~ates, regardless of label, amount to
the same thingo For any one o~ these procedures, the engineer or
engineering Manager providing these est~ates must iUess at where he
is and must also guess as to where he has "to get 0 The more venture-
same or uncertain the research and development program, the less cer-
tain these est~ates are going to be, whether they are reported ver-
bally, in written reports, or in sophisticated computer output sheetso
This criticism is not intended to deQY the fact that the careful plan-
ning and scrutiQY of research" and development projects,perhaps induced
by some of these techniques, might _be helpful. for management of Rand Do
But the companies which have reputations for having been successful in
the area of mdlitary and commercial product development have carerul~
planned and watched over researc~.and development progress even before
the advent 0:0£ the cOlIputer and of the sophisticated techniques (like
PERT) that have accompanied ita
25Pea,rlman, po 1270
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But enough discussion of the formal superficialities of research
and development progress measurementso Let us ask instead what of a
fundamental nature is really taking place in these many apparently 80-
varied attempts to gain assessments of the progress that has been
achieved in any Rand D projecto First, let us recognize that despite
biases that may be present due to evaluation 01- his own 'Work, the
engineer closest to the scene knows the difficulties that have been
encountered and has at least a feeling for the kinds of problems he
expects to encounter before com.plt.~ting hie o"wrn jobo "In the case of
individual projects, good results have been attained by a number of
laboratories which push control down to the lowest possible level--
to those peop1e who are c10sest to the work 0 ,,26 T".ne reason :for this
is that the engineer is concerned with his own work and vants to ac-
complish his technical misSioDo =tAs time passes and effort is applied
to the project, the engineer becomes more and more concerned with
where the project stands in relationship to his plan and the project
cODPletion dateo At 1east once a month, he sets aside a few minutes
to review what has been accamp1ished on each task detai1o·27 With all
of this attention focused down the line in the engineering organization
it seems natural that Marcson should r~ort: "In the conduct of re-
search, day-to-day decisions are in the hands of the scientisto It is
he who decides he has a f~nding ~r fai1ure to reporto n28
2~ubenstein, "Setting~Criteria for Rand 0", po 1030
27Haine and Lob, po 990
28Marcson, ppo 33-340
297
Thus, the process of supposedly controlling Rand D ought to
take into account this real source of control--the individual engineero
I£ the individual engineer or engineering manager is given a cam~any
environment which encourages initiative and integrity, then the people
in the organization will themselves supply the progress evaluation in-
formation t:i"l8.t is needed by top managemento In a very few places the
channels of upward communication in the organization contain informa-
tion mostly about problems and troubleso This data is transmitted on
the common understanding that the primary purpose of higher management
is to help where the lower levels have problemso It also rests on an
organizational penalty-reward structure that encourages such integrity
and allays the fears that exist in most firms 0 In the more usual case
the structure is such that only "sales presentations" are communicated
upward to ~press management with how successfully the engineering de-
partment is functioningo Once such presentations which overstate ac-
tual accomplishment have been put in writing or made to a formal proj-
ect review board, it becomes even more difficult to admit problems that
have been long in the making 0 Almost by de£inition one would think
that the company which understands these facts of li£e and develops
the desirable organizational attitudes is a firm with high quality
management 0
But even in the company in which integrity is high, the effec-
tiveness of engineers in recognizing problems varies as the project
gets further alongo One particular difficulty is that during the
very early phases of a project~ the milestones have a tendency to be
less precisely definable and hence less accurately measurable than
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during later phases of the projecto "Many aspects o£ unit operation
never become apparent until they have to work together; so that even
if units have not yet been polished to the utmost, t~~y can be more
efficiently revised a£ter early ensemble operationso"29
Thus in many projects the ~pressions of the engineer or the
manager in charge might well be that the project is going along at a
reasonable pace until quite late in the project history 0 Then the
manager suddenly discovers that his previous optimistic est~ates have
to be strongly revised~ that rework on ea~lier "completed" tasks might
be necessary, and that ~roblems exist which have shown up in later
phases oil developnent, which problems were not tackled during the
earlier stageso A recent major rocket engine project proceeded despite
great difficulties up to the·rinal~stage of design completion, and the
sequence of milestones on the path toward that completion had been
recorded as successfully completed by the t~e the rocket engine was
placed on the test pado However, at the first test and at two suces-
sive tests the engine blew up, thus causing "agonizing reappraisal"
of the project accomplishment to dateo This kind of difficulty is
seldom rigorously documented in the literature, but other examples of
the same problem can still easily be foundo For instance, is it not
likely that the development engineers on the Lockheed Electra would
have said their Job was comple~ed, long before the wings started to
falloff? To take another case, how far along towards completion was
the Project Vanguard program, before the United States' first satellite
29Hosier, po 1120
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"launching"? The problems in being able to identify the stage of
progress in the development of a new product are enormously diffi-
cult ones~ with the basic information inputs orten lacking until most
people might think: the job is just about over 0 As the Electra example
above shows~ somet~es it is even difficult to dete~ine the state or
completion of a job long a~ter it is .!JUL~~.~n.tl.yworking well. 0 But, in
general, this dirriaulty eases as the product takes physical ro~ and
begins to undergo performance testingo
Fundamentf!llly, then, i t seems that the engineer working on the
job and the engineering manager supervising the job are continuously
assessing the believed rate of progress on the engineering proj ec,t 0
Tney are continuously assuming that by applying time and effort they
are gradually accumulating the solutions to the numerous problems which
con£ront them in t~ project undertaking and gradually narrowing the
gap between what they have accomplished and what they are going to have
to accomplish before the job is doneo However oP there is always the
problem that these estimates or camp1etion might completely differ from
the real fa.eta of the mattero The later phases of research and develop-
ment, wherein the assembled product is tested for its operation and
performance, begin to reveal to the design team whether or not their
estimates or completion were correcto Thus, it is o£ten only after
considerable testing has taken place, including the testing which
takes place at certain of the critical milestones within the project,
that both Qustamer and firm can closely estimate the progress which
has been made to that point in timeo The lag between assuming that
something is right and having a noncontroversial test prove that the
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effort was correctly handled is ortent~es quite long. In mar~ cases,
the problems of the product are never discovered until the product has
completely left the laboratory and even in many cases the manufacturing
plant and is being used in the field 0
On the other hand, to some extent, the organization, at least
at the operating level, often knows that "things are not well- with
the.project, even during its early phaseso The handwriting on the
wall is orten evident to those with the motivation to look. But the low-
integrity-baged attitude that produces hoping-for-the-best inst.ead
of providing-for-the-worst is what often prevents recognition ·ot·
th~se problemso The fact that s~ilar difficulties arise a~ basically
similar places in different proJec·ts of a given company indicates that
these dirficulties are built into the companyis system, and are not
part of th£ general uncertainty of research and developmento Such
factors reflect the inherent ability of the management groupo
The entire process Whereby the customer and ri~ eBt~ate the
effort and cost required to complete the job, which process is to a
great extent involved in this phase of progress measurement and evalua-
tion, was very thoroughly discussed in Chapter 30 Such problems exist
throughout the life cycle of the project, even down to the very end
of the JObo Even when a job has in ~act reached completion the engi-
neering reports may not quite say sao
This uncertainty with regard to the actual t~e scale,
together with the problems discussed above, associated
with the difficulty of precisely defining when engi-
neering or a particular item has been accomplished,
leaves the engineer responsible for specific sub-items
to look for other guides to determine when he must say
that he is ready to release drawingso Obviously, he
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wishes to spend as long as possible on the engi-
neering job because the more time he spends, the
more assurance he has that a11 bugs have been dis-
covered and i~oned out and no difficulty will arise
due to inadequate engineering in his areao A com-
monly-used criterion is to release them as late as
possible without putting himself in a position of
being criticized for delaying the completion of the
over-all jobo In other words, as long as the engi-
neer responsible in one area can assure himself that
other critical items are not yet ready for release,
he feels under no obligation to release his own por-
tiODo What results, then, is a rather strange pro-
cess in which the man responsible for releasing
drawings in each area keeps half an eye on the pro-
gress being made in the neighboring area with a view
to accomplishing his own release as late as possible,
just so long as he is not last 0 The dynamics of this
situation are quite aamparable to those of a horse
race in which every jockey has heavily bet on him-
self to come in next to lasto JO
This description, which seems appropriate for most Rand D
organizationa~ indicates that typically the individual engineer has
almost no incentive to hold down costs on his worko To be sure the
situation would seem to encourage continuous product improvement, but
this results as an accident and not as an objective of the systemo
The goal for the engineer iri such an organizational environment is to
avoid criticism, rather than to produce a more efficient Qutputo This
kind or dirriculty is evidently very common to developnental type work,
as is shown by the following quote: "Computer programmers differ little
fram engineers, in general, in their reluctance to stop tinkering with
and improving their cr~ationso This is a laudable [11] trait; but as
delive~ dates approach and t~e grows short, it has to be restrainedo
Definitive test versions of the program must be established, and tight
JORoB • Kershner, "The Size of Research and Engineering Teams-,
1RE Transactions on Engineering Management, June 1958, po 370
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control exercised over changes, so that all effort can be directed
at those which are really necessary to meet specirications.~31
The problems found in getting someone to anm;t completion of a
job, pl.us sloppy control in phasing engineers out of a job, may in
the project that actually finishes its objective lead to an Qvercom-
pletion of the objectiveo This too can be a problem both in terms
of money to the contractor as well as in unreimbursed overexpendi-
tures by the ri~v The problem results from the incentives seen by
the individual engineer or manager, which in turn derive from the
penalty-reward structure of the organizationo Such a structure is an
important aspect of top management design of the business and reflects
the true ability o1~ the compa.ny management 0
This problem of overachievement is hardly as serious as the
major difficulty that has been discussed in this section, the diffi-
culty in getting meaningful periodic measurements of progress and
problems in research and development projectso Several methods that
have been commonly used in industry have been discussed in this pre-
ceding section and to some extent evaluated criticallyo The fact
that indications of progress became much clearer at later phases of
product accomplishment than during the earlier phases of project lire
was also pointed outo And, finally, the lag between actually accom-
plishing an objective and the information derived from testing of
such an accomplishment was mentioned as being in many cases quite a
lengthy delayo
31Hosier, po 114.
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Response Mechanisms in Research and Development Control
To close the research and development contrLl loop (and also to
complete this chapter), we shall now discuss the actions which organi-
zations take as a result of their measurements of progress. wThis is
the Vso-what? v part o~ management coordinatioDo The manager periodi-
cally compares and analyzes actual perro~ance and status against the
program and objectives. Form this, he can determine the need for and
direction of new actiono The situation may indicate the need for re-
vision of the program~ or a relative increase or decrease in certain
operating activities in order to balance out the whole utilization of
resources. nJ2
Problems arise in trying to decide what kind and how much action
ought to be taken in response to the deviations that are sensed in the
progress of the projecto
It is necessary that the schedules and budgets have
meaning. If they are not being followed, it is im-
portant that some decisions be made in order to in-
crease the resources:} l!lodify the requirements, and
reduce the costso Unfortunately, the decision is
oftentimes to reschedule and budget without taking
any actions that affect the conduct of the projecto
Such actions indicate that the project office really
does not believe in its own schedules and budgets.
Thus, schedules and budgets become ~ndow-dressing
for management and the customer~ as well as objects
of ridicule ~thin the project.~J
But despite such exhortations, it is quite difficult to compare the
dollar cost of a project versus the scheduled expenditures to date,
or the effort allocation versus the expected effort allocation to
date, or the anticipated technical achievement versus the sensed
32uedros,p'! 4. 33Kornreich. p. 10
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technical achievement 0 The figure below
shows this baeic method and the inherent diffi-
culties that the analyst faces in interpreting
the performanceo
Cost
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Ma.tthours
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Figure 6-1 Contract itA"
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On the basis of a comparison of an expenditure
curve and a budget curve, no intelligent decision
can be made as the following questions arise: (1)
Are both curves compatible? (2) Do segments of
. both curves represent the same work? (3) Is there
acceleration or deceleration of per~ormance? For
instance, a finance department will c.onsider the
distance between the two curves as an over-run
conditiono But based on the answers to the ques-
tions posed, the distance between the two curves
could be any of the fo11owing three possibilities:
over-run, under-run, or on-budgeto
To find the meaning of the distance between the
two curves, the correlative properties or the
curves must be establishedo The most signifi-
cant or these correlative properties is the physi-
cal camp~etion o£ the work at tio In addition to
being most signi£icant correlat~ve property, physi-
cal completion knOWledge is one of the fundamentals
necess~ in.the decisionmaking process by manage-
mento Decisions, suca as additional or reduced man-
power, increased or decreased overtime to finish the
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effort based on the current physical completion,
are 0"£ importance to engineering management .. 34
Thus, the various ways in which managements respond to indica-
tiona of errors in their job estimates can well be critical dete~-
nants of the behavior of research and development projects. Two ex-
amples of apparently di£ferent policies will be mentioned here, both
of which are commonplace among Rand D project histories 0 In both
examples, let us assume that the management of the fi~ uses p~riodic
project review sessions perhaps on a quarterly basiso At the ~irst
quarter-year projeat review of a new undertaking, management finds
that only half as much progress has been made as was initially expec-
tedo The basic question is, "How does management respond to this?"
Under one familiar set of policies, management might say tha.t this
error only indicates some of the problems of getting the project under
way, that there is no real reason to change the initial over-all esti-
mate or project magnitudeo The old platitudes, "We don't have to
worry about enoountering that kind of problem again", or "We orten
get into trouble when we're just starting upft> are easily used as the
exouse for such behavior 0 Furthermore, this same general response
might very well be elicited at the next review period, and the one
a£ter that, and so ODo Fina.11y, after perhaps several reviews and a
J
/
year or two have gone by, management might finally recognize that the
series of error indications which they have ignored thus £ar do in
fact dictate a radical revision in the projected effort requirements
for getting the job completed 0 Thus, in this case~ managerial
34versteege, po 720
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policy~ respondin~ 12 problems pointed up by their progress measure-
ment procedures seems 12 ~ ~ policy which really ignores the error in-
diaationso Such an approach might well doom the project to failure,
or at least to serious difficultieso
On the other hand, management policy might well decree immediate
response to any apparent error in the es'timates that is shown up in
such project review sessionso In such a case, the deviation from
estimate indicated at the first quarter-year review might cause manage-
ment to change radically its initial estimate of project magnitude and
to begin to take actions to acquire more people and £acilitieso Once
a company acts to increase the scope o£ its activity, there is built-
in momentum deriving from the purpose and cOIIDllitments of these initi&l
activities. The Parkinsonian attributes o£ an organization are thus
given a boost by deliberate management action and, once moving, actions
to recruit or transfer engineers onto the job or to acquire additional
funds and expanded facilities are very difficult to stopo Of course,
if the error signal to which management responded was in fact due
solely to -the difficulties of starting the project", then such dif-
ficulties were not a sign of the inherent scope of the project or
level of effectiveness of the peopleo In this case, the response will
force overexpansion and wasteful haste in the Job performanceo It
will result in an unnecessari~ large and ultra-expensive project,
much greater than is really required by the basic situationc
Both of these examples, which were presented as two opposite poles
of a situation, are really Just points on a long continuing relation-
ship which basically describes how rapidly the management of a research
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and development project responds to problems shown by comparison,
whether graphical, tabular or mental, of their measured progress with
their previously-expected progresso The company which has an extremely
long del~ in responding to error indications might well be characteri-
zed by the first example given, while a radical decrease in this response
del~ would produce the second example cited aboveo Without advocating
either one of the two extremes cited, it is nevertheless important to
recogni~e the striking contrasts in the results produced by the inter-
action of these managerial decisions with the rest of the research and·
development systemo The way a company typically responds to problems
of this sort is probably a characteristic of the ~i~ based upon its
own previous experiences and upon the intrinsic insight and ability of
its management to understand the underlying situation in the project.
As a result or the response mechanisms uti1.ized in a research and
development project, the firm will sometimes anticipate that it is
going to require greater effort and hence greater aost in accomplishing
the JObo As discussed in Chapter 4, this will often result in a request
£or increased funds from the customer and might similarly resuJ.t in a
decreased willingness on the firm g B own part to invest i ts money in the
project. But in the same way that the firm might begin to get skepti-
cal about the likelihood o~ sueceSs of a project after it has be~un to
respond to its error estimations, so too the customer might have his
doubts as to the wisdom of continuing the project ;,
The decision to terminate a research project is
often a difficult one to makeo This is especially
true if it has been a long project with a consider~
able investment 0 Extending a nonprofitable venture,
however, not only wastes·research dollars, but it
also del~s starting work on potentially profitable
J08
projects. Occasionally one hears comments such as
'Why didn't we drop that project six months ago?'
or 'WhY did we ever start research on that project?i
Sometimes the answer is that no one asks the ques-
tion at the proper time, and if it has been asked,
the project might have been droppedo35
Having taken this i_nto account, we have basically also finished
closing the loop that was started at the beginning o£ this chapter.
SlJmmary of QAapter
This chapter bas discussed the nature o£ measurements in research
and development projectso Most existing meas1JrEmlents systems §~
intrinsically unsuitable because of the ypcertain natu~ of research
and development and because the existing systems igno+s the vital
role 0'£ the individual in the project control systemo Fundamental
to the process of attempting to design controls for an Rand D pro-
ject is the recognition that often masking the real progress which is
taking place are much accompanying bias.1 noise, and random elements.
These factors are partly caused by the experience, ability, and in-
sight of the project managerso The backgrounds or these people, as
well as their personal motivations, tend to distort the ability of
managers (or engineers) to identi£y and/or report the real progress
that is being 8.ccomplishedo Lags due to system testing, lack 0-£
a.ccurate milestone ass~ssment, and similar nonexistence 0'£ timel.y and
care~~lly designed reporting systems all help produce inaccuracies in
project progress estfmationso
J'Carl Ro Gloskey, "Research on a Research Department: An
Analysis o£ Economic Decisions on ProJectsA , lEE Transactions on ~­
neering Managment, Volo EM-7, Noo 4 (December 1960), po ~68
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Above all, therIa seems to be a need on th~ part of the management
o£ the fi~ and of the customer for what Professor Zaccharias of MoloTo
(:ror many years a member of The President's Science Advisory Bo~rd)
refers to as "taste and judgment". This kind of management ability
is vitally needed to help clarify the usually floundering attempts
to define, measure, review, and perhaps redefine the project goals
and objectives. This taste and jUdgment is intrinsically related to
the over-all quality and ability of the management and the technical
personnel of the company and of the customero It der~ves in part fran
the general experience that these people and organizations have encoun-
tered and from the insight and intuitioD of their personnel. To some
extent it relates to an organizationis courage to face up to failure,
an organizational characteristic very closely related to the integrity
that was discussed in the section on bidding within a project. I£
the environment of the organization can be so estab1ished that each
individual engineer has the attitude that his own personal goals are
best met by helping the corporation to succeed in the current research
and development endeavor~ then he will be little pressured by the £ears
o£ admitting problems and facing up to difficulties that he perscnally
is encountering in an Rand D projecto If this sort or attitude exists
throughout the organization, the communication systems of the company
will serve to transfer valuable information as to the real state of
progress and the real expected state o~ difficulties, and not serve as
a means of d~stortion, bias, and del~ in the transmission of valuable
information and in taking of action in response to ito To a great
extent, such problems relate to the r~ward-penalty structure that exists
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within the organization, and in part to the same structure which exists
. within the contractual relationships between the customer and the fi~o
Very few careful studies have been made which would indicate the nature
of how these relationships, affect decision-making within research and
development projects , although the author has recently begun e'~ch an
undertaking under N~AoSoAo sponsorship 0 However, it seems rather ob-
vious that the cost-plus-£ixed-ree contracting approaches (commonly
known as CPFF) create very little incentive for honesty by the firm
or even for success (from the customervs viewpoint) within an indi-
vidual project on which the firm is workingo Longer-range objectives,
different types of incentive systems, more conaern for the motivations
both of corporations and of the individual engineers and managers with-
in these corporations can probably radically affect the ultimate success
achieved within a given research and development projecto These con-
siderations can, no doubt, also greatly modify the outcome of the long-
te~ research and deyelopment programs of our government or or any in-
dustrial corporatioDo As studies on these relationships are made and
reported, our ability to comprehend better the problems in measuring
and responding to progress indicators in research and development will
be greatly etihancedo
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI
The diagram o~ Figure 6-2 incorporates all of the elements des-
cribed in the preceding portion of Chapter 6 and completes the visual
presentation of the general model of research and development project
life cycleso The figure indicates that the level of real Job accamp-
lishment (defined in the Chapter 5 appendix) and the intrinsic e£fort
demanded by the complexity of the job produce a real measure of actual
percentage completion of the proJecto 'rbis, when contrasted with the
believed percent complete (to be discussed shortly), creates a pressure
gap in£luencing change in the completion estimates o£ both the £i~
and the customero The strength of this potential in£luence depends
upon the fraction of this gap which is recognized, which fraction was
earlier explained to be dependent upon the stage of the projecto Cor-
rection of the previous estimate of completion also forces revision in
the est~ate of current progress, since this believed progress rate
had to be in error in order for the cumulative est~ate to have gotten
out of lineo
Other aspects of the diagram show that the accumulation of engi-
neering expenditured is produced by the current rate which depends
upon the number of engineers and their average mont~-cost, including
overhead expenses o The level of cumulat~ve engineering ~£fort (not
considering the productivity of this effort, as was done in Chapter 5)
merely sums the current rate or effort exerted by the engineers who
are actually on the jobo This current effort rate expended combines
with the Chapter 3 est~ate of total effort required for the job to
produce a base believed progress rateo The progress rateVs accumUlation,
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Figure 6-2 'TIne Control of Research and Development Progress
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as revised (see discussion above)i gives the believed percent cam-
pletion to dateo The complement of this is the percent of the Job
believed to be yet incampleteo The latter finally helps dete~ne
the est~te of the remaining t~e needed for completion of the
project, under no~ conditionso
The equations shall begin with one for the actual percent of
project completed, as indicated by the amount of know-how developed
as a fraction of that which is needed (intrinsically) for product
completiono
PPCoK = KLEVFoKNLKP 6-1, A
PPC--Percent of Project Completed (percentage)
KLEVF--Knowhow LEVel a.t the Firm (effective
man-months of er£art)
NLKP--Needed Level of Knowhow for development
of the Product (e£rective man-months of
effort)
Other "aatuals", as contrasted to "beliefs", are also accumu18~ing
as the project evolves& These are the readily measurable variablea
of expenditure and effort rates, and cumulative costs of engineering
efforts on the project 0 The first equation below, 6-2, shows that
the current engineering expenditure rate is determined by the number
of engineers in the firm and the average monthly cost :factor per engi-
neero Equation 6-3 cumulates this rate in..to the level of total engi-
neering costso Equation 6-5 indicates that the number of engineers
actually working equal the number of engineers in the firm multiplied
by the factor which accounts for the average absenteei&1l from worko
The TEEF equation cumulates this expended effort to-dateo Finally
Equation 6-8 cumulates as the total costs to the customer the continuing
rate of customer expenditures on the projecto
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TCEFoK = (MESOH)(ENGRFoK)
TECFoK = TECFoJ + (DT)(TCEFoJ)
TECF = (TEEF)(~OH)
ENAWFoK = (PWAW)(ENGRFoK)
TEEF oK = TEEF oJ + (DT) (ENAWF oJ)
KLEVF
TEEF = UTEF
TECCoK = TECCoJ + (DT)(RECFFoJK)
TECC = 0
TCEF--Total Current EA~enditure rate at
the Firm (dollars/month)
MESOH--Monthly Engineering Sala.~ and Over-
Head (dollars/man-month)
ENGRF--ENGineeRs at the Firm (men)
TECF--Total Engineering Costs at the Firm
(dollars)
TEEF--Total Engineering Effort at the Fi~
(man-months)
ENAWF--ENgineers Actually at Work at the Firm
(men)
PW'AW'--Percent o£ Workers Actually at Work (per-
centage)
KLEVE--Know-how LEVel of the Firm (man-montnb
of effective effort)
UTEF--Utilized Technological E£fectiyeness at
the Fi~ (percent effectiveness)
TECC--Total Engineering Costs paid by the Cus-
tomer (dollars)
RECFF--Rate of Expenditure of Customer Funds by
the Firm (dollars/month)
6-2, A
6-3, L
6-4, N
6-5, A
6-6, L
6-7, N
6-8; L
6-9; N
t:Orr we move into the formulation of the "believed" variables,
rather than the "actual" oneso or course these beliefs form the basis
of decision-making in the project £or both the customer and the firm.
There~ore, the discussion and determination of these equations for
the ri~ will immediate~ be followed by similar equations for the
customer. First j we have the believed level of project completion,
composed of the previous completion estimate plus revisions due to
6-10, L
6-ll, N
6-12, R
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changed beliefs as to the stage of progress and beliefs as to new
progress madeo The believed rate of ne~ progress is merely the ratio
of the amount of effort being produced by the engineers at work on
the project to the number of man-months of effort believed to be re-
quired for project campletioDo
BPPCFoK = BPPCFoJ + (DT)(PRBFoJK + RCBPFoJK)
BPPCF = PPC
PRBF KL = (ENAWFoK)(MllEEM)o EERFoK
BPPCF--Believed Percent of Project Completed
by the Firm (percentage)
PRBF--Progress Rate Believed by the Firm (per-
cent of project/month)
RCBPF--Rate of Change of Believed Progress by
the Firm. (percEll t of project/month)
PPC--Percent of Project Completed (percentage)
ENAWF--ENgineers Actually at Work at Fi~ (men)
MMEEM--Man-Months of Effort per working-Engi-
'. neer per Month (man-months/man-month)
EERF~-Est~ate of Effort Required by Fi~
(man-months)
The factor MMEW -translates the manpower count into a manpower
effort 0 Obv!ouslY$ each engineer who is working contributes one man-
month o£ effort (not necessarily e£fective) per month that he workso
Thereforef)
MME. = 1 (man-month of effort) / (man-month-or work)
The rate of changes in the est~ates relate to the pressure mag-
nitude created to modify the earlier cODDDitment 0 This pressure depends
on the gap between the actual and the believed level o~ completion, and
the extent to which this gap is made potent by the degree of recogniz-
ability or the error 0 The latter, of course, determines the delay in
recognizing the actual achievement on the job and depends on how near
completion (or believed completion) the project has approachedo
RCBPF"KL = ~~:~
GBPCFoK = PPC.K.- BPPCFo-K
DRAAFoK = DMRAF + DVRAFoK
DVRAF"K = (DRAAT)e-(50)(FOGRF"K)(MGBCFeK)
MGBCFoK = MAX(GBPCFeK, - GBPCF.K)
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6-13, R
6-1 4, A
6-15, A
6-16 A,
6-17, A
RCBPF--Rate of Change of Believed Progresa by
the Fi~ (percent ot project/month)
GBPCF--Gap in Believed Percent Completion by
Firm (percent)
DRAAF--Delay in Recognizing Actual Achievements
by Firm (months)
PPC--Percent of Project Completed (percentage)
BPPCF--Believed Percent of Project Completed
by the Fi~ (percentage)
DMRAF--Delay, Minimum~ in Recognizing Achieve-
ments by the Firm (months)
DVRAF--Delay, Variable, in Recognizing Achieve-
ments by the Firm (months)
DRAAT--Delay in Recognizing Actual Achievements,
Time constant (months)
FOGRF--Fraction of Gap Recognized by the Fi~
(percent of gap recognized/month)
~CF--Magnitude of Gap in Believed Completion
~__ ....1-_ "C'.: _ 'p .L \
Ur3 tI.u.~ 1: .J.-u.L \ ~J.-\,;t::u t., J
We have said~ in Equations 6-16 and 6-17, that the rate o~ recogni-
tiOD of the error in completion estimate depends on the magnitude of
the error gap, regardless of the direction of this erroro
On the average i t seems unlikeJ.y that the progress estimate re-
vision could take effect in any less than one month after the cause
for revision exists 0 This minimum delay is likely to exist only when
the Job is almost or actually completed, in which case,
DMRAF = 1 month
On the other hand, if the work were stopped, an additional half-year
might be required on the average to recognize most of what has really
been achieved on the jobo For this,
DRAAT = 6 months
6-18, A
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The recognition of this error in the earlier progress estimate
also tends to produce a revision in the previous estimate of job
progress, with the attendant effects on the est~ate of technological
e£fectiveness (as discussed with reference to RCPEF, Equation 3-24
in the appendix to Chapter 3)0 The resulting modification relates
to the degree (or percent) to which the earlier estimate is now felt
to be in erroro This percent error in the completion estimate believed
by the ri~ is the ratio of the estimate error gap, Equation 6-14, to
the believed completion itself, Equation 6-100
PECBFoK - GBPCFoK
- BPPCFoK
PECBF--Percent Error in Completion Believed
by the Firm (percent)
GBPCF--Gap in Believed Percent Completion by
the Firm (percen--e)
BPPCF--Believed Percent of Project Complete by
the Firm (percent)
Once the percentage completion has been found fram Equation 6-10,
the inverse can be used to designate what is left to be doneo In our
case3 however, since a project can be overdone (more work completed
than necess~); the unmodified inverse for such a case (ioeo, less
.:thim DQ work to be done) would become ridiculous 0 Th't]S we shall speak
o£ a Job whose degree of incompletion ranges only from 100% down to
~, and accanplish this reasonable limit in Equation 6-200 When this
figure is known, we also know the estimated time remaining for com-
p1etion or the project, if no~al scheduling times are utilized. Be-
cause of technical requirements (division in one of our equations by
a value of zero would step the simulation computations), we shall re-
strict the estimated completion time to being no less than our campu-
tation solution intervalo This has no e:ffect on the s~ulation resultso
6-19, A
6-20, A
6-21, A
TBPIFoK = 1 - BPPCFoK
BPPIFoK = MAX(TBPIFoK, 0)
TPCTFoK = (BPPIFoK)(NPD)
EPCTFoK = MAX(TPCTFoK, DT)
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6-22, A
TBPIF--Trial, Believed Percent of project
Incomplete at the Fi~ (percent)
BPPCF--Believed Percent of Project Completed
at the Finm (percent)
BPPIF--Believed Percent Incomplete at the Firm
(percent)
TPCTF--Trial, Project Completion Time at the
Firm (months )
NPD--Normal Project Duration (months)
EPCTF--Estimated Project Completion Tim~ ~t the
Firm (months)
DT--Delta Time~ DYNAMO computation solution in-
terval (months)
For the most part the equations beginning from 6-10 above are
also suitable to describe the customer's beliefs as to project progress o
Equations 6-23 to 6-33 below are similar to the earlier de£ined Equa-
tiona 6-10 to 6-20., 'We shall me:rely repeat them hel~e for completeness
of definition of our system model ~ithout any further commento
BPPCC oK = BPPCCoJ + (DT) (PRBC oJK + HeBPC oJK)
BPPCC = PPC
PRBCoKL = (ENA:R~~ilAm:V)
RCBPC XL = GBPCCoK
o DRAACoK
GBPCCoK = PPCoK - BPPCCoK
DRAACoK = DMRAC + DVRACoK
DVRACoK = (DRAAT)e-(40) (FCGRCoK) (MGBCCoK)
BPPCC--Believed Percent of Project ~amplete
by Customer (percent)
PRBC--Progress Rate Believed by Customer
(percent of project/month)
6-23, L
6-24, N
6-25, R
6-26, R
6-27, A
6-28, A
6-29, A
6-30, A
319
RCBPC--Rate o£ Change of Believed Progress by
the Customer (percent of project/month)
PPC--Percent of Project Completed (percentage)
ENAWF--ENgineers Actually at Work at Fi~ (men)
MMEEU--Man-Months of Effort per working-Engineer
per Month {man-months/men-month}
EERC--Estimate of E££ort Required by Customer
(man-months)
GBPCC--Gap in Believed Percent Completion by
Customer (percent)
DRAAC--Delay in Recognizing Actual Achievements
by Customer (months)
DMRAC--Delay, Minimum, in Recognizing Achieve-
ments by Customer (month~)
DVRAC--Delay, Variable~ in Recognizing Achieve-
ments by Customer (months)
DRAAT--Del~ in Recognizing Actual Achievements,
Time-constant (months)
FOGRC--Fraction of Gap Recognized by Customer
(percent gap recognized/month)
MGBCC--Magnitude of Gap in Believed Completion at
Customer (percent)
The minimum del~ in real achievement recognitioD is the same
as the f'irm;s~one. ~ontht·DRAAT holds for both custaner and firm, too.
DMRAC = 1 mon-th
The customeros modification of his previous progress estimate
(described by RCPEC~ Equation 3-55) also follows the firm's description.
PECBC K = QBPCCoK 6-31, A
o BPPCCoK
PECBC--Percent Error in Completion Believed by
the Customer (percent)
GBPCC--Gap in Believed Percent Completion by the
Customer (percent)
BPPCC--Believed Percent of Project Complete by
the Customer (percent)
Finally we shall provide the equations for the customer's estimate
of the percent of job yet undone 9 thus completing the Rand D project
model.
TBPICoK = 1 - BPPCCoK
-BPPICoK = MAX(TBPICoK, 0)
6-32, A
6-33, A
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TBPIC--Trial, Believed Percent Incamplete by
Customer (percent)
BPPCC--Believed Percent o~ Project Complete by
Customer (percent)
BPPIC--Believed Percent or Project Incomp1ete
by Customer (percent)
As extra information for use in studying the various simulation
results we shall define a few equations which are not used internally
in the project modele First) the profit rate to the ~inm is the per-
cent of percent of pro£it allowed on the project billings times the
expenditures covered by the customero This cumulates iil Equation
6-35 into the profit total to-dateo Subtracting the £inm's own in-
ves~ent (unreimbursed project expenses) produaes the net profit before
taxes as Equation 6-.360 Finally the corporate tax rate factor produces
the residual net after-tax profit on the projecto
PRFoK = (PPP)(ARECFoK)
PROFoK = PROFoJ + (DT)(PRFoJ)
PROF = 0
NPROFoK = PROFoK - TAIFoK
NATPFoK = (em) (NPROFoK)
6-34, A
6.;.3S~ L
6-36, N
6-37, A
6-38, A
PRF--Profit Rate to the Firm (dollars/month)
PPP--Percentage Profit on the Project (percent)
ARECF--Auxili~1Rate of Expenditure o£ Custo-
mer Funds (dollars,/month)
PROF--PROFit (dollars)
NPROF--Net PROFit (dollars)
TAIF--Total Actual Investment by the Firm (dollars)
NATPF--Net After Tax Profit to the Firm (dollars)
CTR--Corporate Tax Rate factor (percent)
As w....ntioned earlier we shall use a profit percentage of ten per-
aent, although this is on the high side of usual practiceo The corpor-
ate tax rate will be assumed as a flat fifty percenta Either of these
can readily be ehanged if felt desirable 0
PPP = 0010 (decimal percent)
OTR. = 00,0 (decimal percent)
CHAPI'ER VII
THE KEY DETERMINANTS OF THE PROJECT LIFE CYCLE
Introducti,on
Chapters 1 through 6 have attempted to describe thoroughly
the cycle of continuing activities which make up the life of a
research and development project. This process of tracing through
the flows of resources and information in any type o~ probl.em situa-
tion is characteristic of' the Industrial Dynamics methodology.
Emphasis on such flow paths brings more clearly to light the spe-
cific decisions, poli~ies, and constraining factors which control
the flows and thus the behavioral outcomes of industrial and eco-
nomic systems. The detailed developments of the last five chap-
ters should therefore contain the relevant information as to
the key determinants of the project life cycle. In reviewing
this information, it is particularly important to note what it
is about the research and development firm, its customer, and
their product, Which make one project different from another pro-
ject. Why is it, for instance, that firm F working with custaner C
makes a success of project X While it fails in project Y? How would
both of these projects have been di~ferent if firm G rather than F
had undertaken the job? What distinctions would have occurred in
the project life cycle if the government agency were customer D
rather than customer 01 The fact that in real lif~ such differ-
ences in project behaviors do occur makes it tmportant that we try
to focus an the sources o~ these differences. This chapter, there-
fore, shall review the processes described in Chapters 2 through 6
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with the view of identifying those factors relevant to the firm,
the customer, and the product which might in fact cause the diff-
erences in project behaviors. These distinguishing characteris-
tics will then be summed up at the end of the chapter.
The Perception of the Need ~ and Value of ~ Product
The first activity to be discussed was the process of per-
ceiving the need for and value of a new product. It was pointed
out in Chapter 2 that basic to this perception process is the
existence of same underlying need £or the product. This was
related in the chapter to the unknown but nevertheless existing
potential value of having and being able to utilize the product
over a duration of possible product life. This characteristic
was called the intrinsic product value.
However, since there is a dif£erence between the intrinsic
product value and the estimates of value made by the customer and
the firm, it seemed important to point out that there is a sig-
nificant de~ay in receiving and absorbing information pertaining
to trle potential value of a new product idea. This delay is prin-
cipally dependent upon the managerial and technical knowledge of
the finn or the customer and is the key in determining how long
it takes before either the firm or the customer recognizes the
need for a new product.
Finally, the perception of product that enters into the later
decision-making and evaluation functions o~ both the firm and
the customer relates to the future value of the product and not
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its existing value. The forecast that the firm and the customer
make of the future value of the product depends to a great extent
upon their relative optimism, their willingness to take chances,
and, in general, the extent to which they are willing to base
decisions of consequence on risk-laden determinations of ultimate
value.
The Estimation Q! e~oject Effort and Cost
The second process to be discussed was the continuing task
of estimating the effort and cost requirements for the project.
Here, too, the concept o~ some underlying dete~inant of the effort
requirement was introduced. This underlying determinant is a two-
fold notion Which recognizes both the intrinsic size or complexity
of the job and the changing level of technological effectiveness
relating to the job. As in the value perception process, however,
neither the firm nor the customer knows tf.le :.intrin:ri:c_,.i$i.~,e_~~Of-;~t.he
job or the actual state of the art that is available to them. They
do attempt to make continuing estimates of both of these factors.
In describing the,; way in which the finn or the customer
attempts to estimate tlle size of the job initially, that is} before
much work has been dane on the project, Chapter 3 pointed out
that here the previous job size experience of the organization,
particularly as related to the basic underlying size of the con-
templated job, is an important determinant 0:£ this initial esti-
mate. The previous experiences of the firm and the customer tend
to influence the way in v/hich they both look at any currently con-
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sidered task. In addition, it was pointed out that modifying the
influence of this previous job size experience is an over-all
tend€~ncy to underestimate all jobs. This tendency seems to be
built into the institutional environment of governmental research
and development management. Finally, modifying both the pre-
vious experience and this underlying tendency is the over-all mana-
gerial and tecTh~ical ability of the firm or of the customer. The
ability of the firm or the customer helps in correctly anticipating
the effort and cost requirements on the job, regardless of: either
previous background or this tendency to minimize expected difficul-
ties. These managerial and technical capabilit~es are obvious
distinctions between one firm and another and one customer and
another.
Initially, both<:the firm and the custaner attempt also to
estimate the technological effectiveness that they will have avail-
able to them in the engineering force of the firm. The first fac-
tor that influences this estimate is the real stete cf tile art
that is currently available to the engineers working for the com-
pany. Since, a.gain, neither the firm nor the customer knows exactly
this real effectiveness, they both try to estimate it. If, in fact,
it is a new product area into Which both firm and customer are
moving, there is a tendency to underestimate the state of techno-
logy available for the project. Too often it is fel.t that a new
product draws fram a Wholly new technology, whereas in reality
there is a great deal OL overlap between engineering methods and
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technological developments in one area and the respective prob-
lem requirements in other areas. Modifying the skepticism, how-
ever, is the relative optimism of the finn as to the abilities
of its own engineers or those which it expects to be able to
acquire for the project. Similarly, the confidence which the cus-
tomer plaees in the abilities of the firm's engineers can also
serve to modify the customer's skepticism. Thus, the relative
optimism or pessimism of the firm and the customer seems to play
an important part in determining their estimates of the current
technological effectiveness that the firm will be able to apply
to the expected job requirements. Moreover, the estimate of the
amount of effort required on the research and development task is
dependent not solely upon the estimate of current state of the
art, but also on a forecast of the future state of the art that
will become available. This forecast is in part dependent upon
the recent rate of change of technology, as well as on the degree
of optimism, willingness to take chances, or risk-taking propensity
of both the customer and the firm 0 The more the plans of both
depend upon expectations of technological breakthroughs, the
greater the risks that both are taking in committing themselves
to such a project.
The way in which the firm and the customer make their ini-
tial estimates of the size of the job and the technological effect-
i veness was described above. But, as Chaptel' 3 pointed out: these
estimates are undergoing continuous revision and reassessment t~ough-
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out the life cycle of the project. The revisions of the esti-
mates .are based largely upon the inputs to the initial estimation
process, that is, an the experiences of both firm and customer,
their abilities, underestimating tendencies, relative optimism,
as well as on real environmental inputs. In addition, of course,
revisions in these estimates are based upon the degree of respon-
siveness of the management of the finn and the customer to chan-
ges of all sorts. This responsiveness, that is, the time that it
takes to recognize and react to changes in the technological and
project progress situations, is probably dependent upon the mana-
gerial and technical ability of both the finn and the customer.
Funding the Research ~DevelopmentProject
In Chapter 4 the problems of funding the research and develop-
ment project were broken down into three areas: the firm's bidding
phase, the custaner 1 s evaluation of the proposal, and the firm I s
decision to invest i ts own funds. The prime determinants of the
firm's bidding activities with respect to its attempts to acquire
funds from the custamer:are, first of all, its be~iefs as to the
expected value ~~d expected cost of the research and development
project. These estimates, hc,wever, are not underlying character-
istics of the firm, but rather are results derived from those under-
lying characteristics which were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
One characteristic, however, which does seem to be fundamental
to the firm, and which was seen in Chapter 4 to influence the firm i s
bidding activities J is that set of criteria which determines for
the firm its desire to participate in a forthcoming project.
These criteria were discussed as being relevant to the firm's ob-
jectives as to potential profitability} direction of technological
development, size of job market in 'which the firm wishes to engage,
and/or other particular characteristics. These things, in general,
seem to relate to the over-all objectives O~ the firm, its goals,
and its partic~ar ways of manifesting these goals in its actions.
In addition to these objectives of the firm which determine
on what projects and under what conditions it would be willing to
submit a contract proposal to the customer, another important
determinant of its bidding activities was pointed out to be the
:firm's !ntegrity. This in·tegrity factor particularly manifests
i tsel.f in the way in which the :firm presents an estimate of cost
to the customer, which proposed cost in fact differs from the
estimate whicll the firm internally holds. The characteris tic of
integrity in ~idding-.seems to be a characteristic which is funda-
mentally different from ane firm doing research and development to
another, and thus ought to be included in this type of listing.
In examining the activities by the customer in evaluating
the prospective job that he is to fund, we 'again account for the
fact that those criteria which the customer uses in evaluating the
. suggested participation in projec~ sponsorship seem to constitute
an important characteristic of the research and development life
cycle. 'These proposed evaluation criteria, as described above for
the firm, also relate to the objectives o£ the customer, as well
as to the project alternatives that the customer has available to
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him. In addition, of course, the way in which 'the customer
weighs the relat,ive cost-v8.1ue rel.ationships is fundamentally
related to the conservatism, or its opposite, the risk-taking
propensity, that the cllstaner is willing to manifest in its re-
search and development sponsorship activities.
A second ~eterminant of the customer's evaluation proce-
dure that was mentioned is the customer r s confidence in the
ability of the firm's engineers and also in the opini ens and in-
formation expressed by the firm. This shows up in the extent to
which the customer takes into account the firm's bid cost esti-
mate in determining its own anticipations as to the 8r7ount of
money and effort that the job wil~ require.
The third factor which determines the customer's participa-
tion in the job are the actual funds that the customer bas available
t.o him t 0 allo~ate -(,0 different research and de~elopment pro-
jects. This is the first resource limitation that has been en-
countered in describing fundamental characteristics of the custo-
mer, the rirm, or the product. But it, too, will distinguish
one custaner agency from another and so must be included in this
itemization.
The final aspect of funding the research and development pro-
ject that will be. discussed here includes the activities of the
~irm in investing its own funds in the project. Here the firm's
<-"t:,tl}~"!iteril:l for participating in a project, Which characteristics
were di,s<?ussed above, are of course most important in influencing
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the firm's investment decision on an R and D ·project. Secondly,
it ~s important to recognize that the firm also is undertaking
risks in investing its own money in such. a project, and, there-
fore, the propensity of the firm to take such cha~ces., its willing-
ness to gamb1e with expected profits, its willinghess to invest money
without definitized project sponsorship, is an important charac-
teristic of the firm that enters into these decisions. And, finally,
just as in discussing the customer resource limitation above, it
is important to recognize that the firm's available funds also limit
the extent to which it can participate in its own sponsorship of
research and development projects. ThUS, the availability of cam-
pany funds is a characteristic Which might distinguish one company
:from another and which is a potential determinant of the life cycle
o~ a research and development project.
~ Acquisition !ms!. Utilization. Ql.. Engineering Manpower
Once the funds have been provided through the process des-
cribed above, the firm begins to engage in the activity of acquiring
engineering ~anp6wer. One fact which .influences the particular
rate of acquisition is the extent of forward planning of the firm.
If it begins hiring manpower in advance of receipt of funds, then
recruitment activities are geared to the anticipated level of
',"..
fUIidi~~-' rather than to the existing l.evel. The extent of £orward
planning by the firm is probably dependent upon the managerial
abil.ity of the firm and also, in part, upon the extent to which
it is willing to take ri.sks and commit .~tself to supporting a level
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O!~. manpower that is not yet adequately funded ~
The second determinant of the rate of acquisition of engineering
manpower :for the firm is the firm f s particular policy towards its
training program for new recruits. The problem faced here is one
of balancing the current project work need to avoid diverting
fully-experienced engineers to helping out the new recruits,
against the later project needs for more engineers which can only
be met through an extensive training and development program.
Here it seems that the ability of the firm to strike a balance
between these two goals and these two problems will be the key
determinant of the particular mode of acquisition of new engineering
manpower.
The £actors which contribute to engineering productivity in
the research and development project were clearly outlined in the
last portion of Chapter 5. The first of these factors, the chang-
ing level of external technological knOW-how, has already been
related to the product and its teclmological environment. Thus
this changing level of teclmological know-how is a basic determil~­
ant o£ the rate of engineering productivity, and it is also a
characteristic of the product.
The first factor which modifies the actual ef~ectiveness
of engineers on the job that was cited in Chapter 5 was the on-
the-project experience that had been accum~~ted.by the manpower
force. This on-the-job experience, however, is not a characteris-
tic of the £irm, the product, or the customer; rather it is something
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which evolves as a variable element during the life cycle of the
project. Thus it does not fit ~ntQ our list of key characteris-
tics which will make one job di±"fer from another job. In a simi-
lar vein, ~hough the existing split of the engineering work force
among various worker categories is in fact an important determin-
ant o~ the current rate of engineering productivity, this, too,
is not a characteristic which would distinguish one firm from
another firm. It is rather a ;phert~!=:~on·· which is· always encoun-
tEred during the l.ife cycle of any research and development pro-
ject.
The final modifier of engineering productivity on a research
and development project to be mentioned in Chapter 5 was the ability
and skills of tIle engineering management. This is in fact a more
intrinsic characteristic of the firm &ld was cited in Chapter ;
as being probably t~~ key detenninant of productivity of an engin-
eering work force.
The Cqntrol of Research and ~elopment Progress
The chapter which closed the loop on the cycle of research
and development activities was broken basically into three parts:
(1) the process of estimating task requirements; (2) obtaining pro-
gress measurements; and (3) responding to signals derived :from
tllese measurements. The key determinants of the first area, the
..:( '-
estimation of.. task requirements for the R and D project, have been
reviewed in an earlier section of this chapter which discussed the
estimation of project ef:fort and cost. The lengthy discussion
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in Chapter 6 on the problems of obtaining progress measurements
ended up with the conclusion that the ability to obtain intelli-
gent measurements of real progress in a research and development
project is dependent mostly upon the managerial and technical ability
of the firm and also o:f the customer, to the extent that the cus-
tomer attempts to assess this progress. The ~actor that was re-
ferred to as taste and judgment was listed here as being of vital
consequence. This is of course one aspect of the more broadly
defined capabilities of the firm or customer. In describing the
responsiveness of the management of the :firm and the customer to
the changes that were indicated as a result of progress measure-
ments J Chapter 6 pointed out the influence of integrity an whether
or not engineers face up to the problems which they are encounter-
ing and admit these to their superiors and their customers. This
seems to be an important determinant of the time that it takes to
recognize the real progress on the job. This int egrity also affects
the extent to which the firm transmits its expectations of diffi-
culties in the project to the customer. In addition, the time
that it takes for the firm and the customer to fully recognize
and respond to the changes that are more or less dictated by the
indications they receive from the project is probably dependent
upon the managerial ability of both the firm and the customer.
Thus we have now reviewed all of the phases of activity Which
constitute the life cycle of a research and development project.
In each of these phases, we have attempted to point out those influenees
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upon the rates of flow of these activities which derive from
characteristics of the firm, the customer, and the product,
which may distinguish one firm from another, one customer from
another, and thus one project from another. It seems reasonable,
then, that we should attempt to summarize these influences into
these very three categories.
Characteristics of the Product
The review of the activities of research and development which
constituted the first general section of this chapter pointed out
three basic characteristics of the product and of the technical
environment in which the product exists. Tlle first of these was
identified as the underlying need for the product, or as it was
labeled, the intrinsic product value. The intrinsic product value
has its main in:fluence on determining the perception of the need
for a product by both customer and firm, which perception influ-
ences the entire process of fund and effort allocation throughout
the research and development project.
The second characteristic of the product which seems to be
critical is the intrinsic size or complexity of the job. This mea-
sure of the inherent amount of effective manhours which would be
required to complete the task is primarily influential in the
estimations of project ef£ort and cost, which activities were des-
cribed in Chapter 3. Through this estimation process, the intrin-
sic size of the job makes its weight felt in tbe estimated man-
power and dollar requirements which then7 as did the value estimates,
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permeate the entire process of the research and development cycle.
In addition, of course, the intrinsic size of the job determined
the basic measure against which effective manhours could be com-
pared to determine the real progress in the research and develop-
ment enterprise.
The final characteristic of the product which seems to be
very ~portant throughout research and development project life
cycles is the changing level of technological effectiveness or,
as it has been otherwise described, the state of the art. This
characteristic was ~portant in the process of estimating project
effort and cost J but primarily the state of the art was regarded
as the basic determinant of the actual engineering productivity
described in Chapter 5.
Characteristics of the Firm
Several characteristics of.the firm also seem at least poten-
tially to be critical determinants of research and development
life cycle behaviors. The characteristic of the firm which was
mentioned most frequently in the first section of this chapter,
and which se~~s to be most pervasive in its influences, was the
firm's managerial and technical ability 0 This factor seemed to
influence the t~e that it took to perceive the need and value
of a new product. It influenced the degree to which the firm
would correctly estimate both the size o£ the job and the tech-
nological effectiveness of the state of the art during its esti-
mating of project effort and cost. It was also noted that the
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managerial and technical ability of the firm probably influences
to a great extent the responsiveness of the firm to changes in
its requirement estimates. In the chapter on acquisition and
utilization of engineering manpower, it was felt that the mana-
gerial ability of the firm determined the extent of forward
planning that the firm did in attempting to acquire engineers.
This ability also was cited as the major determinant of the wis-
dom of the particular training program policy adopted by the
company · That chapter also showed that the managerial and tech-
nical capabi:ity of the firm influence to a great extent the actual
productivity of the engineering work force that was being applied
to the research and development task. To cap a11. this off, in the
discussion on the control of research and development progress,
the tast~ and judgment factor, that is, the basic managerial and
technical ability o~ the firm, was said to determine.to a great
extent the accuracy of the measurements of progress on the job.
In addition, this quality indicator determined the responsiveness
of management in fE'..cing up to and taking action with respect to
changes that were demanded by these progress measurements. Thus
it seems that this characteristic of the fi~, its managerial and
technical ability, is indeed an ~portant one.
A second characteristic of the firm seems also to have in-
fluenced many different aspects of a research and development pro-
ject. In discussing the problem of perception of product need and
value, it was felt that the forecasts o£ fl~ture value depend upon
the finn's willingness to take chances. The next chapter pointed
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up how the degree of optimism or confidence by th~ firm affects
its estimates of technological effectiveness and also its expecta-
tions of further breakttlroughs in teclmol.ogy. Chapter 4 pointed
out how importantly the firm's investment decision was dependent
upon its willingness to gamble or to accept risks in investing
its £unds in a project an which it had not received contractual
assurance. A1l of- these indicators rela~~e to one over-all char-
acteristic o£ the firm--the re1ative conservative or speculative
nature or the canpany, the degree to which it is wi11ing to
undertake risks or, as we might readil.y sum these up, the risk-
taking propensity of the firm. Ti'.is propensity evidently affects
a good number o~ the re1atianshi~s and activities in which the
firm engages in a typical. researc.h and deve10pment project.
Another charaoteristic of the firm w:hioh was thought to in-
fluence at 1east one aspect o£ research and development projects
is the previous job size experience of the canpany$ This previous
Job size experience of the firm in part determines the initial.
estimate made of the size of the job that the canpany was facing.
Thus -the previous Job size experience of the firm provides a bias
that wi11 intluence at least its initial decisions based on the
rel.a1iive cost-value relationships of- the ant·icipated project. The
bias frem tl.lis previous job size experience is, however, modified
by an over-alJ. tendency towards underestimation ot a1~ jobs and
towards uncertainty as to the state or technology. All of these
have inf'luence in the same gent 9J. area, the estima'tlon of project
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effort and cost. All three influences should probably be recog-
nized as approximating a sing~e characteristi.c of the company.
Another basic characteristic of the finm was identified to
be the. integrity of the canpany. This strongly determines the
request for funds which the finm makes of its customer, as des- .
cribed in Chapter 4. It is also ~elt to be of great influence
in the process of measuring and rea~;ting to progress on a re-
search and development job. The integrity characteristic pervades
an organization and creat,es an atmosphere which either encourages
or makes it difficult for an engineer to face up to the diffi-
culties which he is encountering in his task, and admitting them
to his supervisor. Similarly, the lack of integrity in the organ-
ization discourages or prevents the finn from admitting its prob-
lems to the customer and perhaps making plans to solve these diffi·-
culties in advance. Thus the integrity of the firm seems an impor-
tant determinant of research and development behavior.
Another basic characteristic of the firm relates to the cri-
teria which help it to determine the nature of the projects in
which it participates. The firm t s policies might well be those
of seeking any jobs Which will be profitable to at least a mini-
mal degree, or jobs that will satisfy the customer to a certain
extent, or so forth. These criteria for project participatiC!l seem
to be the most obvious manifestation of the goals and objectives
of the firm. The goals and objectives of the firm certainly con-
: stitute a very import8..a."'1t characteristic of the company II They LTl-
~~~,.,.-:..
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fluence the timing and the extent to Which a :firm will" attempt
to gain customer funding for a project, as well as the extent
to which the firm will be willing to invest its own funds into
some prospective project. Such goals and objectives did not
explicitly fall into our discussion of the various research and
development project activities.
The final characteristic of the firm which seems to have in-
fluence an controlling the flows of activity that have been des-
cribed thus far is the availability of funds to the company.
This is the constraining factor on the firm's ability to invest
in a research and development project, and might for different
firms allow one to enter competition in a new area and prevent
the other from such an undertaking. Thus the extent to which a
company possesses monetary resources may in fact strongly deter-
mine at least one aspect of its research and development project
behavior.
Characteristics of the Customer
The factors that have been discussed above as characteristic
of the fi~ do in fact most strongly influence the behavior of
the company in its participation in a research and development
project. These same :factors, moreov"er, have great influence on
the customer's behavior in an R and D project. The customer is
swayed by the same general modes of influence in perceiving
the need for and value of a product, estimating project effort
and cost? evaluating the worth of a project for investment purposes,
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and attempting to detennine ths relative progress on an R and D
job. The Ct~stomer does not usually engage to the same extent
as does the firm in the acquisition and utilization of engineering
manpower. However, on those jobs in which the customer staffs a
management organization or an extensive project supervisory
organization, he too is influeneed py-~the;)s·8J1l~~<ik~~d·so¢;fl:.deteF-~:~;",'j
':~~ " ":..•~' r., /-:~.~. ~I ••••• ,", '. :~-',~...... ~ • • ''t'!'.'
minants as is the firm in acquiring and effectively using engineer-
ing manpower.
There seems to be only one additional characteristic o£ the
customer which influences his decision~aking. This characteris-
tic is an interesting one to be singled out in this way because
o£ the £act that it describes an interrelationship, the custo-
mer's confidence in the firm. The extent to which the customer
has confidence in the firm will influence the degree to which it
listens to and accepts the firm's estimate of the value and cost
of the R and D project. It also affects the degree to which the
customer will place faith in the technical capability of the firm's
engineers to carry out the job at reasonable cost. Thus this
characteristic of the customer, its confidence in the firm,
seems to at least potentially be another added characteristic
of importance in the research and development project.
Swmnary
Those factors itemized in the three sections above, the char-
acteristics of the product, the firm, and the customer, seem to
include those things whicb could possibly make important differ-
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ences between Olle project life cycle and another. These poten-
tially key determinants of research and development project life
cycles are:
Characteristics of the Product
1. Intrinsic product value;
2. Intrinsic size of the job;
3. Rate of growth of related te~hnology;
Characteristics of the~
4. Managerial and technical ability;
,. Willingness to accept risks;
6. Previous job-size experience;
7. Integrity;
8. Criteria for project selection;
9. Availability of funds;
Characteristics Qt the Customer
10. Can£idence in the firm;
All the factors listed above as characteristics of
the firm.
Although there are ten different characteristics listed above,
these ten enable us to narrow the problem of understanding re-
search and development into a far more compact grouping than the
·popular folklore of R and D would seem to allow. A one-sentence
summary of the general theory o~ research and development project
life cycles is that these ten characteristics of the project, the
~; .....m _ .QT'\rl +.n~
- ---7 --- ..-....- customer are
from another.. The project case histories which will be developed
through simulation in the succeeding chapters will more speci-
fically illuminate this point.
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PART II
EXPLORATIONS INTO THE MANAGEMENTOF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
"If you have built castles in the air, your work need not be lost;
that is where they should be. Now put the foundations under them. It
Henry David Thoreau.
Walden
343
PART II
Part II of this work reports on a wide variety of studies of the
general theory of research and development project dynamics that was
presented in Part I. The studies were conducted by simulating the
model developed in the appendices of Chapters 2 through 6 for a broad
array of input and parameter modifications, concentrating mostly on the
key determinants described in Chapter 70 The first chapter of Part II,
Chapter 8, goes in detail through the life cycle of a typical Rand D
project, examining the causes of various project decisions and demon-
strating the over-all plausibility of the general model of Part I.
Chapter 9 reports on the effects of different changes in major product-
related characteristics on the outcomes of research and development
projects. Chapters 10 and 11, respectively, describe studies of the
influences of the characteristics of the firm and the customer on project
life cycles. Chapter 12 examines some characteristics, previously undis-
cussed, which were brought to light by the extensive computer simulation
explorations. These factors relate to the general processes of perfor-
ming research and development work, and seem of a different nature than
the previously cited characteristics of the product, firm, and customer.
These explorations into the management of research and development are
finally summarized in Chapter 13, the concluding chapter of this volume,
in which both conclusions of the undertaking and recommendations for
future inquiries are outlined.
CHAPTER VIII
THE LIFE CYCLE OF A TYPICAL
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
This chapter will pres~nt the simulated time history of the
typical research and development project described in Part 10 The
equations and constants used in representing this project were those
provided in the appendices of the chapters of Part I. This chapter's
discussion will be based on the data produced by the computer simula-
tion, much of which results are reproduced in the figures printed through-
out this chaptero The input characteristics (and as we shall see, the
resultant life cycle) of this project are probably similar to those of
a large number of military (or, more broadly, governmental) research
and development undertakingso The product inputs are such that the pro-
ject requires something in the range from 500 to 2,500 man-years of
engineering effort, depending on the state-of-the-art advances which can
be utilized and the over-all ability of the developing firm's management
and engineers. This effort requirement indicates project costs between
$15 million and $75 million, a range covering many significant research
and development activities, including, as examples, a new highly advan-
ced computer system for the Atomic Energy Commission, a radar-control
center for airport traffic control for the Federal Aeronautics Administra-
tion, a small jet engine for Navy helicopters, an air-to-ground missile
for the Air Force, and a solid-fueled sounding rocket for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. All of these examples, and the
simulated project too, relate to areas where in the relevant technology
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is in a state of rapid advance, the needs for the end product mentioned
change as the times and circumstances change, and both the firms and
the customers involved have a background of earlier experiences with
each other and with at least somewhat similar types of undertakings.
The Project History
With the above as background we shall immediately begin to relate
the history of a typical research and development project, as revealed
by the computer results of the project simulation. The project history
begins with a single engineer working on company funds, doing work in an
area technically related to our potential product. In general, he and
his company management feel that it is worthwhile to allocate a small
amount of funds and effort for such research, although at this initial
time they as yet sense no partiCUlar value to the product area being
investigated. As the engineer continues to work in this tield, he
gradually beings accumulating some technical know-how that will be rele-
vant to the eventual direct product development efforts. Working on his
own, with the usual available clerical, drafting, and shop assistance,
the engineer can be relatively productive. He is personally experienced
in related areas of work and is able to devote his full time to the
.research task at hand, not needing to spend any effort on recruiting,
training, or supervising other engineerso
The company pays the costs incurred by the engineer out of its
general funds, feeling that it ought to provide its traditional support
of a one-man activity in this new technical area. As the costs pile up,
the firm's investment in the area accumulates, and it charges this off
to its general operatiaos as a current expense. If the firm or the
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engineer at work could conceive of the eventual project at this early
time, they would estimate its cost to be extremely high. The excel-
lent technical and managerial ability of this particular company would
enable it to correctly estimate both the inherent scope of the job and
the state of the related technology for performing the necessary research
and development work. These factors would lead the company to an initial
effort estimate of about 2,000 actual man-years of engineering, which
amounts to a cost estimate of about 68 million dollars. This is based
on figuring the job at an average cost of thirty-thousand dollars per
engineering man-year and adding on the extras needed to cover the usual
eleven and a half per cent engineering time spent aw~ from the tasko
Such a cost estimate coupled with its current zero-value estimate of
the product worth would give the firm no hope of getting any customer
support as things now stand.
The customer organization has also had experience in related tech-
nological areas, as well as with the firm just under discussion. The
customerVs relationships with the firm have been reasonably normal for
the military r~search and development field, and the customer has only
slightly better-than-average confidence in the company's capabilities.
The customer tries to keep fairly well informed as to the areas of cur-
rent research of most companies working in his fields of interest. The
companies of course cooperate because of their own attempts to determine
customer thinking on various project ideas and also because of their in-
terests in getting research support or major development contracts. In
the specific product area under consideration the customer is aware of
the company's efforts, but is also unimpressed as to any potential value
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of the investigation. The customer has not at our initial time allotted
any funds for the area being studied, and has not even been approached
by the firm.
If the customer were made cognizant at this initial time of the
potential product, he too would form a very high estimate of its research
and development costs. This customer's ability, relatively speaking, is
much lower than the firm's, and as a consequence his estimates would
probably be in error by a wider margin. Given the customer's past
experience with jobs somewhat smaller than the one currently under con-
sideration, plus his own bias towards underestimating the complexity of
a project, the customer would arrive at an estimate that the job ought
to be able to be done under optimum conditions with about 300 man-years
of effort. But then taking into account the undeveloped and apparently
not chang~ng ~tate of the technological art in this field, and his own
extra doubts as to this (or any other) firm's competence, the customer
would raise the estimate by about a factor of ten. This would lead the
customer to estimate Rand D costs at about one hundred million dollars,
almost fifty percent higher than what the firm would have believed. Under
these existing conditions the customer is certainly unwilling to support
any'major program in the technical area under consideration.
The next few months pass with no noticeable change occurring in the
situation. The single engineer keeps working on the task, developing
some more understanding of the technical area; no changes take place in
the real world affecting either the product development cost'or the
intrinsic value of the potential product; and neither the customer nor
the firm perceives of a suitable undertaking in the area under study.
Then, at month six, something different begins to happen. Although
neither the customer nor the firm recognizes this fact as yet, same
things begin changing in the world situation which make our potential
product have some underlying value to societyo To be sure, its value
at month seven is very small, very eas~' to ignore, and in fact the
product value is overlookedo Yet, during the next few months, still
unrecognized, the intrinsic value of this produ't begins to grow.
The world situation is changing enough so that by month twelve, only
six months after it began having any worth at all, the basic value or
the product, if it were available to society, reaches one million dollars.
In the meant~e, product technology is still basically unchanged, al-
though the company engineer's added experience is beginning to have
slight, almost ~perceptible positive effect on the overall productivity
of his work. The potential research and development costs of the pro-
Ject thus remain about as they were initially, estimated at between
sixty-eight and one hundred million dollars, depending on whether you
think about the ri~'s or the customer-s est~ateo Thus, the potential
project is still not attractive to either customer or finm, but the finm
does continu~ supporting its engineer's effortso In fact, the ri~ has
decided by this t~e to try to entice the customer into sponsoring this
work, and is currently requesting a small grant of thirty thousand dollars
to provide for the next year's activities. The custQmp~, seeing no value
yet to the work area, and feeling that the ri~ ought to support such
small costs out of its own funds, has so far rejected this request.
At about this time the firm and, soon afterwards, the customer
begin to learn small bits of infonmation Which, when pieced together,
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provide an inkling that there might be some value to the product area,
Neither can yet pin down the exact need to be filled but both have a
slight hunch that something worthwhile is going to turn up. Two con-
tinuing trends are helping along this perception of the potential value
of the producto First, the underlying worth of the product area is it-
self incre~sing very rapidlyo Due to changing world circumstances,
this basic but unperceived value has moved from one million dollars at
month twelve to ten million only six months latero Thus, the need for
the product is steadily increasing and there is greater likelihood that
the customer and/or the firm will be able to more clearly recognize this
need. The second steadily increasing influence on the perception pro-
cess is that the company is continuing its exploratory work in the
potential product area,: somewhat improving its know-how as each month
goes byo This is gradually putting the firm into a better position for
sensing opportunities and technical possibilities in the product area.
And, to some extent, the customer receives information from the firm
which assists his own ability to interpret the changing world circumstances
into the need for specific productso For both of these reasons the per-
ception of product value by customer and firm begins to increase, but
not at all significantlyo For example, the firm's perception of the
current product worth does not pass the million dollar mark until month
twenty-nine 0
On the other hand, as the perceived value increases ever more rap-
idly, both firm and customer begin responding to the pace of change,
looking forward to future increases in the need for the producto In
fact, they begin thinking in terms of what the product might be worth
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in the future, at a time by when it is possible that research and
development on the product might be complete. Thus, at month twenty-
nine, when perceived present value has just reached one million dollars
the firm's estimate of the future value of the product is already up to
three and one-half million dollars and rapidly growing. The steady ad-
vance of the perceived current value of the product influences both cus-
tomer and firm to believe that such a trend as they detect will continue.
In fact the "band-wagon effect" of this growth causes them to rely more
and more on the projections of the value changes, rather than on the
recognized product value itself. Gradually, the decision-making of both
customer and firm moves toward depending on their estimates of future
value, an even less reliable concept than their perceived present value
of the product.
While all these changes are beginning to evolve on the value side
of the fence, important events have also begun to occur in the product
cost area. At about month nineteen some of the work being done out-
side of the company's activities begin to reach pay dirt. The gradual
accumulat~on of technical knowledge in areas related to the potential
product starts to payoff as new insights, techniques, and tools begin
to appear in various scientifio laboratories and engineering offices
around the country (or world). For the first time since the beginning
of our simulated project life, the optimum costs to do the job start
decreasing. Using the new technical breakthroughs, a firJtlnow can,
at least theoretically, get the project completed for slightly less
than before. Neither firm nor customer is yet aware of the initial
discovery, or of the fact that new improvements now start showing up
351
with regularity, slowly advancing the state of the art and gradually
cutting the necessa~ cost to develop the product.
But within a few months the customer, primarily through his
industrial contacts, and the firm, in part through his conversations
with the customer, begin to learn about these breakthroughs. Some
signs show.up in the trade literature and the professional meetings,
and the firm's own activities are assisted by receipt of this additional
knowledge. More importantly, both the customer and the firm start to
factor the latest achievements into their thoughts about product pos-'
sibi1ities and project costs. And again, just as the band-wagon began
to grow in regard to value estimation, so too does the band-wagon phe-
nomenon take effect in the cost estimating area. As the advances in
technology are recognized, similar achievements begin to seem more feasi-
ble and, in fact, expected. The state'of the art, once having begun a
rapid advance, is expected to continue its headlong plunge into progress.
Aided by their desires for optimism about product possibilities, both
customer and firm rely more and more for their cost estimates on fore-
casts of a future technology.
To this basic underlying change in the real-world product enviton-
is added a gradual .shift in the customer's attitude towards the firm.
Initially the customer's confidence, established from previous project
experiences with the company, ·was about average and tended to bias'the
customer's estimate of the firm's ability to carry out a project effi-
ciently. But as the customer builds up more of a contact with the firm
in this new area, he gradually begins to shift his opinion. Several
influences act to produce this shift. First, working without the
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strains of a research and development contract between them, the cus-
tomer tends to see the firm in a more favorable light generally.
Secondly, the fact of the different technology (even if only slightly
changed) can easily lead the customer to think that the firm's com-
petences in the new area will be of a higher calibre than its earlier
performances. Finally, the passage of time tends to cure all ills,
and the customer can readily forget his earlier grievances with the
company. This is particularly true because of a generally optimistic
approach taken by both customer and firm to the new and the different
area, with the catchiness of novelty helping dissuade everyone of his
sometimes more rational hesitances.
These three forces---(l) the gradually rising perceived current
value and similar future projections; (2) the apparently accelerating
changes in technology and the future cost expectations induced by them:
and (3) the customer's generally enhanced opinion of the 'firm's effec-
tiveness, with attendant implications for project cost estimates--be-
gin to improve the over-all appearance of suitability of the project.
By month thirty the firm estimates that the future value of the project
is about 8% of the expected total project costs, but this figure changes
rapidly. Six months later this ratio is up to 32% and after only an-
other three months, by month thirty-nine~ the firm estimates future
value of the product at 57% of cost expectations. This quick trans-
formation is caused by the combined effects of rapidly rising future
value estimates and rapidly falling estimates of the costs to develop
the project under the expected future technology.
In turn, the more favorable project outlook begins to affect the
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plans of the firm. The firm now begins to think that there is a
slight but growing chance that the customer will in the relatively
near future be willing to sponsor a major program in this area. This
impression is based on the firm's own improving feelings about the
product suitability, its understandings from contacts with the customer
as to the customer's beliefs, the firm's knowledge as to the types of
endeavors which have been pursued in the past, and on his awareness of
the customer's allocation within the past month of his first few thou-
sand dollars worth of funds for this technical area. The firm is there-
fore willing to take a chance and risk some of its internal funds in
the project area, in the hope of speeding up a contract award and of
putting itself ina better position to receive such an award.
The firm thus decides that it would like to hire several engineers
to work on the project, but immediately runs into the restriction that
the single engineer on the job cannot really handle more than a couple
of new men. He has been doing exploratory studies up until now, had
not really thought much about project work organization, and needs time
to get things straightened out and smoothly rolling forward. During the
next two months some engineers are found on other projects in the company
who are freed part-time from their other tasks to begin working on this
new area. The original engineer needs to spend more and more of his
time explaining the area to the additional engineers, helping them get
accustomed to the work, and supervising their efforts. This detracts
from his own output on the job, and in fact, for a few months actually
lowers the total group productivity to below that of the single engineer
initially. But two new men are gradually added to the job and others
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are sought.
This seems like an appropriate place to temporarily break this
description of a project life cycle to see from whence we have come and
where we now stand. Initially, we began with a situation of no really
intrinsic or perceived need for our potential product and with a single
engineer working on company funds in an area in which no technological
change had recently occurred. The basic costs to do the job were very
high, and therefore no suitable project appeared possible. Then,
graduall~, things began to happen. The engineer's work helped gain
insights into product possibilities, basic changes began to occur in
the world situation, which alterations produced increasing need for the
product, and cumulative technological advances began reducing the ex~
pected research and development costs. As the situation bettered, the
firm recognized the possible desirability of committing its own funds
to the product area. It tried to add more staff to the project team
but ran into the basic problem of being able to absorb them into the
pre~ious one-man effort. But after a few months, by about month forty-
five, the.group had at least gotten past initial growing pains, and
though still quite inefficient in terms of their own productivity, are
now trying to add more new engineers to the project. The intrinsic
value of the product has grown to one hundred and sixty million dollars
worth, but neither customer nor firm yet recog~izes current worth of
more than twenty million dollars. Estimated future value, as contrasted
to the current value perception just mentioned, goes up to sixty-four
million dollars presently, to compare very favorably with cost estimates
ranging between forty-four and forty-seven million dollars. Both organi-
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zations view the product area as one of high potential, but the custo-
mer's conservatism prevents him from leaping into the area so soon.
He is still awaiting a more convincing product need-product cost rela-
tionship before committing much of his funds to a research and develop-
ment project.
These factors are pictured in Figure 8-1, which consists of the
computer output plots of the early part of the simulated project model.
The entire period of time discussed to this point, almost four years,
has involved activities usually ignored in any recorded manpower, cost,
or contract histories of a project. These activities constitute the
pre-formal-project stage of a research and development life cycle, an
embryonic stage in :Which all the necessary precursors of the formal
project get started. Within the project life cycle, foundations have
now been laid for clear perception of the need for the product, for
estimation of the required project effort and cost, for getting the
process of customer funds allocation and the firm's risk-taking invest-
ments under way, for creating the core of a project engineering team and
in fact, for actually accomplishing some small amount of research and
development work on the project. Researchers or managers who ignore
the existence of this phase of a life cycle forget the sources of the
entire project concept and execution.
Returning now to the simulated project history, we find that the
rapidly changing project situation reported above is still continuing.
As the world problems evolve, the underlying value of the potential pro-
duct to society holds to its increasing path. The perceived current
value and the estimated future product value also are carried upward as
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customer and fi~ receive and respond to new in£ormation about the world
situation and as the firm continues to learn fram its technical studies.
Cost estimates for research and development of the product also continue
their earlier steady decline as new technological know-how is recognized
ann further achievements anticipated 0 These influences keep pushing up
the attitudes of both customer and firm as to the suitability of the
potential product for large-scale development. As the firm employs
more engineers on the job it requests more support fram the customer.
The customer soon begins to provide some token support of the worko
By month forty-nine the customer is spending almost two thousand dol-
lars a month on the project while the fi~ is adding more than seven
thousand dollars a month out of its own funds 0 Both custoDIer and fi~
now think that the future worth of the product is greater than what the
product will cost to develop, but the customer is not yet quite satis-
fied that he should take the chance on supporting a major program in the
-~
area. The customer's funds are lih~ited and he wants to invest in the
most attractive opportunities (iOe8 9 those with the largest value-cost
ratios), so he is still slightly hesitant.
By month fifty the fi~ has decided that the customer will soon
be willing to support the research and development project for the
potential product and submits a full-scale proposal with an accompanying
estimate of costs. The firm really believes that the project will cost
about 41.5 million dollars, but cuts this by about 10% in its communi-
cation to the custamero The firm's integrity is fairly high, but it
thinks that in anticipation of the customer's minor reluctance and in
view of possible competition for the project, it should reduce its
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initial funds request slightly. Under the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPPFF)
type of-contracting which pertains to most government research and
development jobs, the worst that the firm might expect to happen as a
result of this underestimation is that it will not receive its negotiated
percent markup on the costs incurred beyond the amount bid. Actually,
this too is not much of a problem since a large portion of the project
-cost overruns can usually be claimed as changes in the job specifica-
tion and "the fee also collected here. If all the project costs are
legitimate, the firm does not have to worry about reimbursement of its
actual expenses. The CPFF system encourages the firm to be concerned
only with the contract base for collecting fees, and not with the rela-
tionship of final actual costs to initial estimated costs. Thus, the
company in our project model requests about 37.7 million dollars for
a job it really expects will cost almost four million dollars more.
By this time the firm has four engineers on the job and is contin-
uing to recruit, hire, and train more as fast as its existing project
group can effectively absorb them. One more engineer'is added in the
next four months, another by three months afterwards, and so on.
The customer in the meantime has begun taking into account the firm's
request for project funds. At the time of request the customer felt wil-
ling to commit as much as 45 million dollars to the project, and the
firm's request added further encouragement. The customer's average con-
fidence in the firm leads him now to gradually revise his earlier esti-
mate of costs, taking into consideration the lowered figures submitted
by the firm. The influence of the firm's bid combines with a continuing
recognition of cost-saving technological advances as well as a continuing
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perception of improving product worth. These convince the customer that
the project should be supported adequately and he begins the process of
allocating the needed funds to the project. One million dollars is ob-
tained from other funds in a very short time, and during the next year
the customer gradually builds up this allocation to about 30 million
dollars. These monies are, of course, not immediately made available
to the firm, but by month fifty-fiv.e, for example, the customer is
willing to authorize spending at a rate of one million dollars per month.
The firm's slow growth has kept its expenditures during that same month
down to fourteen thousand dollars. Thus, the firm continues its attempts
to expand its organization and is continuously restrained by the capacity
of its current group to train and supervise more engineers.
By month sixty-two the project staff is still up to only nine engi-
neers, with four more in the process or finishing negotiations to join
the company. Not much real progress has been made on the research and
development program, although no special technical difficulties have
yet become apparent. The continuing recognition of technological ad-
vances leads the firm to think that the costs to do the project are
much lower even than what it has indicated to the customer a year earlier.
Thus, during the next few months the firm informs the customer that it
believes costs will be lower, cut~ing its estimate by about five million
dollars within the next year 0
From month sixty something else has been hapening that augurs a
different type of situation in the months ahead. The underlying in-
trinsic need for the product, which had steadily been increasing, slows
its rate of growth and by menth sixty has reached a plateau' level of
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real value at 200 million dollars. This results from changes in the
world situation. which diminish the importance of the initial source of
need for the product, or which point to a more effective means of treat-
ing the underlying problem creating the need for the product. The intrin-
sic product value remains approxim~tely constant for eighteen months and
then begins to fall for the same two reasons mentioned. As before,
neither the customer nor the firm have knowledge (nor is such possible)
of this intrinsic value. However, they do gradually receive information
about the world situation creating the underlying need, and they do
gradually respond to modify their product value estimates. Particularly,
as the rate of change of the world situation slows, the formerly steadily
increasing urgency also slackens. Soon the firm and customer sense the
fact that little more is going to happen to improve the ultimate values
of the product. At month seventy-two the firm's estimate of the future
value of the product, an estimate based on a four-years-ahead projection
of the changing demand situation, peaks at 492 million dollars and from
then on begins declining, somewhat slowly at first and then rapidly
gaining momentum in its downward tumble. The customer's value estimates
also go through a similar pr'oc,ess.
The suitability of the project to both customer and firm still
remains very firm. At about the time of the peak future value estimate,
the customer, for instance, thinks that the project will be worth more
than twelve times what it will cost to develop; i.e., the customer is
then willing to develop the product even if the research and develop-
ment costs were several times more than what they are expected to reach.
Thus there is no slowing of project support and in fact, project activity
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continues to steadily improve. The firm has managed to get twenty-one
people at work on the project and has ten more near joining the firm's
group. Despite the technological advantages which have accrued from
the new breakthroughs outside of the firm's own work, its real project
accomplishment is still small~ eThere are two main reasons for this
low progress: (1) the relative lack of effectiveness of the new engi-
neers, most, of whom are without much experience in general and particu-
larly without experience in the technical area of the project; and (2)
the need for utilizing most of the experienced project engineers to
indoctrinate, train, organize, and supervise their newer colleagues on
the job. But despite this slow pace the firm and customer both remain
~leased with the project possibilities.
During the months that follow, up to month one hundred, real value
keeps dropping, estimated future value also plummets, and estimated costs
continue a slow decline as technological improvements are discovered,
communicated, recognized, and interpreted with respect to their research
and development cost significance. The engineering group is steadily
built up to a level of 135 engineers plus supporting staff, by month
one hundred with an anticipated increase of 50% within the next few
months 0 Taking the project schedule into account the firm would actually
like to have almost five times as many engineers but is unable to re-
cruit and train that many in such a short period of time. Progress on
the task has been accelerated greatly in the months prior to month one
hundred but most of the job still remains to be engineered.
The significant change that has been taking place in these months,
however, is in regard to the apparent over-all desirability of the project~
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The customer, who earlier thought he would be willing to pay as much
as twelve times what he then had estimated as the project costs, has
gradually become far less enthusiastic about the job.. By month one
hundred, his perceived ratio of future value to estimated cost has
fallen to 4..5, with an apparently continuing loss in the project's
appeal., The firm, whose value estimate has fallen far more rapidly
and who also internally holds to a higher cost estimate than does
the customer, thinks the project is even more marginal a proposition
and is beginning to worry 'about the prospects of the customer cutting
off the funds.. To worsen this situation in the firm's opinion is a
slightly lowered efficiency which it begins to notice during month
ninety-nine.. This ,has a slightly boosting effect on the firm's esti-
mate of what the project is going to cost to complete ..
This seems like another good place to pause for perspective.
From month forty-five the project life cycle has significantly evolved
in terms of a more definitized cost-value structure, a broader span of
activities, and a much greater number of engineers and dollars being
utilized .. During the period described the firm has requested major
funding and the customer has responded with a large allocation to the
program; the intrinsic value of the product to society has matured,
stabilized, and gone far in its decline; and the expected future value
of the product has similarly mushroomed upward, peaked, and sharply
fallen~ The ,attractiveness of the project has also boomed then stag-
gered to the point where the firm, at least, is concerned about the
completion prospects of the job.. And yet despite all this activity,
really not much money has been spent relative to total project cost
expectations, the engineering staff is still only a fraction of what
seems needed to get the job done, and correspondingly only a small
percentage of the task has yet been accomplishedo All this sounds
very similar to many other projects, particularly those which receive
nationwide pUblicity, such as in the current conflict over the RS-70
3,000 mopoho bombero Given our long lags in identifying worthwhile
research and development undertakings and in being able to respond to
such situations, our national research and development efforts seem to
really get going in full swing either at a time when we feel it is no
longer very much worth the effort anyway (as some now feel about the
country's anti-missile missile program), or long after others have bene-
fited by earlier achievement of the same product objectives (as was the
case in our manned space flight efforts to date) 0 So, too, our typical
project simulation shows an emergence into the phase of major research
activity at a time when the attractiveness of the entire project is be-
ginning to dullo
The life history to date of the major project variables discussed
is ptctured in the simulation output graphs of Figure 8-2 on the next
page 0 Here we see the same majbr variables that were shown in Figure
8-1 on page 356~: but with the perspective of a longer time period and
with two additions to the plotso The tremendous impact of technological
advance during this period of more than eight years is clearly shown in
the greatly reduced estimates of project costo Also notice that the
underlying value phenomenon, basic as a concept to the evolution of all
product innovations, now appears as almost a full life span of embryonic
existence, birth, and early growth, development to full maturity, gradual
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obsoleting decline, and, not yet occurring, dec~ into nonexistence.
The curve of value perceived by the firm shows up clearly the great
time lag in the recognition of product possibilities during the entire
emergence of the real worth of the product. Then comes the phase of
product perception which is nurtured by its own history of growth,
wherein the band-wagon effect of anticipated change overcomes the
conservative influence of current achievement and knowledge. Examine
the towering growth of the value estimates, relative to their real
underlying counterpart. As the gap between expectationscand reality
widens, the danger increases that relatively small changes in the
underlying world situation can precipitate radical revision of the
whole previously established value-basis of the project. The estima-
ted future value turns, begins to decline, and with it gradually erodes
the suitability of the entire project.
Note also the customer's allocation of funds to the project.
His favorable opinion of the product situation leads to relatively
quick provision of funds to the project area, with gradual revision
setting in as estimates of costs fall under the impact of co~tinuing
technological progress. Observe too the steady period of engineering
work done by a single engineer in the firm, followed by the gradual
expansion of the engineering group as more funds become available and
then clearly growing in an exponential fashion in the second half of
the simulated project graph. Finally, look at the history of the firm's
profitability on this project. First one sees the long period of in-
creasing financial loss on the project, as the company supports its
small engineering effort out of its own funds. Then comes a stabilization
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period as the customer support, including profits, just covers the
current expenses of the projecto And finally the rise in current
profitability of the engineering activity takes place as the firm
applies its fee to cancel out its previous investments, "breaking into
the black" on the project at time 86, and rapidly increasing its accumu-
lated profit on the more intensified spending rate.
Looking back at the latest year of the project life, one can
readily see signs that people commonly associate with the formal be-
ginnings of a research and development project. During the entire
period of time a substantial and rapidly growing number of engineers
are at work on the project. A formal and firm request for funds has
been made and the customer has allocated a matching amount to the pro-
ject. Expenditures are rising rapidly and the firm is starting t~
accumulate profits on the jobo Thus we can consider the project to be
formally well under way by month one hundred, from which time our pro-
ject history now continues.
As the engineering organization grows in size, it increases its
basis for further expansion both because or the number of people al-
ready in the organization and also because of their greatly increased
average experience. Thus growth of the organization now takes place
r~pidly as the firm enters into large-scale development of the product.
This rapid growth does, however, gradually affect the experience mix
of the engineers and the firm soon starts recognizing slight slippage
in its project performance. This reflects itself in the slow but
steady rise, starting in month one hundred, that occurs in the firm's
estimate of total project cost. After ten months of this rise the firm
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finally decides to request more funds from the customer, and gradually
begins to increase its pressure on the customer for more money for the
project!'
In the meantime, the customer's opinion of the desirability of
the project has been slowly deteriorating. His estimate of the pos-
sible future worth of the product has dropped sharply, while his cost
estimate has increased, helped along by the firm's requests-for more
funds. But even as late as month one hundred fourteen the customer
thinks that his further investment in the project is justifiedo Com-
paring~his estimate of the future value of the product to the est±mated
additional costs needed to finish the project and derive the value bene-
fits, the company still thinks the project is worth twice ~he additional
amount it will now cost. At month one hundred fourteen the customer
thinks the project will require 19.5 million dollars more to achieve
completion, whereas he feels that it will be worth 39.5 million dollars
when completed. If the customer took account of the total expected cost
3203 million dollars in~tead of the additional cost, the value-cost
comparison would be less favorable. But the costs already put into the
project should not enter into the customer's rational economic decisions.
In addition, should they irrationally be considered, these sunk costs
pr9bably influence the customer to look for the project evaluation cri-
terion which will tend to save those costs from being totally wasted.
Thus the customer might well think: "I have already spent over twelve
million dollars on this jobo If I cancel now, I get no product benefits
from this money. But the investment of an additional 19.5 million can
payoff in a two to one ratioo Therefore, I should continue my support
of the project." Such behavior has been assumed in our typical simu-
lation.
This customer evaluation policy is critical to the project be-
havior. It leads the customer to gradually increase his allocation
to the project several months after the firm requests the additional
funds. It leads him from month 117 on, for instance, to continue full
support of a project whose total costs are now expected to exceed ;its
total value derived. Though the customer no doubt feels disappointed
in the project by this time, he still recognizes that he has more to gain
by his'additional investment than he will lose. It is with this set of
attitudes that the customer fully finances the last phase of product
development, continuing right up until he feels the job is done at
month 128, after which the customer discontinues his funding activities.
The firm, during this entire final phase of the project, continues
the growth of its engineering staff and advances the work on the research
and development activities needed by the project. From about month 108
the firm has begun to feel the accomplishment slipping behind the project
schedule. The firm revises its request for funds from the customer
when the gap between the cost estimate and the allocated funds widens
sufficiently that the firm thinks it necessary to go back to the custo-
mer for more money~ In turn, the customer has also been led to revise
his project cost estimates, but, as explained above, the customer grad-
ually responds by providing the additional needed funds. With the large
number of engineers at work on the project, 450 by month 117 and still
growing, progress on the job begins to take place rapidly. By month
127 all the needed work on the job is completed in fact, and by the
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next month both customer and firm are convinced that the research
and development project is indeed finished. The momentum of the pro-
ject causes a few extras to be done during that final month, such as
additional product testing and more thorough final debugging.
But the work is now done, the customer stops reimbursing the costs
of the firm, and the firm shifts its engineers as quickly as possible
from what is now company-supported work in the technical area of the
project just completed to other work within the company, or if abso-
lutely necessary it lays off those engineers it cannot utilize. All
of this is shown in the final part of the graphed project history, now
pictured in entirety in Figure 8-30 The charts now clearly depict the
project life cycle from many points of viewo The total cycle of the
product value phenomenon is now visible: intrinsic value growing, level-
ling, and falling into disappearance; perceived current value lagging
in recognition all along; estimated value of both the firm and the custo-
mer lagging in growth, then accelerating and overshooting the real value
counterpart, then falling rapidly for the firm and less quickly for the
customer toward zeroo This is one of the major life cycle characteristics
of research and development projectso
Another is the perceived product cost curve. Starting very high
relative to product worth at that time, estimated effort and cost on the
project gradually fall under 'the influence of a rising technological
state of the art. This decline in the cost estimate slackens as soon as
the engineering work gets under way to any great extent, and the firm
begins to form a more realistic impression of the effectiveness of the
engineers 0 In fact, the cost estimate rises as a result of this same
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recognition, combined with the feeling that the basic scope and cam-
plexity of the project is bigger than anticipatedo
The curve of engineering employement on the project also shows the
rise and fall of the life cycle. For a long t~e only a single engi-
neer is working in the product area within the finm. This effort level
is so small relative to the later engineering activity on the project
that it does not even show up on the graphed simulation results. Then
the engineering force curve shows the gradual gro~h that takes place
as the finm invests more of its own funds in the project area 0 As the
project receives customer support, the staff grows steadily and ever
more quickly, tapering in its gro~h only as the project nears final
completion. Then the last phase of the engineering curve shows the
period of transfer of engineers out of the technical area of the project
to other areaso
The last curve drawn on this graph shows the real percentage com-
pletion of work needed for the project. This curve is hardly visible
l
for many, many months of the project life cycle. During what was refer-
red to as the embryonic phase, up to month forty-five, the percent of
project completion appears to have a zeID value 0 Only during th~ latter
part of the next period examined, the active birth and early growth of
project activities fram month 45 to month 100, does project accomplish-
ment begin to appear on the graph. In part this is misleading. For
although the engineerine~ output relative to that needed for project
completion (this is the concept being shown on the graph) was almost
1
nonexistent dllring the entire period of ttme, some very essential achieve-
menta had already been accomplished. These achievements were organizational
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or conceptual in nature: (1) the engineering staff had been increased-
to a broad base for doing the project work; (2) cost estimation on the
project had been firmed up; and (3) funds were allocated by the custo-
mer. These achievements were all vital to the proj ect, but none of them
can be related directly to the engineering tasks needed to be completed
in order to finish the product development. In any event, from month
100 on the project engineering jobs do gradually get completed, with
over 75% of the effective work being done in the last year and a half of
the project life (from about month 110). The work was actually completed
in month 127 and some extras added during the period of transferring the
engineers from the project area.
Adding More Realism to the Project Model
The results pictured and discussed so far in this chapter do seem
to portray the basic phenomena of research and development projects.
But they appear to lack one element of realism. Most people who have
examined research and development project data would observe that the
manpower curves in projects tend to have many ups and downs, some siz-
able, in addition to the general growth and decline pictured in the simu-
lation results. Some such observers offer explanations of these phe-
nom~na which relate to multi-phase scheduling of project activities or
to other reasons which sound somewhat basic. In reviewing the project
model used to develop the simulation results of this chapter, one can
find two far simpler reasons for the lack of such fluctuations in the
manpower chart. First, the problem of voluntary engineering turnover
has been neglected. When engipeers quit and leave the company (or are
vitally needed on another job), their movements show up in the manpower
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curve. Secondly, the curves plotted for most real projects are those
of direct applied engineering effort. Such curves exclude engineers wh
who are absent from work due to sickness, holid~s, vacations, or other
personal reasons.
To test the effects of such realistic causes of short-term fluctua-
tions on the job a new project simulation was run in which a single
change was made in the model. Previously a constant average figure of
11.5 percent was subtracted from the engineering force to determine
those actually at work on the project. This took into account some
of the results of a study made several years ago by the author in a
General Electric Company engipeering organization, in which for budge-
ting purposes various causes of engineering overhead expenses had to be
examined olIn the new run the average monthly figures which made up
this result were used insteado In each month of the new run the engi-
neers actually at work were found by taking into account the expected
average monthly absenteeism figure and selecting from a normal statis-
tical distribution about this average.2
1Edward B. Roberts, "The Digital Computer as an Element of a
Financial Control System" (unpublished Master of Science thesis, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, June 1958), pp. Al-27, 28.
2To accomplish this, the equation for PWAW, Percent Workers
Actually at Work, was changed from:
PWAW = 1 - AVABS Equation 5-66, N
whereAVABS equalled the AVerage ABSenteeism 01 11.5%. The new equations
are:.
PWAW.K = 1 - TABS.K
TABS.K =, HABS*l.K + AABSoK
HABS = HOXCYC(12,1}
HABS* = 00046/0046/0/.046/0046/0/.046/0/0046/.046/
.092/0046
AABS.K = NORMRN(AABSN*l.K, STDEV.K)
STDEV.K = (O.25)(AABSN*1.K)
8-1, A
8-2, A
8-3, B
C
8-5, A
8.6, A
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This sole change in procedure was used to produce the project his-
tory shown in Figure 8-4. Now in addition to the other variables shown
earlier, there appears the curve of actual engineers working on the job.
This in fact by itself does produce the kind of applied manpower fluctua-
tions usually attributed to research and development projects, and thus
satisfies our needed ttrealism"0 But the realism, or at least its appear-
ance, is about the only thing that is changed. The basic phenomena of
value, cost, and accomplishment are unaltered by the added random effects.
This is as one should reasonably expect 0 The underlying concepts and
mechanisms that bring about the J; fe cycle of a research and development
project do not respond to superficial changes that satisfy superficial
observation of project behavior. Since these added fluctuations then
serve only to slightly mask the basic changes taking place in the project,
where:
PWAW--Percent Workers Actually at Work (percent)
TABS--Total ABSenteeism (percent)
HABS--Holiday ABSenteeism (percent)
AABSN--Additional ABSenteeism, Normally (percent)
AABS--Additional ABSenteeism (percent)
STDEV--STandard DEViation (percent)
These new equations say that the decimal percentage of workers
actually working is-1 minus the percentage absent (Eq. 8-1). Those
absent are the sum of absentees due to holidays and those due to other
reasons (Eq. 8-2). The percent of a month'S normal work days which are
omitted due to a scheduled holiday is listed in the set of 12 DYNAMO
locations, one for each month, designated by the HABS equation, with the
values shown in the HABS* table of constants. The HABS equation speci-
fies to DYNAMO that the table values should be shifted around each month,
so that the holiday absenteeism for the current month will always be in
the computer location designated HABS*I. The same type of thing is done
for the normal absenteeism due to sickness, vacations, or any additional
causes. Here, because such absenteeism is not deterministic, as.are
the holidays, but rather occur more randomly about some shifting monthly
average, the additional absenteeism during any month (Eq. 8-5) is found
by having DYNAMO select randomly from a normal distribution. This dis-
tribution has a mean shown by the average monthly additional absentee-
ism and a standard deviation (Eq. 8-6) that is 25 percent of the mean.
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they have been omitted from ~he investigations discussed in Chapters
9 through 12, which reports can now be undertaken.
h itt rom st t s hapters
hro hi rt ert en.
CHAPTER IX
EFFECTS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENCES ON PROJECT OUTCOMES
The product was described in the summary of Chapter 7 as
having associated with it three characteristics which seemed of
potential consequence in influencing the success or failure of
research and development projects. These three factors were:
(1) the basic amount of total effective work demand~d by the pro-
duct's size and complexity, to which we have referred as the size
of the job; (2) society's inherent (but changing over time) need
for the product, which we have called the intrinsic product value;
and (3) the ever-qhangipg potentiality for technical effectiveness
of engineers on the project, which potential results from pro-
gress in the technology related to the product. This chapter will
report the results of experimental attempts to assess the extent
of influence of each of these three characteristics. The experi-
ments were carried out by using the high-speed electronic digi-
tal computer as a laboratory tool, operating upon the basic repre-
sentation of genera~ research and development project activities
that was presented earlier. By making simple changes in the value
of the particular characteristic under investigation and then pro-
ducing new simulated project life cycles, we can readily isolate
~d identify the effects of each variable separately on the ulti-
mate outcomes of research and development projects.
Job Size Variations
Variations in the basic size and complexity of a research and
development job are found in all areas of technology where different
378
scopes of the same general need are encountered. For example, the
development of a new rocket engine may be a more-or-less difficult
job, depending on the state of technology; but the exact magni-
tude of the task will vary if the mission is to hurl a thirty-pound
satellite into orbit instead of a three-ton spacecraft. Similarly,
two computers could be developed to perform the same functions,
but the research and development effort needed to house the compu-
ter in a one-cubic-foot box would differ.greatly from the effort
required to put the same product into room-size dimensions. Develop-
mentof a new material that can withstand J, 0000 Fahrenheit tem-
peratures is an R and D project that,.is.plausible, and it would
require far less effective work than a project which sought a
material which in addition could withstand temperatures approaching
absolute zero. Thus in any area of current research and develop-
ment activity, a given project can be increased or decreased in the
needed amount of effort'by:mer~ly shifting some of the end-product
specifications.
Important questions to ask, then, are, "What is the effect
on the project outcome of such specification changes? To what ex-
tent does a change in mission requirements that is bound to create
a change in engineering man-months demanded really change the like-
·lihood of project success or failure?" In order to get answers
to this type of question, a series of computer studies were made,
using the same model that produced the typical project life-cycle
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discussed in Chapter 8.1 In different runs the input parameter
which designated the intrinsic job size (NLKP) was changed, with
all other factors being left unchanged. The results then picture
the over-all effects of this single aspect of an R and D project:
the basic requirement for total effective effort on the job. Some
of these results are pictured in Figure 9-1, in which three different
curves have been plotted. In all three, we note a sizable varia-
tion in the resultant variables as the intrinsic job size changes.
The date of project completion, for example, occurred during
month 81 of the simulation for the smallest job studied and was
not reached until month 114 for the largest job actually cample-
ted. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that although simula-
tion studies were made for projects with input effective effort
requirements ranging up to 1,500 effective man-years of engineering
work, no job that required more than 1,200 man-years reached com-
pletion. All jobs larger than that amount were cancelled by the
customer after only part of the work had been done. Another inter-
esting feature of the completion date curve is its nonlinearity.
The smallest job shown had a simulation life span of more than
six years, which takes into account the long embryonic phase des-
cribed in Chapter 8. But this life span, and more significantly,
the elapsed time of any concentration of engineering effort, did
not increase in proportion to the size of the task. Doubling the
IThe only change in the model parameters was in the value
for TEl, the Training Efficiency Index. Whereas this was defined ini-
tially equal to 1, it was set equal to 2.5 for all of the runs which
investigated job size effects. The importance of changes in the TEl
value itself will be described in Chapter 12 •
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basic job size from the smallest one, considered of 50 man-years
to the next simulated job size of 100 man-years added only about
seven months to the project life cycle. Further size increases
had still less than proportionate effects, and eventually a satura-
tion effect seemed to dominate the time of completion, with the
last four completed jobs all falling within three months of the
same completion date. These figures emphasize the lengthy startup
time encoontered in research and development undertakings. This
startup takes into account not only the obvious initial delays
in processing funding requests and allocating 'support by the custo-
mer, or even the sometimes not so obvious delays needed to recruit,
train, organize, and make productive the engineering team of the
firm. It also includes the usually lengthy time from the first
signs of a positive intrinsic product value to the time that
R and D companies and customers begin to take note of these pro-
duct possibilities and later to take their initial actions towards
bringing the potential product into being.
Beyond the intrinsic size of 1,200 effective man-years, the
completion date curve has a very sharp discontinuity (not pictured),
at least conceptually, since larger jobs never reached completion.
Such obvious departure from the asymptotic completion-date behavior
cited above clearly indicates the influence of some factor other
than job size. This factor must relate to the customer's willing-
ness to allow (or rather his financial encouragement to achieve).
I
project completion. Since the work is for the customer's use and
is largely financed by his funds, the customer's decisiqn to with-
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draw support usually leads quickly to the halting of any further
job progress. Remembering our discussion in earlier chapters.of
the customer's project evaluation practices, let us now look at
the factors of direct consequence to this decision~aker.
Perhaps first among these factors is the cost of getting
the project accomplished. This curve, too, has been drawn in
Figure 9-1 for the range of jobs which were finished by the R and
D firm. As the basic size of the job increased, the total cost
of the project also increased. Despite some slight nonlinear-
ities in the relative costs shown for t~e smaller jobs, by and
large the total project costs increased in direct proportion to
the basic size of the task undertaken . Although really compara-
tive figures of this nature are currently impossible to obtain from
industry, our intuition initially would very likely have led us
to a different conclusion, leaning more towards costs which increase
at a rate more rapid than the job size. A result of this nature
leads to careful re-evaluation of the basic equations of the model,
and in our particular case to~ard an attempt at increased realism
in the formulation. However, as we shall see in Chapter 12, in
Which the formulation has been adjusted, the basic results pic-
tured here (cost increases linearly related to job size changes)
are not affected by the later model modifications.
The other influence on the customer's project evaluation that
is of equal importance to the cost aspect is the perceived worth,
value, or usefulness of the project results. In this series of runs,
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the same input curve of intrinsic product value was used for
all the simulated jobs of different sizes. Some may argue that
there is an inherent correlation between the magnitude of an
R and D project and the potential value to be derived from it.
But this argument has only superficial validity and, coincidental
relationships to the contrary, there is no causal·or intrinsic
mechanism that links the cost of a job to the utility of that
job. To demonstrate, let us take the extreme of the Congressional
"pork-barrel" project, defined as such since all observers feel
the project to be just a waste of government funds to produce not
a worthwhile end-product but merely the easing of politically-
motivated pressures. Here the basic cost of the job might intrin-
sically be related to the significance of the politician, but cer-
tainly not to the societal value of the project. To be sure, it
is often coincidentally true that a project inferentlY requiring
greater effort also inherently has greater value. But these cost
and value changes are seldom of the same magnitude. As example,
the IBM 7090 computer has operating speeds about five times as
fast as the predecessor IBM 709 computer. One reasonable measure
of the computer r s value might well be the number of computations
that can be carried out per unit time, and in these terms the 7090
value is about five times as great as the 709. But the typical
rental cost of the newer machine is only slightly, far less than
twice, greater than that of the older version. Thus, while both
the intrinsic value and production costs of these two pieces of
equipment moved in the same general direction, there is no correlation
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between their respective magnitudes. For our purposes, then, we
have chosen to hold the product value curve the same for all pro-
ject life cycles, while we have varied the inherent job size inputs.
This allows us to temporarily segregate the effect of cost change
on a project, and we can soon examine the alternative approach.
Now let us recognize the obvious outcome of increasing the
total effective effort needed on a job, while the value of the re-
sults are unaffected by this increased effort. The larger job,
as we discussed above, costs more money, but in our studies is
worth no more to the customer. Thus, the cost-value relationships
of the projects decrease as the cost rises. More significantly,
the larger job takes longer to complete. But the basic nature of
the intrinsic value curve, or of the perceived product value curve
as discussed in the preceding chapter, is one of initial rise and
later decline as the need for the product eventually diminishes.
The job Which is finished at a later date is perceived by its cus-
i0merr~asbeing~:ofdecreased value. Thus, as projects increase
in basic size and complexity, three tendencies eXistf! (1) increased
cost; (2) later date of completion; and (3) decreased utility
when finally available. These characteristics create the forces
which lead to SUbstantially decreased customer satisfaction and
cancellation of the larger projects (in our case, requirements
greater than 1,200 man-years of effective engineering effort).
As the third curve in Figure 9-1, we have plotted one such
measure of customer satisfaction--the ratio of the customer's per-
ception of product value (when he relt the job was finally complete)
385
to the customer's total project cost.2 The customer satisfaction
is obviously greatest for a project perceived to be still very
. I ,
worthwhile when it becomes available for the custaner's use, par-
ticularly when the customer's cost to acquire the product is low.
The customer is dissatisfied when he feels that the project "cost
more than it was worth". This satisfaction measure is equivalent
to an after-the-fact determination of return on the customer's
investment. The strongly nonlinear curve of customer satisfac-
tion realistically portrays the rapid decline in enthusiasm which
takes place in any given project as costs climb and delivery date
gets prolonged. Beyond a point (occurring in our typical project
at input requirements of 700 man-years of effective effort) the
customer feels strong dissatisfaction which results from his having
spent more than he afterwards felt was justified by the benefits
achieved.
For everyone of these simulated projects the customer used
the same initial investment criterion which sought a desired re-
turn on investment. The 500 man-year project was the largest to
satisfy this initial goal at the time of completion. The 700 man-
year job just broke even in the sense of returning to the customer
benefits which he perceived (at zero rate of return) to equal his
2 The satisfaction value for each project simulation was
found by canputing the ratio, LRPVC.~TECC.K, at the time that the
customer recognized that the project had been completed. LRPVC
represents the Level of Recognized_current Product Value at the
Customer (dollars) and TECC is the'Total'Engineering Costs to the
Customer (dollars).
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project coats. All larger jobs were less satisfactory,producing
negative return on project investment. Obviously, we have no
measur~ of value to the customer of the projects which were never
completed and hence were never of significant use to him. The
phenomena pictured in this satisfaction curve in part explain
why so many large military R and D proj ects were deemed "obsolete n
when finally completed, and never entered large-scale production
and usage. The use value remaining in the product when it finally
became available was so small, and the over-all disenchantment'
by the customer was so great (due to the poor value-cost outcome),
that dissatisfaction with the project prevented the customer from,
as he would probably justify it, throwing away more funds on the
project.
Product Value Variations
During the preceding discussion of the effects of changes
in basic size of a research and development project on the outcomes
of the project, we had of course to recognize the interdependence
of both cost and value changes on R and D decisions and results.
We come now ~o examine more directly the effects of different
intrinsic product value situations upon project life histories.
In other words, we seek more information at this point regarding
distinctions between projects of the same degree of technical diffi-
culty but of differing degrees of worth to society. Differences
in the real.value of a product to society arise out of differences
in the goals, needs, and problems of the society. For example,
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in the absence of the constant potentiality for military conflict
in the world, how would the real value of most of our military
technology be changed?.3 Under various goal-need-problem environ-
ments, certainly some R and D projects would receive different
treatment.
In trying to investigate this problem, we suddenly recognize
the much greater degree of complexity involved in our concept of
intrinsic prqduct value than is present in the notion of intrinsic
job size. The basic size of a job has but one dimension of varia-
tion--it is larger or smaller, more complex or less. Consequently,
we were able to thorough~y explore the effects of job size varia-
tions on project behavior. But intrinsic'product value is a
concept describing the changes in real worth of a product as time
evolves. This cannot only change up or down, but its life span can
be expanded or contracted and its shape modified in a myriad of
ways. In other words, we no longer have one dimension of change
as we had with job size. We have the possible combination of this
type of change for everyone of the infinite number of points along
our intrinsic produc't vvabueccurve . We shall therefore not even
attempt a wide array of variations, in hopes of bounding this infini-
.3 ''',A good case could be made that our entire defense program
can be justified solely on the basis of the economic and technological
by-products of its existence, but this would be an argument as to the
indirect value of the effort and not the direct.value of the intended
product resulting from the effort. Many see today in the goals and
management of the N .A.S.A. space program a mixture of the direct with
these formerly indirect results as part of the primary intended pro-
gram purpose.
388
t.ude of possibilities,. but ',rather-shall examine only two possi-
bilities: (1) the comparative effects of two input curves, one
everywhere higher than the other by the same degree; and (2) the
results of decreasing the time period of maximum worth of a poten-
tial product. Any other type of value curve variation can readily
be examined by the curious reader through simple use of the simu-
lation laboratory. For this particular study the additional effort
required for these inquiries does not seem justified.
In the first set of runs, all modeled project characteristics
were exactly the same as those used for testing the size of job
variations, except that the intrinsic product value curve was re-
duced throughout by 50%. The figure below shows the initial pro-
duct value input with its newer, halved-value, counterpart. These
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Figure 9-2 Original.and Halved Product Value Inputs
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runs will then demonstrate what would happen to a product develop-
ment cycle if the outcome were just as hard to achieve but worth
only half as much. On the next page, the completion date, cost,
and customer satisfaction for this series are superimposed upon
the corresponding segments from the original results (Figure 9-1).
Some of the results are obviously expected ones. For example,
given the lowered intrinsic value for the new project simulations,
it is obvious that customer satisfaction for each completed pro-
ject would be lowered. The'difficulty of doing the job was un-
changed but the resultant value decreased. Hence, the customer's
perceived value return on his investment is diminished.
It is no doubt obvious that the cut-off point in the size of
the projects which would be completed is also reduced as the value
input is decreased. The customer can no longer justify some of the
larger jobs on the basis of his given value-cost ratio investment
criterion, and more jobs are cancelled sooner than before. The
cut-off job size of 700 effective man-years is a small amount greater
thari"half the previous cut-off size of 1,200 man-months, despite
the halving of the product value input. This small nonlinearity
is caused by the fact that in both series of projects a great mar-
gin exists between the perceived value-cost ratio and the customer's
desired investment criterion ratio during the middle phases of the
project life cycle. Thus a large number of projects are started.
However,. as the perceived value begins to decline, the value-cost
ratio becomes more marginal. For the lowered value input simuiations,
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this value-cost factor becomes critical sooner than in the ori-
ginal studies; and hence several additional then incampleted jobs
get cancelled. But the ttming of this critical stage is not in-
herently tied to the completian-date curve and though more jobs
are cut o~f, they do not quite constitute 50% more.
Same perhaps even less expected results are also found here,
which results point up other facets of R and D management problems.
On the new series of stmulated projects, the date of completion
always occurs at a later time than in the earlier runs, contribu-
ting to still lower final satisfaction by the customer. This re-
sults from the longer time needed initially before the firm and
the customer become enthusiastic enough about the project possi-
bilities that they are willing to provide funds for its support.
~hus, the project which is inherently less valuable requires more
time before it gets underway; and consequently is completed at a
later stage of its declining value phase. Also somewhat different
are the costs to develop the end products, being definitely but
only slightly lower for the new product simulations. This is also
caused by the decreased initial enthusiasm which slightly de1ays
the R and D engineering schedule. C~sequently, the engineers
working an the project are able to take added advantage of the
technological changes that are ever occurring in our simulated en-
vironment. This produces an increasing degree of engineering effec-
tiveness and hence a decrease in project costs. To be sure this
cost change is perhaps inconsequential in magnitude, but its presence
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helps us to recognize the interdependency of various forces,
changing over time, on project success or failure. The influence
of technological progress on research and development results will
be more specifically investigated in the last phase of this chap-
ter.
Before going on to this exploration of the effects of chang-
ing state of the technological art, let us examine one more type
of variation in the ~ntrinsic product value input. Here we shall
see the effects of changing the time shape of the product-value
curve to reflect primarily a decreased period of maximum real
value of the end product. Our initial value input and the changed
curve are pictured in Figure 9-4. The change is really a small
one. The new curve follows the original up to its peak value,
but remains at that peak for one year less, and then follows the
original curve's decline, but a year in advance of the original.
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But its consequences are far more noticeable than the change itself.
As shown in Figure 9-5 the shorter duration of maximum product value
and the earlier decline of this value result in fewer of the large
projects being completed. Here the cut-off job size has changed
from the original 1,200 man-years of effective effort required
to 800 man-years. ~n this case, the earlier decline of real value
is, after the usual delay,felt by both customer and firm. This
produces less time for a bandwagon-effect buildup in estimated
future product value and the resulting earlier decay of product
-value expectations. As was mentioned in the discussion of the halved-
value simulations, the customer's decision to cancel a project depends
on the timing of the critical perceived value-cost ratio. If per-
ceived value falls sooner, and from a lower height, then the pro-
ject suitability for customer investment diminishes more rapidly
in the customer's opinion. Project cancellation therefore occurs
more often or sooner than in the original studies.
Since the ini~ial phase of product-value growth was the same
for the new runs as in the original investigation, the projects get
started at about the same time and utilize the same basic available
technology. Thus, the curves show no distinctions in date of comple-
tion or cost for those jobs which did get finished under these new
conditions. The only exceptions are for the largest jobs to get
done under both situations, since they become more questionable under
the new value input and suffer some stretch-out of project scheduling
prior to eventual completion. For all of these projects, however,
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the customer's satisfaction is lower than in the original case.
This is due to the fact that the projects are all being completed
during the declining value phase of the life cycle. Under the
new test situation, the real value has declined further at these
times of completion than in the original tests, and the customer Is
perceived value has decreased still further. Thus, the customer's
satisfaction with the end product is also reduced for all the jobs
completed.
Other types of value changes could be tested to demonstrate
the significance of this factor on project outcomes. They would
perhaps be of interest but could never be .inclusive of all possible
changes. Primarily, they would point out three factors, as these
above experiments have already shown: (1) ·the consequences of changes
in the intrinsic product value inputs are far more significant than
the degree of change itself; (2) these results are largely depen-
dent on the time changes of the perceived cost-value relationship,
and not on either factor alone; and (3) changes in value input
produce secondary effects in such things as completion dates and
project costs due to direct influence of the value changes on over-
all project scheduling.
Product Technology Variations
Let us now go on to examine the effects of the third and final
factor cited in Chapter 7 as a product-related key determinant of
project .behavior. This determinant is the technology related to
the project und~rtaking, which we have identified in various places
100 .
396
as the state-of-the-art, the degree of technical effectiveness, or
quite often as the extent of technological progress. In any project
requiring several years from time of initial perception until the
final job completion, changes in the basic technology available to
the engineers can certainly have an effect on project outcome. The
questi~ of relevance is not the existence of the influence, but rather
the degree of influence. How sensitive is the determination of a
project's success to the partic,ular rate of technological growth that
is occurring during the project's life cycle? To provide some clues
to this question, three runs·were made on the same basic task for
various te~hnical progress curves. The job size used for all runs was
6,000 man-months of effective engineering effort. 4 The three input
curves used to represent the changing state o~ the art are shown below.
:I
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Figure 9-6 Technological Progress Curves
4 .The basic model parameters were all exactly the same as those
used for the r,uns cited earlier in;.th~s chapter, except that TEl, the
Training'·Efficiency Index, was restored to its original value of 1.
397
The curve numbered (1) was used in all of the simulation studies
,discussed'~~lier in this chapter. Number (2) shows a more sharply
rising technological progress, while number (3) is delayed for a
longer 'period before its.technical growth begins.
The cost, date of completion, and customer satisfaction for
each simulated project appears in the table below. Project 2
is clearly superior to ,the other two projects on all bases of cam-
parison. Its completion occurs seven months prior to that of
project 1 and ten months earlier than project 3. It costs 20% less
Cost CustomerProgress Completion
($xl06)
Satisfaction
Innut Characteristic Date (month) (~xlOO)
1 Original curve 130 28.9 0.7
2 More sharply rising 123 23.0 1.5
3 Delayed rise 133 27.5 0.5
TABLE 9-1 Effects Qf Various Technological Progress Curves
than project 1 and 16% less than project 3. Finally, and of probably
greatest consequence, when we apply our previously defined ~easure
of customer satisfaction, the ratio of the customer's perceived pro-
ject value to his cost, project 2 is the only one which provi~es
satisfaction, rather than dissatisfaction, to the customer. Both
customer and firm quickly become aware of these major breakthrQughs
and their enthusiasm promotes an e,arlyproject start. The technical
advances soon became usable by the firm's engineers on the project,
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greatly enhancing their effectiveness and reducing the total cost
of getting the job done . With the job completed relatively early,
the customer feels confident that he will be able to make worthwhile
use of 'theend product. Thus, compared to projects land, 3, the
customer finds in project 2 an available product of both greater
worth and lower costs, and hence he is far more pleased with the
project outcome.
Now turning to project 3, we find the prolonged period without
technological change kept the customer and firm from moving into
the project with"any significant effort initially. The small and
continuing effort over ,the longer duration did, however, produce
some cost accumulation during this period of low engineering effec-
tiveness. The te~hnological change which then occurred produced
a sufficient modification in the project cost estimates that full-
scale project funding was provided and the remainder of the job
was completed~taking sane advantage of the more advanced state-
of-the-art effectiveness. The earlier cost buildup, however, made
this job more expensive than project 2. More significantly, the
later scheduling of major engineering activities delayed project
completion so much that its low value to the customer, when it
became available, produced much customer dissatisfaction with the
project.
In the original situation, project nwnber 1, the early and
steady growth of technological progress caused early entrance into
the project effort. Funding was provided and engineers were employed
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on the job during a period of steadily rising, but still relatively
low, utilizable technical effectiveness. This lowered effective-
ness produced the high total cost, while the earlier start pushed
the completion date slightly ahead of that for project 3. The
timing of completion was critical enough so that the resulting
value-cost ratio for project 1 was somewhat better than for pro-
ject 3, despite the increased cost of 1.4 million dollars.
To explore the e!fects of technological progress still fur-
ther, four more simulated projects were studied under different
~-
sets of technical environments. For these computer runs, it was
decided to hold the state of the art constant for the entire life
cycle, thus disallowing any external improvement in potential engineer-
ing effectiveness. The runs were made holding the level of available
technological effectiveness steady at 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent,
respectively. Taking the first figure as an, example, this means
that each fully-experienced engineer wi~l produce 0.25 effective
man-months of:effort for each man-month he actually works. The
intrinsic job size for these simulated projects is the same as was
used before, namely 500 effective man-years of effort. These two
facts imply that 2,000 actual engineering man-years would be needed
to complete the job if all the anployees were fully experienced and
fully employed on engineering work. Of course, most of the, engineers
would have to be brought into the project organization ~equiring
training or indoctrination for their jobs, and would thus be less
effective for the duration of·this entry period. In addition,
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other engineers would be unable to fully devote themselves to
engineering tasks and thus their contributions, in terms of
directly produced effective engineering output, would also be
reduced. Even disregarding these added inefficiencies, the 2,000
man-years needed would cost (at.about $30,000 per man-year of
engineering) about $60 million.
~espite the fact that both the firm and the customer do
eventually perceive the future value of the product as far greater
than this base cost of $60 million, the period of favorable per-
ceived value-cost ratio is rather short. It is not surprising,
therefore, for the project simulated with technical effectiveness
at 25%, that it never really "got off the ground "; and the slight
amount of effort was·eventually stopped after only ·2.5% of the job
had been completed.
The same reasons could be ventured to explain the completion
of only 17.5% of the project for the case of 50% technical effect-
iveness. However, with the base cost now at $30 million, and the
maximum value at $200 million, it would seem that the perceived
value-cost ratio should have been sufficiently encouraging to
, allow the project to be completed. Now we must recognize the sig-
nificance of timing on ~hether a project gets completed or not.
If very early in the product value life cycle, the cost is expec-
ted-to be low enough to produce a favorable value-cost ratio (given
the customer's investment criterion), then the project will be funded
and it is likely to be completed. If the favorable value-cost rela-
tionshipislnot perceived until much later" then it ,is,.;likelythat
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this relationship will become unfavorable before the project has
a chance to be completed. For the project situation in which re-
lated technology is at a standstill, neither the customer nor
the firm are apt to be moved towards early enthusiasm about the
project prospects. This is what happened in the case now being
explained. In the more usual situation of rising technological
progress, the changes create influences upon the cost estimations
of both customer and firm. They expect further progress and lowered
costs, and enter a project based at least to some extent on expec-
--tationsthat a favorable value-cost relationship will occur in
the near future. The possibility of such extrapolation is lack-
ing in the case of no changes in the state of the art.
In the final two cases, technical effectiveness at 75 and
100 percent, respectively, the over-all lowered costs are suffi-
ciently attractive that expected further lowering of costs is no
longer necessary_to produce a worthwhile investment opportunity.
The former case would require an expenditure of $20 m~llion if
every engineer could always work at the full ,available technical
capacity of 75 percent effectiveness. The actual cost to complete
the project was $33.8 'million, the additional 69% needed to pay
for the training and supervisory costs. Thus, the cost to build
and run a research and development organization is quite sizable,
even when compared to the direct cost of performing the basic
.effort requirement of a project. This project was completed at
month 121, and became available to the customer at exa~tly his
"15reak-even" satisfaction value of 1; the customer's perceived
product value just equaled his total project expenditures. In
the final project, the optimum cost would have been $15 million,
but the costs actually amounted to $25.3 million, again approxi-
mately a 69% surcharge to pay ,forthe lowered effectiveness due
to manpower development and supervision. The job was completed
at,month 115, and the higher value then perceived combined with
the lowered project costs to produce a customer satisfaction
measure of 1.8, quite close to the desired value of 2, the cus-
tomer's initial investment criterion level.
All of the results are summarized in the following table.
Technical Cost CustomerEffectiveness
($xlO6)
Completion Satisfaction
(-oercent) Status Index.
25 2.9 2.5% ----_ ...-
50 10.5 17.5% -------
75 33.8 100% at month 121 1.0
100 25.3 100% at month 115 1.8
TABLE 9-2 Effects Qf Various Levels of Constant Technology
T~is series or runs has helped us recognize the important influence
of technological progress, not only on the real effectiveness of
engineers but also on the perceptions of expected project costs
and on the investment decisions depending on those perceptions.
Without progress occurring, the basis for a projected lowering of
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of costs is missing. With it goes one of the important. ~nfluences
helping to get projects underway early enough to end in success~ul
(and satisfactory) complet~on. Our simulated projects showed that
for an unchanging state of the art only the most favorable value-
cost"situations will be successfully developed into a completed
end product, satisfactory to the customer. These ~tudies also
helped separate the co~tributions to engineering effectiveness
caused by enhanced technology from those caused by the engineer's
own development and effort allocation. The cost in both comple-
ted projects to bring new engineers up to full competence level
(this cost being divided between the higher dollars/effective-
effort-output paid to new engineers and the needed .supervisory
costs) amount to 69% as an addition to what the project would
optimally have cost. Any managerial activities that could in-
crease the effectiveness of new engineers without expending too
much effort by the fully-experienced stafr can thus greatly reduce
total project expenses.
CHAPTER X
THE FIRM'S INFLUENCE UPON PROJECT SUCCESS
The effects of product characteristics on the outcome of research
and development projects, as described in Chapter IX, can certainly
be recognized as significant. But R and Dmanagers, both in govern-
-ment and industry, too often attempt to blame the probleins of re-
search and development upon product-related influences. In this
chapter we shall demonstrate that factors and policies, related to
or determined by research and development firms, are themselves
significant in determining the successor failure of project under-
takings.
. The'Quality of the Firm
The first companyfactor cited in the Chapter VII listing of
key determinants of project behavior was the over-all quality or
capability of the firm's managementand engineers 0 The influence
of this characte~istic is all-pervasive in the typical project. The
·quality of the firm affects the accuracy of the estimates of project
value and cost; it dominates engineering output rate through its
influence upon the effective organization of work and on the tech-
nical decisions made in the project; it is a factor of consequence
in every delay in recognizing and responding to changes in technol-
ogy, funding requirements, project milestones, and engineering ef-
fectiveness; and finally, the quality of the firm's managerial and
engineering personnel produces whatever effectiveness exists in the
firm"s policies for recruitment, training, and transfer of engineer-
ing personnel.
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Does this characteristic appear to be so critical in our simu-
lated projects? The first tests to be shown certainly lend evidence
to this belief, as is illustrated in Figure 10-1. Using the basic
model of a research and development project that evolved in the
first seven chapters of this document, the parameter descriptive
of the firm's general qualific$,tions (QF) was changed in several
simulations over the· range from ;0 to 100 percent effectiveness.
Ols a reminder, quality is used in the model in a multitude of ways:
for example, 100 percent quality indicates that no hannful managerial
effects exist on the basic engineering productivity; 100 percent
qUality also indicates that the natural initial error in the job
size estimation is entirely wiped out. These examples demonstrate
the kinds, and at least the direction, of effects of the quality
factor.) The figure discloses that only with quality equal to or
in excess of 90 percent was the project task aa~ual1y completed.
The other projects we~ehalted woefully short of completing the
product-deve1opment~· Not only does the lowered ·qu8.lityprevent
the Job accomplishment, it also increases the costs of the job by
an enormous percentage. A1though extrapolation of partial comple-
tion data provides a questionable basis for drawing any strong
conclusions, examining the extrapolated total project costs is
admittedly an interesting exercise. As an example, with a measure
of ;0 percent quality of the firm, 11 percent of the job cost 14.;
.million dollars 0 The same cost rate 'produees an extrapo1~ted total
project cost of 1;0 million dollars, an amount four and one-half
times as great as the actual project cost under maximum effectiveness.
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Similarly, the 70 percent quality situation produces an extrapolated
result of about 51 million dollars, about a 75 percent cost Increaae
over the 29 million-dollar actual figure created by only a 30 percent
decline in over-all ability.
These results attest to the unique sensitivity of project suc-
cess to the basic capability of the R and D firm. Not only do rela-
tively small changes (relative, that is, to the degree of change
ex~ined for other key determinants of project behavior) in the
firmts quality produce drastically amplified effects, but in addi-
tion this ~plification increases nonlinearly as the firm's ability
'declines •
.But let us go on to more specific manifestations of the firm's
general qualifications. The capability of the firm's management
and engineers probably reflects itself very readily in the extent
to which they are aware and can take advantage of new changes in
the state-of-the-art. Management influences this by its relative
wisdom in motivating the technical staff to keep abreast of new
developments through conferences, professional activities, and uni-
versity courses. The engineers' capability enters in their trying
to read the numerous and complex technical joUrnals, absorb the new
infonnation, recognize its applicability to their current problems,
and actually apply the newer approaches and ideas to the project.
The direct effects of an increased quality of the firm, in this
regard, would then be in the role of decreasing the average delay
'in transforming the improved potential inherent in the state-of-the-
art into engineering effectiveness actually utilized on the job.
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This factor,·too, shows up in the simulated studies as being of some
importance. Table 10-1 documents the results for delays indicating
Delay in Acquiring and Absorbing Project
NewTechnology Cost Completion
(months) ($xl06) I Status
96 22.8 only 43% completed
48 34.6 100%at month 147
24 27.7 100%at month 129
12 24.9 100%at month 127
6 23.6 100%at month 126
"
Table 10-1. Influence of the Delay in utilizing
the state-of-the-Art
a wide span of finn quality. Again, the lowest quality indihat~d,
the delay of ninety-six months or eight years in finding out about
and being able to use new technical advances, results in the highest
potential project cost and the latest potential completion date,
the potential indicating that that project was never completed.
For the other delay values, costs decline and completion date draws closet
as this quality indicator (the shortness of the delay) improves.
From the discussions of the preceding chapter, we can immediately
recognize 'that the effect of these two facts in combination is to
increase the customer's satisfaction with the project outcome as
the company's ability increases.
It is certainly tru.e that we could readily examine the effects
of changes in many other aspects of our resea~ch and development
activities, all of which might provide some additional insight into
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the very consequential relationship between the over-all quality of
the finII'·andproject success • However, there are many other charac-
teristics of the firm still remaining for our exploration, and con-
tinuation of the present line of inquiry could soon becamemarginal
in terms both of our own interests and of the new information that
would thereby be derived. Let us conclude this section by citing
just one investigation in which we pushed to an extreme, impossible
in practice but available to us through our simulation laboratory.
In every information flow there is same delay, if only the time for
an electromagnetic signal to cross a small but finit"e distance 0
Given this, we recognized the relevance of asking: "Whatwould
happen if all delays in receiving information--as to value, cost,
technology, progress, etc 0 --were reduced to the minimumpossible
value?" This would represent one kind of maximum-maximorumof
quality firms, and is of interest to examine. Several characteris-
tics of this simulated project are listed below, with the corre-
sponding results from our basic study presented for comparison. It
may be surprising at first to see that all project measures presented
Peak
Delays Engineering Project Completion Customer
in Force Cost Date Satisfaction
Recognition (men) ($xl06) (months) Index
Normal 541 28.9 130 0.7
Reduced->e 702 33.6 " 112 1.25
Table 10-2. Comparison of Pseudo-Qmniscient
Firm to Basic Case
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do not favor the pseudo ...omniscient firm. Although its project was
completed a full year and a half' in advance of the nonnal case, the
project cost 16 percent more. This perhaps is a reasonable trade-
off of usage time versus the customer's money. However, the stability
of the work force was substantially reduced in the quickened project,
30 percent more engineers being acquired at the peak of activity,
therefore indicating 30 percent more engineers requiring eventual
transfer from the project or possibly the firm. The advisability
of this trade-off is !lQi so clearly indicated by our comparative
data. Finally, the customer was in fact, although barely, satisfied
with the omniscient's project outcome, whereas he was: dissatisfied,
although only slightly, with the normal product result.
The key to this lack of impressiveness in the case of the special-
delay project lies in three facts: (1) the quick recognition of the
underlying value-cost relationship leads to a very early project
start, at a time prior to the significant advance of the technologi-
cal state-of-the-art; (2) despite the zero delays in recognition,
the nonna1 but substent Ial,delays in recruiting, developing, and
employing an engineering organization effectively caused project
completion to occur at month 112 rather than near-instantaneously,
as some might have expected; and (3) the assumption that the firm
had almost immediate access to all information was accompanied by
the equally plausible assumption that the customer too had product-
value information readily available, and the customer's final com-
parison of real value to real costs turned out less striking than
might have been the case if the nor.mal value-perception delay were
p..., RJ mr:Z'WS=rrU"'Prfr'TVnmimm_s,<,.",r,
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utilized.
In summary, this last run shows that while increased quality
of the firm can certainly have substantially amplified effects on
project success, its'exact influences are: (1) not very obvious;
(2) limited by the constraints of getting things accomplished in a
real world environment; and (3) dependent to a great extent on other
factors, unrelated to the quality of the firm.
Willingness to Accept Risk
Let us now turn to another aspect of the firm f s general char-
acteristics which is not dependent on the over-all ability of the
firm but which might also be significant in the determination of
research and development project outcomes. The propensity to under-
take risks, the willingness to gamble, to take a chance, to specu-
late, to deviate by .same degree from total conservatism, are all
shades of the same color. They appear in the presence of success
just as they do with failure. The conservative investor in the
stock market places his funds in an AT and T and sametimesis for-
tunate enough to find himself holding a substantial growth issue.
In any event he seldom suffers much capital loss. The speculator,
on the'other hand, has much less of a chance of buying Litton In-
dustries or Ramo-Wooldridge just before the boom than he does of
latching on to a fly-by-night market sensation just before the
bubble bursts. Of course, if the speculator can guess right often
enough,he'll'be a rich man.
What happens when both types of people, -the conservat ive and
the speculative, and the infinite varieties between" enter the world
rrrrrmgmrsu .'",rrmwrmp7mZ·"'t"
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of research and development as engineers, managers, or customers?
. . .
Their intrinsic personality, as shown in their investment behavior,
- -
also tends to be projected onto the business. In this way a firm,
and even a government agency, soon develops a reputation and a mode
of action that is in one dimension a reflection of the willingness
to accept risk of the people in the organization. Their attitudes
toward new teclmologies, their basic optimism or pessimum, are all
modes of expression of the same underlying phenomena. ("Which came
first, the risk-propensity or the optimism?!' is another chic.ken-or-
egg question. The factors fundamentally relate, and in research
and development projects they influence decisions of potential im-
port.)
As embodied in the discussion above and in the represeIl:tative
project model, the fir.mlswillingness to accept risks affects not
only the relative optimism of his estimates of future product value,
technological progress, and engineering effectiveness, but it also
is a key determinant of how much of its funds the firm is willing
to risk as an initial investment in an R and D project before it
obtains substantial customer support 0 Let us examine same possible
results of variations in this risk-taking characte+istic upon a
series of different size jobs, all ostensibly having the same input
product-value characteristics 0 The chart on the next page indicates
several measures of the effects of such policy variants.
Examination of this table shows up same very interesting charac-
teristicso Both policies of risk-assumption, high and low (WARF=l
and 0.1, respectively), ended in project completion for the smallest
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Intrinsic Risk-Taking Propensity
Size-of Job Project of the Firm
(effective man- Outcome
years of .effort) Measure H~gh Low
Cost ($x106) 2304 2101--_._ ...._ ..-
Completion 100% at 100% at
Status month 127 month 138
400
Profit to the
Firm ($x106) 2 0.7
Customer
Satisfaction 101 0.5
I Index
Cost ($x106) 28.4 1305
Completion: 100% at stopped
Status month 130 at 38%
500
Profit to ~he
Firm ($x1O ) 1 1
Customer
Satisfaction 0.7 ---
Index
..
!
Cost ($xl06)• 22.4 10.7
Completion stopped stopped
Status. at 5J!, at 24.3%
600 JProfit to the
Firm ($xlO6) 1.7 0.8
Customer
, Satisfaction --- ---
Index
Table 10-3. Effects of Risk-Taking Propensity of the Firm
for Various Project Sizes
·job size investigated. The more speculative firm invested more of its
own funds initially, and got the project moving faster and completed
much sooner. Since it worked with a slightly less effective level of
technological art than did the more conservative firm, the former
project cost about 10 percent moreo But the former case was completed
in time enough that the customer was satisfied that he had at least
gotten his money's worth, and, relatively speaking, the customer was
twice as pleased as with the more conservatively-managed undertaking.
The conservative firm put very little of its own funds into the project
initially, waiting instead until the customer provided financial sup-
porto This policy retarded project progress to the point that the
customer became unhappy with the project as it neared completion and
cut back on some of his supporto This left the firm supporting an
over-staffed engineering organization which did finally finish the
job, but at a substantial cost to the firm's profits on the job.
In the case of the 500 man-year job, the contrast in ultimate
effect of the two risk-propensities is much sharper. Here, the delays
caused by the conservative management's unwillingness to build up its
project effort in anticipation of funding produced not just customer
dissatisfaction with the project resultso This policy actually caused
the failure to camnlete the job, and the complete waste of the 13.5
million dollars of customer funds already spent on the effort. Only
through our .simulation laboratory can such a result be pinpointed in
a definite fashion, for we know that the only difference between the
two simulated projects, the only possible cause of any differences in
results,. was the sharp distinction in the willingness to assume risk
by the two firms. This is not to say, however, that this effect exists
only in simulated projects and not in the real world. To the contrary,
company managements in numerous research and development project situa-
tions, both military and cOIIDIlercial,have often, as Monday morning
quarterback, been forced to say, "If only we had started the .work a
little sooner, instead of stalling, we'd be sitting prettty now with
two-thirds of the market (or that new large development contract).w'
In case readers need reminding, the aftermath of Sputnik I was a
series of charges and countercharges as to who (which President or
which Congress) had prevented the needed risks from being taken and
the required funds from being allocated.
It is certainly not a cut-and-dried fact, however, that firms
should undertake bold risks in every project contemplated. Obviously,
the customer funding does not necessarily result just because the
firm has advanced some of its own money into the project. The firm's
own confidence in the project, as manifested by its investment, of
course does actually encourage the customer8s award of a project con-
tract, but such a re~ationship does not uniformly hold nor could a
firm feel guaranteed of customer support on any given project, jy§1
due to its own risk-taking. The non-discerning gambler, then, ca.ngo
bankrupt in Rand D as easily as he can in the stock market. But I
it is vital that all research and development management note that here
is .§; policy,m:m! that can in .§.Q!!l§. cases, through its own workings alone,
change .§; venture from success to failure Qt vice versa.
From our simulation examples above, we have seen that as the
projects become less cushioned in terms of their potential value-cost·
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relationship, the assUmption of risk by the firm has greater influence
on resulting project behavior. But the study in Chapter 9 of job
.size effects showed clearly that some projects are just too big and
costly to ever be completed without a major upward revision in the
value structure of the customer. The third set of projects indicated
in Table 10-3 shows what. happens in one of these too-large projects
under both sets of extreme conditions of risk-assumption. Neither
project gets completed, the conservatively-handled one going about
,0 percent as far along as the otner. The customer wastes more money
under the high-risk project, and consequently the firm makes a higher
profit due to this increased level of expenditureso It is now no
longer obvious as to which risk-assumption policy is preferrable.
On this single project, the customer might not favor the high-risk
policy which induced him to invest more in a fruitless effort. The
firm, on the other hand, has to weigh the benefits of the current·
higher profits against the customer's perhats increased dissatisfac~
tion, considering the attendant future impact of such dissatisfaction
on the firm's profitability. Instead of concerning ourselves with
whether A or B was the better approach in this ~, it suffices to
recognize here that for some projects even the most speculative firm .
cannot by its policy alone-rescue the job from failure.
The discussion above presented evidence as to the effects of two
extremes in the risk-taking of research and development companies on
the results of jobs of varying degrees of intrinsic difficulty. It
is of interest now to view briefly the continuum of results created
by the full range of risk-taking propensities which lie between the
two earlier extremes. For the pr~ject of intrinsic job size equal to
400 effective man-years of work, with the quality of the firm set at the
75 percent level (QF = 0.75; see discussion earlier in this chapter),
the firm's willingness to assume risk was varied from the very conser-
vativ~ to the very speculative and the results plotted in Figure 10-2.
Here we see indicated the final percentage completion of the project,
and the time of completion for those which did reach fruition. Given
the preceding discussion of the effects of risk-taking by the firm,
the general nature of the results pictured is not surprising •. As the
firm assumes a higher degree of risk, a larger percentage of the job
gets to be completed. Finally the point is reached (here, when the
firm is willing to invest 70 percent of expected profits) where the
job does get completed for all higher values of risk-propensity.
It is also not strange, given the earlier discussion, that, fOr the
completed Jobs, the date the product is ready draws nearer as more
risk is assumed by the firm.
What is noteworthy, perhaps, is the nonlinear rise in percent com-
pletion (particularly for WARF > 0.55) and the nonlinear decline in
the time of completion. These factors indicate that below some thres-
hol~ value (different,: to be sure, under various project si~uat~ons)
the relative effectiveness of risk-assumption is insignificant. But
beyond that value, the increasingly greater undertaking of risk by the
Rand D firm·makes much more likely the canpletion of the task, and
at a timing which produces increased customer satisfaction. Past this
threshold, the effects of the risk-policy seem highly nonlinear and
can cl~arly spell out the difference between company success and failure,
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with respect to both the short-term profit situation and the longer-
term business prospects that are based on satisfactory company-cus-
tomer re1ationsll
The aspects of conservatism of the firm studied thus far have been
those which relate to the extent of the firm's investment in an Rand
D project. In considering the firm's investment criteria in the-dis-
cussions in Chapters 4 and 7, we mentioned the likelihood of importance
of the general rules that determined suitability of a project for invest-
ment by the firm II One such rule really relates to the conservatism of
the firm. This aspect is the firm1s basic optimism or pessimism regar~
ding the customer's willingness to support the project. An over-
optimistic management will expect the customer to be willing tc contract
for projects which even initially are marginal in their value-cost
relationships, whereas the over-pessimistic firm will expect support
.on only those projects which have ultra-strong perceived value-cost
ratios. This particular characteristic manifestation of the firm's
risk-taking propensity has some, but as Table 10-4 below shows, only
slight effect on the project outcome for those projects that are sut~
ficiently cushioned in their underlying value-cost relations. The effect
is more significant, potentially, for the more marginal projects also
shown in Table 10-4.
In the first set of simulated jobs indicated, the project is com-
pleted in all t~ee cases. The naive optimism of the firm (naive since
the'firm is incorrect) does produce a sufficient effect to get the job
completed a few months earlier, whereas the pessimism has a similar
delaying effect. Neither of these influences is great enough to alter
either the firm's profits or the customer's cost or satisfaction by
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Firm's Estimate
Intrinsic of Customer's
Size of Job Investment Customer
(effective Criterion Project Firm's Satis- Compl.e-
man-years (percent of Cost Profit faction tion
of effort) correct value) ($x106) ($x106) Index Status
100% at
50 29.9 1.4 .83 month 127
100% at
500 100 29.0 1.3 .69 month 130
100% at
1,50 27.4 1.3 .70 month 132
\.
100% .at
50 35 1.5 043 month 132
~
600
only 55%
100 23.1 1.8 --- completed
only 46%.
150 20 1.7 ---- completed
Table 10-40 Effects of the Firm's Risk-Taking Propensity
As Ma~ifested in its Investment Criterion
an important amount. The direction of effects, however, does follow
Qur'earlier established pattern-added hesitation prolongs the project
duration and saves a small portion of the total project cost pecause
of t~e newer technological advances utilized.
In the second set of projects shown above, Where, because of
larger intrinsic job size, the value-cost relationship has became
more marginal, the naive optimism does have more effect. The firm
incorrectly and optimistically underestimates the customer's return-
on-investment demands,undertakes more self-sponsored activity initially
and pushes the project to completion. The customer is not very satisfied
wi~h this. job but might be more ~ontent than in the latter two cases
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shown, in which only part of the job is completed. The firm, on the
other hand, had better find satisfaction in the job completion or in
the unknown longer-term effects of this project, since its profits are
slightly reduced relative to the two latter cases. This was caused
by the firm's increased support out of its own funds of the engineering
costs on the projecto Thus, in the ~ of projects which ~ basically
marginal, naive optimism of the firm might change project outcome in
the customer's favor, without necessarily benefitting the firm itself.
In general, though, the results of the larger job simulations again
follow the pattern that the more optimistic the firm the further along
the project progresses prior to .stoppage.
In the risk-propensity studies indicated above, we found that
the firm1s undertaking of risk can critically influence the success
or failure of the job. Such influence comes about more through the
size of the firm v s gollar~, in projects tsa: which il expects cus-
tomer funding, than through any overly optimistic or pessimistic attitudes
~ to which projects will eventually receive such funding. Thus, an
optimistic attitude alone is not a crucial factor in determining the
outcome of the project. But confidence, supported by the firm's funds,
does have considerable bearing on research and development results.
Such a conclusion helps to more clearly focus our attention on those
ways in which the firm1s key characteristics significantly operate.
Previous Job-Size Experience of the ~
The testing of a dynamic model of a large system sometimes pro-
duces results which contradict the initial hypotheses of the model-
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buildero When such a circumstance arises, it demands more careful
analysis of the hypotheses to determine whether the theory was wrong
or the model merely an i~adequate representation of a correct theory 0
In our Chapter 9 studies, the resulting linear variation of project
costs as job size changed led to a model refonmulation whicll sustained
these initial results as valid (as shall be demonstrated in Chapter 12)0
Now J in this chapter too, we encounter another example that causes this
deep-seated re-evaluation of the theory and its modelo
In earlier chapters we claimed that the previous experience of
the fi~, especially in te~s of the size of projects it has under-
taken in the past, would be of influence in the fi~qs management of
a research and development projecto Particularly, this previous ex-
perience was felt to modify the firm~s ability to correctly comprehend
the es~imate of the size of a job which it is contemplating 0 The
model equations in the Chapter 3 appendix incorporated this factor
as a bias in the initial job size estimate of the fi~o
Let us look at the simulated projects in which this experience
factor was changed in order to test its effect on project behavioro
Table 10-5 shows that over a wide variation in the previous jOb-size
experience of the firm, relative to the current project being simulated,
this experience has almost no effecto To be sure, the company with
experience on larger jobs does apply slightly more engineering effort
a little sooner, and consequently costs increase by a small amounto
But in general, these ~esults tend to~ our earlier hypothesis that
the previous size of job experience of the firm is a key determinant
of project behavior 0
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Average Size of
Previous Jobs as Project Completion
Percentage of Current cos~ Date
Job Size (percent) ($x10 ) Month
5 2709 133
:30 2801 133
50 2802 133
75 2804 133
100 2806 133
150 2908 132
175 3007 132
200 3107 133
Table 10-50 Ef:fect of Previous 'Job Size Experience of the Firm
A re-examination of our model representation shows that the
previous experience of the firm directly modified only the effort and
cost estimation process of the firmo To be sure, the varying esti-
mated magnitude of the job led to different timing and pacing of
primarily ,the initial project effortso But these initial flaws in
the firm's programming are soon gradually corrected as the firm begins
to gain non-the-current-job experience"o The real potential impact
of the previous size of job experience of the firm is on the style
or 'strategy of doing the job. The degree of preplanning, general in-
formation seeking, and laying of the groundwork might well differ be-
tween the firm experienced in handling big contracts and that which
has handled the.smaller jobso But this degree of work detail has been
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aggregated in our model representation into an indistinguishable part
of the over-all company management and engineering effort. Thus, the
effects of the previous size experience are not visible in our results.
In fact, they would not be noticed except in a model of research anq
development projects of far greater complexity' than that which we
have ventured or thought wothwhile to develop.
Integrity of the Firm
The firm's integrity in presenting to the customer its own be-
liefs as to the expected cost and value of the Rand D project was
cited in Chapter 7 as a potential key determinant of project outcome.
The firm's IthungerU to obtain a contract, produced perhaps by competi-
tive bidding pressures but mainly supported by the inept CPFF contract
regulations, very often leads the company to underestimate its expected
project costs in the proposals' su'bmitted to the customer organization.
Some firms are notor-Ious in doing this and the huge cost estimation
errors cited in Chapter .3 are in part due to this factoro Other
firms regularly attempt to accurately anticipate the project costs
and forewarn their potential customers of the full expectations.
Still others manage to be "conveniently" optimistic, in varying degrees,
at the time of proposal preparatdon,
The effects of these various shades of corporate integrity on
the outcome of research and development projects were studied by
means of our simulation laboratory. Using our typical project model,
the factor denoting the firm's integrity characteristic (the Integrity
Coefficient of the Firm, ICF) was changed from one project run to
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another and the results recorded belowo We first notice that the
firm's integrity has relatively small effect on project completion
status, cost, or the firm's profitso But as the integrity factor
Integrity Project Firm's
Coefficient Cost Profit Completion
of the Firm ($ x 106) ($ x 106) Status
1000 2908 106 100% at month 130
0090 29 103 100% at month 130
00'75 28 100 100% at month 132
0.50 28 202 only 91% completed
0035 17 103 only 47% completed
Table 10-60 The Firm's Integrity versus Project Results
continues to be lowered, as the firm intentionally underestimates
its expected costs by a higher degree, the results become more dra-
matically different. At the 50% level of integrity, at which point
the firm initially bids only half of what it expects the project to
cost, the project gets stopped shortly prior to completion, with the
customer having spent as much money as was needed to get a finished
project in the 75 percent integritycaseo In the last case indicated
in the table, the results are more severely changed, with the project
getting less than halfway toward its objective before being cancelled
by the customer.
How does such project behavior result fram changes only in the
firm's bidding influences? Let us look first at the 50 percent integ-
rity·caseo Here the Birm initially received customer support by
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underestimating project costs by a factor of two. With this initially
low cost estimate, the customer was persuaded to begin supporting the
project a little sooner than in the Chapter 8 case study, but at a
funding level commensurate with the firm's "halved" request. The
firm, in turn, began to staff its organization and work on the pro-
ject at the level provided for by its Rand D contractual support.
For a period of time, the firm continued at this project effort in-
tensity without seriously revising its funds request. This is caused
by three reasons: (1) given the recent low bid submitted by the firm,
it would appear very suspicious and in general would be very awkward
for the firm to immediately revise this cost estimate sharply upward;
(2) during the early stages of the contract even the lower available
funds are adequate to meet the firm's expenditures and little pressure
exists on the firm to immediately obtain more funds; and (;) the firm
orten succeeds in convincing itself, after a few months of working
under the contract, that what it requested is really. not far out of
line after all and there is no serious need for revising the funds
request.
But as the project qontinues and the firm begins to more clearly
recognize the amount of effort needed to complete the task, it also
more. clearly feels the need to acquire additional funds. A higher
rate·of effort is needed and the available funds are inadequate to
support such a buildup. Thus, the firm begins gradually to request
more funds, which action in turn forces the customer to revise his
earlier project cost estimate now based largely on the contract bids.
Not only does the customer require more time now to rebudget his funds
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and allocate more to the project, but also the customer now has less
confidence in the over-all suitability of the project. As time pro-
gresses the customer realizes the declining value of the potential
product in contrast to the rising cost expectations. This project
re-evaluation leads to a lessening enthusiasm of the customer for
the project with an attendent stretchout of his project funding. As
the customer "takes more time to think over" the project situation,
his perceived value drops even further and results in project cancel-
lation by the customer.
Thus, here is a case in which the lowered integrity of the firm
caused the cancellation of the project prior to completion. The cus-
tomer is certainly penalized by this policy of the firm, but the firm
does not necessarily suffer equally. In terms of profits, Table 10-6
shows that this project, because of early funding and custom~r ,repay-
ment of almost all the engineering costs of the firm, resulted in
higher net profits than any other case presented. To be sure the
eventual project failure may cause much greater losses in business at
a later date, but these are neither shown nor certain.
In the final situation listed i~ the table, wherein the firm
understates by approximately a factor of three, the project effort
remains at such a low level relative to its needs for such a long
duration that cancellation results before the job gets even half com-
pleted. From this example, and the preceding discussion, we can
clearly see the significant impact that the firm's integrity can have
on research and development project outcome~o Within a limited range,
the simulated project histories showed variations in the firm's integrity
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policy or behavioral characteristic can mean the difference between
project success and failure. The firm itself does not necessarily
suffer immediately from this policy. Therefore, the company manage-
ment which seeks short-term profits under our existing contracting
system may well be influenced to intentionally underestimate project
cost requirements. Most government and industry people working in
the research and development area recognize this practice to be domi-
nant. To solve this problem, either industrial leaders must take a
more long-range view of the determinants of corporate sucess (which
may be naive hope), or major changes must be made in our system of
Rand D contracting to provide a structure of motivations and evalua-
tion that will eliminate the wisdom of this industrial practice. New
research programs are now beginning in this latter approach.
Resource Limitations of the Firm
The final characteristic of the firm to be examined in this
chapter is the availability of resources to the firm. Principally,
we think of financial resources in this regard, and we shall limit/
our investigation in the present chapter to this area. But limita-
tions on the availability of skilled personnel are also potentially
important, and shall be studied in Chapter 12. The amount of funds
which the firm has available in general, or a specific dollar limit
on investment in a single project, does certainly influence the activ-
ity level of any self-supported engineering program. Whether such a
limitation is serious or not is illustrated in the next table. The
variable factor in the three projects shown was the time at which
Timing of Funds Project Firm's
Availability Cost Profitg Completion
(month) ($ x 106) ($ x 10 ) Status
0 26.8 1.3 100% at month 135
~ 27.5 0.9 100% at month 133
60 16.5 1.1 only 47% completed
Table 10-7. Effect of Financial Limitation of Rand D Projects
adequate funds for project investment became available to the firm.
The results:show that if the firm is not financially able to support
an early and steady engineering program in a new area of technology,
th~n the later bettering of its financial situation may be insufficient
to allow project successo Not only does the "table demonstrate the po-
tential importance of funds resource, but moreover it again emphasizes
the need for the firm's undertaking of project risk by its own support
of engineering activitieso The lack of funds denies the possibility
of such risk assumption by the firm and has its effect through this
indirect channelo ,In addition, we observe that here too the short-
term profitability of the various projects is not such as will of
itself induce the firm to try to make funds available earlier. This
therefore suggests a further needed change in contracting policies to
give incentive to companies to provide early funding for research and
development projects.
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Summary
This chapter inquired, through use of our typical research and
development project model and the computer simulation laboratory
approach, to uncover the extent to which the firm1s various charac-
teristics influence project success. The first characteristic
studied, the over-all quality of the firm, was found to be quite
consequential in its effects, and particularly noticeable as this
ability declined. Both in its direct effects on estimate accuracy
and engineering productivity and through its indirect effects on
various organizational response delays, this quality factor was shown
to be as dominant as the earlier discussions hypothesized. The will-
ingness of the firm to accept risk and invest its own funds in pros-
pective projects was also critical to project outcome, especially
below some needed threshold value of risk-taking propensity. The
same type of conclusion is justified in the case of the firm1s
contract bidding integrity. Here, too, variations in this character-
istic of the firm could cause'the difference between project suceess
and failure. The need for the firm to have sufficient resources to
undertake early project sponsorship was also developed in this chapter,
as was the fact that the previous job-size experience of the firm has
almost no effect on project outcome. The latter was a denial of our
hypothetical claims and provoked the type of soul-searching that is
itself a beneficial result of this mode of analysis.
CHAPTER ,XI
THE CUSTOMER'S INFLUENCE UPON PROJECT SUCCESS
In the preceding chapter the fact that the firm'can strongly
influence the outcome of research and development projects was clearly
established 0 This chapter shall inquire into the same kind of question
with respect to the customer and prime financial supporter of the R
and D efforto Since, in general, the firm rather than the customer
l\s ';th.e·doerof the actual r-esearch and development work, we should expect
that the influences of the customer will be less direct and perhaps also
less critical except at extremeso
The Quality of the Customer
The first point which we can examine in regard to the above
contention is the effect on project behavior of the customer's over-
all qualityo In the model this characteristic influences only the
accuracy of the customer~s initial project,\!cost and value estimates.
With just these factors active, the customer quality variation has
almost zero effect on project outcome, as shown in Table 11-1 below.
Quality of Project Completion
the Customer Cost Date
(percent) ($xl06) (month)
30 2901 130
60 2900 130
100 2806 130
Table 11-10 Direct Influence of the Customer's Quality
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This table does not say, however, that factors certainly related
to the quality of the customer are not important. One factor associated
with the customer's quality that does seem to be important is the delay
in the customer's response to the firm's request for funds. This delay
influences both the customer's cost expectations which are based on
funding requests and the customer's processing of the requested funding
change 0 The higher the quality of customer organization, the more
rapidly the customer will be able to achieve these thingso This results
from consideration of both: (1) the paper-processing time, which wred-
tape period" is no doubt reduced as the customer's abilities are increased;
and (2) the delay in getting approval from higher-ups, which is also
probably reduced as the lower-level customer organization earns more
of the confidence of its superiorso In any event, Figure 11-1 illus-
trates that this delay in the customer's response to requests for funds
can significantly alter the outcome of Rand D projectso Using the
typical project mode'l, the delay was changed from the six months figure
used originally and the results recorded with respect to completion date,
cost and customer satisfaction. This in!tial delay value of six months
is about average for a wide range of projects but is definitely low for
the larger Rand D undertakingso From the graphs we see that the custo-
merls delay in processing the funds requests has its greatest effect on
the date of project completion, and upon the customer's satisfaction
which largely derives from this timing. This effect is most noticeable
in the range beyond the original six months delay, for which range the
completion time shoots up from month 131 to month 1,0 (for DRRFC = 13.,
months) and beyond that to time = infinity" since none of the simulated
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projects got completed for longer funding delay valueso For smaller
jobs, of course s the completion, cut-off value of the funding delay
would be much longer. Since the costs remain relatively unchanged
(the highest cost is less than 10 percent more than the lowest cost),
the customer's satisfaction drops almost continuously as the time of
completion is postponed and the perceived product value declines.
Two features of these results are particularly noteworthy. First
of all, the shape of the project cost curve demonstrates that some
policies may appear to work well up to a point, but further extensions
of them can be disastrous. For the range up to a delay value of nine
months, the main effect of lengthening customer approval time is to
postpone the major project engineering activities until further techno-
logical advances can be utilized. The completion date is delayed by
a few months and the customer satisfaction index begins to decline, but
neither change is very large and the satisfaction index is, of course,
intangible 0 Thus the most obvious measurable result is that costs some-
what decline. But as the customer delay is further increased, the cost
savings are quickly wiped out by the inefficiencies of the stretchout,
the completion date jumps sharply, and the satisfaction index drops
quickly toward zero 0 Now the measurable cost changes are more apparent
and are disappointing to the customer, the delay in project completion
becomes obvious, and the over-all customer disappointment with the pro-
ject is SUfficient to also become near-tangibleo Among other things
this illustrates the fact that the cormnon process of evaluating proje~t
performance by the most readily attainable, traditional, and tangible
measures may well mislead research and development managers, both in
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industry and government, to institute or extend policies actually
harmful.
The second<feature of these results that bears noting is that
here is an area of customer behavior, controllable at least to large
degree by the customer himself, in which the customer9s actions bring
about proglect failures. Government, particularly, should therefore
recognize that the slow-downs and postponements of project activities
that are orten caused by the delays in the customer's funding procedures
can themselves be critically damaging to research and development proj-
ect outcomeso
Another aspect of the customer9s operations, which also reflects
his over-all ability of planning and carrying out a new project activity,
is the customer9s scheduling of project programso Whether the customer
tries to get a project completed in one, two,three, or more years is an
indication of how much he really understands about the scope of the job,
and also shows his recognition of the timeliness of the project. For
our typical project model, we have simulated the effects of the customer's
attempts at scheduling the project duration. Table 11-2 shows the results
of four simulated projects, in which the nonmal project duration (NPD)
was varied from on~ to four years lengthol The indicated results clearly
show that the customerus intended scheduling has not been accomplished.
1 .In our project model, NPD does not precisely represent the
scheduled duration of the projecto Instead it is the scheduled time-
constant of the project, which .is equivalent to the time required to
complete approximately two-thirds of the projecto This time-constant
concept is analogous to the half-life concept used to describe the
radioactive dec~ of an atomic particleo
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Scheduled Peak
Project Project Customer Engineering
Duration Completion Cost Satisfaction Employment
(months) Status ($xl06) Index (men)
12 100% at month 130 3005 067 . 823
24 100% at month 130 2804 07 477
36 100% at month 135 2503 06 335
48 only 82% completed 2006 --- 221
Table 11-20 Effects of Customer Scheduling of Project Duration
Halving the scheduled project time from our original value of two years
to but twelve months made no improvement at all in the date of comple-
tiono Slowing the intended project schedule down by an additional
twelve months only increased completion time by five morrtha, These
facts are true in this case because the factors really dominating the
timing of completion exist apart from ihe scheduleo Completion time is
far more influenced ~ §Y.Qh factors .§§. the company's risk-propensity
!m9. cmality ~ the customer gs funding delayp all of which have been
discussed earlier, and ~ the ability of the firm to expand its or~ani-
zation more rapidly,9 which will be discussed in the next chapter , But
the customergs scheduling decision does have distinct effect at the ex-
treme,9 in that its prolonged extension, in this case to forty-eight
months, is too long and the project suitability fades away before the
job can get done,9resulting finally in customer cancellationo
The most obvious effect or the scheduling period is on the
stability of the firm's engineering organization, and secondly on the
project costs which at least in part relate to the formero The crash
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program suggested in the one-year schedule forces a very high bui1d-
up of the engineering organization, followed by a very rapid decay of
engineering employment. This effect of the customer's schedule on the
peak size of the project team is continuously observable in Table 11-2,
with the stability of engineering activities increasing as the intended
project duration is prolonged.
The effects shown in the above table are even more pronounced when
the f~rm is able to respond more quickly to the customer's desires. In
Figure 11-2 the results of variations similar to those described above
are shown for a modified project situation in which the expansion ability
2of the firm's organization has beeen greatly enhanced. The general shift
in all the results, occurring because of the change in the firm's expan-
sion ability, can be ignored until Chapter 120 It is sufficient here to
note t~at the over-all conclusions of these runs are unchanged from
those derived from the Table 11-2 results above, but indeed have been
made m6re obvious. The major effect still lies in the stability of the
size of the engineering organization, which stabilization takes place
as the customer allows more time to get the job done. Secondly, deriving
in part from the engineering stability, the project costs decline as
scheduled project duration increases. The cost change is more pronounced
in these projects than in the examples listed in Table 11-2 largely be-
cause of the wider variation in organizational size, and to sane extent
2The Training Efficiency Index, TEl, was changed from its
normal value of 1 and set equal to 20;, the same value that was used to
produce the results for the "size of project" simulations that were
illustrated in the first part of Chapter 90 .
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because of variation in the date of actual completion which permitted
different degrees of utilization of the advancing state-of-the-arto
Because of these factors, the customer satisfaction curve also shows
a greater degree of variabilityo
For the particular set of project characteristics sused here,
referring especially to the combination of the project size, intrinsic
value j and technological change inputs, these studies show that a
ma.xim:wnperceived return on the customer v s investment, which we have
defined as our measure of customer satisfaction, is achieved for the
two-year project time-constanto This single resulting value could
certainly be changed if a different set of inputs were used, although
the characteristic nature of the resulting curves would remain sub-
stantially similaro This indicates that for gm given §.§1 of project
specifications, ~ particular scheduled project duration (or a narrow
schedule range) produces maximum customer satisfactiono The customer,
of course~ might want to concern himself with a different satisfaction
criterion than that represented in the grapho For instance, he might
(or perhaps should) want to maintain a high degree of stability of engi-
neering employmento To maximize this stability criterion alone, the
customer would obviously have to provide eternal funding for a fixed
number of employeeso Such a policy would, for a low fixed number,
result in ~ projects of consequence being completed while they are
still of value, and for a high constant employment level, result in a
phenomenally expensive set of end resultso The var,ying demands resulting
from different job characteristics would in addition make impossible
the continued maintenance of any fixed-size engineering organization
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without some such wastageo Thus, the customer could at best try to
satisfy ~ reasonable degree of employment stability, while he·also
tries to satisfy some 'reasonable rate of return on investment 0 Most
customer organizations tend by nature,or by the combination of politi-
cal pressures and those ·created byre~earch and development·fir.ms them~
selves, to try to meet some similar joint criteria of satisfactiono
And as we can see from the results above, even those customers which
did think solely in terms of maximizing a single criterion would be
frustrated by the real world eventso
Risk-Propensity of the Customer
The most significant embodiment of the customerRs propensity to
undertake risk is the ratio of perceived value to expected cost which
the customer demands~ before he will fully support a contemplated re-
search and development projecto The customer will not be satisfied
after project completion unless the then-perceived value-cost ratio
equals o~e or better, signifying at least that perceived value equals
expended cost, thus producing the break-even on the customer's invest-
mento Thus, if the customer is willing to start the project when
this value-to-cost ratio equals one Or less, he is staking his invest-
ment on hopes that neither cost will rise nor perceiyed value decline
or that both will no worse than proportionately change by the time
the project is completedo If the customer delays any major invest-
ment until the current value-cost ratio is greater than one, he is
showing an increased degree of conservatismo The higher the value-cost
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ratio demanded prior to major customer investment, the more conserva-
tive is the customer. The table below shows the results upon project
outcome- of this type of customer risk-taking propensity, for jobs of
two different intrinsic sizes. In the job of smaller size, the job
Intrinsic Size Value-Cost
of Job Ratio Demanded Project
(effective man- by Cos~ Completionyears of effort) Customer ($xlO ) Status
1 28 100% at month 131
500 2 2804 100% at month 130
3 18 only 48% completed
1 '. 3401 100% at month 133
600 2 23.1 otU:.y55% completed
r.
3 1605 only 35% completed
Table 11-3. Customer Risk-Taking Propensity
with more "cushion~ in its built-in value-cost relationship, reducing
the investment criterion from two to one has no significantly noticable
effect either on cost or completion status of that project. However,
when the customer i.:nsiststhat perceived value be equal to;three times
expected cost before he will support the proje~t, the customer delays
the funding to the point where the project is doomed. For the larger
job, in which the justifiability of the research and development project
is more limited, the increased conservatism of the customer has its
effect more quickly. Here, moving even to the investment criterion used
as the "normal" above, a criterion which sought projects whose perceived
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value equaled 200 percent of their expected cost, is sufficient to
cause project cancellation. Thus, .in all cases, the lower degree of
customer risk-propensity makes less likely the successful completion
of an Rand D undertaking. In projects basically marginal in charac-
ter, this characteristic is more quick to make itself evident in dooming
the potential success of the projectso Thus, here is a policy of the
customer which can well be self-defeating to the customer's own desires
for project satisfaction.
Previous Experience of the Customer
In the preceding chapter the previous size-of job'.exPerience ot~~the
firm was found to have almost no influence on project outcome. Given
this fact and the already-illustrated less direct effects of the custo-
mer on many aspects of research and development, we might perhaps expect
the customer1s previous experience to be similarly lacking in importance.
This is true for a broad range of job-size experiences of the customer.
However, as Table 11-4 on the following page demonstrates, when the
customer1s average previous job is large, relative to the current task,
the effectiveness of this influence does become apparent.
The effect of customer conservatism described earlier in this
chapter demonstrated that a more conservative attitude of the customer
tended. to delay his support of the project, retarding the·rate of
staff build-up and job progress 0 Under strong influence of this conser-
vatism, the delay was sufficient to prolong the work on the job until
the product no longer appeared worthwhile to the customer, and project
cancellation took place. Here is another example of a customer charac-
teristic which achieves its effect in much the same manner.
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Average Size of
Previous Jobs as
Percentage of Current Project
Job Size Cost· Completion
(percent) ($xlO6) Status
5 2901 100% at month 130
40 29 100% at month 130
8205 2809 100% at month 130
150 2806 100% at month 131
175 29.2 100% at month 135
200 1907 only 54% completed
Table 11-40 Previous Job-Size Experience of the Customer
Th~ customer's experience with larger jobs in.~he past influences
hiM.to overestimate the magnitude and hence the cost of the simulated
task. This'increased cost estimate reduces the estimate of over-all
suitability of the project for customer investment. As this discour-
aging. (for the project) influence increases, the Job progress begins
to be delayed to the point that the date of completion comes later
(at month 131 and 135 in the table). Finally, under sufficient con-
straint due to lack of early customer willingness to invest in the
project, the work delay is long enough that the job enters into the
time zone of a seriously reduced value-cost ratio and the job is fin-
ally cancelledo
The most important aspect of the customer's previous experience
is the influence of the induced high customer cost estimates on the
firm's actions. In the case of customer over-estimation of p~oject cost,
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the firm senses the fact that the likelihood of customer support of the
project is lessened. Hence, the firm's willingness to invest its own
funds in the project also declines. For these reasons, we have here
the case in which the customer characteristic, at its extreme, has
more effect on research and development behavior than the comparable
characteristic of the fir.mo This results both from the strong in-
fluence of the customer's funding on the timing of the phase of major
project effort and from the indirect discouragement provided to the
fir.mts own risk acceptance.
Resource Limitations of the Customer
The financial resources of the customer provide the funds required
to get the project accomplishedo What happens, then, when the custo-
mer lacks such funds? As we did in the Chapter 10 exploration of the
firm's resource limitations, so too have we in this chapter simulated
a set of research and development projects in which the timing of the
availability of funds to the customer has been variedo The results
appear below 0 They show that the fact that the customer had no avail-
able money made no difference, as long as this problem was solved by
Timing of Funds Project
Availability Cost Completion
(month) ($xl06) Status
a 29 100% at month 130
40 29 100% at month 130
60 29 100% at month 130
.80 1606 only ;0% completed
100 10; only 2% completed
Table 11-;. Effect of Customer Financial Limitation on
Research and Development Projects
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month 60 of the simulated situationo However, beyond this point lack
of customer money resulted in overt failure of the projecto
The results imply, in the first three cases entered in the table,
that the fi~ls assumption of risk and undertaking of effort with its
own money was sufficient to bring about project success, as long as
the customer finally got its funds by month 600 In these cases when
the customer did get his funds, he still felt the project worth sup-
porting, did so, and the jobs got completed without change in final
outcome 0 When the funds were further delayed in becoming available,
the lack of financial support from the customer between months 60 and
80 was sufficient to retard project progress to the point that even
though the customer finally did begin providing money at month 80, the
job never got doneo The work was slowed to the point that the decline
in the customerls recognition of project value came about sooner than
di\d/the decline in expected additional costs to complete the project.
Thus, stretch-out and later cancellation occurredo
In the final case shown in Table 11-5, the full 105 million dollars
expended on the project was invested by the firm, with his self-supported
engineering activities on the project increasing from one man up to
twenty-two men at the peak, before gradually cutting back these activi-
,tieso All of this engineering work took place prior to month 100, when
the customer received his funding. By that time the firm had eliminated
the project program, and the then apparent value-cost relationship made
the project unattractive to the customer.
From these latter two cases we see that at its extreme the custo-
merls resource limitations can affect research and development perfor.mance.
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The effect took place somewhat sooner when it was the firm (and not
the customer) which lacked these resources. This was due to the cru-
ciality of the initial firm-supported staff build-up, which we have
examined under several contexts earlier and which we shall again see
in Chapter 12. However, the customer funding itself does not seem
needed at early stages of a project life cycle, as long as the customer's
attitude towards project potential is encouraging to the firm. This
reinforces our finding in the previous section about the influence of
the customer's previous job experiences. If the lack of customer funds
is accompanied by the attitude that such funding availability is un-
likely, even in the future (a situation not represented in our current
project model), then the effect can be more serious over a broader
range of variation.
Customer Confidence in the Firm
The final characteristic of the customer that was listed in
Chapter 7 was the customer's confidence in the firm. This confidence
basically determines the extent of influence that the firm's cost and
value estimates will have on the figures which the customer uses for
decision-making purposes. The customer's confidence in the firm also
limits the customer's estimate of the technical effectiveness of the
firm in carrying out the contemplated project. As we can see in Table
11-6, this customer characteristic, too, is important to over-all re-
search and development results only at its lowest values. It acts in
a way similar to the customer's risk-taking propensity. In fact, one
could argue that to at least some extent any.organization's confidence
in another is a function of the former's willingness to accept risk.
447
Customer Confidence Project
in the Firm Cost Completion
(percent) ($xl06) Status
100 29 100% at month 130
80 29 100% at month 130
60 28.9 100% at month 130
50 28.8 100% at month 131
40 20·4 only 57% completed
30 16.3 only 42% completed
Table 11-6. Influence on Research and Development Results of the
Customer's Confidence in the Firm
Regardles~ of such similarity (or lack thereof), the results clearly
" .
show that unless the.customer's confidence is low, relative to the
maximum' possible confidence, value, this characteristic of the custo-
mer will not be influential.
Swmnary
Of the customer characteristics studied in this chapter, only
three factors, two of which were closely related to the customer's
over-all ability, seem to have significant influence throughout their
full range of operation. These factors are the customer's funding de-
lay, his scheduled project duration, and his risk-taking propensity as
manifested in his project selection criterion. All of the other poten-
tially influential characteristics, inclUding the customer's previous
job-size experience, resource limitations, and confidence in the firm,
did not have effectiveness over a broad range of situations. To be sure
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many customers consistently operate within some,one or more of,these
critical value ranges. Our discovery that close consideration of such
customer factors is needed only under such limited cases, however, is
itself an informative conclusion.
CHAPTER XII
ORGANIZATIONAL REO.UIREMENTS OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The three preceding chapters have reported the results of ex-
plorations into the determinants of research and development project
dynamics 0 These studies have focused, respectively, on the influence of
characteristics related to the Rand D product, the firm, and the custo-
mer. The course of conducting and analyzing such studies, however, has
forced recognition of a different source of influences upon project
outcomes--the organizational requirements deriving from the process of
research and development itself.
Expansion of g Technical Organization
The process of research and development of new or significantly
improved products or techniques requires the project organization to
include sufficient number and breadth of technical manpower to carry
out the tasko In military Rand D in particular, this demands growth
of the project staff from the one or more engineers who initially under-
take exploratory studies in the product area to the several hundred men
oftentimes needed to successfully complete the job. In any area of new
technology, or of significant departure from the firm's previous work
specialties, the firm's ability to expand the technical organization
is inherently limited by its existing capabilities. If, for instance,
as often happens, only one man has pioneered the new endeavor in the
firm, he is the only one in the firm with the necessary background
upon which the organization can deve'lop, Initially, much of his
time will be needed to recruit, train, and/or supervise others
entering the project. This type of problem, the transfer of know-
how from one person to another, the translation of individually-
thought objectives and technical approaches into mutually understood
goals and methods, is inherent to the process of research and develop-
ment.
In our typical project model, we assumed that on the average
every two fully experienced engineers~ by devoting about 30 peroent
of their time, could help five new engineers reach the average effec-
tiveness of their more experienced colleagues in a duration of eighteen
months. Any of these figures are subject to debate, but there exists
no reason or data that should lead to rejecting them as not plausible
for many Rand D projects. Moreover, on several occasions in the past
three chapters, we found that the effects under study became more apparent
when the firm's flexibility was enhanced by adjusting its ability to ex-
pand more quickly. Thus, it seemed that this expansion ability of the
organization might be an important characteristic of research and develop-
ment projects. The results below strongly confirm this belief.
In the table are shown the outcomes of simulated project time
histories for jobs of different basic sizes, using first the normal
expansion ability of the firm and then increasing it by a factor of
ten. This was done by changing the Training Efficiency Index (TEl)
from one to ten, indicating that an experienced engineer, with the
same basic effort and time requirement as before, could now assist
the development of ten times as many new engineers. Such a test,
while surely stretching the limits of plausibility, helps provide added
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;Intrinsic Size
of the Job
(effective man- Training Project Customer
~ears of engi- Efficiency Cost Completion Safisfaction
neering effort) Index ($x106) Status Index
500 1 29 100% at month 130 007
10 62 100% at month 88 300
600 1 1603 only 26% ---
10 76 100% at month 102 104
800 1 1308 only 16% ---
10 9205 100% at month 106 008
Table 12-1 Effects of Expansion "Ability of the Firm on Various Size
Research and Development Projects
insights into the process under investigationo Under the greatly
increased expansion ability, jobs previously left incomplete are now
completed, jobs previously finished are now done much soonero To be
sure, there isa trade-off between time and money, and the first set
of jobs indicated in the table shows a doubling of cost under the new
conditions. Despite this, however, the much earlier job completion
leads the customer to be far more satisfied with the new resultant.
This leap from a normal expansion effectiveness by a factor of
ten is no mean feat to achieve, and is most likely a practical impos-
sibility. It is of interest therefore to see what lesser and more feasi-
ble improvements might produce. In Figure 12-1 are displayed the results
of a series of simulated typical projects, in which the training effi-
ciency has been changed from one run to another. The unidirectional
changes apparent in the graphs are impressive. As the expansion ability
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increases, the completion date continuously draws nearer, costs
continuously rise as a partial offset, but customer satisfaction
nevertheless also continues its upward advance, all in a nonlinear
manner 0 These results clearly show the importance of the technical
organization's ability to expand rapidly without suffering greatly
from the pace of expansion. Th~ sensitivity of project outcome to
this process characteristic is at least as significant as the response
to any other characteristic studied thus far.
However , it is unreal to think that by will alone a firm can
greatly change its staff size without encountering at least transient
loss of same of its engineering effectivenesso As but one kind of
problem. that is typically encountered, let us see what happens when
the firm's increased expansion ability is accompanied by a decreased
engineering effectiveness of the new recruits. obviously, some tempor-
ary decline will also affe,ct the more experienced engineers who will be
needed more and more to double check the work of the new additions to
the project or to assist in their over-all training and indoctrination.
We can neglect this factori however, and still gain a good idea of the
general results of rapid expansion of an engineering team.
In Table 12-2 are pictured results that demonstrate the typical
distinction between an orderly, smoothly growing project group and a
crash project, expanding quickly and at least temporarily losing some
effectiveness. The more rapid expansion approach still gets more of the
job completed, or the entire project done sooner, but the cost increase
is higher and the customer satisfaction only questionable improved. Com-
pared to.the entries of Table 12-1, these new figures show a far less
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Intrinsic Size
of the Job
(effective man- Project Customer
y-earsof engi- Program Cost . Completion .Satisfaction
peering effort) Type ($xl06) Status Index
400 Normal 26.8 100% at month 135 0·4
Crash 69.5 100% at month 106 1.0
800 Normal 13.8 only 16% ---
-'
Crash ,91 only 49% ---
Ta.ble12-2 "Crash" versus "Normal" Project Management
Approaches
favorable trade-off between time and money 0 This is due to the
decreased engineering effectiveness of the new recruits which decrease
accompanied their rapid absorption into the organization .0 This ~·type
of occurrence is what we expect and experience in any crash program--
Atlas, Polaris, Mercury, and also in many lesser known Rand D programs.
The job gets done sooner--usually--but at\the surrender of many added
dolltrso If the need for the project results is urgent, the more
timely completion is sometimes well worth the effort. But in some
situations the lowered efficiency and the resulting mushrooming costs
can make the crash program less justifiable. At times this haste is
even self-defeating, producing great customer (and Congressional) dis-
satisfaction and even project cancellation.
Management Policies·to Effect Needed Expansion
The studies outlined above have demonstrated that one characteristic
of the process of doing research and development work, the need for
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efficient absorption of new people into the Rand D organization,
is of critical importance to project behavior. What beside wishing
can Rand D firms and their customers do to handle this problem. area?
Two approaches seem feasible within the existing organizational frame-
work of most research and development oompanies: (1) the firm can
attempt to reduce the training time of the new engineers on the pro-
ject, making them able sooner to undertake full productive respon-
sibi1ities,inc1uding giving assistance to other new personnel; (2)
initial project study.groups can be staffed in larger numbers, thus
providing a broader base for project growth 0 A third alternative
might r~quire rather sweeping changes in corporate organizati.on to
increase mobility and rapidity of adjustment to a new work configura-
tiono A proposal along the latter lines has been presented by Jay W.
Forrester in his recent booko1
Decreasing the Training Time
Let us examine the first alternative in more deptho We have
assumed that in about eighteen months the average new engineer coming
into a project can be developed to the point of nearly equal effective-
ness with the other engineers in the organiz~tiono Some studies to
which we earlier referred suggested that this period·1asted·only six
months, whereas others have argued for as much as three years. Cer-
tainly the different experiences of different organizations working
in.different technological environments can readily explain such
1Jay Wo Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge: The
MoloT. Press, and New York: John Wiley and.Sons, Inca, 1961), ppo 329-3350
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variation in the estimates. For our purposes, it is not important
to settle upon a si.ngle agreeable "training period for the simulation
model. Rather, we should seek to find out what differences in out-
come might result from the various assumptions, and further to sug-
gest what procedures might lead to the more desirable results.
In Figure 12-2 are shown the results on the typical project
model of various training time requirements 0 The curves show that
the project outcome is extremely sensitive to the delay in develop-
ing new engineers in the organization, with the completion date and
customer satisfaction being particularly responsive. Additional simu-
lated projects not shown on the graph establish that with the given
set of project characteristics, a training time longer than eighteen
results in project cancellation prior to job completion. For a delay
of 22., months, 44 percent of the job is done; training time of 27
months results in only 26 percent completion; and a 36-month training
period produces but 13 percent job progress. These figures, too, empha-
size the nonlinear sensitivity of the project outcome to this training
time period. Furthermore, although a different initial set of project
characteristics would have led to other specific values of the mea-
sured results, the curves and the conclusions would have appeared
similar in nature, thus emphasizing the generality of the observed
phenomena.
Thus, in research and development work the many months needed
to.develop new professional talents constitute a vital influence upon
Rand D project behavior. Companies working in this field should ob-
~iously strive to reduce this time period. The new proj ect which "can
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draw on engineers available elsewhere within the firm is greatly aided.
A similar advantage accrues to the firm which locates itself in a
strongly technically-populated geographic area. Whenever skilled indi-
viduals who require less break-in time are accessible, a decreased
period of indoctrination and personnel development is needed, and
beneficial 'results accrue to the project.
In the technological development which is radically different
from its predecessors, very few eXperienced. engineers are likely to
have skills or knowledge significantly transferrable to the new area.
From what we have observed above, it becomes obvious that in such a
situation the project growth will take place very slowly, with both a
low rate of absorption of new people and a long time period to develop
their skills. Such has been the experience of many Rand D-type projects,
including our own Industrial Dynamics Research Group at M.I.T.
One obvious danger of jumping to conclusions about the implica-
tions of the above simulation reseults is that one is liable to attempt
reducing the formal or informal indoctrination time, without making
extra effort to accomplish the same effectiveness of the training.
If the reduced training time is accompanied by a diminished product-
ivity of even the trainees, the results may be disappointing. This
is demonstrated in Table 12-3 below. As was mentioned before, for our
'chosen project specifications the 22.5-month training period results in
only partial completion. If, however, the firm could reduce the train-
ing period to eighteen months, for example, without lowering the effec-
'~yeness ~f the program, the project would be succes~fully completed.
On the other hand, as is also shown in the table, a decrease in
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Training Effectiveness Project Completion
Time of Cost status
(months) Trainees ($ x -106)
• • > -
. . . . .- .... - . - . - .
2205 Normal 16 only 44%
00"" . .- . .~ . -"' . - , ..... '- . "'. "-' . . . .. ... -,
18 Normal 28.9 100% at montli'130.
1$ Lowered 20 only 37%"
.. eo .... ", ... - .. ,. '." ~ ~.' ~ _. ..- . - .. .. • r'·
9 Normal 3008 100% at month 112
9 Lowered 33 100% at month 114
Table 12-30 Changed Training Time and Trainee Efr~ctiveness
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effectiveness which accompanies the decrease in the training period
might do more harm than good, resulting in the expenditure of more
money and the accomplishment of even less progress on the job. If
lowered effectiveness of the new engineers necessarily goes along
with a shortening of their time of training, obviously a more sub-
stantial reduction in the training time must take place for any given
decline in effectiveness before the change can reap a desirable out-
come for the -project 0
Increasing the Initial Staff Size
The second alternative suggested above as a means to cope with
the need for organizational expansion in all Rand D projects was for
the firm to staff initial study groups with more engineers. This
would provide a larger base of people exploring the problem area of
interest, developing a mutual understanding of the difficulties in-
volved and of the means to accomplish project objectiveso It should,
therefore, allow ror more rapid project expansion. But, to what extent
can this be effective?
The curves of Figure 12-3 show that, to perhaps. even a surprising
degree, a higher initial staff size can have excellent effects upon
research and development project results. The ability to get the job
done sooner is greatly enhanced by the bigger "push" initially and,
despite higher costs accruing from use of a less-developed technology,
the customer satisfaction with the project is still much strengthened.
In the typical project model that was used in Chapter 8 and as·the basis
of all the exploratory studies reported in the other chapters of Part
II of this work, each project1s beginnings were assumed to stem from
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one engineer. His initial work, comb1ned with other knowledge and
beliefs of his company management, led to the gradual increasing
of staff on the project and eventually to the major activity phase
of the research and development project life cycle. For the simu-
lated runs used in Figure 12-3, however, the initial "research" staff
was set in different projects at a level of as many as ten people,
producing the graphed results. The greatest effects take place for
the first few increments in staffing. Moving from the situation of
one man working only half-time (not shown on the curves) to one man
full-time changes the job from only partial comple tion to one which
is fully completed but with some accompanying customer dissatisfaction.
Adding one .'more man to the initial staff brings up the customer's per-
ceived value received to beyond the "satisfaction break-even point"
and also reduces the completion time by eleven months. These results
perhaps demonstrate the "critical mass effect" of an initial threshold
level of engineering effort concentration that is needed to "get the
ball adequately rolling~'. Beyond this number, the still further in-
creases in initial staff size do cause more benefits, but at a gradu-
ally decreasing rate of change.
Especially when viewed from a practical light, the outcome of
these tests of initial stafr size effects seem encouraging. For
example, staffing an initial project atudy group with three men in-
stead of one man produces results comparable (in terms of completion
date, cost, and customer satisfaction) with cutting the over-all engi-
neering training.ttme down to nine months while avoiding any decreased
effectiveness. The higher staffing, however, can reasonably be accomplished,
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given the availability of somewhat more money and manpower initially,
whereas the severely decreased training period is highly unlikely,
particularly without serious counterbalancing effects on engineering
productivity 0 Again, from a practical viewpoint, the results bear
upon management decisions as to how many men to put on a preliminary
study contract, or as to how many different projects a limited engi-
neering staff should try to keep activeo
Since the implication of these results is that research and
development firms should be induced to accept higher risk on any pro-
ject through larger initial manpower and monetary commitments, the curve
of net profit to the firm, also shown on the preceding figure, is of
interest 0 It demonstrates the existence of very little short-term
financial incentive for the firm to adopt policies beneficial to the
customer's derived utility from his research and development supporto
It seems reasonable that the customer's policies, therefore, with re-
spect to his criteria for awarding contracts and/or for setting the
rate of compensation for research and development projects, ought to
reflect an attempt to encourage these apparently desirable staffing
practices 0 To an indefinite, relatively insignificant, and grossly in-
cons~stent extent, such a policy does get followed by government contrac-
ting agencies tod~o This practice needs great strengthening before its
potential effectiveness can become realizableo
One way of summarizing the results of the two policy approaches
suggested here is to examine the relative effectiveness of the two in
meeting the same objectiveo Figures 12-2 and 12-3 show, respectively,
the effects of training period and initial staff size on project cost
and completion time, and the satisfaction of the customer with the
project outcome. Since, at least theoretically, a research and develop-
ment project is sponsored by a customer to satisfy the needs he recog-
nizes, the customer satisfaction criterion seems a good one for analysis
of the effectiveness of the two approaches. To achieve this resultant
each of the curves was examined to find which value of training time
(or initial staff size) produced customer satisfaLtion indices 1, 1.5,
2, 2.5, and 30 The training time and staff size values for each index
number then served as the horizontal and vertical axis coordinates of
the new Ftgure 12-4. These points were joined to form a tradeoff curve
which shows, at each point, the alternate policy parameters which can
achieve the same customer satisfaction result. The curve shows, for
example, that in our typical project simulation either a training time
of about seven and one-half months or an initial staff size of about
four and one-half engineers can achieve a customer satisfaction measure
of 2, which indicates a perceived 100 percent rate of return on the
project investment.
The tradeoff curve emphasizes not only that "there is more than
one way to string a cat", but also that the relative desirability.of
the two alternatives can be subjected to analysis. If it is equally
difficult to shorten training time by one month (while maintaining
training effectiveness) as it is to increase the initial staff by one
man, then the slope of the tradeoff curve indicates the more effective
policy approach. When operating in the region to the left of point A
on Figure 12-4, decreasing training'time would produce better results,
while increasing staff size would be more effective to the right of
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point Ao This particular analysis, however, is not correct, since
it is extraordinalily more difficult to cut the training period by
a month than it is to add another engineer initially. But the general
methodology outlined is meaningful and with a much greater input of
effort than seems appropriate here could be extended and applied to
tradeoffs between other policies, using perhaps other objective cri-
teria, as well as to the example demonstrated.
Effects of Organization Size
In our Chapter 5 discussion of engineering productivity, the
size of the engineering work force was cited as influencing the organi-
zation's effectiveness, pointing out the inefficiencies which arise
as the organization grows.2 Problems of poor communica1io,n,organi-
zational inertia, strangling red tape, and low motivation of engineers
all plague the typical large project group. To be sure, some excep-
tional organizations avoid these size effect problems. MOre usually
firms suffer from the size inefficiency effects. The typical project
model studied to this point~ however, did not directly include any size
influence on the productive effe~tiveness of the engineering team.
Now~ to see if this factor really matters, inefficiency due to the size
of the engineering manpower force shall be introduced and studied.
Previously, the engineering output of the firm depended upon.the
number of engineers~ distributed according to experience and project
utilization, t~e relative productivity of each engineering category,
the percent of engineers not at work due to holidays or sickness, etc.,
2Ro Bo Kershner, "The Size of Research and Engineering Teams",
IRE Tr~nsactions on,Engineering Manag~ent·, VOl.EM-5, No.2(June 195~) ~ po '35~
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the available state of.the technological art, the managerial ability
of the firm, and the engineers' experiences on the current project.
T~ this, we now add consideration of an over-alI- inefficiency due to
sheer size of the organizationo3 The figure below.pictures.our assump.;..
tion as to the size effect on organizational efticiencyo As the size
o~ the organization grows, its work efficiency decreases, slowly at
3 The initial engineering productivity formulation is pic-
tured in Figure 5-7 and developed in Equations 5-59 through 5-66. The
engineering output rate itself was written as:
ENPRFoKL = (UTEFoK)(MEPIKoK)(RPEWFoK)
We now write instead:
ENPRFoKL = (UTEFoK)(MEPIKoK)(RPEWFoK)(SEEFoK)
SEEFoK ~ TABHL (TSEEF, ENGRFoK, 0, 750, 50)
12-1, R
12-2, A
TSEEF* = 1/1/095/0875/08/07/0625/0575/055/054/053/
052/051/050/05/05
ENPRF--ENgineering PRoductivit~rate of Firm
(effective man-months/month)
UTEF--Utilized Technological Effectivenes~ ~t
Firm (percent) .
MEPIK--MUltiplier to Engineering Productivity
, . due to Increased Knowhow (pe~cent)
RPEWF--Relative Productivity of Engineers actually
Working at the Firm (effective man-~opths/month)
SEEF--Size Effect on Efficiency of the Firm (percent)
TSEEF--Table of Size Effect on Efficiency of the Firm
(percent)
ENGRF--ENGineeRs at the Firm (men)
The table values of TSEEF are taken from ,Cthecurve of Figure 12-5.
T~e values correspond to engineering organizations whose sizes range
up .to 750 men, This limit is incorporated in the SEEF equation '
through use of the DYNAMO TABHL function which treats all input values
as if they <lie in a permissable t~ble range.
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first, then diminishing more rapidly as the size gets still larger,
and finally tapering off to an over-all effectiveness equal to half
the normal amounto No evidence exists to either substantiate or
refute this or any other curve of efficiency versus size of organi-
zationo The existing curve will serve adequately for our exploratory
studies 0
EFFIC.l E Nc' 'f
fv\vLTIPL.IER
'.0 (SEEF-- %)
o.'1S
o.SO 0 ' .. __ •• __ •• _. __ •• ._, __ ._._. o ._. .. ::::__ ~ •• ---------
o 15'0 300 "00 ?S'O
NUMBE~ 01=' E'lVc&INlrEei:S
(eN6"Rr: -- MeN)Figure 12-5 Size Effect on Efficiency of Firm
Three s~ts of analyses were made of the project model with the
size effect includedo The first of these examined the size effect's
influence upon project re~ults~ when the basic scope of project is
varied in magnitudeo In Figure 12-6 the ou~puts of this set of simu-
lations is compared to Figure 9-1, in wh~ch extensive variations of job
magnitude sans size effect were reportedo Many of the obvious exp~c-
tations can'be observed hereo First~due to decreased efficiency as the
organization grows, every job costs mor-e to get done, Secondly, for
reason of th~ same lessened efficiency, every job is completed at a
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later dateo Third, customer satisfaction is accordingly reduced
on all jobs, for reasons both of the higher costs and the delayed
completion, hence lowered finished product~value perceivedo Finally,
the lowered satisfaction of the customer causes him to cancel a greater
number of the projects, some of which did get completed under our
earlier considerationso What perhaps was not expected is the fact of
the great similarity in the nature of the new resultant curves with
the earlier outcomeso Costs, for example, do not rise non1inearl~
upward due to the decreasing effectiveness, as might have been assumed.
Nor does completion time soar as jobs get bigger and organization size
larger 0 In the cases illustrated here the non-tforganization-sizetf
influences on the project seem to determine the characteristic nature
of the results,-with the s;i.zefficiency factor affecting only the mag-
nitude of the results~
The second type of effect examined under the added pressure of
engineering size inefficiency was that of the expansion ability of the
firm, s~own earlier in this chapter in Figure 12-10 Again, as can
readily be seen from the next diagram, Figure 12-7, the size inefficiency
of the firm causes increased cost, delayed co~pletion, and decreased
project satisfaction by the customero But again, although the scales
may be shifted, the.basic charac~er of the researCh and development
results is unchangedo
The final variation attempted, using t~e organizational size
effect on efficiency of engineers, was to test the response to changes
in customer scheduling of projecto This again causes higher costs
and later completions, wit~ attendant lowe~satisfactiono Again this
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takes pl~ce without disturbing the basic nature of the earlier
results that were produced with no size inefficiencies. Here in
Figure 12-S, we have also shown the peak engineering work force
utilized with and'without size effect on engineering efficiency.
The lower efficiency results show that many more engineers are employed
on the project, causing gre~ter disturbance to the job market. than in
the full efficiency cases.· Once more, however, this ch~nge'appears
more as a shifting of the curves rather than a real modification of
their charac'ter,
From these experiments, o~e can conclude that the effect Qf in-
creased organization si,zeon project results, even when one directly.
assumes decreased effectiveness accompanying increases in size, is of
a scaling nature only. The basic character of all the output curves
drawn, ari-dthe conclusions drawn iniearlier chapters, are not at all
affected by explicit recognition of organizational size inefficiencies.
This factor was thus appropriately left out of the typical ~roJect model
and should not concern research, and development managers, except to the
extent they believe that,they can limit the size of their project teams
to below several hundred people. In the larger projects such a demand
will require a new organizational approach, a different project schedule,
or a very lengthy absorption process that will ~aintain engineering effec-
tiveness despite organizational size. Further consideration of all or
these alternatives is beyond the scope of our current efforts.
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CHAPTER XIII
SUMMING UP AND LOOKING AHEAD
This chapter will perform two functions, providing a sunnnary
of the major conclusions of the preceding work and a designation
of that further study and research which now seem needed as a
result of this investigation. The summary -is divided into four
sections: (1) a restatement of the dynamic systems theory of
research and development projects which formed the basis of this
study; (2)-a brief review of those factors relating to the research
and development product, customer, firm, and process which emerge
from the simulation studies as vital in their consequences to
project behavior; (3) a discussion of the additional findings of
this research effort which appear important to those both in
government and industry who formulate and administer the policies
of research and development; and (4) an analysis of the general
applicability of this study approach and results to all types
of research and development undertakings. The additional studies
recommended in the latter part of this chapter are themselves divi-
ded into iwo parts: (1) suggested extensions of the model-building
and simulation approach utilized herei to add more depth or breadth
to investigation of -research and develop~ent management problems;
and (2) data gathering and analysis undertakings which seem necessary
to pinpoint more exactly the sensitive parameters and critical
policy variables of research and development.
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!Dynamic Systems Theory of Research and Development
The chapters of Part I described and the results of Part II
verified the validity of a dynamic system theory of research
and development project behavior. This system encompasses inter-
actions between the manifested characteristics of the research
and development product, the firm, the customer, and the pro-
cesses relating to the nature of the work itself. These inter-
actions take place continuously in the context of the life cycle
of research and development projects. This life cycle was pic-
tured in the following
COMTI1'.JUOUS
R'EhL wORlJ'
INPuTS
i
'PERcEfTION
OF- "NEe]:) FoR
TH£ PRoDuC.T
Figure 13-1 Dynamic System Underlying Project Life Cycles
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Its closed-loop activities include several stages, ini-
tially sequentially phased in time but becoming a continuously
ongoing set of activities once the project has gotten underway.
These activities include:
1. the perception of the need for a new product by the
customer and/or the firm;
2. the estimation by customer and/or firm of the amount of
manpower effort required to develop the product;
3. the estimation of costs corresponding to the expected
effort requirements;
4. the firm's request for financial support by the customer;
followed by?
5. the customer's evaluation of the funds request with res-
pect to the expected cost-value character of the proposed
project,? leading to the commitment of customer funds in
those projects which continue to further stages of develop-
ment: or,
6. instead of, or in addition to, the request for funds from
the customer, the firm may initiate the investment of
its own funds in the project;
7. the undertaking of project-oriented effort, including the
hiring of an engineering staff;
8. ·the employment of the technical staff and the consequen-
tial accomplishment of job progress;
9. the attempt at assessing the degree of project progress;
477
10. the reformulation of project effort estimates and value
estimates, based on the newly achieved project ~ow-how,
producing re-evaluation of the suitability of the project
for continued customer and/or firm investment; and finally,
11. the continuation of the ten activities indicated above
until the desired results are achieved and the job is
completed, or until the project is cancelled at some
stage prior.to job completion.
Since these general activities contain within them the elements
of research and development life cycles for projects both large
and small, the representation of research and development requires
detailed descriptianof only those ten phases. This general re-
presentation was accomplished in the chapters and appendices of
Part I.
Factors Q£ Consequence in Research and Development
By means of the simulation experiments described in Part II
the key influences upon research and development success and fail-
ure were isola~ed and studied in depth. The··factors of consequence
emerging from these studies can conveniently be grouped into four
categories: (1) those characteristics relating to the product under
development; (2) t"hecritical factors involving the research and
development firm; (3) the customer's determinant aspects; and
(4) the influences resulting from the very process of doing re-
search and development work.
Turning first to t~e product its~lf, research determined that
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three basic factors were important influences on the outcomes
of research and development projects. These characteristics
were: (1) the intrinsic job size of the product, measured in terms
of the amount of effective engineering effort demanded by the size
and complexity of the task; (2) the intrinsic product value, mea-
sured by the amount of money an all-knowing society should be
willing to pay to receive the product benefits at any given time;
and (3) the state of the product technology, also called the state-
of-the-art or the technological progress, which factor contributes
to the changing potential effectiveness of engineers who are
working on the project. All three of these factors were thoroughly
explored by use of simulation investigation methods and all were
found highly consequential to project behavior.
Five characteristics of the firm were then studied to deter-
mine their importance to research and development. Of these,
three were found to have major significance over a wide range of
variations: (1) the over-all quality of the firm, which directly
influenced the firm's estimation ability and engineering produc-
tivity, and indirectly affected most of the time delays in per-
ception 8.udaction; (2) the firm's willingness to accept risk,
or the firm's risk-taking propensity, as measured by the percentage
of expected J)1"o"fits--a company would invest in a proj ect prior
to contract receipt; and (3) the integrity of the firm, Which
indicates the extent to which a firm would admit its internally-
held project cost estimates to the customer during the bidding acti-
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vities. A fourth factor, the financial resources of the firm, was
found to be important only under conditions of extremely prolonged
financial limitations, which had effect by preventing the firm's
exercise of its normal- risk-assumption function. Finally, a
fifth characteristic of the firm, the average size of the firm's
previous jobs, was shown in the simulations to have no effective-
ness except for slight cost influence. The earlier theoretical
assertion _that this factor is important can be borne up only to
the extent (possibly considerable) that the previous. job-size
experience affects the style or strategy of doing the jobS'which
variables were omitted from the model representation. These re-
sults do not question the importance of the previous experience
of the firm with respect to the areas of technical activity.
Such experience largely determines at least the initial technical
effectiveness-of the engineering organization and is no doubt
significant to research and development results.
The customer characteristics were also investigated in
the simulation phase of this Industrial Dynamics study of research
and development management. The results, as reported in Chapter 11,
showed that project results are sensitive over a wide range of
variation to but very few aspects related to the customer. For
example, while the direct effects of customer quality on job out-
come seem almost nil, the indirect effects, as manifested in the
length of the customer's funding delay, are consequential to pro-
ject results. In particular, the project completion date responds
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in a sensitive manner to changes in the customer's funding
delay. FurthermorE7, the risk-taking propensity of the custo-
mer can have substantial effect on research and development beha-
vior, with conservatism by the customer being particularly able
to doom a project to failure. The other customer factors stu-
died are important only at their extremes: a very large average
size for the customer's previous jobs can harm project results;
an extreme (more so than for the firm) lack of funds by the cus-
tomer can doom a project; and extremely low customer confidence
in the firm can affect project results.
Finally, .two problems which seem to relate to the process of
doing rese~rch and development work were also investigated. The
first area~ that of achieving rapid-enough expansion of a technical
organization was found to be of critical importance. Two possi-
bilities for achieving the required expansion ability, namely,
(1) decreasing the training time period for new engineers, and
(2) increasing the initial size of the engineering organization,
were explored and found to be able to strongly influence the .
project results. The second problem, that of decreased effec-
tiveness due to the size of the project organization, was also
studied. This added source of inefficiency was found to contri-
bute only a scaling effect to the previous project results, with-
out significantly altering any of the chzracteristic behavior
produced in the projects.
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Findings of Importance to Research and Development Policy~akers
This study of the dynamics of research and development has
been no doubt both long and involved for the people reading. It
seems especially vital, therefore, before concluding, that those
findings of particular import to managers of research and develop-
ment firms and to their customers be brought into focus here. These
findings are of two types: (1) some general observations about
research and development projects; and (2) specific conclusions
which pertain to the factors of consequence to project results,
which conclusions may recommend specific policy moves.
A first general observation~ discussed earlier in this chap-
ter but repeated here for emphasis, is the apparent importance of
the project life cycle concept used as a basis for our inquiry.
This orientation to the ongoing interconnected circular flows of
activities in a research and development undertaking provides
some handles for getting a better grasp, an improved insight,
into research and development operation. In looking more closely
at these entire cycles, one can make another observation of interest
\
regarding the perhaps surprising length of the typical time-duration
of the complete life. This length results from the necessary
inclusion in the life cycle of that preparatory portion wherein
little activity or even thought may be obvious to the random
observer. But proj ect life cycles do include a very lengthy
startup time, usually not recognized, during which period custo-
mers and firms begin to recognize the potential value of a pro-
duct, begin the 'actions ~~ading towards t~e product's development,
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begin to process the initial funding requirements,· and finally
begin recruiting, training, organizing, and making productive
an engineering team. All of these ought to be recognized as
integral parts of the project process.
A second general conclusion is that timing considerations
seem very consequential to research and development decisions.
In particular, whether a project gets completed or instead gets
cancelled by the customer seems to depend upon the timing of a
critical perceived value-cost ratio by the customer. Furthermore,
if, very early in the product value life cycle, the cost is expected
to became low enough to produce a favorable value-cost ratio
(given the customer's investment criterion), then the project
will be funded and probably ultimately completed. If, however,
the favorable value-cost relationship is not perceived until
much later, then it is likely that this relationship will become
unfavorable before the project has a chance to be completed,
then i?ducing customer cancellation of the project.
Another observation of a general nature relates to the denied
similarity between one factor's label and its implications. Spe-
cifically, the scheduled project duration had very little influence
upon determining the observed project duration. This is particularly
noteworthy since the most widely acclaimed current management fad
is P.E.R.T. (Program Evaluation Review Technique) and the closely
related critical path schedul.Lngmethods. Here, the whole con-
cern is with continuous project schedule redetermination with speci-
fication of expected project bottlenecks. This whole approach,
with apparently no proven merit to research and development
has received wholesale approval, with attendant incorporation
into contract specifications, of the government customers of
research and development. It is significant to note then that
our investigation showed that the factors which really dominate
the timing of project completion exist apart from the intended
schedule. Project completion time i.§far ~ seriously influenced
:EJ such factors ~ the company's risk-taking propensity and general
quality, the customer's funding delay, and the ability of the
firm to expand its organization rapidly while maintaining il§. .
effectiveness.
With respect to the latter reference to the impor¥ance of
efficient growing capability of a research and development firm,
the observed costs of this growth prnnp~~ deserve mention. In
tyPical(prooect~r sim4~ted .th.e'-,cbsts>due;td needed growth of the
" ,'-.',_ •• '.' ' ...• '.... tc,
organization added about 70% to what the project might optimally
have cost. These costs are divided between the direct supervisory
and training costs for the new personnel and the indirect costs
attributable to the lowered effectiveness per new engineer. These
growth-dependent extras thus constitute about 40% of the total
actual project cost. Such an observation commends the advisa-
bility of both managerial attention to and corporate investment
in the process of engineering training and development and in
fact in the entire approach to project organization.
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One final general problem seems worthy of comment. It
seems likely that the common process of evaluating project per-
formance (in fact, most corporate activity) by the most readily
attainable, traditional, and tangible measures may well mislead
~esearch and development managers into instituting or extending
policies that are actually harmful. This is illustrated by the
experiments on the effects of the customer funding delay. Stretch-
ing this delay out somewhat did in fact reduce costs slightly;
i.e., ,by not rushing into,the project the customer delayed major
activity until a more advanced technology helped produce a small
savings in effort and cost. If the cus~omer realized that the
lengthened delay produced the lowered costs he would likely con-
tinue or even further extend this policy. Moreover, because
costs are tangible and easily accounted, it is likely that the
customer would in fact become cognizant of the policy results.
The diminished countervailing factor, the perceived product value,
could possibly escape notice because of its lack of solid measure.
Thus, by relying on the available and traditional cost measure of
performance, the customer is liable to be misled into believing
that a lengthened funding delay is effective. Should he further
this policy, as was shown in the simulation studies, the customer
would eventually discover that this policy wipes out the previous
cost savings and, more importantly, significantly delays project
completion and produces heightened customer dissatisfaction.
In concluding these general comments it seems appropriate to
comment on the model-building and computez: simulation approach used
in this study. This inquiry demonstrates the feasibility and
effectiveness of such an approach even to those areas of socio-
economic activity which are laden with intangible but consequen-
tial influences. This applies not only to the management or
research and development but also to other top-level corporate
areas. The model-building sharpens the precision of ideas rele-
vant to the area under investigation, while the simulation brings·
out clearly the dynamic :l.ntel!r'elationshipsof the system and allows
innnediate determination of the implications of changed hypotheses ~
The specific conclusions derived from the study are organized
to coincide with the corresponding factors of consequence to
resea,rch and development that were listed earlier in this chap-
ter. The first set of these conclusions relate to the intrinsic
product size. The investigation pointed out that as projects
increase in their basic size (and complexity) three tendencies
exist: (l) total project costs increase; (2) completion is achieved
at a later date; (J) decreased product utility remains when it
dQes become available. These characteristics tend to produce
decreased customer satisfaction on larger 'projects, leading to
gross disappointment on some jobs, a feeling that the final pro-
ducf is "obsolete" on still other tasks, and actual cancellation
on some other projects. The feeling of obsolescence really indi-
cates that the customer perceives the product value as being very
low compared to earlier beliefs as to what this product would
be worth when ready, or, even more likely, compared to what the
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project actually cost.
The costs in research and development projects of the same
general type seem to proportionally change as the intrinsic magni-
tude of the task changes. This phenomenon was observed in the
simulation studies even when inefficiencies due to organizational
size were added to the picture. But whereas cost shows this
linear cause-effect relationship to job size, both the project
completion_time and the customer satisfaction measures display
nonlinear saturation-type effects as projects grow in basic job
size. This shows, at least beyond some point of research and
development project size, that completion time and customer satis-
faction are relatively independent of the size of,task.
Three major conclusions can also be drawn from the experimen-
tal variations in the intrinsic product value: (1) the consequence
of a change in the intrinsic product value inputs are far ~
significant :YllYl the degree of change itself~ (2) these results
are largely dependent on the time-variation of the perceived
value-cost relationship, more than on either cost or value alon~;
and (3) changes in the value input produce important indirect
effects on such things as completion dates and project costs due
to the direct influence of the value changes on the over-all pro-
ject schedUling. The initial conclusion here shows the extent
of amplification which exists in the research and development sys-
tem, making small shirts in society's underlying need for a pro-
duct have large effects on project outcomes. The second observation
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points up the fact that intrinsic product value has no necessary
relationship to the intrinsic magnt.tude of the job. Hence, pro-
duct value has no necessary relationship to the cost of achieving
the product. Thus , it is important to note that while value and
cost are independent of each other, it is their effect in combina-
tion that is the critical influence on evaluation and funding
decisions, and on ultimate customer satisfaction. To add more
clarity to_the observed third effect of value on the system, let
us review the result of an assumed lowering of the input value
curve. With lower initial growth of perceived product value
accompanying this lowered input, enthusiasm for the proj~ct is
slower in building up and is lessened at any point in time. This
retards funding and hence effort on the project, thus causing later
job completion. In this manner perceived value at the time of com-
pletion is lowered by two factors~ first, the initial assumed
lower input; and second, the lowered va:J.ueresulting from comple-
tion at a later point on the declining value curve. Thus, per-
ceived value at completion time is doubly damaged, and customer
satisfaction falls correspondingly.
The final product-related characteristic that was found sig-
nificant was the teclmological progress. It has an important influence
not only on the effectiveness of the engineering effort, but also
on the perception of expected project cost and on the investment
decisions which depend on that perception. For the project situa-
tion in which related technology appears to be at a standstill,
neither the customer nor the firm is apt to be moved toward early
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enthusiasm about the project prospects. In the more usual case
of rising technological progress, the changes in technology create
influences upon the cost estimates of both customer and firm.
These participant organizations expect further technological pro-
gress and lowered costs, and they enter a project, to at least
some extent, on the basis of expectations that a favorable value-
cost relationship will occur in the near future. Without such
progress o~curring, the rationale for a projected lowering of
costs is missing. With technological progress goes one of the
important influences help~ng to get projects under way early
enough to end in successful (and satisfactory) completions.
The second source of the system characteristics of impor-
tance to these conclusions is the firm doing the research and
development work. Its most vital character is its basic capa-
bility which permeat.ee rthe firm's operations • Relatively small
changes in the over-all ability of the firm produce far more
signific~t results on projects, the extent of this amplification
factor increasing nonlinearly as the firm's ability declines.
Thus small improvements in the existing capability of research
and development firms can produce very important successes before
diminishing returns to such improvement efforts begin to become
important considerations.
The ne~ characteristic or perhaps policy of the firm that
is very important is risk-taking. By risk-assumption alone, a
finn can in some cases change a venture from failure to success.
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Some projects, of course, are just inherently too big and costly
to ever be completed, regardless of the degree of risk-assumption
by the firm, unless a major upward revision should first occur
in the value structure of the customer. But in those projects
in which the dangers of loss to the firm are greatest, i.e., those
which are least cushioned in terms of their potential value-cost
relationship, the influence of the firm's risk-assumption on re-
sultingpr~ject behavior is also greatE3st. Increased risk-taking
by the firm gets jobs finished sooner for those which do reach
completion, and pushes progress to a further point even for
those projects which get cancelled before completion. This
effect of risk-assumption on project completion is a nonlinear
one, with some minimum threshold level of risk-taking needed
before significant changes in results begin to occur. Added hesi-
tation due to more conservatism (L.eo, less willingness to accept
risks) does s~e~~t lessen project costs, since project t~ing
is delayed and the firm uses a slightly advanced technology
on the job. The cost savings due to conservatism do not canpen-
sate for the loss in product utility caused by its later avail-
ability. One difficulty in all this is that a dire lack of
funds may prevent the firm from following the risk-assumption
policies needed for project success.
From a policy-maker's viewpoint it is interesting to note
that whereas risk-taking by the firm does definitely advance
the customer's interests, the firm's profitability on the parti-
cular project is not similarly aided, and .in fact seems lessened •.
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,There' is then a conflict between the customer's project satisfac-
tion objectives and the firm's profitability objectives. The cus-
tomer must therefore modify his policies so that it is also bene-
ficial to the firm to undertake needed risk. Some change in con-
tracting policies is desired that will provide incentives to com-
panies to make available early funding for research and develop-
ment project.s, One way of doing this "is 'to':offer a higher per-
centage fee to a company which has invested its own monies in
the project. Or, the customer could adopt amore generous atti-
tude towards repayment of certain risked expenditures of the firm.
Other changes might include the suggestion of a broadly-based
reorganization of the entire customer-firm relationships in re-
search and developmento This latter idea is beyond the scope of
this discussion.
Another characteristic of the firm which has vital bearing
on policy-making is the firm's integrity 0 A low integrity, re-
sulting in significant underest~ates of project cost, can produce
job failure. It does this by inducing a reduced initial rate of
funding and engineering effort, and a slower initial rate of job
accomplishment, thus delaying recognition of ~ expected costs
until a time when these costs are more likely to appear unfavorable
relative to the perceived product value. This phenomenon causes
project stretchout by the customer and cancellation 0 It is inter-
esting to again call attention to the simulation results which
showed that the firm do~s not suffer in its profits from low integrity
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in the short-run, whereas the customer's desired project satis-
faction is decreased by low integrity of the finn. Thus, the com-
pany management which seeks short-tenn profits under the existing
government contracting system may well be influenced to inten-
tionally underestimate project cost requirements. Here, too, the
goals of the finn and those of customer seem in conflict, given
the rest of the contracting system relationships. To solve this
problem, either industrial leaders must take a more long-range
view of their self-interest (which may be a naive hope), or major
changes mustb,~ made in our system of research and development
contracting. Such changes should provide a structure of moti-
vation and evaluation that will encourage industry adoption of
a high-integrity policyo This action would, of courseJ have
effects on general business ethics, which effects, of themselves,
seem worthwhile.
The customer's effects on the project resUlts offer other
areas for policy formation. .An initial problem arises out of
consideration of but one .manf res'tatdon of the customer r s ability,
i 0e., his delay in approving funding requests 0 If this delay is
too long» it can cause project failure. Government, in particular,
is guilty of acting to induce slow-downs, postponements, and the
general uncertainty which results from the tangles of red tape.
One approach towards solution might include shifting the center
of customer project 'responsibility and decision~aking down closer
to the work-interface between customer and finn. It may also be
wise to shift these customer activities to the -part of the organ-
• I
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ization intended to use the product.
Another customer ability relates to the customer's project
scheduling. Project scheduling time particularly affects the
stability of an engineering organization, and also affects the total
project cost. Too short a project duration results in tremendous
cost and manpower utilization inefficiencies that historically
seem to accompany a crash project. However, dragging a project
out over too long a period can result in its never getting accom-
plished 0 Too long a scheduled duration delays achievement until
the product value.has almost vanished, and sometimes even to the
point of producing project cancellation. Thus, it seems that
customer satisfaction would best be served if some middle range
of project duration is utilized. For any given project size, such
a desirable time scheduling is at least in theory determinable.
Another policy of the customer which can serve to defeat his
own ends is a low risk-taking propensity. This policy makes less
likely the successful completion of a research and development
undertaking.
ThA simulation ·studies also pointed up the fact that if the
customer's past experience with large jobs leads him to initially
overestimate the cost of the project under consideration, the firm
is influenced into believing that little likelihood exists for
customer support of the project. This induces a lessened willing-
ness by the firm to invest its own funds in the project, causing
the same problems which arise from a low risk-taking propensity
of the firm. This example again highlights the system of inter-
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relationships between customer and firm through which the custo-
mer's beliefs and practices, operating upon the firm's attempts to
meet its own objectives, affects the decisions and actions taken
by the firm. This same phenomenon is confirmed by the finding
that customer funding itself is not needed during the early
stages of a project life cycle, as long as the customer's atti-
tude toward project potential is encouraging enough for the firm
to undertake risk-assumption.
The final source of infonnation important to research and
development policy~akers is the series of'studies of the research
and development process which emphasized two aspects3 the process
of organizational growth and the effects of organization size.
The most obvious conclusion of these studies is that the over-all
expansion ability of the finn very sensitively influences project
outcomes; the more rapidly the effective growth can take place,
the more satisfactory the project r~sults·are to the customer.
The problem exists in trying to grow while maintaining engineering
effectiveness3 since if even the effectiveness of the trainees is
decreased because of the increased rate of expansion, '~s obviously
occurs in most crash programs1 then the project results are no
longer obviously desirable.
Two possibilities for achieving a more rapid growth process
were studied through model simulation. These investigations demon-
strated that reductions in the time required for engineerin~ training
and development would meet the needs for more rapid organizational
expansion. Part'icular1y the project completion date and customer
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satisfaction are extremely sensitive to changes in the engineering
training delay. Thus, in research and development work the many
months needed to develop new professional talents constitute a
vital influence upon project behavior. Companies doing work in
the research and development projects can strive to reduce this
time period by locating in strong technically-populated geographic
areas, by developing competence within the firm which can be
drawn off ~o nurture new projects, or by attempting new organi-
1zational approaches to the whole problem. It is not an easy
task, however, to reduce the engineering absorption time without
suffering some loss of engineering effectiveness. The simulations
clearly showed that under such conditions of diminished effective-
ness of the training program a decrease in its length may well
do more Harm than good. In addition, the curves were used to pro-
duce a tradeoff curve, showing comparative effectiveness of the
two policy approaches (shortened training time and increased ini-
tia1 staff size) on the customer satisfaction criterion.
An alternate way of achieving more rapid project growth was
also tested. The alternative used, a higher initial staff size,
was found to have exce~lent effects on research and development
results. The greatest effects take place for the first few incre-
ments in staffing. This demonstrates the "critical mass effectlt,
1 As one example of an organizational framework different
from What is usually encountered, see Forrester's Industrial Dynamics.
pp. 329-335.
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namely that an initial threshold level of engineering effort con-
centration seems necessary to "get the ball adequately rolling".
These results are important to management policies regarding the
number of men to assign to a preliminary study effort, and with
respect to the number of different projects a limited engineering
staff should try to maintain. The very interesting fact about
these findings is that whereas the reductions in training time
mentioned above might be near-impossible to effectively attain,
the increased staff size is clearly dependent only on the avail-
ability of the necessary support funds and personnel, both easily
within the realm of implementation.
A final observation with respect to this latter policy for
accomplishing organization growth is that the higher risk required
of the firm by the increased initial staffing is not rewarded
by higher project profits to the firm. Therefore, again, the cus-
tomer's objectives of project success are in conflict with the
firm's profit objectives. The government customer must eliminate
this conflict by changing existing policies for a~rding contracts
an~or for setting the rate of compensation on projects to encourage
research and development firms to adopt these apparently desirable-
to-the-customer s~affing practices. The firm with a longer-range
view of its self-interest might well see the wisdom of adopting
such.staffing policies even without encouragement by the customer,
since the increased likelihood of customer satisfaction with the
project results will no doubt eventually bene~it the firm's own
success through improved reputation and increased business oppor-
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tunities with the customer. The customer, however, should still
seek to alleviate this source of cOnflict with its own objectives.
In addition, the curves were used to produce a tradeoff curve,
showing comparati ve effectiveness of the two policy alternatives
(shortened training time and 'increased staff size) on the custo-
mer satisfaction criterion.
General Applicability of the Results
This study of the dynamics of research and development has
emphasized projects performed by a company for a government custo-
mer on a military or quasi-military product. This approach seems
to have value for such a situationo But what of other kinds of
research and development projects? To what degree can the methods
used and conclusions established here be extended to other research
and development environments? The answer is that almost all re-
search and development projects can be treated by the broad sys-
tems framework and the basic life cycle descriptions adopted.
Even the conclusions as to factors of consequence and most of the
policy-oriented observations and recommendations have general
applicability.
To argue this claim let us examine, very briefly, other
classes of research and development activities. First we can
take the case of the project performed by a commercial product
development company for another fi~i as sponsor and customer of
the development effort on an industrial or consumer product. Here
we encounter exactly the same system as before. The customer and
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the firm are two distinctly separate organizations from all.for-
mal considerations, each with the same class of characteristics
described earlier in the military research and development case.
The product, be it for govenunent, industry, or consumers, can
be described by the same characteristics used before. To be
sure, the product might not be as technologically complex as the
usual military product. On the other hand, if we think about
some commercial computer systems or industrial precision equip-
ment or anyone of our nationally-used communications networks,
we find products more complex than many military products. We
might suppose that less uncertainty as to product value would be
featured in a non-military market. Indeed, this is probably true,
but yet who in 1950~ even after successful operation of prototypes
of modern data processing equipment~ forecast the present market
value of such equipment? Or, who knew or could regard with much
certainty the demand for hula-hoops or Edsel cars? Thus, While
some of the parameters might be different in this case from those
in our more intensely-investigated research and development example
(and we cannot be very certain that they are in fact different),
the basic variables, their interrelations7 and the conclusions
dependent upon these might well be very similar.
Let us take a different kind of organizational situation,
one in which the project is performed by the product development
division of a company under the sponsorship and financing of a
manufactur-Ing division of the same company. This, too, might
be a different basic system but in fact it seems like the same
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one heretofore considered. The decentralized manufacturing divi-
sion might feel more friendly towards the company research and
development group than in the comparable military customer-private
firm case, but certainly many corporate research and development
executives would testify to other kinds of feelings for gompany
compatriots in the product divisions. No doubt many manufacturing
officers could raise questions as to their confidence in the re-
search and development group that would be very similar to those
a government customer might ask of a contracting company. The
decentralized product division might be under more pressure to
sponsor projects or more pressure to refrain from cancelling such
projects than the government customer. Even if this were true
(which is doubtful), this difference would be one of degree and
not one of basic underlying substance. Thus.9 it seems that this
class of research and development projects fits the same mold as
the earlier research and development projects studied. A similar
situation also exists when ~anufacturing and research and develop-
ment are simply separate functional organizations within the same
company or product division 0 To the extent that the research
and development project funding is determined outside of its own
function on the basis of progress and prospects, the same kinds
of relations observed earlier dominate the project life cycle.
What about the research and development project in which
the work is performed within a research and development depart-
ment on funqs allocated by the manager of the Rand D organization?
Is this not perhaps a basically different ,situation? Again the
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answer must be a definitive "No". Even here we can trace through
the entire life cycle of project activities, substituting the mana-
ger of research and development at every point we previously re-
ferred to the customer, and the project group every time we pre-
viously discussed the firm. The same characteristics of product
value versus cost, technological change, conservatism of the manager
and of the group, experience, ability, integrity, and the other
factors of_consequence, still apply in the same marmer to the
same basic decisions. The same questions as to project evalua-
tion, progress determination, funding 3 scheduling3 etc. are all
present. And again, while some of the time delays in communication
and action and other parameters might be changed, the fundamental
system principles and system dynamics remain;u:h~.isturbed.
In review, we have discussed research and development pro-
jects performed by military-oriented research and development firms,
industrial new product development organizations, decentralized
research and development departments, or project groups within a
research division, sponsored by comparable customers, and intended
-for military, commercial, and consumer markets. All of these
research and development activities seem to fit the basic dynamic
systems theory of research and development. All these forms of
research and development at least contain the elements demonstrated
to be factors of consequence in the original study. All the project
possibilities appear suited to the same methodology applied here,
with good chance that basically similar conclusions would hold for
every case. Indeed, the understandings of military-based research
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and development projects which have been developed in this investi-
gation have general applicability across-the-board to all research
and development.
The ~ for Further Extensions of This Study
The introductory chapter of this volume described the Industrial
Dynamics approach to industrial or economic problems. It consists
of several phases:
1. problem identification;
2. verbal description of the dynamic system theory
affecting the problem;
:3 • mathematical model development;
4. computer simulation of the represented system;
; 0 analysis of results to determine model validity and
factor sensitivity;
6. double-checking of and data collection on the sensitive
areas of the model;
7 • simulation experimentation to help identify improved
system parameters and policies;
8. implementation of results of investigation in the
real-world problem areas;
9 . evaluation of the effectiveness of the changes, and
return to the first term of procedure listed above
for continuing improvement if necessary.
The Industrial Dynamics phi~osophv and methodology were applied in
the study now canplete to the problems. of 'research and devel.opment
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factors.
A second extension of the approach used here might be the
addition of an explicit competitor firm~ with its own characteris-
tics, also considering the project. The contract award decision
by the customer could then be presented with more direct realism,
and the effects of various customer and firm policies then stu-
died. One would want definitely to include feedback effects
between the customer policies and the behavior of the two compe-
ting firms, as was discussed on several occasions in previous sec-
tions. Such an approach might point up more clearly the dynamics
of the conflicts inherent in government contracting practices
today~ and also provide a vehicle for studying alternative poli-
cies.
Another kind of extension that might help clarify our re-
search and development understandings would be one which visibly
demonstrated the longer-than-single-project relationships which
endure' in research and development and which certainly are impor-
tant to project behavior. For example, the customer's confi-
dence in the firm is surely not a constant parameter, as was
assumed in our single project studies. Rather, it derives from
customer experiences with the firm in a number of previous projects
and carries over, as a changing variable, from one project to ano-
ther. The firm's Willingness to accept risk might, as another
example, be dependent upon how successful a similar or opposite
policy on an earlier project is evaluated as being. For the
study of such longer-life effects it is probably SUfficient as a
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start to represent two sequential projeats between austomer and
firm. The values of many of the faators of consequence in the
seaond projeat ought then to refleat the learning resulting during
and after the first undertaking. This extension would also pro-
vide an opportunity to study the effeats of various learning delays
or behaviors in general on long-run suaaess of the austomer and/or
firm. It should 'talsoenable further study of the differenae
between long-run and short-run effeats of poliaies suah as the
risk-assumption propensity 'and integrity of the firm.
A different type of multi-projeat extension of this study
also seems promising. Instead of examining two or more projeats
in sequence, one coul.d study two or more projeats in parallel
in the firm or under the austomer's sponsorship. Here, the ari-
teria for investment deaisions aould be put into sharper foaus,
and a good opportunity would be presented for examination of the
effects on suaaess of various policies of resource allocation.
Some of the work necessary for such an extension has already been
initiated in recent theses by Sloan Fellows of the M.I.T. School
of Industrial ManagementJ but their work requires revision to put
it more in the context of project undertakings.2
2 Donald C. Beaumariage, itADynamic Model Study of a
Mili tary Product Development> Organtzation It (unpubli shed Master of
Science thesis, M.l.To School of-Industrial Management, 1960); and
Philip W. Lett, "An Industrial Dynamics Analysis of a Defense Produat
Development Organization" (unpublished Master of Saience thesis,
M.I.T. Sahool of Industrial Management, 1961).
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The final kind of Industrial Dynamics-type extension to the
basic work described in this volume is one which seeks to add
more organizational depth to some of the relationships treated
in simple aggregate form. For example, both the customer and
firm might be represented in closer form to their real vertical
structures, providing communication paths up and down the
organization, and representing various levels of information
filtering ~nd processingj and decision-making. Such a repre-
sentation could help in the examination of the effects of inte-
grity or of the reward structure on the communicated informa-
tion within the firm. It would also show up various important
internal sources of amplification within the organization. Ano-
ther area wherein more depth of representation might be deserved
is the notion of engineering productivity. Explicit recognition
of such factors as morale, work loadj corporate success3 vertical
mobility and others might turn up interesting conclusions as to
what is important to det.ermtndng the output of an R and D organ-
ization. This kind of study seems deserved on its own account
because of l the general nature o·fthe quest.Ion, and in fact, might
more readily be treated initially in a context other than that
of a research and development project.
The Need for .0000~iLlfesearch
One part of the Industrial Dynam~cs approach outlined above
is'the search for more accurate knowledge about those factors
which seem of consequence to the problem under investigation.
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Our study has suggest~d many such areas which shal~be designated
below. The first suggestion for data collection and analysis is
a gene~al one; namely, all of the factors of consequence in research
and development described early'in this chapter deserve careful
measurement under various sets of conditions. Fpr example, what
magnitude of intentional cost underestimation is present in re-
search and development proposals? To what extent do companies
risk their own funds in research and development projects? How
long does the customer usually take to process funding requests
for research and development? How rapidly are new projects in
fact able to add more engineers to their staffs without loss of
effectiveness? These and many other studies are clearly suggested
by the list of factors consequential to research and development
results 0 Some involve aspects very difficult to identify and/or
measure in real organizations. This intangibility does not deny
the need for the study 0 It poses instead more challenge and most
likely more reward to the enterprising researcher able to make
headway in those areas.
In addition to research aimed at determining the factual value
ranges for the factors of consequence, more study seems demanded
of those policies and decisions affected by these factors. Here,
the closed-loop systems theory presented in this work, and 'reviewed
in this chapter, offers the suggested breakdowns possible for such
inquiry. The activities listed on pages 476 and 477 are the deci-
sion areas influenced by the factors of importance to research and
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development. One inquiry could seek more knowledge as to how
the need for a new product is actually perceived,by a customer
or firm. Another could attempt to determine the process by which
companies estimate project costs, or decide to invest their own
funds into a project efforto All these studies are needed to
clarify the factual basis of the theory developed hereo
Hardly any competent research work has been done on any of
theseques~ions, or at least hardly any is publicly available.
The two prime data-collecting groups at work on research and
development have not yet contributed a factual base for answering
any of our questions. SCARDE (Study Committee for Analysis of
"Research, Development and Engineering) --a 'subgroup,of COLRAD,
(College of Research and Development of The Institute of Manage-
ment Sciences) has collected some relatively superficial manpower
and cost data on research and development projects, but no impor-
tant results are yet forthcoming. The second group, the National
Science Foundation, has concentrated mostly on economic-type data,
e .g., men and money inputs to research and development by company
and industry, and has so far contributed almost nothing to under-
standing or improving the process of research and development
management. Thus, the field is apparently wide open for compe-
tent students of organizations and management to make fame and 'for-
tune while helping meet a fundamental national need for research
and development knowledge.
The third kind' of research work which appears desirable is
the study of system, interrelationships in research and development.
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For example, the conclusions cited earlier in this chapter pointed
out the possibility that customer contracting policies and the
objectives of research and development companies migh~ be in basic
conflict. The author has now begun a research study (under a grant
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to the M.l.T.
School of Industrial Management) to determine the facts of this
potential conflict and to establish the system redesign that would
be necessary to eliminate such conflict 0 The system involves the
translation of organizational objectives into policies and prac-
tices, the motivation of contractor organizations and their res-
ponses to believ~d customer policies, and the effects through
decision~aking and actions of all this on contract proposals and
performance obtained in research and development 0 other systems
of in~errelationships deserve similar research treatment.
The final suggestion for research follows that phase of the
typical Industrial Dynamics approach which in fact was definitely
not applied in the current study. Recommendations for changed poli-
cies and organizational structures should be implemented and their
effects observed 0 This is the only way in which many of the poten-
tial suggestions of other research approaches can ever be tested.
Some government contracting policies which have been suggested
are not anywhere in existence. Thus, no data on comparable effec-
tiveness of one policy versus an alternative can be obtained and
evaluated until such'-real organizational experimentation is attempted.
The government and progressive research and development companies
should be willing to try different approaches to initial staffing,
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for example, or to tra~ning program management, or to project
duration scheduling, as have been suggested in this work. Such
real-world experimentation eventually must be tried before much
benefit of the entire approach used in this ~nvestigation can
be derived.
A basic tenet for management of research and development is
a belief in the value of research and development activities. Hope-
fully, such management will quickly realize the potential payoff
of research into their own functioning and organizations. Ini tial
successes in managerial research into the management of research
and development itself can serve as a springboard for research-
based managerial improvement throughout the corporation and in
our nation as a whole.
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APPENDIX A
LISTING OF MODEL AS PREPARED FOR DYNAMO SIMULATION
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ESTIMATED SCHEDULE OF PERCENT COMPLETION BY FIRM
ESPCF .K= (;TEEF.K) (ETEF.KlIBNKPF.K
FOGRF. K=TABLE (lPPGR, DPPCF. K, 0, l" 5,.1 ) T I ME-SIGNIF I CANCE OF GAP
bPPCF.K=r~AX(PPC.K'BPPCF.K).. DOMINANT COtv1PLETION
TABLE ,:OFINFLUENCE •.' OFTH'1EONGAP-RECOGNI TION
rP PGR* = 0 I 0 10 / , 05/ • 12 I • 20 I .35 I. 6 a I •80 I • 991 1 • 0/111 I II 1 I 1 .
TECHNOLOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS DUETOSTA EOF THE ART' DEVELOPMENT
T E • K= TA BL E ( T ETA 8 , TIM E • K , ° '·18 0 ,6 )
TETAB*=. 25/.25/,251.25/.26 1.271. 28/. 301'~321 ~3 51 .38/.42 1.46/.511.57
I 0 63'1•.70 I •.77 /« 82 1 • 861 • 891 • 91/ • 9 3 I •.94 I .•9 5 I·. 96 1.,9 7 I • 98 'I••99 I •99 5/ 1 • a
AVAILABLE ,TECHNOLOGICAL:EFFECTIVENESS AT THE'F1RM.
AT EF ~.K=A TEF. J+ (,DT )( RCTAF .JK+O·)
ATEF=rT~ ,
ReT AF .KL= ( 1/DT IT F L( TE. K-ATEF. K) RATE OF ·CHANGE ;OF TECH. PROGR ESS
ITE=0~25 INITIALTEVALUE
DT IT F=8, DELA Y i' I N 1NFORMAT ION '.-TRANSM I TTAL .
SMOQT:,ED TECH~OLOGICALPROGRESSRATE, .SEEN BY FIRrvl
STPRF.K=STPRF.J+fbT)(l/DRTPF) (RCTAF.JK-STPRF.J)
STPRF=O
.2-27
2-28
2-29,
2-30
2..31
2-32
2-33
2-34'
2-35,
2-3.6
2-31
3-,1
3- 2
3- 9
3-10
3-11
3-13
3-14
3-1
3-16
3-17
NOTE
~L
ft.4.N
~OJE
14N
59N
NOTE
C,il"
21R
Cr',t,
4!+'A.
NOTE
44R
NOTE
1.4 A
44A:
, C(iT
NOTE
22A
NOTE
l'2AL:,
12N
20N
26N
G';ij:
Ct"
7A
NOTE
NOTE
NOJE
ll...
12N
59N
59,N
~~N
G,,}lL.
C,;./;,,'
21A
12A
12,R,
~QTE
4:.'4 A'.:>.
59A
56A
NOTE
IL',fi'L
§N/~"
2,:lR
NO:TE
3..L,
~~,
q',::/i
eYe)";
NOljE.
1,L.;·[L
l3N.i.,
~4.N..",
.3
DRTPF=2, ,DELAY I N RESPONDING TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
ESTJMAJE OF·CURRENTTECHNOLOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS AT FIRM
EJE-f. K=ETEF. J+ (DT) (RCEEF .JK+RCP EF. JK)
ETEF,:,::(MTEF)(ENPRFl/ENAWF INITIAL T"E. ESTJMATE
INFLUENCE Of RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY ON EsrIMATE OF TECH. EFFECT.
MTEF?=l+(IWARF )(EAEEF)
lWARF=TABLE( IWTAB,WARF,O,l,0.2)
TABLE OF INFLUENCE OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT RISK ON TE ESTIMATES
IWT AB~r=-. 9/- .751 -.6 °/ -.40/ - ~25/1.5
RCEEF.KL=( l/DRTEF) (RTEF.K-ETEF.K) RATE OF CHANGE OF EST EFFECT
.DRJE.f=2 ,DELAY I N RECOGN I t. I NG T. E. AT FIRM
RTEF.K=(PRBF.JK)(BNKPF.K)/ENAWF.K REALIZED T.E. AT FIRM
RATE,OFCoRREcTrONOF PREVIOUS EFFECTIVENESS ESTIMATE
RCP EF,. KL'? ('PECBF • K·)· (ET EF. K ) /DRAAF. K·.
ESTIMATE OF FulURE TECHNOLOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS ;
EFIEf. K=ETEF. K+ (XPTPF. K) (STPRF.K)
XPTPF.K=(BPPIF.K)(NPO)J2 EXTRAPOLATION PERIOD FOR TECH PROGRESS
NPD=24 NORMAL.PROJECT.DURATION
ESTI MATE OF EFFORT REOU IRED=T EEF+ (BPPlF)( BNKPF/EFTEF)
EERF. K = ( 1 / EFI EF • K) (( TEE F. K) ( EFT EF. K ) + ( BNKPF .•K ) (B PP I F. K ) )
ETCPF.K=(EMECF)(EERF.K) ESTIMATED TOTAL COST OF PROJECT
EMECF=(MESOH)(ABSCM) ESTIMATED MONTHLY ENGRG COST FACTOR.
MESOH=ESOHRI12 MONTHLY ENG SALARY ANDOH RATE
ABSCM=Jl+o+O )./.( l-AVABS+O) ,ABSENTEE ISM COST FACTOR
ESOHR=30000 ENGRGSALARY AND OVERHEAD. ANNUALLY
AVABS=° .115 AV ERAGE ABSEN TEE ISM .
ECCPF,.j<=ETCPF.K-TECF.K EXPECTED ADDITIONAL. COST
CUSTOMER EST Ifv1AT E OF PROJECT EF FORT AND COST,
BNKPC.K=BNKPc.J+(DT.) (RGEJC.JK+O) ESTlfv1ATED JOB SIZE'
BNKPC-=(MSEC) (NLKP)' INITIAL SIZE OF JOB ESTIMATOR
IESEC~TABLE(I ETAB,PDPEC ,-1,1,0 •.2)
EAEEC~T ABLE (EAETB ,oe, ° ,1,0.1)
MSEC::=l+lEAEEC ).( I ESEC)
PDPEC?-O.175 PERCENT DEVIATION OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
QC= 0.6,. . . . QUAL I TYOF CUSTOMERSfv1ANAGE~1EN T
GEAC. K= (1/ sppec. K l (ESPCC. K-BPP·CC. K)'\ ' GAP I N ENGRG ACCOtY1PL I SH.
GENKC.K=(GEAC.K.) (BNKPC.K) GAP IN ESTliv1ATE OF JOB SIZE .
RGEJC. KL=( FOGRC. K)( GENKC. K) RECOGN I lED 'GAP! N ES T IMA TE OF JOB
ESTIMATED SCHEDULE OF PERCENTCOMP.LET ION • BY CUSTO~~E'R
ESPCC. K= (TEEF. K) (ET EC.K)/ BNKPC. K
f:OGRC.K=TABLE(IPPGR,DPPCC.K,0,1.5,.1) Tlfv1E SIGNIFICANCE OF GAP
DPPCC.K=fviAX(PPC.K,BPPCC.K) DOM. COMP. INDICAi"OR
AT EC. K=AT Ee. + (DT ) (RCT AC. JK+O)
ATEC='! TE .. '.< ,
RCTAC.KL.=(l/D !) (TE.K~ATEC.K)
?MOOTHEDTECHNOLOGICAL PROGr~ESS RATE, :5EEN BY CUSTOMER
. STPRC. K=STPRC. J+( DT )( 1 /DRTpC )(ReT AC.JK~S TPRC. J)
"STPRC::::O
DrITC~6 DELAYI.N INFORMATION TRANSMITTAL. TO CUSTOMER
DRTPC=2 'If~ RESPOND I NGTO/TECHNOLOG I CAL .PROGRESS
ESTIMATE Of CURRENTTECf.iNOLOGICALEFFECTIVENESS, BY CUSTOi'IjER
ET Ee. K=ETEC. J+ (DT ) ( RCEEC. JK+RCPEC.,JK)
ETEG ::(MT Eel (AlEC) (CNFC
MT.EC=lf(··I,WARC·),.·( ..EAEEC)
AVAILABLE T.E.
'.'.
3-18
3-19
3·....20
3-21
3-24. .
3"'25
3-26
3-28
3~29
3:"30
3-31
3-33
3-34
3-35
3-36
3-37
3-38"
3-39
3-40
3-41
3-42
3-43
3-44
3-45
3-4$'
3-47
3-48
3-49
3-50
3-51
59N
2·1R
44A
NOTE
44R
G
i\tOT E
NOTE
lAA
44A
NOTE
i~OTE
22,A
12A
l;A,
1\10 IE
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
1\10 T E
NOTE,
12A
54A,'.'.'
49R
39
ZA
NOTE
4'9r~'.
SlA
-"(,;::{! "
SIA
20A
7A
14AN01E
,\lOTl:.
12A
(ii., ,',
;.,,', .. ,.,
NOTE
I6A
NOTE
59A
G·:.:
NOTE
BIA
20A
7A r ;.'
ll..
6N
56A
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
14A,:,
4
IWARC=TABLE ( lWTAB ,vJ Ai~C,O ,1,0.2).
CNF·C=O.6.< CONFiDENCE, IN FIRM.BY CYSTOf\'1EF<
RCEEC.:KL=(l/D(~TEC)U<TEC.K-ETEC.K) RATE OF CHANGE OF EST EFFECT
RTEC. K=( PRBC. JK) (BNKPC. K )/ENAvJF • K TEAL lZED T. E .BY CUS TOMEI-<
F<AT E:OF ;COI-\RECT ION OF . PREV IOUS EFFECT I VENESS' ES T IMA TE
f~CPEC't KL =,( P ECBC. K). (.ET EC. K ) I DI~AAC. K
DRTEe = 8 DELAY IN R E CQ GNl Z I NG T. E .A T FIR t·1
INFLUENCE OF.RISK-PROPENSITY ON ESTIMATE OF TECH. EFFECTIVENESS
ESTIMATE.OF FUTURETE
EFTEC.K:":ETEC.K+J-XPTPC.K) (SIPRC.K) .
XP..TPC.K=(BPPIC.K) (NPD)!2 EXTRAPOLATION PERIOD FOR, TECH PI~OGRESS
EST I fv1ATE .OF ",EfFORT REQU IRED=T EEF+ (BPP,I C.) (BNPKC/.EFT EC)
EER C. K = ( 1 IE FT·EC • K) ( (1 EEF • K ) (EFTEe. K ) + ( BNKPC. K) (B PPIC. K) )
ETCPC.K=(Ef'ltECF)LEERC.K)· ESTIrv1ATED TOTAL COST
ECCPC.K=EICPC.K-TECF.K
fUNDING T~E RAND D ~ROJECT
THE
.,
PA C R F • K = ( 12 ) ( T C E F • K ) :8 ROJ E C TED ANN UA L COS T 0 F r~ESE A ;.\Crll
jVt RS L F • K =MIN ( E CCP F: • K, PAC r~F ,0 K ) fv1A X RES SUP P 0 R T'" LEV E L
SACR F. KL=S~v I TGH{ M,RSLF.K, 0, RF P F. K) SUPPOI~T AS LE ANNUA L RES COS T
RJ\CR F. KL=DELAY 3( SACRF • JK, DRSCF ) REQU EST ED, SUPPOH T
,TRGDF.K=lECC'.KtRACRF.JK TOTAL RES GRANTS DES'II~t:D
DRSCF=2 DELAY I REQUESTING. SUPPORT OF COSTS
·RQCPF. KL=SvJI TCH ( ROE! F • K', TRQCF • K, RFPF • K ) REQUES T ED CHANGES
RQFIF.K=CLIP,fTRQG:F.K,O,VcRc.K,ROICC) REQUESTED FUNDS INITTALLY
'iRQCF. K =TRQ I·F. K+ T RQDF. K TR I AL"r~EQ FOR CHANG ES IN FUNDS
T RQ IF. K= eLI P (R Q R IF. K ,0 , B0 R F F • K, 8 P F RF • K ) .' TRIA L R EQUE S T ED INC R •
RORIF.K=BORFF.K/DT REQUEST RATE OF CHANGE
BORFF~K=BFR~~~-RFPF.K . BIDDABLE OVERRUN IN FUNDS
BFRF.K=TECF.K+{ Ii'vli3F.K) (ECGPF.K) BIDDABLE FUNDS REQUEST BY FIRi·l
IPB IDD:\BLE FUNDS ARE. BP PERCEN T GREATEF< THANj~EQUES TED
TOTAL"FUNDS,RFPF, THE FIRM WILL ASK FOR MOF<t !'/tONEY
BPfRF.K=(BP)·(RFPF.K). BREAKING POINT·{N FUNDS REQUEST.
BP=O.05
.
1MB F • K= ( rc F (1) + (1) ( Itv1 BFl. K )+ (- I CF ). (If·1 BFl. K ) + ( 0 ) ( 0 ) I N T EG f" I TY
. AS A-M 0 D I FIE R. 0 F ,.,'BID S«B Y THE F I l~tvl
ICF=.9
I tv! BF It K:::TAB L E ( I i';~TAB' B P P C F • K to, 1 • 5, .' 25 )
I IvlTAB ,i- = 0 / 0 I 0 I ••6 0 11/ 1 / 1-
TRQDF. K=C.L IP (RQF~DF. K, 0, EURFF.K t Bp,FRF. K). REQUES TED DECREASES IN s
RQRDF • K :J - EURFF • KID T' ," RAT E "0 F CHAN GE- - Do~..;N~vARDS
lJRFF. K=RFPF. K-ETCPF.K, EXPECTED UNDERRUN I N FUNDS
Rf P F. K=HFP F. J+'.( DT') ( RQCPF • JK+O. 0 REQUESTED FUNDS FOf\ PI~()JEC T
RFPF=O; .
TCRFF.K=MAX(RFPF.K;TRGDF.k) TOTAL CURr~ENT REqUESTS FOR FUNDS
THE CU$TOMERSiEVALUA"TIONOr=:"THE FUNDS REQUEST
cUST. IS INFLUENCED BY FIRi\1--ES • OF ADD. cos r ADOPTED BY Cl!ST.
ETCAC K= ETepC. K+tCNFC)( DECFC. K) CUS rOiv1ER 1 S
3-52
3-53
3-54
3-55
3-56
3-57
3-58
3-59
3-60
4
4- 6
4- 7
4- 8
4- 9
4-10
4-:1:1
4-12
4-
4.-14
4-16 .
4-17
4-18
4-19
4 ...20.
4-21
NOTE:
31.:.<,i,
oN},
cij,:(,/,
~0~TE
}j'SR
4liA'
i~0;T'E
1J4'A
n:tOTE
rA,' '
~dTE
NOTE
i'IJOTE
]9;A
i~'dTE
5'6A
2,0',A
z:o:A
54-A
NOTE
5'8·A
I~OT,E
f~OTE
I~'OTE
1\2A
NOTE
i~(j'T,S
5:4'A
NOTE
~'L
6N
l~LI
6N
NOTE
18\
5N!~ .
41R
(r2,;~.
e': :\
,NOT E:
54R
20A
S6A
NOTE
alA
20A
NOTE
7A'
Gl-;;
G:,·
iSA,:',
NOTEiL
6N"
NOJE,
5
Dl:f=.FERENCE,,·IN KNOltJN cost ESTIIv1ATES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE
DECF;C.-K=DECFC • ..J+LDT)( 1/ DF<F<FC)tD Ecr~c • ..JK-DtCFC it oJ)
DECFC=,O, .
DRRFC~3'~;;([)ELAY; IN RESPONDI f'-lG TO' REQUESTS.For~ FUNDS
u'lFFERENCE,/JN EST I f'.1ATED COS I, ,f~ATE'··OFCHANGE
O'ECRC.KL=( I SF .K)( r~FPF. K-ETCPC.K )
ll?'F,.K::swfrGH( 0, i,RFPF. K ') IN DIGATE SA BID BY THE·F I Rflj
EVAUc.K.i:EFPVC. K+( CNFC ) (DEVFC • K) . GUS TorvlER I SINFl.UENCED ,
. ;i··:,"By,i,T-HE;FIRM' 'IN DETEI~;v11NING THE ESTIMATE OF VALUE.ACTUALLUUSED
OEVFC.;K=FSVPC.K~EFPVC.K DIFFERENCE BETvJEEN THE ESTTt·if\TEOF, 4-·27A
vA t, U E PRE SEN TED BY THE FIR j·1 AND THAT [vjA0 E I NT ERN ALL Y B Y CUSTO {\1E R
THE\"Fr:IHI\lS.ESJ;IMATESOFPROJECT VALUE Af\:E SENT TO,
THE .,c~ STOM E'R, ,';8 UGG E,RED BY THE FIR i',jS I NT E G r~I TY
,FEVPG.K= (ErvlXVF.. K)'C 1+0 e o-r- r c F)
FTRMS·'iVALUE.,EST,IMATE ,KNOV.JN TO CUSTOME~'
E'MXVF.K=f'.1AX(EF:P\lF.K,LRPVF.K); EFFEGTIVEMAX VALUATION BY FIRM.
VCRC .,~~=EVA.UC .,K;IECCP C. K r ., VAL UE-COST 'RAT 10
'. TSPIC ••K=VCRC.K/RO I CC TRIAL SR INC
ROICG=2.001 ; ;RETURN ON INVESTMENTCr~ITERIONOF ,CUSTOI\1ER.
SP,ING.K=r~I:N'('TSPr-C.K'l) SUITABILITY OF PROJECT FOR INVESTfvlENT BY C.4~32
CUSTOMEf~SWILLINGNESS'TO SUPPORT THE COSTS,OF',THE FIR~l
ItlSCFC .K=T,ABHL (PCSF, SPINC, K ,0,3:,0.1)' 4 ....33,·
TABLE·;,OFPROB!\SI'uITY. OF ·C:USTOf'.1ER SUPPORT TO FIRt·1
PCSF1f=0 /0 1.010 ~1 /',,21.3/ ,51.75/.91,9511,'0,.,.
TOTALfUNDSWILLTNG TO BE COt~MI TTED 8Y eUSTOHER
TF0cCiK=(WSCFC.K) (ETCAC.K) ,
ALLOCATIONS, TOTAL' DE~IRED BY CUSTOMER
tv'lADe .K=MIN(Tn-WCC. K, RRFC.K)
e ELAY ED',.;RESEA RCH.F UNDS REQUE S IE D ;,FR 0 IV! THE CUs To 1"1EI~
RR17C ~K::: RRFe •.J -::·1(,D T ) ( 1/0 RRFe) ( TCRFF • J- RRF G• J )
RRFC=O '.
,AAC.K=AAC.·..J+CDT) (RFAC.JK+O) TOTAL ;ACTUAL ,ALLOCATIONS BY CUST
AAC= 0;: " 1. .\.< I
FUN DS}AV A lllAB LE.'FOR·A L LOCAT IONS BYIH E·:CU S TOI~'1ER
'FAC~K=FAC'~' J+(.OT 1 (FINe • ..JK-RFAC.J K)
l ',:
FAC=O .
FINC~·K~=PUl..SE(Vl..ARG' INTIVlC,VLARG) FlNANCTAl..! I NPUT TO CUSTOf"lER
VLARG=lE10 ONE BILLION
INTMC=O ;I,NPU"F TIME 0F CUSTOj·'iERS FUNOS
RESEARGHALL0CATIONS.ORGANCELl..ATIONS,RATE .. ,
RFAc. Kil. =MIN( TR FAC.K ,MI~FAC. K)
MRFA<2.K=FAC.K/DT
TR FAE. K=MAX( READe. K ,-LCRAF. K') TR rAL
:"DES IRED ALLOCATION RATE BY CUSTOjv1EI~
RFADC •.K :'(.lIDBFC. K")' (MADe,. K'~AAC. K')
L·CRAF .K=:UCAF. KlDT , L llvn T
DELAY IN BUDGETING F~ESEAR(H EUN os
DBFC.K~DMBFC+XDBFC~K
Dj~lSFC=6.0 DEl.'AY, MINIMUM,. IN .BUDGET ING r~E~EAReH FUNDS
DBFTC::: 12fvlON THS " DB F.C.',TItv1E -CONST AN T
XDBFC.K=(OBFTC)(l-SPINC.K)~ EXTRADBFC
UNSP ENTRESEARCH ALLOCAT I ONS· FROM 'CUSTOtv1Ef~ AT F I Rt'1
UCAF.K=UCAF.J+(DTl(RFAC.JK-RECf1F,".JK)
UCAF=O .
4~,+9
4~~O·.':
4-35',<,
4-40
4-41
4-42'
4-46<'
4~47;
, '" ., 'I~' I
''''-'7
4-48':
6
RATE OF lXPEN~ITURES OF CU~TOMER FUNDS
,AREcF' K=MIN{ jV)RtPC. K, lCEF • K) A UX I L I Ar~Y I~l:.CFf
!'F.'lR'E:pc•.k,~s~VITCH (fviR ER (.K, {viPERe. K, IBF • K ) MAX I\AT E EXP. P E Rivi ITT EG
,~jREBc~K~MIN( (vlREDC.K ,fvH~EAC.K ), II/lAX. RES c./\RCH LXP END. I~A TE
r~,RED~.K=UCAF.K/SRP DESlr~ED f/jAX. EXPEND. DURING f~ESEAI~CH STAGE
SR 8= 12,.).' '. . , .' . SCHEDULED, RES EA f~ CH, PER I 0 D
'MR,.EAc.K:;:(O. 50)( reEF.K) HAX F~ESRCH EXPEND I lURE F~ATE ALLO\'JED
TM8ER.KfUCAF. K/SPDC. K .
CUSTOMERW ILL. NOT BOTHER TO· SUPPORT LESS THAN 1 i:iAN DURING DEVEL.
MPERC.K=CLJP( Tr·1PER. K , 0 ,TI~P ER. K ,Jv1RESC JlviAX PROJECT EXPEND. r-~ATE .
fvlRESC::(lJ(fvIESOH) MIN. I~ATE OF EXPENDITURE FOr~ SUPPORT BY C
§Bri·.'
?4A'
49A,
54,A""
(.),\ ,\ '\
?gl~ '.
C'!'.····.· .
'~2A'
'~QA
~OTE .:,
51A;,:,
l2N,;:,
NOTE
71:\r 'SP DC. MpeT C • K+ASP DC. K
5.6 MRCTc.l<=?i'IJAX (f~PCT 1.K 'D T )
i3~ fvlPCT I'.K= (SPPTC.X) (.5) (NPD)
28 A A'S8 DC. K= JXP DC. K ) EX P ( EXPD • K ) AD o I T ION A L S P DC
~A ~PDC~K~NgD~MPCTC.K· EXTRA PD
NOTt OVEREXPENDITURE EXPECTATIONS CAUSE STRETCHOUT
~O;rE ·'r~!,0MA~lMLJMI';~f.UNDING·,BY CUSTOiv1ER J MREPC
~~A EXRD'.K::j~'lNJ75,BEXPD.K) KEEP- 'EXPD IN BOUNDS
~2A BE~PD.K~JEOESD}rpOEEc.K) BASIC EXPD
. §b)~", EOESD=2'J,j:"j::EFFEGT.OF OVEREXPENDI lURES ON SCHEDULING DECISION
~QTE e~R~~NI~oYERExeENDITURE\EXPECTED
':tQA aGE EC'I$=SWI TeH ( 0, PO EE 1.K, AAC. K)
2. 6 A ' PO EEl.K.= JE CCPC. K- EVAU C • K+0) I (EVAU C. K+iv1V RC+0)
gN: i M\lRc::'lSMAL;'i ~/IIN UVIAL VA~UAT ION OF I~ESEAF\CH r c.cus r
~}i\ L..~O.09001,
NOTE
NOTE
~QlE
20A
2qA'"
G;'U\'.
~QTE
QJQTE
58,A
NOTE··.·,
1,2A -.
12A.
SCHED~LEDPROJ DURATION BY CUST
MIN PROD COMPLETION TIME
JHE:: F.·I Rrv1S.····INVES THEN T DEC I S I ON
VCR F~K=EffPVF·. KIElep F. K VALUE-COST RATI 0
SPCBF. K=VGRF. K/RO I CF . SUI TAB I L I TY OF PROJ ,TO c- BEL I EVED BY F
RO rc F;2. Q Q,:,:'R ET U I~N . ON I NV EST MEN T C R I.r E R I ON 1"HAT THE FIR {vi '
~>:,i.:BEL.IEVES IS USED BY THE CUSTOfvIEF~ For~ DEC!SION-IVtAKING
IMA~E;,PROBA13I L I TY OFCUS TOlvlEI~ SUPPOI~T TO F I1~Jvl '.
EP"GSF.K= JASHL (PC,sF, SPCBF • K, 0,1,0,1)
EXRECIED':GOSJ$ To BE FINANCED.8 Y THECUSTOlvlER
EXCFC.K=}EPGSF.K) ( ETcPF.K ) .'
EXHRf.K=tEPRF1(EXCFC.Kl EXPECTED PHOFITS TO fIF\t·1
q.' 'ERRF~O .10:;';,,\ ;-j. EXPECTED ·PROFr T I~AT E FOF< F I r~r'1
12A:'TM IDf.K=:(WAR FlJ EXPR F • K ) fvlAX I ;V1U~1 DES I R ED I N V ES TM EN T
5,~;A st" MJ'DJ;: •K,:;:HAX (,TMID F. K, TA IF. K )
7:.~, . MA I DF.K=Ml'Qf • K-TA IF. K rlAXJIVlUl'·1 f\ DD I T IONAL ' I NV 55 Tf'1EN T ut::,s Ir~E D
20,A' I\1DRAF.K=fvJAIDF.K/EPCTF.K jv1AX DESIr-<ED ALLOCATION I~ATt:
5Q'A,;~ TRAF: .K=fv1AXLMDF:A F.K,BRAF) T RIAL RF AF
1:2,N. ..BRAF.= (:Jv1i::SOHJJL E I }
(;'6,'''''' LE.l;=Tj,;r,~,,·\i:,''j,:,. .LEV·EL OF ENGINEEf-<S,INIT IALLY
SARi RFAF.Kl...,=MINfTRAF.x; fv1FI-<AF.K) .. ·I-<ATE OF FUNDS ALLOC
2,OA f'!lF-RAF.'K=.EAf. K/DT fvl.AXlf'.'iUfv1 FUN [) ING " F~AT E AVA I LABLE I N TEI~NAL L Y
J.',~,./'"FAF.K::;F.AF'J+CDl.)( F I NF. JK- I I-<F. JK) IN TEF<NA~ FUNDS 'AVA I LAB LE TO F I l·U:i
6N;;, EAF,=B.RBt:',\;i)
41,R,,; F:,lNF..,K8,=PUl..SE(V{.'Ai~G'INTivIF,VLAi~G) FINANCIAL INPUT (0 FIF\ivi
4C INT(\IlF=O: \,;.';; INPUT T IfvlE OF FIRMS: FUNDS
~g:rf0~';~E~'1:"RESEARCH ALLOCATIONS of THE FIRM
2.UD 'lJJ'AR .~=l;JI,Ar:: • .J+; (DT r (RFAF.JK-I RF.JK~CAF. j 1<+0+0+0)'
oN,······ UJ,AF=BRBF
NO,T:E /8ASrC v;RESE'ARCH "BUDGETED BY THE "'F'rf~/'v1':'
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